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The Ming Dynasty Great Wall stretches 6300km.
Admiral Zheng He’s fleet (1405-1433); giraffe was sent from Africa to Beijing as a tribute.
Emperor Yongle (1359-1424 Taipei: National Palace Museum)
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The travel route of Zheng He’s voyages.
The territory of the Mongol Empire; the Timur Empire succeeded the western part of the 
Mongol Empire.
Early 17th century Chinese woodblock print, thought to represent Zheng He and his 
ships, for the novel, Xi yang ji {record fo r sailing western ocean).
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The statue of Admiral Zheng He at Changle in Fujian Province. 1417 Quanzhou Stele of 
Zheng He
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1417 Quanzhou Stele 1431 Changle Stele Poem from Emperor Xuanzong
Hormuz as chief destination. Hormuz as chief destination. (This stele is made in present-day)
6
(Left) Zheng He’s grave stone at Nanjing in China. He was a Muslim, the characters 
printed on the first front of his grave are written in Arabic language.
(Right) Indonesia, Zheng He Temple, Sam Po Kong -  Semarang
Chinese stamps in 1985 commemorating the 580th anniversary of Zheng He’s first voyage. 
(Right) Silver coin of Zheng He
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Chinese stamps in 2005 commemorating the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s first voyage.
(Left) Malaysian stamp in 2005 commemorating Admiral Zheng He and Malaysia-China 
relations on the 600th anniversary of Zheng He’s first voyage.
(Right) Cambodia silver coin in 2005 commemorating the 600th Anniversary of Zheng He’s first 
voyage. (20 gm)
(Left) Genghis Khan (Paper Money of the Republic of Mongolia)
(Right)The memorial coin of Kublai Khan and Marco Polo (Republic of Mongolia)
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Qin Emperor Shihuang (259 BC -  210 BC) Han Emperor Wudi (156 BC -  87 BC)
Tang Emperor Taizong (599-649) 
(Taipei: National Palace Museum)
Emperor Hongwu (1328-1398) 
(Taipei: National Palace Museum)
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Genghis Khan (1162-1227) Kublai Khan (1215-1294)
(Taipei: National Palace Museum) (Taipei: National Palace Museum)
(left p.) Hulagu (1217-) was the founder of the ll-Khan Empire in Persia. This illustration is from 
a medieval Persian manuscript and shows Hulagu taking possession of a conquered city.
(right p.)Timur (center) and his son, Shah Rukh (left 1377-1447), Shah Rukh was very friendly 
with Emperor Yongle.
The Parthian Empire was recorded in Shi ji, The Sassanid Persian Empire was recorded in 
It was friendly with Han China. Chinese Dynastic Histories.
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The Abbasid Arab Empire had sent troops to assist Tang China against revolt, its big territory - 
10,000 /./'(around 5000 km)- was recorded in the Tang shu and the Song shi.
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The Ming government knew that the Mongol powers were not just the Yuan Dynasty.
The Mongol Empire Hulagu Khan's (Kublai Khan’s brother) army attacked Baghdad (capital of 
Abbasid Empire) in 1258.
The Mongol troops entering the palace of the Abbasid Empire in Baghdad.
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The Mongol Empire Kublai Khan’s war on Japan showed it a great sea power. The samurai 
Suenaga facing Mongol arrows and bombs. Moko Shurai Ekotoba (Picture of Mongol invasion 
painted in Japan in 1293.
Defensive wall at Hakata. Moko Shurai Ekotoba, 1293.
Japanese samurai attacking a Mongol ship. Moko Shurai Ekotoba, 1293.
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Map of the Ming Empire (1368-1644)
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Map of the Timur Empire in 1405
The Timur Empire in 1405
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(Left) The Timur Empire’s territory
(Right) The orange line shows the extent of the Mongol Empire in the late 13th century. The 
red areas show areas occupied by ethnic Mongols today.
(Left) The 138-126BC travels of Zhang Qian to the West, Mogao Caves, 618-712 AD 
mural.
(Right) Travel countries of Zhang Qian. Zhang Qian’s mission could be an inspiration for 
Zheng He’s voyages.
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The travel route of Marco Polo
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This map shows the trade route from Hormuz to Heart..
(Left) The Spanish Ambassador visited the capital of the Timur Empire, and recorded that 
Timur was planning to conquer Ming China. (Center) Ibn Battuta (1304-68) was a lifelong 
traveller.
(Right) The Timur Empire’s mark was 3 balls, which meant that this empire’s territory occupied 
3 fourths of the world.
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Genghis Khan (1162-1227), this picture was painted in west Asia.
Daniel f  . Waugh . , -aC-,
This Statue of Timur (1336-1405) is at Samarkand in Uzbekistan.
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(Left) The “Voyage map of Zheng He” : Hormuz island. (Right) Hormuz’s Satellite photo[1].
(left) The 17th Century map indicates the bell shaped island of Hormuz
(right) Hormuz by Johann Caspar Arkstee and Henricus Merkus in 1747, Leipzig, Germany.
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Abstract
This thesis, Fleet and wall: Ming China’s Strategic Options 1392 - 1449, 
concentrates on four focuses: 1. defence strategies in Chinese history 2 
early Ming China’s strategic background 3. the strategic role for Zheng He’s 
voyages 4. the abandonment of the Ming Fleet and the construction of the 
Great Wall. It links north and south, war and diplomacies.
The first chapter is an introduction.
The second chapter is on methodology. Relevant Chinese historical 
documentations for the Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties carry implications of 
Sinocenterism, prejudice and territorialism; and contain the imperial 
ceremonial language and a confusion between tribute and trade, distorting 
the real difficult situations for Ming China’s defense strategy. I give an 
analysis of Ming Shilu and the 23 Dynastic Histories, showing that Asian 
history (beyond China) from 1405 to 1433 provides the key for Zheng He’s 
voyages
The third chapter discusses north and south - strategy and route (before 
1392). There were different land and sea strategies to cope with frontier 
crisis and maritime contingency. For example, land: constructing the Qing 
Dynasty Great Wall and alliance with powers in central Asia for destroying 
Xiongnu. Sea: The Yuan’s wars on Japan and Java. Besides, there was a long 
history of traffic to the west by land and sea.
The fourth chapter is on diplomacy and military elements in the response to 
Ming China’s crisis (1392-1404). This is an analysis of the strategic 
background and the interaction of three empires: the Timur Empire, the 
Mongol Empire and the Ming Empire. Particularly, the Timur Empire is often 
neglected by historians. It was a great lost empire, its territory had 
changed a lot in history. Few historians are familiar with this empire. 
However during Zheng He’s voyages 1405-1433 it was a major power in the 
world.
The fifth chapter is on north desert wars and west ocean voyages 
(1405-1419). Emperor Yongle’s five great expeditions and Zheng He’s 
impressive voyages were spectacular events of the same period. Zheng He’s 
voyage very probably involved a strategic role.
The sixth chapter is from advance to defense - from the move of the capital 
to the last voyage (1420-1434). Many significant events for the Ming Empire 
are linked in my analysis. The various sources show Hormuz as chief 
destination for Zheng He’s voyages. However according to Iranian history, 
Hormuz belonged to the Timur Empire during Zheng He’s voyage 1405-1433, my
VI
conclusion is  that  Zheng He’ s f l e e t ’ s v i s i t  to Hormuz was to v i s i t  the Timur 
Empire.
The seventh chapter is on how the Great Wall replaced the Imperial Fleet 
(1435-1449). After the Mongol powers were reunited in 1434, the Ming 
government gradually changed i t s  s trategy -  the great Ming f l e e t  was 
abandoned and the colossal Great Wall was constructed.
The eighth chapter is  conclusion.
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1. Il-K: Il-Khan Empire
2. Gold: Golden Horde Empire
3. Chag: Chaghatai Empire
4. Ta : Tartar Empire (The Northern Yuan)
5. Oi : Oirot Empire
6. These two geometries are created by this thesis, can be quoted but 
please indicate its origin.
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Emperors of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)
Emperors of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)
Dynastic Title Name Title of Reign Years of 
Reign
1 Taizu Zhu Yuan Zhang Hongwu 1368-1398
2 Huidi Zhu Yun Wen Jianwen 1399-1402
3 Chengzu Jt£1L Zhu Di Yongle 1403-1424
4 Renzong \ZM Zhu Gao Zhi Hongxi 1425
5 Xuanzong It Zhu Shan Ji Xuande 1426-1435
6 Yingzong Zhu Qi Zhen 7^ :f|3|8 Zhengtong JE |jt 1436-1449
7 Jingzong jp:7K Zhu Qi Yu Jingtai 1450-1456
6 Yingzong Zhu Qi Zhen 7^ jff[IiÄ Tianshun J^lljf 1457-1464
8 Xianzong Zhu Jian Shen Chenghua 1465-1487
9 Xiaozong Zhu You Tang Hongchi JA'/n 1488-1505
10 Wuzong Zhu Hou Shao 7^ /pBS Zhengde IEt§ 1506-1521
11 Shizong tÜTK Zhu Hou Cong Jiajing Ü 5 S 1522-1566
12 Muzong W m Zhu Zai Hou Longqing H H f 1567-1572
13 Shenzong Zhu Yu Jun Wanli 1573-1620
14 Quangzong Zhu Chang Luo Taichang 1620
15 Xizong M tf Zhu You Jiao Tianqi 1621-1627
16 Sizong Jg*? Zhu You Jian Chongzhen |^/fj=i 1628-1644
Notes:
1. In 1424, Emperor Yongle died and his Dynastic Title was established as 
the Ming Taizong In Jiajing Period (after a controversial event,
the Grand Institute i^jltfti ), the Dynastic Title of Emperor Yongle 
was changed from the Ming Taizong to the Ming Chengzu .The Ming
shi does not explain it. Probably it was because the Tang Taizong and 
the Song Taizong had ascended the throne in circumstance that posed 
questions about the accession, and Emperor Yongle’ s accession was 
similar.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
(l) China’s Strategy
The "'Moon Cake” was a "'revolutionary cake” in one popular legend in Chinese 
society; 600 years ago, when Han Chinese were ruled by Mongols in the Yuan 
Dynasty, the future Emperor Hongwu ordered his followers to place papers, 
with revolutionary material, in cakes, and distribute them widely. After 
several years of war, the Ming Empire was established. Ming China was the 
result of a nationalist revolution 1 , which followed a humiliating time, 
when the whole of China was ruled by barbarians. ”Expel savage people 
(Mongol), restore Chinese prestige” ’ f^cliEI=l=l^  , this political
slogan was used to summon the people to revolt, and is famous in Chinese 
history.
"Fleet and Wall” means Zheng He’s Imperial Fleet and the Ming Dynasty 
Great Wall, certainly the two most spectacular enterprises of the Ming 
Empire. During the Ming era, 1392 to 1449: Emperor Hongwu found that the 
Islamic Timur Empire was sending spies to China in 1392; Ming China’s 
ambassador Fu An and 1500 soldiers visited the Timur Empire in 1395, and 
were held there for many years; and in 1449 Ming China’s 500,000 troops were 
routed in the Tumubao Incident. Ming China chose to develop these two grand 
strategies for national security - the Great Wall and the Great Fleet.
In the period 1405 - 1433, the Ming Empire sent the most splendid fleet the 
world had yet seen to the "Western Ocean” 2. After 1435, the Ming Dynasty
' Some communist scholars think of it as “a class struggle between landlords and 
peasants ", however the difference in status between Mongol and Han Chinese in 
the Yuan Dynasty was obvious; besides, many slogans in these revolts were 
nationalistic. For example: "restore the prestige of Han Chinese officialdom”
J Roberts, J. A. G. .China - prehistory to the nineteenth century.
Sutton Publishing. 1996-2000. pi85.
1
Imperial  F l e e t  was abandoned and a remarkable a r c h i t e c t u r a l  p ro je c t ,  the 
Ming Dynasty Great Wall, was c a r r i e d  out.  I t  should be emphasized t h a t  Ming 
China’ s s t r a t e g i c  focus of  defence was o f t e n  in the n o r t h 3 . This t h e s i s  
d i scusses  the  s t r a t e g i c  op t io ns  fo r  the e a r l y  Ming Empire, a g a in s t  a 
background of  the t r i a n g u l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between the Ming, the  Mongol 
Steppe and Timur Empires d .
According to  the Oxford D ic tionary , s t r a t e g y  means the a r t  of  planning 
ope ra t ions  in  war, e s p e c i a l l y  the movements of  armies  and nav ies  in to  
favourable  p o s i t i o n s  f o r  f i g h t i n g ;  and s k i l l  in managing each encounter.  In 
c o n t r a s t ,  the  concept  in Sun T ze ’s  A r t o f  War i s  def ined thus*
'"Strategy i s  the  g rea t  work of  s t a t e  ( the o rg an iz a t io n ) .  In l i f e  or  death 
s i t u a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  the Tao of  s u rv iva l  or  e x t in c t io n .  I t s  s tudy cannot  be 
n e g l e c t e d " 5. However, perhaps few sc ho la r s  have resea rched  the e a r l y  Ming 
h i s t o r y  from t h i s  po in t  of  view -  defence s t r a te gy .  Emperor Yongle was 
f a m i l i a r  with the Sun T ze ’s  A r t o f  War, h i s  b r i l l i a n t  s t r a t e g i e s  were 
admired in the  Ming sh i, and revea l  an uncommon leve l  o f  imaginat ion. The 
purpose of  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  to  examine the o r ig i n s  o f  these  two g rea t  
s t r a t e g i e s ,  Zheng He’ s Imper ial  F le e t  and the Ming Dynasty Great Wall.
(2) S ig n i f i ca n c e
The most spectacular of Yongle’ s foreign i n i t i a t iv e s  was the 
despatch of the famous oceanic expeditions. The motives behind 
these have never been en t i r e ly  clear.
Mote, F. W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard
University Press. 2003.
In the north, the Mongols continued to dominate the ent i re  
Chinese defense s t ra tegy unt i l  early in the seventeenth 
century. (Havard University, Mote)
1 Zhu, Ya Fei • "Luo Luan Ming Chao Yu Sa Ma Er Han De Guan Xi"
Ed IF JSUiLH Sf Utlif, Ming Dai Zhong Wai Guan Xi Shi Yan J iu  
. J inan:  Jinan Publish 1993.
Mongol was the chief  threat  to the northern front ie r  defense of 
the Ming Period, however, the Timur Empire was close to Mongol 
both in blood and geography. Thus the Ming government in i t s  
active defense against  the Mongol, had to maintain be t te r  
re la t ionsh ip with the Timur Empire in the same time.
mmmm  •
Sun Tze i f f f  . Sun Tze’s Art o f  War .Huhehaote: Yuan Fang chu ban
she M  Zflhl&jF. .2004. p9.
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The question of the ch ief  o r ig ina l  motive for  Zheng He’ s voyages is  probably 
one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t  in today’ s Chinese h i s to ry  research.  This 
quest ion involves Ming China’ s p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry ,  her  foreign r e l a t i o n s  
h is tory,  and her  h is to ry  of m i l i t a ry  s trategy.  Many scholars  research  i t  
using only Chinese sources, ignoring the h i s to ry  of other  Asian countries,  
and th i s  is  a ser ious def ic iency in research  to date in to  Zheng He’ s voyages.
The reason fo r  the abandonment of Zheng He’ s grea t  f l e e t  is  another 
s ig n i f i c a n t  question for  cur rent  Chinese h i s t o r i c a l  research.  I f  the 
o r ig ina l  motive for  t h i s  major Asian h i s t o r i c a l  event can be establ ished,  
then the abandonment of the Ming Imperial f l e e t  w i l l  be e a s ie r  to 
understand. Furthermore, the diplomatic and m i l i t a ry  p o l i c ie s  of the
ear ly  Ming Government can be iden t i f i ed ,  and the whole Ming h is to ry  can be 
b e t t e r  understood. Thus t h i s  research is  extremely important for  Chinese 
history.
I have found a useful  c o l lec t io n  of books on Asian Studies in the Menzies 
Library of the Aust ra l ian  National Univers i ty and the National Library of 
Aust ra l i a ;  toge ther  with numerous books from a l l  over Asia, they have 
provided me with many new ideas for  making changes to my research 
methodology. In the Aust ral ian National Universi ty I have many student 
f r iends  from Mongolia, Vietnam, Korea, India and Iran, who have provided me 
with much s ig n i f i c a n t  h i s t o r i c a l  information and f resh  poin ts  of view6.
(3) Focus
This the s i s  w i l l  not at tempt to discuss the whole of Ming China’ s s tr a tegy  
but w il l  focus on i t s  ea r ly  s t r a t e g i e s  covering those two most splendid and 
spec tacu lar  events -  Zheng He’ s b r i l l i a n t  voyages and the construct ion of 
the Ming Dynasty Great Wall -  thus l inking the northern defence c r i s i s  and 
the southern maritime opportunity for  the ear ly  Ming Empire, an aspect  which
Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia.
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research inst i tute.  2003
This was the time when the Ming dynasty, guided by the 
traditional Khan concept of Sino centrism started to pursue in 
Mongolia a policy of yi yi zhi yi i. e. ’use some
barbarians to govern others’ . (Source from the Republic of 
Mongolia)
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has not been given adequate treatment by modern scholars. There is some 
modern scholarship devoted to it, but not enough, nor in sufficient depth.
The history of the fall of the Song Dynasty, following the Mongol invasion, 
was an object lesson for the early Ming Empire, whose people could never 
forget the terrible military operations of Genghis Khan. After the collapse 
of the Yuan Dynasty, the new dynasty, the Ming Empire, was established by an 
outstanding hero, Zhu Yuanzhang (Emperor Hongwu), who had to face the grave 
question of how to defend this empire.
The object of this thesis is to interpret the real foreign relations policy 
of early Ming China, the strategic role of Admiral Zheng He’s voyages and of 
the other grand strategy, the construction of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall. 
Some scholars have researched Ming China’ s northern frontier defence and 
military operations, others the southern oceanic opportunity and Admiral 
Zheng He’s voyages, but few scholars have covered the whole situation 
so as to explain the strategic options for the early Ming Empire. My papers 
have been presented at different conferences ' and in academic magazines in 
order to further the research of Zheng He’s achievements.
During my high school period, I came across a historical puzzle: the 
western part of the Mongol Empire (the three Khanates) could be said to be 
the origin of the Timur Empire, which thus had a large territory in 
western Asia; and Zheng He visited Hormuz several times. But why did Zheng 
He visit only Hormuz (a port), and never the Timur Empire itself? This 
question has been researched by me continuously over 20 years.
7 Canberra, 29 June - 2 July, 2004: 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian 
Studies Association of Australia. My paper: Fleet and Wall 1405-1433, 
The Zheng He expeditions and Ming Empire policy.
Beijing, 11-12 July, 2004: International Symposium on World Civilization 
and Zheng He s Voyage. My paper: The purpose and abandonment of the 
Ming imperial fleet.
Nanjing, 6-8 July, 2005: Open to the world Peace and Development -
International Symposium in Memory of the 600th Anniversary of Zheng He’s 
expedition. My paper: A real reason for the greatest puzzle - the secret 
of Zheng He’s voyage.
Singapore, 18-20 August 2005: The third International Conference of
Institute & Libraries for Chinese Overseas Studies. This year the chief 
topic was Maritime Asia and the Chinese Overseas, 1405-2005. My paper: 
Zheng He’s fleet at Hormuz - Ascertaining the original motive for Zheng 
He’s voyage.
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(4) Important Sources
A l i s t  of the most s u b s t a n t i a l  o r ig ina l  sources fo r  t h i s  research includes 
seven Chinese works and f ive  non-Chinese works: The Ming sh ilu  The
Ming sh i Bfjjjtd / The Yuan sh i jrcjjj.; Ma, Huan Hlfc 1414-1451' Ying Ya Sheng Lan 
(The o vera ll survey o f  the ocean’s  shores) ;  Fei, Xin flrflf 
, 1388-1436?: Xing cha sheng lan YfYXWr'W. (The o vera ll survey o f  the s ta r  
r a f t ) ;  Xia Xie M'M 1799-1875'- Ming Tong Jian  > Admiral Zheng He’ s
s te les .
The tra v e ls  o f  Marco Polo (1271-1295) / The tra v e ls  o f  Ibn B attuta  
(1325-1354)! Gonzalez de C lavijo, Ruy-' N arrative o f  the embassy o f  Ruy 
Gonzalez de C lavijo  to the court o f  Timour, a t Samarcand, (1403-6) / Nakkash, 
Khwaja Ghaiassuddin-' A Persian Embassy to China (1419-1421) / Yule, Henry: 
Cathay and the way th ither.
Not one Chinese pre-modern record uses the term "the Timur Empire". 
In the face of a shortage of  useful  material ,  such a reference would have 
g rea t ly  a s s i s t e d  research into Zheng He’ s career . Current research into 
Asian h i s to ry  (except tha t  of China) is  d i f f i c u l t  for  Chinese scholars,  
and i t  is  perhaps fo r  t h i s  reason tha t  the o r ig ina l  motive for  Zheng He’ s 
voyage has been hidden u n t i l  now, since in r e f e r r i n g  to the Timur Empire 
the Ming sh ilu  and the Ming sh i speak only of “Samarkand” and “Herat” , 
i t s  two c ap i ta l s .  My th e s i s  r e l i e s  on sources from d i f f e r e n t  count ries  to 
appraise h i s t o r i c a l  works and documentations from the Ming Dynasty and 
ear ly  Qing Dynasty, in order to analyse the true  s i t u a t i o n  of in te rna t iona l  
r e l a t io n s  in the ear ly  Ming Period.
(5) Relevant researches
There are many s ig n i f i c a n t  c o r re la t iv e  modern researches on the topic,  for  
example: Zheng, Hesheng HßfiSf , Zheng Yijun f|[l— '-Zheng He xia  x i yang z i  
l i ao  hui bian ( _ t T W )  • Xu, Yuhu '-Ming zheng he
zh i yan j iu  , Zheng He ping  zhuan Jlß^PjFFfli , Ming dai Zheng He
hang hai tu zh i yan j iu  • Wang, Gungwu: The Nanhai
trade -  The ea r ly  h is to ry  o f  Chinese trade in the south China Sea. China and 
Southeast Asia  •' myths, threats, and culture. China and the Chinese
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overseas. Ptak, Roder ich: China and the Asian Seas: trade, travel, and 
visions o f  the other (1400-1750) / China’s seaborne trade with South and 
Southeast Asia, 1200-1750. Lo, Jung-pang: "The termination of the early Ming 
naval expeditions", "The decline of the early Ming navy", China as a sea 
power, 1127-1368: [a prelim inary survey o f  the maritime expansion and naval 
e xp lo its  o f  the Chinese people during the Southern Sung and Yuan periods]. 
Ng, Chin-keong. "Maritime Frontiers,  T e r r i to r ia l  Expansion and Hai-fang 
(Coastal Defence) during the Late Ming and High Qing”
Reid, Anthony: Charting the shape o f  early modern Southeast Asia. Wade, 
Geoff: Melaka in  Ming Dynasty Texts. Rossabi, Morris: (The Ming and Central 
Asia) Zheng He and Timur: any re la tion?  Ming China and Turf an, 1406-1517. 
Waldron, Arthur: The Great Wall o f  China from H istory to Myth. Lee,
Cheuk-Yin (Li, Zhuoran) Mao, Peiqi : Ming Chengzu Shi Luan Bfj
• Zhang, Y i Shan • Zhu Ming Wang Chao Luan Wen J i  -  Taizu,
Taizong Plan M ä  , . Zhu, Ya Fei £ 3 5 #  .Luo Luan
Ming Chao Yu Sa Ma Er Han De Guan Xi •
Chen, Hsin-Hsiung , Cheng Wing-sheung .N ew sletter on Cheng-Ho
• Chen, Hsin-Hsiung, Chen Yunu . Zheng He Xia Xi
Yang Guo J i  Xiao Shu Yan Tao Hui Luan Wen J i
Chen, Hsin-Hsiung . Song Yuan Hai Wai Fa Zhan Shi Yan J iu  
95 • Cheng Wing-sheung . Lai Zi Hai Yang De Tiao Zhan —
Jackson, Peter. The Cambridge H istory o f  Iran, volume 6, The 
Timurid and Safavid Periods. Rapson, E. J. (Edward James) . The Cambridge 
h is to ry  o f  India. Holt, Peter Malcolm; Lambton, Ann K. S. and Lewis, Bernard 
The Cambridge h is to ry  o f  Islam. Tarling, Nicholas . The Cambridge h is to ry  o f  
Southeast Asia.
Three theses are pa r t icu la r ly  signif icant for my research, namely (l) 
Rossabi, Morris: Ming China’s re la tio n s  with Hami and Central Asia,
1404-1513: A re-examination o f  trad itiona l Chinese foreign policy. This
thesis  has a good review on early Ming’ s foreign strategy. (2) Lee, 
Cheuk Yin (Li, Zhuoran) : Ch’iu  Chun (1421-1495) and h is  views on government 
and h istory . Especially, Ch’ iu Chun’ s thinking for the national defence of 
the Ming Empire. (3) Tashakori, Abbas: Iran in  Chinese dynastic h is to r ie s , a 
study o f  Ira n ’s re la tio n s  with China p r io r  to the Arab conquest . This 
thesis  was completed by an Iranian scholar at the Australian National
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University, but its point of view is from Iran. Such research is valuable 
for me, but it is limited to the Persian Sassanid period during AD 225-637.
(6) Notes, Date, Glossary and Appendix
Notes
The Ming shilu is noted with Title of Emperor Reign and number of juan. The 
24 Dynastic Histories are noted with number of juan and classification (Zhi, 
Zhuan and so on). <<Imperial Edict>> and ((Memorial to the Throne)) are 
specially used for clear understanding.
Date style
The Chinese Lunar and Common Era calendars are different, There is a special 
"'date style" in this thesis. For example: [1409.3], means the 3rd month of 
the 7th year of Yongle; the majority of the 7th year of Yongle is in 1409; 
the month is as for Chinese Lunar Calendar, but the year is changed to 
Common Era. Marking it as [1409. 3] makes it easier to compare with different 
records. It may seem unconventional, but there is no "3rd month" in English 
usage, only March, so this special style should not confuse readers.
Glossary
The majority of the translations of the official titles of Imperial China 
are in accordance with Professor Hucker’s work - (Hucker, Charles Oscar. A 
dictionary of official titles in Imperial China. Stanford, Calif : Stanford 
University Press, 1985). Some translations differ from Hucker; these are 
listed in the glossary. Others have been translated by me or arise from a 
discussion with Dr Colin Jeffcott.
Appendices
There are two appendices:
(l) Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi. There are many Imperial 
Edicts, and Ming shilus’ records are very important for research into the
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or ig ina l  motive fo r  Zheng He’ s voyages and the rea l  m i l i t a ry  t h r e a t  beyond 
the l ine  of the Great Wall.
(2) The s t e l e s  of Admiral Zheng He: the s t e l e s  are probably the most 
subs tan t i a l  and o r ig in a l  evidence for  Zheng He’ s voyages. I bel ieve tha t  the 
s t e l e s  reveal  the re a l  charac te r  of  the voyages and demonstrate tha t  Hormuz 
was ce r t a in ly  t h e i r  ch ie f  goal.
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Chapter 2 
Methodology
Introduction:
Professor John King Fairbank has described the concept of Sinocentrism which 
exists in many important archives dealing with China’s foreign relations 
history1. Indeed, this concept is often misleading for research into Zheng 
He’s voyages. Many scholars are too dependent on the Chinese classic 
archives, and have been deceived by these sources.
Ma Huan’s J| f|fc Ying ya sheng lan Millie it is one of the most important 
original sources for Zheng He’s voyages. In this work’s preface, Ma Huan 
even then asked one question, often ignored by scholars today: is it true 
that Zheng He’s voyages took place simply because the two Emperors wanted 
to demonstrate China’ s prestige and luxury to distant countries 2 ? The
Fairbank, John King. A preliminary framework. Fairbank, John King (ed.)
. The Chinese world order ; traditional China’s foreign relations 
Cambridge , Harvard University Press, 1968. p2.
The relations of the Chinese with surrounding areas, and with 
non-Chinese people generally, were coloured by this concept of 
Sinocentrism and an assumption of Chinese superiority. The 
Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving 
expression externally to the same principles of social and 
political order that were manifested internally within the 
Chinese state and society.
Ma, Huan fSlfc 1414-1451, Edited by Feng, Chengjun . Ying ya sheng
lan WkMMtW .Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan ,1934. p2.
Emperors Yongle and Xuande each ordered Grand Supervisor
(Imperial Eunuch) Zheng He to take a group of remarkable people 
overseas to trade with foreign countries: brilliant figures, 
superb ships and outstanding technology not previously seen. 
Could it really be true, however, that the two Emperors just 
wanted to show off their wealth and achievements in distant 
places?
• m m i m  • m
ä'I'L' ’
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original motive for Zheng He’s voyages has been a great puzzle in Chinese 
history from the Ming era to the present-day.
There are a number of sources of research into the early Ming Dynasty and 
Admiral Zheng He’s spectacular voyages. They could be divided into five 
groups'- One: Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Two: Mainland China. Three: 
Other Asian countries. Four: English countries. Five: European continental 
countries. Mainland China has the most scholars researching relevant topics, 
with many achievements, but there are still numerous academic questions 
needing further research.
After a sketch of the two major characters in this thesis - Emperor Yongle 
and Admiral Zheng He - this chapter discusses the methodologies used to 
assess Ming China’s foreign relations, and reviews previous researches into 
the original motive for, and reason for abandonment of Admiral Zheng He’s 
voyages. The original motive for Zheng He’s voyages is one of the most 
significant questions in Chinese historical research. An analysis has been 
drawn from the greatest sources - Ming shilu and the 24 Dynastic Histories.
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<1> Admiral Zheng He and Emperor Yongle
Admiral Zheng He
Zheng He (1371 - 1435, Arabic name: Hajji Mahmud Shams)
Zheng He is the greatest and most well-known Chinese mariner and admiral. He 
was a Muslim Chinese, a Grand Supervisor (the court eunuch), a Regional 
Military Commander of the Ming Empire, and a close confidant of Emperor 
Yongle. He came from Yunnan Province. His family belonged to the Semu caste 
(non Han Chinese) which practised Islam during the Yuan Period. He was the 
sixth generation descendant of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, a famous Yuan 
governor of the Yunnan Province from Bukhara in modern day Uzbekistan (Timur 
was born in Uzbekistan, and the capital of the Timur Empire, Samarkand, was 
in Uzbekistan, too). His family name "Ma" came from Shams al-Din’s fifth son, 
Masuh.
Both his father, Mir Tekin, and grandfather, Charameddin, had travelled on 
pilgrimage to Mecca (probably by land), and no doubt he heard them
recounting tales of travels to Persia and other places in western Asia. 
After the Ming army conquered Yunnan Province he was taken captive, and was 
made a eunuch. The name Zheng He was given to him by Emperor Yongle. Zheng 
He studied at Nanjing Taixue (The Ming Imperial University, the highest
educational institution of the Ming Empire).
Zheng H e ’ s voyages between 1405 and 1433 demonstrated the maritime
capability and technological might of early Ming China, but they did not 
however lead to further significant development. Zheng He was an admiral 
and an official, not a colonizer or merchant - his position in government 
was similar to that of Captain James Cook, who proclaimed ownership of 
Australia and New Zealand for the British Empire. Zheng He did not proclaim 
ownership of any extra territory for the Ming empire, and did not seek 
economic profit for Ming China. His chief goal (which is the subject of this 
thesis) was to pursue diplomatic and military matters, not colonization or 
trade. One of the Ming’ s works described him as being at least seven feet 
tall. In 1424 Emperor Yongle died. Zheng He made one more voyage under
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Emperor Xuande, returning to China in 1433, but a f te r  tha t Ming China’ s 
oceanic f le e ts  sailed  no more.
The Grand Ming Universe map (1389) and the Kangnido map (1402) predate Zheng 
He’ s voyages, and suggest tha t he had quite de ta iled  geographical 
information on the whole of the Old World (Asia, Africa and Europe), from 
Europe and Africa in the west, to Korea and Japan in the east. The “Western 
Ocean” re fe rs  to the Asian and African places which Zheng He explored, 
including Southeast Asia, Sumatra, Java, Ceylon, India, Persia, the Persian 
Gulf, Arabia, the Red Sea as fa r  north as Egypt, and Africa as fa r  south as 
the Mozambique Channel. According to Zheng He’ s s te le , Hormuz in Persia was 
the chief destination for Zheng He’ s voyages.
The number of his voyages varies depending on the method of calculation, but 
he trave lled  seven times to the "Western Ocean" with his f le e t .  In addition 
to the main missions of these voyages, he brought back to China ambassadors 
from more than th i r ty  kingdoms. Also, he arrested  the king of Ceylon 
(probably Buwanekabahu V, 1374-1408) -  according to Zheng He’ s s te le , the 
king attempted to s tea l property from Zheng He’ s f le e t  -  and took him to 
China. Emperor Yongle la te r  released the king. Hormuz in the Timur Empire, 
and Melaka in Malaysia and Ceylon would have been two important lo g is t ic s  
bases for Zheng He’ s f le e t ,  a f te r  the voyage from Quanzhou in China.
According to Chinese sources, at i t s  height the f le e t  comprised 27,800 men 
and over 300 ships 3 . A g ira ffe  brought from east Africa in the twelfth
J Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and the Ming shi 
Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Zheng He, p7767.
According to, the Ming shi, Zheng He Jia Pu üßjüMns> Shu Yuan Za J i  IS
Huang Ming s i  y i  kao^ . Qian wen jiMfMIS .other Chinese archives, 
And Bao, Zunpeng (Pao Tsen-Peng) Zheng He xia x i yang zhi bao chuan
kao
The 1405 expedition consisted of 27,800 men and 317 ships, 
composed of: (however, the sizes of ships are s t i l l  not confirmed)
"Treasure ships" : used by the commander of the fleet and his deputies 
(nine-masted, about 120 m long and 50 m wide).
"Horse ships" : carrying horses, tribute goods and repair material for 
the fleet (eight-masted, about 103 m long and 42 m wide). 
"Supply ships" : containing food-staples for the crew (seven-masted, about 
78 m long and 35 m wide).
"Troop transports": (six-masted, about 67 m long and 25 m wide).
"Fuchuan warships": (five-masted, about 50 m long).
"Patrol boats" : (eight-oared, about 37 m long).
"Water tankers" : with 1 month’ s supply of fresh water.
1 1
year of Yongle (1414) was ju s t  one example of exotic plants and creatures 
carried  back to China by the f lee t .  One popular b e l ie f  holds tha t a f te r  
Zheng He’ s voyages, China turned away from the sea and underwent a period of 
maritime technological stagnation.
Although Ming China called  a ha lt  to shipping for a few decades under the 
"Maritime Forbidden Policy", th is  ban was eventually l i f ted .  One viewpoint 
has been tha t because of th is  ban the Ming (and la te r  Qing) Dynasties forced 
countless numbers of people into blackmarket smuggling, thus reducing 
government tax revenue and increasing piracy. The ocean-going navy was 
probably abandoned so tha t the Ming Empire could concentrate more resources 
on the huge requirements of northern defence. Shortly a f te r  the la s t  voyage 
of Zheng He in 1433 construction of the huge project, the Ming Dynasty Great 
Wall, was begun and th is  work continued u n ti l  the end of the Dynasty in 1644. 
One thing is cer ta in  -  state-sponsored naval endeavours declined 
dramatically a f te r  Zheng He’ s voyages.
S tart ing  in the early 15th century China experienced increasing pressure 
from the resurgent Mongol Empire in the north. In recognition of th is  threat, 
in 1421 Emperor Yongle formally moved the cap ita l north from Nanjing to 
present-day Beijing. From the new capita l he could achieve greater imperial 
supervision of the e ffo r t  to defend the northern borders. At considerable 
cost, China launched annual m ilitary  expeditions from Beijing to weaken the 
Mongol between 1409 and 1424. Zheng He’ s voyages took place during the same 
period, and may have had a s tra teg ic  role for the northern expedition (as 
th is  thesis  will demonstrate); at the same time, the expenditures necessary 
for these land campaigns d irec t ly  competed with the funds necessary to 
continue naval expeditions.
In 1449 Mongol cavalry ambushed a land expedition led by the Ming Emperor 
Zhengtong about 100 km northwest of the cap ita l.  In the Battle of Tumubao 
the Mongol cavalry slaughtered Ming China’ s army and o f f ic ia l s  and captured 
the emperor. This b a t t le  had two important outcomes. F irs t ,  i t  demonstrated 
the clear th rea t posed by the northern nomads. Second, Emperor Zhengtong 
recovered the throne in 1457. Upon his re turn  to power Ming China changed 
i t s  stra tegy of land expeditions, embarking instead upon the massive and
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expensive cons truc t ion  of  the Ming Dynasty Great Wall for  defence. In t h i s  
environment, funding fo r  naval expedit ions for  mi l i ta ry /d ip lomat ic  missions 
simply did not happen.
The primary o r ig in a l  motive for  Zheng He’ s voyages is  a s ig n i f i c a n t  ques t ion 
in Chinese h is to ry ,  s ince very probably they had a spec ia l  s t r a t e g i c  mission, 
which th i s  t h e s i s  w i l l  discuss.  An increase in the p res t ige  of Emperor 
Yongle was probably not the ch ie f  o r ig ina l  motive for  the voyages, because 
Zheng He did not v i s i t  Japan, an e s s en t i a l  country for  the Ming Empire. The 
cos t  of the expedi t ions  and the bestowal of g i f t s  to foreign  roya l ty  and 
ambassadors more than o f f s e t  the benef i t  of any t r i b u t e  collected,  and so 
trade was a lso  not the ch ie f  reason.
Therefore, when Ming China’ s government f inances came under pressure and 
t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  ob jec t ive s  changed, funding for  the naval expedit ions melted 
away. In cont ra s t ,  by the 16th century, most European missions of 
exp lora t ion made enough p r o f i t  from the r e s u l t in g  trade and se izure  of 
na t ive  land/  resources to become se l f - f inanc ing ,  al lowing them to continue 
regard less  of  the condi t ion  of  the s t a t e ’ s finances.
A recent  con t rove rs ia l  theory put forward by Gavin Menzies (1421 ~ The year  
China d iscovered  the world ) suggests  tha t  Zheng He’ s ships circumnavigated 
the globe and discovered America in about 1421, before Ferdinand Magellan 
and Christopher Columbus. I do not devote much of my discussion to Menzies 
theory. However, i f  my conclusions regarding Zheng He’ s voyages are accepted, 
then at  the very l e a s t  some of Menzies’ conclusions would have to be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
modified. 1
1 Mr. Gavin Menzies’ theory needs to be supported by more evidence.
The o r ig in a l  motive ( o f f i c i a l  mission) fo r  Zheng He’ s voyages is  
discussed in th i s  th e s i s .  However, the o f f i c i a l  mission and the b e n e f i t s  
to the crews were not n e c e s sa r i ly  in c o n f l ic t .  O ff icers  and s a i lo r s  were 
not in v ariab ly  loyal only to Emperor Yongle (some may have been loyal to 
Emperor Jianwen). The f l e e t  lo s t  many ships and s a i lo r s  over 29 years, 
but they could not a l l  have been lo s t .  Some may have chosen to  s tay  
overseas, some o f f i c i a l  ships may have been used for p r iv a te  trade, or to 
find  gold fo r  the crews (a Ming China t r a d i t io n ! ) .  These were a l l  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  which would not have been recorded in o f f i c i a l  
sources. (Perhaps some had many wives overseas, and did not go back to 
Ming China, but the government’ s records would have shown th a t  they died 
in the se rv ice  of the em pire .)
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Some people in Zheng He’ s f le e t  who had v is i ted  Mecca may have heard of 
gold in west Africa, Ghana . . . .  some who served in th is  f le e t  may have 
sailed th e ir  ships away to seek th e ir  own fortune. Zheng He may have le t  
his sa ilo rs  take some benefit as a reward for th e ir  service. I f  the 
“Grand Ming Universe Map” was made in 1389 exactly (according to 
sp e c ia l is ts  of the F irs t  H istorical Archives Building in Beijing), of 
course, some of Zheng He' s ships could well have passed the Cape of Good 
Hope.
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Emperor Yongle
Emperor Yongle (1360 -  1424, Zhu Di) 5
Emperor Yongle was the th ird  emperor of Ming China, from 1402 to 1424, and 
is generally considered to be among the greatest of the Emperors. He was the 
fourth son of Emperor Hongwu. As the King (Prince) of Yan dntJE, he possessed 
a m ilitary  base in Beijing for the northern defence of the Ming empire. He 
became known as the Ming Chengzu becoming Emperor following a c iv i l
war. The great voyages of Admiral Zheng He were commissioned by him, now 
seen as a s ign if ican t event in Chinese and world history. During his reign 
the monumental Yongle Encyclopedia was completed; also, he moved
the capita l from Nanjing to Beijing. Emperor Yongle is buried in the 
Changling JÜIÜ mausoleum in Beijing, the central and largest mausoleum of 
the Ming Dynasty Tombs in Beijing (only Emperor Hongwu’ s tomb is  in 
Nanjing).
Zhu Di (the future Emperor Yongle) was given the t i t l e  of Prince of Yan, 
the area around Beijing. Zhu Di, with help from General Xu Da, secured the 
northern borders and became an excellent f ie ld  marshal in the process. Also, 
he ba ttled  re le n t le ss ly  against the Mongols in Northern China. Zhu Di had 
been very successful against the Mongols and impressed his father with his 
energy, r isk -tak ing  ab i l i ty ,  and leadership. Even Zhu Di’ s troops praised 
his effectiveness -  especially  when Emperor Hongwu rewarded them for th e ir  
service.
Emperor Hongwu died on June 24, 1398, and his eldest grandson, Zhu Yunwen, 
was crowned Emperor Jianwen. In leading a c iv i l  war against Emperor Jianwen, 
Zhu Di’ s main slogans were “cleaning emperor’ s evil m inisters” and "'self 
defence”. His spy system and outstanding strategy ied him to win th is  c iv i l  
war, and he gained strong support from the populace and many of the generals. 
He was a great m ilitary  commander and studied the Sun Z i’s Art o f  War 
extensively. Zhu Di ended Jianwen’ s reign, but the former emperor
Ming shi, 5-7, (Ji 5-7), Chengzu ,p69-107
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disappeared. On July 17, 1402, a f t e r  a b r i e f  v i s i t  to h is  f a t h e r ’ s tomb, Zhu 
Di was crowned Emperor Yongle at  the age of 42.
To strengthen  the economy, he also worked to reclaim for  production of crops 
r i c h  regions such as the Lower Yangtze Delta, and ca l led  for  a massive 
rebuild ing  of the Grand Canals of China. The Grand Canals were almost 
completely r e b u i l t  and were eventually to move goods from a l l  over the world. 
This also meant tha t  he did not t r u s t  the trade sea route,  showing tha t  
t rade  was not the ch ief  reason for  Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages. Yongle 
ambitiously planned to move China’ s cap i ta l  to Beij ing  for  nat ional  defence, 
a s ig n i f i c a n t  s tep for  the Ming Empire’ s secur i ty .  He al so  planned to build 
a massive network of s t ru c tu re s  to house government o f f ices ,  o f f i c i a l s ,  and 
the Imperial family i t s e l f .  The Forbidden City and Tiananmen (today the 
na t ional  emblem of the PRC) were f i n a l l y  completed in 1420 and became the 
p o l i t i c a l  cent re of China for  the next 500 years. ( The p o l i t i c a l  cent re of 
PRC, Zhongnanhai, was o r ig i n a l l y  a garden of the Forbidden City. ) These 
buildings prove tha t  Emperor Yongle was also  a good a rch i tec t .
Emperor Yongle sponsored and crea ted many c u l tu r a l  t r a d i t i o n s  in China. He 
promoted Confucianism (so Confucianism was not the reason for  the end of 
Zheng He’ s voyages!) and observed t r a d i t i o n a l  r i t u a l  ceremonies with a r ich  
c u l tu r a l  theme. His respec t  for  Chinese cu l tu re  was apparent. He 
commissioned h is  grand secretary ,  Xie Jin,  to put together  a compilat ion of 
every subjec t  and every book known to the Chinese. The massive p ro j e c t ’ s 
goal was to preserve Chinese cu l tu re  and l i t e r a t u r e  in wri t ing.  The book, 
named the Yongle Encyclopedia, ( records Marco Polo’ s mission from Quanzhou 
to the 11-Khan Empire) and is  s t i l l  considered one of the most marvellous 
human achievements in h is to ry ,  despite  some p a r t s  having being lost .
Mongol invaders were s t i l l  causing many problems fo r  the Ming Dynasty. 
Trad i t iona l ly ,  Han Chinese Dynasties r a re ly  went on the offensive against  
the Mongols. However, Yongle determined to change th i s  less-than-proud 
t ra d i t i o n .  He mounted f ive  m i l i t a ry  expedit ions into Mongolia and crushed 
the remnants of the Yuan Dynasty tha t  had f led  north a f t e r  being expelled by 
Emperor Hongwu. He strengthened the the northern defences and forged buffer  
a l l i a n c e s  to keep the Mongols a t  bay; and in p a r t i c u l a r  he changed the 
r e l a t io n s h ip  between the Timur Empire (a superpower at  tha t  time), and the 
Ming Empire, from h o s t i l e  to fr iend ly .  This was important for  the northern
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stra tegy .  I f  Timur, proclaimed the descendant of Genghis Khan, had combined 
toge ther  with other  Mongol forces, i t  would have been a t e r r i b l e  th re a t  to 
Ming China. Emperor Hongwu’ s s t ra tegy  was to contain  and i s o l a t e  the 
Mongols, force them into economic dependence on the Chinese, gather  na t ional  
support aga ins t  them, and launch periodic  i n i t i a t i v e s  into Mongolia to 
c r ipp le  t h e i r  of fensive power.
Through f ighting ,  Yongle learned to apprec ia te  the importance of cavalry in 
b a t t l e  and eventual ly  began spending much of h is  resources to maintain a 
good supply of horses. Yongle spent h is  en t i r e  l i f e  f igh t ing  the Mongols. He 
did not secure a decisive v ic to ry  but also  never los t .  Emperor Yongle’ s 
t roops intervened in a c i v i l  war in Annam (present-day north of Vietnam) 
which then became a province of  Ming China. Yongle al so  es tab l i shed  a 
f r ien d ly  r e l a t io n s h ip  with Japan and Korea.
On April 1, 1424, Emperor Yongle launched a large  campaign into the Gobi 
Desert to pursue a f i e r c e  Mongol power, the Tar tars  (the Northern Yuan). On 
August 8, 1424, Emperor Yongle died. Despite some negatives, he is 
considered to be the main keeper in h is  era of Chinese culture ,  h is to ry ,  and 
s t a t e c r a f t ,  involving grea t  m i l i t a ry  achievements, making him one of the 
most in f l u e n t i a l  r u l e r s  in Chinese h istory .
[Ming sh i] H is to r ica l  Comment: The Cultured Emperor Yongle was 
fam i l ia r  with the m i l i t a ry  from his  youth. Basing himself  on You 
Prefec ture and the Yan (Beijing) eminent areas,  and taking 
advantage of the weakness of the Jianwen Emperor, he took his  
forces on the long march to the [southern] cap i ta l ,  and made 
himself master of the Empire. After  he took the throne, he 
demonstrated grea t  personal f ruga l i ty ,  and was always prompt in 
sending help when the re were d i s a s t e r s  such as f loods or 
drought, ensuring tha t  no obs tacles  were put in the way. He had 
a good knowledge of men, and employed them shrewdly, 
understanding them through and through. His understanding of 
m i l i t a ry  s t ra tegy  was b r i l l i a n t ,  on a par  with tha t  of  his  
f a th e r  the Hongwu emperor. After  many major m i l i t a ry
expeditions, the northern steppes were cleared ........... t o t a l l y
30 countries  received the Imperial Edict and brought t r i b u t e s  
........... His accomplishments were glorious  indeed. Yet at  the time
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of his usurpation, he had followed an unprincipled course and 
his immoral conduct cannot be covered up!6
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The "Historical Comment'' from the Ming shi on Emperor Yongle gives him high 
praise, but also indicates his negativity. Emperor Yongle’ s five grand 
expeditions still must be considered as achievements. It must also be 
rememebered that from the middle period of the Tang Dynasty to the Yuan 
Dynasty the political prestige of the Han Chinese had declined. The northern 
steppe peoples had superiority in horses, and they dominated the north of 
China for a long time. The Song Dynasty was militarily weak, and the Han 
Chinese were ruled by Mongol in the Yuan Dynasty.
Emperor Yongle’s diplomatic actions were also very successful, especially 
with two important powers, the Timur Empire and Japan. Some historians 
believe that part of his success was due to good fortune7. In fact, his 
success was not just by chance. He had good intelligence for central Asia, 
and made many suitable military preparations to cope with the serious 
military crisis from Timur. Furthermore, he made a spectacular effort to 
convert an enemy to a friend, by sending Zheng He’s fleet to visit the Timur 
Empire’s territory, Hormuz; this great fleet and its long distance voyages 
was a brilliant innovation in world history. In addition, he built the 
Forbidden City and Tiananmen, which became symbolic buildings for China.
Ming shi, 4. Chengzu jT^jjiil
Harris, Nathaniel. Hamlyn history of Imperial China. London: Octopus 
Publishing Group Limited. 1999. p49.
[Emperor] Yongle needed a certain amount of luck, which in his 
case manifested itself in a negative event: he was not compelled 
to face the latest of the great nomad conquerors, Timur, who 
died in 1405 when his horde was poised to invade China. As a 
result, Yongle figures in history as a successful military man, 
occuping Vietnam and inflicting severe defeats on the Mongols. 
Even so, the northern border remained a matter of constant 
concern, as the emperor recognized in 1421 when he transferred 
the Ming capital from Nanjing to Beijingin the north, from which 
he could respond quickly to any threatening developments.
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Emperor Yongle made some mistakes 8 , but from a broad perspective e he 
protected China from a c r i t i c a l  invasion, the Timur Empire combined with -fo the 
other Mongol powers. Emperor Yongle formed a good in ternational relatic>mslnship 
with many Asian countries, and then commanded troops which entered 1 the 
te r r i to ry  of present-day the Republic of Mongolia and Russia to re;s;t>store 
China’ s prestige. Emperor Yongle’ s achievement was to res to re  Chiimina’ s 
m ilita ry  and p o l i t ic a l  position. He could be favourably compared wit.hi h the 
Han Emperor Wudi, the Tang Emperor Taizong and the Qing Emperor Kangxii,, i, and 
perhaps also two quite  in f lu en tia l  emperors, the Qin Emperor Shinuamgg ng anc 
Kublai Khan (the Yuan Emperor Shizu), as one of the grea tes t empercoinors ir 
Chinese history.
However, he sometimes behaved badly, especially in the k illing  af te r  th<e 3 e the 
civ il war and a f te r  his lover, Princess Wang, died, his rule anid d id and 
punishments were very severe.
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<2> Previous research - Zheng He’s objectives and 
abandonment of his voyages
The chief original motive for Zheng He’s voyages
The original motive for Admiral Zheng He’s expeditions is one of the most 
important academic questions in Chinese history. It has been discussed by 
historians since the early Ming Dynasty and up to the 600th anniversary of 
Zheng He’s first voyage in 2005.
Ma, Huan’s JUffc Ying ya sheng lan 9 and Admiral Zheng He’s 1431
Changle Stele10 are two of the most significant sources for
Zheng He’s voyages, but these two classical and detailed descriptions do 
not clarify the chief original motive for Admiral Zheng He’s voyages. 
Today, there are several interpretations of this motive in world researches 
n . I have put them into five groups with examples given for each.
(1) Prestige -
It was certainly related to his usurpation and his desire for
universal legitimacy ....  which led him to seek endorsement
from all the foreign rulers his navies could reach. (Wang Gungwu) 12
H Ma, Huan Hilf 1414-1451, Edited by Feng, Chengjun hJ§7p;§fj . Ying ya sheng 
lan .Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan jlST^EPilffl ,1934. p2.
IC Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Changle Stele « »
Emperor appreciates his (or their) loyalty, ordered Zheng He and 
others to command a group of officials, with tens of thousands 
of military officers and soldiers travelling in hundreds of huge 
ships, carried money to grant him (them). To proclaim the
virtues of Imperial China and win the respect of far-off
peoples. (Zheng He: "The 1431 Changle Stele")
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1 This cuestion could well be more important than another historical
puzzle in modern history: who killed the U SA’s 35th President, John F.
Kenned} (1961-1963)?
12 Wang, (ungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic 
Press, 1991. p59.
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For whatever reasons - and these have been the subject of 
speculation from that time to the present - to make his reign 
known throughout the sea lanes and all the countries on their 
shores, to tell all of them that he was now the legitimate ruler 
of China, and to invite their rulers to visit his court to offer 
tribute in the old Chinese pattern of interstate relations.
(F. W. Mote) 13
A more plausible reason was Yongle’s desire to enhance his 
reputation and his claim to legitimacy. (J. A. G. Roberts) 14
(2) Trade -
Promoting international trade was the main reason, a subsidiary 
one was showing off strength and power. (Li Dongfang) 15
It was more urgent to expand foreign markets in the classes of 
industries and commerce; using Chinese fortunes to exchange 
goods with overseas countries, thus increasing the Emperor’ s 
prestige. (Liu Ying-sheng) lfi
mmm)
The two most important missions for Zheng He’s voyage, were: 
negotiating with foreign countries, and purchasing their 
treasures. (Chen, Hsin-Hsiung) 17
Mote, F. W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p613.
14 Roberts, J. A. G. .China - prehistory to the nineteenth century.
Sutton Publishing. 1996-2000. pi85.
10 Li Dong Fang fjljflA- Xi Suo Ming Chao Shanghai: Shanghai ren min
chu ban she _L$SAKuLLSIi ,2003. p 153.
Liu Ying Sheng .Si Lu Wen Hua Hai Shang Jua.n
Hangzhou: Zhe Jiang ren min chu ban she , 1996. p 199
17 Chen, Hsin-Hsiung PJffffAft . ” From royal voyage to eunuch voyage”
.Tainan: Department of History, Cheng Rung University,
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(3) Search for the former emperor -
Emperor Yongle doubted tha t Emperor Jianwen had fled overseas, 
and wanted to search for him; besides, he wanted to show off his 
power in foreign regions, and to demonstrate China’ s wealth and 
strength. (Ming shi) 18
mmmizam» » Km
Ostensibly to demonstrate prestige, in r e a l i ty  to search for 
Emperor Jianwen. (Cai Dongfan) 19
M i Ä - f i P M «  m m w )
Searching for Emperor Jianwen, purchasing treasures and showing 
off his m ilitary  power in foreign regions. (Lee Cheuk Yin, Mao, 
Peiqi) 20
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(4) Second front against the Timur -
To organise a great oceanic alliance, so as to partly  
encircle  the Timur Empire in Central Asia. (Xu Yuhu) 21
2003-2005.
Chen, Hsin-Hsiung 1WisWt. , Cheng Wing-sheung .N ew sletter on
Cheng-Ho .Tainan: Department of History, Cheng Rung
University, 2003-2005. 18, p24
Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Eunuch 1, Zheng He, p7767
14 Cai Dong Fan Hjllif! .Ming Shi Yan Yi BPAlftii Taipei: Wen hua Tu Shu 
Gong Si
Li, Zhuoran (Lee, Cheuk Yin) Mao, Peiqi J^ jjijppj- .Ming Chengzu Shi
Luan .T aipei: Wenjin Publish ,1994. p248.
Jl Li Dong Fang ijlifCA- Xi Suo Ming Chao Shanghai: Shanghai ren min
chu ban she JriSASLbfiSÜtt ,2003. p 153.
Xu, Yuhu Zheng He ping zhuan JÜl^Pjp'ßjL Taipei: Zhonghua wen hua
chu ban shi ye wei yuan hui 1958.
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(5) Proto-colonialism
We see these ’voyages of friendship’ as aggressive attempts to 
achieve a Pan Ming in the Asian maritime realm, with Melaka, 
Palembang, and Samudera as key elements. We also observe Ming 
efforts to dominate the trade routes linking the Middle East and 
East Asia (Geoff Wade). 22
The original motive, or motives, for Zheng He’s voyages, is a key question, 
as it is also for Ming China’s strategic options. These voyages demonstrated 
that Ming China had the sophisticated technology for maritime development, 
but if their original motive cannot be established, then how can we 
determine the reason for the abandonment of Zheng He’s Imperial Fleet? This 
is an extremely important academic question not just for Chinese history but 
also for world history. I shall discuss both aspects of the question. .
Why are these reasons for objectives not sufficient?
Prestige; Trade; Finding the former emperor; '"Second front against the 
Timur"; and "Proto-colonialism": all these five suggestions could help to
explain what lay behind Zheng He’s voyages. However, they do not make clear 
the "chief" original motive for the voyages. Many scholars have provided 
arguments in support of these ideas. I will briefly review them, giving the 
main arguments against each.
(1) Prestige -
The Ming shilu’s record points out that Emperor Yongle and Japan had a
i9so
Wade, Geoff. “ The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment” . Journal of the
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Volume LXXVIII Parti. 
2005.
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special relationship in 1406 23 . If "prestige” was the original motive for 
Zheng He’ s voyages, then he should have vis ited  Japan. In Chinese
Dynastic H is to r ie s , from the Shi j i  to the Yuan shi, Japan was always put in 
the second or third position, just behind Korea and Vietnam. Zheng He 
visited  Hormuz in Persia five times, but he did not v is i t  Japan once during 
the 29 years from 1405 to 1433. Thus, "prestige" was not the chief original 
motive for Zheng He’ s voyages.
(2) Trade -
The policy of "Maritime trade prohibition" (c iv il)  was initiated by Emperor 
Hongwu in 13682\  and Emperor Yongle continued this policy. In 1402, Emperor 
Yongle emphasized the need to ban private oceanic contact with foreign 
countries25. In 1404, the Emperor banned c iv il ian  ocean-going ships but 
allowed river tr a ff ic 26 . This policy of "Maritime trade prohibition" in the
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 50, 1 month, 4th year of Yongle. p751.
[1406.1] An ambassador was sent to take the Imperial Edict 
praising the King of Japan, Yoshimitsu. Earlier, after Tsushima,
Iki and other islands’ pirates had plundered residents, 
Yoshimitsu was determined to capture them. He sent troops to
seize the leaders and killed members of their groups .........  the
Emperor (Yongle) praised Yoshimutu’ s duty and sincerity in the 
Imperial Edict, in addition granting 1000 Liang of platinum
.........  and two sea ships. Also, he proclaimed Japan’ s mount
Guarding State Mount in perpetuity, and a stele was erected.
Emperor (Yongle) in person wrote the inscription: .........
m im m m  > ' w & w m m  • » e s
; m m m m z  • m m & m m m M W L  * m m m w m m ...... tm n m m  • &
greift ’ • x z m m z iu m  ■ m m m z
UU ’ üjLSWÄ ’ ±H SciE I : ......
24 Zhang, Bincun (Chang Pin-tsun) . ” Chinese maritime trade: the case of
sixteenth-century Fu-chien (Fukien)” .New Jersey: Princeton, Ph.D. thesis 
1983. p8.
The peculiarity of Ming maritime trade is evident in the 
institution of the "tribute trade system" and in the application 
of a "Maritime trade prohibition" MW . lasting from 1368 to 
1566.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 10, 7 month, 35 year of Hongwu. pl49.
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26 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 27, 1 month, 2 year of Yongle. p498.
[1404.1] At that time Fujian residents boarded sea ships 
privately, had contacts with foreign countries, then became
24
early Ming Period is very well-known; and neither was official trade 
encouraged. The Ming government, both Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle, 
were not anxious to seek profit from oceanic trade Thus, it is very obvious 
that trade was not the original motive for Zheng He’s voyage .
(3) Finding the former emperor -
This motive for Zheng He’s voyages is often mentioned in writings from 
the periods of the Ming and the Qing Dynasties. In particular, it was 
recorded in the Zheng He Biography of the Ming shi, which was compiled 
in the early Qing Dynasty by many outstanding scholars in the Qing 
government, and is always thought of as a very authorative source. The Ming 
shi is studied by many scholars throughout the world in their research 
of Ming history. However, many well-known scholars do not agree2' , and many 
steles and other sources provide evidence that Hormuz was the chief 
destination for Zheng He’s voyages, for example the 1417 Quanzhou stele 28 .
The Imperial Mandated Regional Military Commander Grand
Supervisor Zheng He proceeding to Hormuz and other countries in
the western ocean for official affairs, offers incense and prays
pirates. When these countries reported the matter, civil sea 
ships were forbidden, the original sea ships were changed to 
"blunt head" ships, and local offices monitored their departures 
and returns.
• s m u s  > m m m  *
Wang, Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic 
Press, 1991. p59.
(Emperor Yongle) announced his intention to find his predecessor 
and nephew, Emperor Jianwen, who was rumoured to have fled 
abroad, which might have been no more than a public 
justification to express opposition to his father’s prohibition 
against military action overseas.
Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900~1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p615.
It was rumoured at the time and speculated on thereafter that the 
real motive of these expeditions was to locate the Emperor
Jianwen ....  It seems most unlikely that Emperor Yongle could
have believed that.
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1417 Quanzhou stele, in Fujian Province
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for God’s blessing on the 16th day, fifth month, fifteenth year 
of Yongle. Judge Pu Heri recorded this and set up the stele.
Would Zheng He go to Hormuz to find the former emperor? From the 3rd to 7th 
voyages of Zheng He, Hormuz was the chief destination. It was of course 
impossible for Hormuz, in present-day Iran, to become the place of asylum 
for Emperor Jianwen. Hormuz is simply too far from China; Japan, Taiwan, and 
the Philippines are closer to Nanjing. Also, since Muslims take neither pork 
nor wine, both of which are very important to the Chinese, how could the 
Emperor go there?
Japan seems the most likely place for Emperor Jianwen’s escape. The location 
is close to Nanjing, Japanese and Chinese are similar in appearance, the 
life styles are closer, and Japan is a big country and populous. If Emperor 
Jianwen fled to Japan and was disguised as a common Chinese merchant, it 
would be difficult to find him. Nevertheless Zheng He did not visit Japan, 
Taiwan or the Philippines once during 29 years of voyages. Thus ''finding the 
former emperor" would not be the original motive for Zheng He’s voyage
(4) Second front against the Timur -
"To organize a great alliance, so as to make a half-encirclement of the 
Timur Empire in Central Asia (Xu Yuhu)" - which was impossible, because the 
Timur Empire had a strong cavalry, with vigour and mobility, and occupied 
vast areas of land from Delhi in the Indian Peninsula to Ankara in Turkey. 
If Ming China had attempted to form an alliance with Thailand, Melaka, Java 
and Sri Lanka, so as to confront the Timur Empire, this would have had no 
chance of being effective 29 .
Rossabi, Morris. “ Zheng He and Timur: any relation?” . Oriens Extremus.
19-20. P135
Zheng He’s travels led him nowhere near any state that could 
have opened a second front against Timur.
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Xu Yuhu’s interpretation is nevertheless closest to the truth. He comes near 
to solving this question. The spirit of his explanation is close to that of 
the Ming shilu and takes into account the real international relationships 
in Asia in 1405, except that he ignored one thing - Zheng He took much gold 
on his departure from China, he visited Hormuz five times, and Hormuz was 
a part of the Timur Empire’s territory. Zheng H e ’ s visits to Hormuz were 
always friendly, and he brought many gifts, and so the Timur Empire was not 
treated as an enemy during his voyages. Ming China was far more likely 
to make friends with the Timurs.
(5) Proto-colonialism
Dr. Geoff Wade, of the National University of Singapore, interpreted Zheng 
He’s voyages as the origin of imperialism, or the early stage of 
imperialism, because if he "travelled in peace", why did Zheng He’s voyages 
need so many soldiers? In addition, according to the records of Ming shilu 
and other sources, the Ming Empire had always demonstrated an imperial 
posture towards other countries. This is a significant new explanation which 
helps to interpret the original motives of Zheng He’s voyages.
This theory contains a fresh outlook on the nature of Zheng He’ s voyages. 
The characters and events of Zheng H e ’ s voyages should not be interpreted 
simplistically. For example, the King of Ceylon was arrested by Admiral 
Zheng He and sent to China, only for Emperor Yongle to release him. 
According to Zheng H e ’ s steles and the Ming shi, this matter arose because 
the King of Ceylon wished for gold and attempted to rob the property of 
Zheng He ’ s fleet. Admiral Zheng He ordered his soldiers to repel the 
King’ s troops, and they captured the King and the Queen. There is no source 
from Ceylon which would enable this to be verified, nor is there enough data 
to judge which side was in the right. Of course, the kingdom of Ceylon did 
not have any obligation to pay tribute to Ming China.
The president of the International Zheng He Society, Mr Tan Ta Sen, 
describes Zheng He’s voyages as "peaceful travel", in a thesis in which 
he discusses the matter and provides opposing arguments 30 . He claims that
,0 Liao Jianyu .Zheng He and Southeast Asia
.International Zheng He Society. 2005. p22. PJUltfU : ?
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the "Proto-colonialism" scene was not part of the nature of Admiral 
Zheng He ’ s voyages, and presents many reasons in support of this view.
In any case, Zheng He did not use his military powers to claim any land, or 
send people to colonize overseas countries. Taiwan island is close to 
Quanzhou, but Zheng He did not attempt to seize land or property from Taiwan. 
It should be remembered that Zheng He took many gifts to bestow on kings, 
especially the King of Hormuz. Zheng He’s voyages had many special 
characteristics. For example, Zheng He went to the western ocean, but not 
the eastern or the southern oceans. His seven voyages were all to the west. 
Further, the Ming Empire did not consider the use of Zheng He’s great fleet 
to destroy Japanese pirates31. One thing is very important, but ignored by 
scholars: Zheng He took much gold when he departed from China32 for the 
western ocean in 1405 (for an analysis, see chapter 5). This is an important 
consideration which supports the “peaceful travel” theory.
(6) Other -
? >
11 Ming shi, 7, 19th year of Yongle, plOO.
1421, First month ....  Zheng He as ambassador to the Western
Ocean again, Second month ....  Military Officer Hu Yuan
commanded troops at sea to capture Japanese 
pirates.
[1421]— ^ ... » f n f U S B f f  • ■
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Zheng He, p7767.
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Other explanations include "to maintain a stable s i tu a t io n " 33 , which has 
not been established sa t i s fac to r i ly ,  because there are no overseas 
countries which strongly influenced Chinese p o l i t i c s  in China’ s history, 
prior to the year of the Opium war, 1842. In th is  thes is  I have put 
forward a suggested new theory, with evidence, to explain one of the chief 
original  motives for Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages. In my view the Ming Empire 
under Emperor Yongle wanted to a l ly  i t s e l f  with the Timur Empire in order to 
s p l i t  up the Mongol powers -  the Timur Empire, the Tartar (the Northern 
Yuan), and Oirot; and th is  was a substantial  strategy in 1405.
The chief reason for Zheng He’ s f l e e t  being abandoned
Under the early Ming Empire, China emerged as a great sea power. After 
Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages, for reasons not completely clear;  the Ming 
Empire withdrew from oceanic ac t iv i ty  34. Despite the success of Zheng He’ s 
voyages, the Ming imperial government ended large-sca le  ocean­
going expeditions a f te r  1433. There are various explanations for th is  
strategy:
(l) Excessive Cost
The argument over the abandonment of a l l  government- sponsored 
seafaring revealed tension between seafaring in te re s t s  and the 
stronger landward-oriented in terests.  (Frederick W. Mote)35 .
Fan, Jin Min . ” Zheng He Xia Si Yang Dong Yin Chu Tan” UPTH 
, Zheng He xia x i yang Luan Wen J i Di Er J i M
.Nanjing: Nanjing University Press ,1985. p285.
"A wish to search for Emperor Jianwen" cannot be believed. 
"Showing off his military power in foreign region" is 
incredible. "Promoting international trade" is d if f icu l t  to 
confirm. Perhaps the purpose was to establish good social order 
and create a peaceful international situation, and to establish 
and maintain amicable relations with foreign countries. (Fan 
Jinmin)
msmsMttnm °  m&mmzT'nJB °  •  m u
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Daniels, Pa tr ic ia  S. and Hyslop, Stephen G. .Almanac o f  world 
history. Washington D. C. :National Geographic Society. 2003. P170.
Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : 
Harvard University Press. 2003. p617.
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1. This policy was too expensive: there were innumerable missions 
to and from the region followed by generous if patronizing 
hospitality and gifts. 2. The new commitments in the south 
endangered the northern defences: the peace that the Emperor
Yongle had achieved in Northern and Central Asia after the death 
of Timur did not last long. 3. The traditional tribute system 
was never meant to support active international politics: it had 
been evolved over centuries to encourage regular but minimal 
foreign relations, and to provide an instrument for imperial 
defence policy. (Professor Wang Gungwu) 36
The regime’s fiscal crisis that resulted in funds being 
unavailable for these very costly ventures. (Ray Huang).3'
There were some literati in the imperial court, who were 
concerned that Zheng He’s "treasure ships'' were too wasteful, so 
they were extremely hostile to the expeditions after the death 
of Emperor Yongle, leading to the result that on the day that 
Emperor Hongxi ascended the throne he proclaimed an Imperial 
Edict, "stopping western treasure ships". Emperor Xuande ordered 
Zheng He to go to the western ocean once again. At this time, 
Zheng He was no longer young. After he returned he could not 
continue his activities. (Li Dong Fang)38
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(2) Xenophobic isolationism
36 ij». 1994. P7i
Wang, Gungwu. China and the Chinese overseas. Singapore : Times Academic 
Press, 1991.
,i7 Fairbank, John King. Goldman, Merle. China: A New H istory. Cambridge, 
Mass. : Harvard University Press. 1992-1998. p138
Li Dong Fang Jj. Xi Suo Ming Chao Shanghai: Shanghai ren min
chu ban she ,2003. pl60.
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The early Ming expansionism was coupled with a xenophobic 
isolationism. . . . The great overseas naval expeditions were
terminated. . . . Ming garrisons were withdrawn from Inner
Mongolia, and the Great Wall was rebuilt into the impressive 
monument i t  remains today, more formidable than ever before. 
(Charles 0. Hucker) 39
Emperor Yongle’ s aim was to create what even Kublai Khan had 
failed to achieve, a maritime empire spanning the oceans...110 (his 
successors did not agree with this aim)
One thing seems certain: had the emperors who followed Emperor 
Yongle not retreated into xenophobia and isolation, China, not 
Europe, would have become the mistress of the world.11
(3) Feudal Emperor system
It was the inevitable consequence of a feudal tribute trade 
system. (Yang Xi) 12 (according to Marxism, “feudal society” 
means “capitalis t society” )
• m xw )
Yongle’ s desire was to enhance his reputation and his claim to 
legitimacy - he was a usurper, but after his death the 
motivation of seeking recognition no longer applied. Another 
possible motive was that of commercial advantage, prompted in 
particular by the conquests of Timur which had cut the
Hucker, Charles 0. .C hina 's Imperial Past . Stanford: Stanford
University Press. 1975-2002. p291.
10 Menzies, Gavin. 1421 -  The year China discovered the world. London:
Bantam. 2003. p52.
" Menzies, Gavin. 1421 -  The year China discovered the world. London:
Bantam. 2003. p455.
42 Yang Xi f§ ’ A H  • ” Zheng He xia xi yang De Mu Di Ji Qi Bei Ting Hang De 
Yuan Yin” flpf P T i ® ¥ 6 t l g , Zheng He xia  x i yang lun wen 
j i  (1) - Beijing: Ren min j iao  tong chu ban she
1985. p35.
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Continental s i lk  route. (So, a f te r  re la t io n s  with the Timur 
improved, these voyages were unnecessary) (J. A. G. Roberts)43
Because the main reason tha t ''Zheng He went to the western 
ocean" was to serve the p o l i t ic a l  purposes of the feudal 
emperor, the policy lacked a strong and continuous economic 
motive. Factors such as a narrow "continental" viewpoint 
contributed to th is  resu lt .  (Chen Yan)44
a lrä ®  °
(4) Confucianism
The great Chinese voyages were stopped by Confucian-trained 
sch o la r-o ff ic ia ls  who opposed trade and foreign contact on 
principle. (Edward Dreyer) 4S.
(5) Eunuch in i t ia t iv e
Confucian scholars opposed the involvement of court eunuchs in 
a f fa i r s  of s ta te , believing the voyages to be a "eunuch 
in i t ia t iv e " .  (Duyvendak, Jan Ju lius  Lodewijk)46
Seemingly, a f te r  Emperor Yongle died, succeeding emperors preferred
iso la tion , and stopped the expeditions, as I w ill discuss.
Why are the reasons for abandonment not su ff ic ien t?
u Roberts, J. A. G. .China -  preh istory  to the nineteenth century. 
Sutton Publishing. 1996-2000. pl86.
" Chen Yan [JF • Hai Shang Si Chou Zhi Lu Yu Zhong Wai Wen Hui Jiao Liu $§ 
_ h f . B e i j i n g :  Peking University Press, 2002. pl77
ln Fairbank, John King. Goldman, Merle. China: A New History. Cambridge, 
Mass. : Harvard University Press. 1992-1998. P138
4b Duyvendak, J. J. L. (Jan Julius Lodewijk), 1889- .China’s discovery o f  
Africa. London : Probsthain, 1949, p27.
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By 1500 the early Ming Empire was the most forceful and advanced nation of 
its time"1' 48. However, the Ming Empire, whatever the cause, then retreated 
from the ocean and ''the period when China ruled the seas, 1405-1433" was 
in the past. The existing explanations for the abandonment of Zheng He’s 
voyages are not comprehensive enough, and there are other points which could 
te added.
(1) Excessive cost
It is true that Zheng He’s fleet cost a great deal, but the Ming Empire 
could have sent a smaller fleet to continue, so we should ask why the Ming 
Dynasty discontinued the whole of the oceanic expeditions. Besides, the 
cost of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall was, of course, extremely high 
compared with that of Zheng He’s fleet. Thus, cost by itself is unlikely to 
be the main reason.
(2) Xenophobic isolationism
Comparing early Ming with late Ming, there was no difference in the 
'Xenophobic isolationism" of each. Trade between the Ming Empire and Japan 
increased in the late Ming. So "Xenophobic isolationism" is not a 
satisfactory reason for the decision.
(3) Change of Emperor
After Emperor Yongle died in 1424 there was another large-scale expedition 
by Zheng He, from 1430 to 1433, and when Zheng He returned to China 
Emperor Xuande was delighted by this voyage - therefore the change of 
Emperor is not the main reason.
(4) Confucianism
17 Daniels, Patricia S. and Hyslop, Stephen G. Almanac of world history. 
Washington D. C. :National Geographic Society. 2003. pl70.
IK Kennedy, Paul. The rise and fall of the great powers ~ Economic change
and military conflict from 1500 to 2000. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1992. Chapter one - Ming China.
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Confucianism was respected in the Yuan Dynasty, the early Ming Dynasty and 
the la te  Ming Dynasty. During Zheng He’ s voyages from 1405 to 1433, 
Confucianism was respected widely by Emperors and subjects alike in Ming 
China. Emperor Yongle had pa rt icu la r  respect for Confucius 49; thus 
Confucianism is not the chief reason.
In 1410.2, Emperor Yongle ordered 500, 000 men to march 2000 km, to make war 
on Mongolia, a f te r  90 years of Mongol rule over a l l  China. The Emperor 
intended to res to re  China’ s prestige, and th is  was the f i r s t  time a Han 
Chinese Emperor himself commanded troops crossing the desert to attack the 
northern enemy. Before Emperor Yongle’ s departure, he sent an o f f ic ia l  to
pay respect to Confucius.
(5) Eunuch in i t i a t iv e
Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages are highly regarded in Chinese society, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in recent times (2000-2006). Everyone knew Admiral Zheng He 
was a court eunuch, but he had the complete respect of Confucian scholars 
from the early Ming to the Qing Dynasty. An example is the biography of 
Zheng He in the Ming shi. 50
In short, what obstacle was there to further voyages for Zheng He’ s f le e ts?  
This is  a s ign if ican t question because th is  episode marked a turning point 
in Chinese h is to ry51. Zheng He’ s expeditions underlined the sophistication 
of Chinese navigation and shipbuilding technology. In th is  thesis, I 
w ill discuss the reasons.
Iv Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, 101, 2 month, 8 year of Yongle, pl316.
15 March 1410) (Emperor Yongle) sent o f f ic ia l  to pay respect 
to the prophet teacher, Confucius. Emperor himself would lead
an expedition on steppe enemy..........Emperor’ s wagon (and 500,000
troops) set out from Beijing
t * )  l- ?  • \ m  -
50 Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Zheng He, p7767.
Elvin, Mark. The Pattern o f the Chinese Past. Stanford. Stanford 
University Press. 1973-1998. p203.
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<3> The Ming knew four Asian powers' Japan, Java, 5outh 
India and the Timur
Ming China knew Japan was a great power
If scholars do not clearly understand "the political Asian Map during 
1405-1433", just relying on Chinese classical sources, then how can they 
decide which countries Zheng He visited, and why? 52 If there is a lack of 
good, balanced data on Asian history, then how can we know the true 
background of Asian countries in this period? If the background of Asian 
history from 1405 to 1433 is not clear, this will of course lead to
misjudgments by historians.
Did Zheng He visit only city states? Of course he did not! This is a very 
important concept for scholars searching for the original motive for Zheng 
He’s voyages. There are many mentions of foreign countries in the 23 
Dynastic Histories which demonstrate the presence of several big
countries in the Western Region. Persia, the Arab Empire and the East Roman 
Empire were often referred to in the Dynastic Histories, especially the 
Yuan shi (compiled in the Ming Hongwu period) which shows that Ming China 
knew there were great powers in Asia.
Here is one example:- because of Japanese piracy, the Ming Emperor
Hongwu once planned to send troops to Japan to destroy piracy there, but 
after considering the lessons of the Yuan’ s war on Japan, he abandoned 
this plan 53. So the Ming knew that to conquer other countries over the seas 
would not be an easy thing for its Empire.
Ming China also knew the Majapahit Empire (Java) was a great power
The Majapahit Empire 54 was based in eastern Java and ruled much of
In 18-20 August 2005, Singapore Conference, "Maritime Asia and the 
Chinese Overseas", I suggested a new way - "the political Asian Map 
during 1405-1433” which is a key for research on Admiral Zheng He’s 
voyage.
Yan Cong Jian edited by Xu Sili . Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu k^igScRfl
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000.
54 Khoo, Joo Ee, 1940- . ” Chinese elements in Javanese culture during the
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the southern Malay Peninsula, Singapore, Borneo, Sumatra, Bali, and the
Philippines from about 1293 to around 1500. Its greatest ruler was Hayam 
Wuruk, whose reign from 1350 to 1389 marked the empire’s peak, its territory 
covering most of present-day Indonesia (the fourth most populous country 
in the world). The Majapahit was the last of the great Hindu empires of the 
Malay archipelago.
The Majapahit Empire was always called Java in the Ming’s records. 
Its territory and influence was similar to that of present-day
Indonesia. The Ming government knew that Brunei was under pressure from Java, 
and had sought the Ming Empire’s protection °5; it knew also that Malacca -
its territory between Siam and Java - was under pressure from Siam, and
had appealed for the Ming Empire’s assistance. Present-day scholars know 
that the distance from Java to Brunei is great. So the country of Java had a 
large territory and broad influence during Zheng He’s visit, and the Ming 
was well aware of this. This was a Hindu Empire.
Majapahit period” . Thesis (Ph. D.) - University of London 1976.
The Majapahit Empire (1293-1500 AD)
Vijaya was a prince of the Singhasari kingdom who escaped when 
Jayakatwang, the ruler of Kadiri kingdom, killed the king of Singhasari, 
Kertanagara. The Yuan Empire’ s Kublai Khan sent an expedition to Java 
in 1293. Vijaya collaborated with Yuan China’s troops in defeating 
Jayakatwang; Vijaya then turned against the Yuan Chinese and expelled 
them from Java, following which Vijaya founded the Majapahit Empire.
Gajah Mada, an ambitious Majapahit Prime Minister from 1331 to 1364, 
extended the empire’s rule to the surrounding islands. A few years after 
Gajah Madah’s death, the Majapahit navy captured Palembang, putting an 
end to the Srivijayan kingdom. Although the Majapahit rulers extended 
their power over other islands and destroyed neighbouring kingdoms, 
their focus seems to have been on controlling and gaining a larger share 
of the commercial trade that passed through the archipelago. The spread 
of Islam and the rise of the Islamic states along the northern coast of 
Java eventually brought the Majapahit Empire to an end in around 1500.
Ming shi, 325, (zhuan 213), Brunei , p8412.
[King of Brunei stated]: "Your subject country sends 40 jin of 
camphor each year as tribute to Java, please instruct Java by 
Imperial Edict to cease demanding this tribute. We will now send 
tribute to the Empire. Your subject now returns to his country, 
seeking a protection order, to provide guards for one year to
ensure his countrymen’ s wishes are met ....  " The Emperor was
in complete agreement ....  and instructed Java to abandon the
tribute from Brunei.
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The Vijayanagar Empire in south India was recorded in the Yuan shi
Almost no Chinese sources mention th is  empire. Calicut "jAM and Cochin föjfö 
are two c i t i e s  -  not s ta tes  -  which belonged to the Vijayanagar Empire. The 
Vijayanagar ruled South India from 1336 to 1565. After the kingdom of Delhi 
was destroyed by Timur in 1398, the Vijayanagar 56 became a major power 
in the Indian Peninsula, with i t s  capital  at  Hampi. I t s  architecture  was 
b r i l l i a n t ,  and there are many ruins in Hampi. This also was a Hindu Empire, 
recorded in the Yuan sh i3/, and the Yongle Encyclopedia 38 . From these two 
works, i t  could be judged that  the Ming government c learly  knew the 
Vijayanagar Empire’ s location was on the sea route between Quanzhou in 
China and the II-Khan Empire in Persia.
The Ming thought the Timur Empire had broad t e r r i t o r i e s
The Timur Empire is a great los t  Empire, i t s  emblem, three balls , meaning 
that the world had four quarters and the Timur Empire occupied three 
quarters of i t .  Early Ming China sent many missions to the Timur, and from
Indian Council of Historical Reasearch . Inscriptions of the Vijayanagara 
rulers .New Delhi : Indian Council of Historical Research ; Nothern Book 
Centre, 2004.
The Vijayanagar Empire (1336-1565 AD)
Hampi is the capital of the Vijayanagar, this city is famous for i t s  
ruins belonging to the erstwhile medieval Hindu power of the Vijaynagar, 
and i t  is declared a World Heritage site . The temples of Hampi, and i ts  
monolithic sculptures and monuments, a t trac t  the traveller because of 
their  excellent workmanship. The Hindu style of architecture found at 
Hampi re flec ts  the splendour of the Vijaynagar Empire. The rugged 
landscape adds to the h istoric  ambience of this site.
Yuan shi , 210, (Zhuan 97) , Vijayanagar HAJnl , p 4669.
Yongle Encyclopedia A IH A ft (Yongle Da Dian), 19418
In the 27th year of Zhiyuan (1290), an embassy of the Yuan included 90 
people was sent to the I1-Khan Empire via the Vijayanagar Empire (south 
India). This record corresponds with the record in the Travel of Marco 
Polo.
M 7 C - + - b « i S 9  0 A 1 M 5 I S  > r ® S U f£ A J E  j
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them the Ming government would certainly have received reports on the size 
of the Empire.
[Herat] ... 3,000 Li to the southwest of Samarkand, is distant
12,000 Li from Jiayuguan, and a great country in the Western 
Region. The Yuan Imperial son-in-law, Timur, being king in
Samarkand, dispatched his son, Shah Rukh, to rule in Herat. 59
t m i  * m  • jtm
The Timur Empire was recorded in the Ming shi as Samarkand and Herat, using 
the two capitals to represent this empire. These records demonstrate that 
Ming China knew that Samarkand and Herat both belonged to the Timur Empire! 
and since the distance between these two capitals is 3000 Li (about 1500 Km, 
which we know to be geographically accurate), the Ming also knew the Timur 
Empire had a large territory. It should be remembered that Emperor Hongwu 
had said: “Our Empire (Ming China) from Liaodong in the East to Gansu in 
the West stretches 6, 000 Li “.60
Thus the Ming knew through its many ambassadors that The Timur Empire was a 
great power, and that its territory and influence included present-day Iran, 
Iraq, Central Asia and part of Russia. And of course Hormuz belonged to the 
Timur Empire. There was no kingdom of Hormuz!
In short, Zheng He did not visit Japan, and Java was not one of his chief 
destinations, according to the Ming shi and Ming shilu. The Ming’s records 
do not mention the Vijayanagar Empire. However, the Ming Empire knew 
the countries that Zheng He visited were not just city states, and that Java 
had a huge territory. Which two Asian countries had the largest territories 
in 1405? The truth is, that Ming China and the Timur Empire had the largest 
territories in Asia at that time. The Majapahit Empire (Java), the 
Vijayanagar Empire (India) and the Timur Empire were the three largest 
countries that Zheng He visited.
59 Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizu, 253, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3656.
38
<4> Sinocentrism concept - research into Ming China’s 
archives
Sinocentrism - distortion of the international relationship
The darkest period in the history of Mongolia was the 275 years 
of Manchu domination.hl
This point of view is recorded on a DVD, '"Inspiring Mongolia", made in the 
Republic of Mongolia, and checked with Mongolian scholars and students in 
the Australian National University; everyone agrees with it. Of course, this 
point of view is very different from that of Chinese studies, and perhaps it 
never appeared in any Chinese book. However, it is believed by present-day 
Mongolians absolutely. China’s archives and other countries’ sources 62 have 
very different views on China’s foreign relations history. Many statements 
in the Ming shi are exaggerated, for example:
After Emperor Yongle had subdued China by military means, he 
wished to subjugate the whole world. Ambassadors were sent to 
foreign countries to announce his reign. All these countries 
submitted to his demands and declared themselves his subjects, 
ever fearful that their tribute might be too late. From the 
furthest desert of the north to the unnamed parts of the 
southern ocean, beyond the rising and setting sun, wherever 
carriage or boat could reach, all submitted to the Emperor.'1'3
’ mmmu»mmwmm •
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bl Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research institute. 2003.
b“ There is an old joke, which I have seen in newspapers, and which 
happened to me, too. When I told a Korean student, "China and Korea are 
brother states", the Korean responded, ”But who is the elder brother?”
63 Ming shi, 332, (f# 220), Kun Cheng , p8625.
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In the period of Yongle, the Western Regions, out of respect for 
the prestige and power of the Emperor, were all submissive, and 
did not dare to make unauthorized attacks on each other. M
*§8* ’ ’ « n s  ■ rsdtfflife •
Such records 65 should not be used or believed. The Timur Empire of this 
time had very strong military forces and cultural achievements (see chapter 
4); in addition, the Oirot empire (see chapter 7) was starting to become 
a powerful military force, and it maintained this force into the early 
Qing period.
How should we research the actual international relations of the Ming 
Dynasty? Ming shilu has been used as a check on the Ming shi
and the Xi Yang Chao Gong Dian Lu (The Western Ocean
tribute record) and other Ming books have been used to verify
statements in both these substantial books. But because all such works are 
limited by their ideology of Sinocentrism, we need in fact to use sources 
from other countries to review the international relations of the Ming 
Period.
From research, it is clear that the Ming shilu is freer of Sinocentrism than 
the Ming shi, but some of its statements are still exaggeratedhfi . Many 
Chinese books of the Imperial period are unreliable about this and similar 
subjects. Their views do not represent a true picture of international 
relations and the thinking of other countries.
Ming shi, 332, (jlj 220), Xu Tian , p8614.
65 Ming shi, 332, ( #  220), Xu Tian d P M  , p8614.
In the period of Yongle, the Emperor demanded that many countries 
over a vast area submit to his rule, and his ambassadors visited 
the Western Region annually.
7mm ’ »
Ming shilu, Taizu, 131.
Barbarous peoples submitted completely, and military strength 
was extended to the western region.
-
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Mongolians did not use Chinese as their language - they had their own 
language and writing system during the Ming Period h'. All Chinese records 
dealing with their verbal and written statements were translated or 
conjectured, a point sometimes neglected by scholars. Sinocentrism is 
pervasive in the 24 Chinese Dynastic Histories, particularly in the Ming shi. 
Sinocentrism obscured many facts, and ignorance of them would inevitably 
lead to a failure to understand the real nature of the international 
relations of the Ming Empire.
Prejudice and the imperial rhetoric - obscuration in foreign affairs
(l) Prejudice
Prejudice is an important factor that influenced judgements in international 
relations in Chinese Ming Period. One of its effects was to obscure the 
truth of the northern defence crises and the southern economic opportunity. 
This situation continues to exist in the Chinese world of today, because of 
the deficiency of China’s understanding of Asian history. Some scholars 
today suggest that Western countries do not understand Asian countries’ 
history, but China is no different, China does not understand other Asian 
countries’ history. Many prejudices are evident in Ming China’s archives 68, 
The same is true for the Ming shi hi9.
6: Ming shi, 156, (Zhuan 44), Xue Bin ... Li Xian
Lee Xian ... he was a Tartar, and had been the Minister of the 
Construction Ministry of the Yuan Dynasty. In the 21st year of 
Hongwu he came to us as a translator. Emperor Hongwu granted him 
a name . . . all statements from beyond the Great Wall and the 
Imperial Edicts were ordered to be translated by him.
.iia • 7gx« w  • ’ mmm •
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b' For example, the name - "barbarous country" I f ®  .For example, "The 
Record of Savage Countries" by Zhao Rushi in Southern Song,
"The Record of West Region Savage Countries" PhtijScIf®^ by Chen Cheng 
and Lee Xian Plfijic ' 0 "The record of western ocean savage countries"
by Gong Zhen 1|:J^  in early Ming Dynasty.
Ming shilu. Taizong, 24. 10 month, 1 year of Yongle, p435.
"Since now, people of savage countries who wish to enter China are 
free. "
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Many the Ming’ s works have p re jud ic ia l  t r a n s l i te r a t io n s  which sometimes 
mislead the judgement 70 . Many Asian countries have th e ir  b r i l l i a n t  
c iv i l iz a t io n  in the past, for example; The Mausoleum of Timur 71 in Samarkand 
and the Angkor Wat 72 in Cambodia are both magnificent. Their c iv i l iz a t io n s  
were b r i l l i a n t ,  also.
(2) The imperial rhe toric
The imperial rh e to ric  means the e tique tte  of China’ s Imperial Court. The 
Ming s h i lu ’s sentences might be in terpre ted  as a strong n a tio n a lis t  posture, 
sim ilar to imperialism'3. However, in fact, many records in the Ming sh ilu  
and the Ming sh i are simply based on the Etiquette  of China’ s Imperial Court, 
which the Ming government fu l ly  understood.
Because the Qing Empire t r ied  to control a l l  Chinese thinking, the '"Literary 
Inquisition" was very active. Of course, the scholars who compiled
the Ming shi had to be careful to avoid the In q u is i t io n ’ s a ttention. This 
was p a r t ic u la r ly  necessary when dealing with the re la t io n s  between Manchu 
and the Ming Empire, the h is tory  of res istance  by the Southern Ming Regimes, 
and the re la t io n s  between the Ming Empire and the peoples beyond the Great 
Wall. For example, the rhe to ric  of imperial leg itim iza tion  found in the 
words "Expel the savage (Mongol), re s to re  Chinese p restige"
Ip? (rjFilpf does not invariably mean savage people) -  the s ign if ican t imperial 
ed ict used by Emperor Hongwu -  was erased from the Ming shi. Brutal 
incursions by northern peoples were often mentioned in the Ming shi.
70 The transliteration of "Java" and "Malay" especially used derogatory
expressions that confused the facts. Java was called - PÜÜ - in Yuan 
Dynasty, Ming called -  /J\T±i-  pejoratively, and the name has been used 
until now. In reality -  MfE ~ would be closer. Malay was transliterated 
to - in fact, - U ff - would be better.
71 Philip’s world history encyclopedia. George Philip. London, 2000. p401.
Charles Higham. The Civilization o f AngKor. London: Phoenix, 2003.
Wade, Geoff. The Zheng He Revival: Reassessing, Commemorating, and
Utilizing the Eunuch Voyages and Voyagers. International Symposium on 
World Civilization & Zheng He’ s voyage. Beijing: Peking University 
Press. 2004.
Wade, Geoff . ” The Ming Shilu as a Source for Thai History — 14th to 
17th Centuries” . in Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, Sept. 2000, 
Singapore, pp. 249-294.
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The "lack of grace to the former dynasty" is another Imperial Courtesy. The 
rhetoric of justification for the new regime through denigration of the 
previous ruler is very evident in the Ming shilu and the Ming shi. It could 
be described as "new regime legitimization". The ideology also obscures the 
truth.
Territorialism - confusing the real threat
Was Tibet part of the Ming Empire’s territory? This issue is a very 
sensitive one in Mainland China, but the question is of significance to 
our judgement on the northern defence of the Ming Dynasty, so it should be 
discussed in this thesis. My purpose is to clarify the actual international 
relations and defence conditions during the Ming Dynasty. Every country 
thinks its territory is sacred, so its accounts of its territories over 
history are often confusing. This is evident in many countries’ textbooks, 
and might be called" retrospective territorialism". The fact is that the 
world map has changed often throughout history.
Today California and Arizona are the territory of the USA, but before 1848 
they were part of the territory of Mexico 74 . Today, Tibet is Chinese 
territory; after 1731 - the fifth year of Emperor Yongzheng ^IIE ~ it was
included in the territory of the Qing Empire, but in the Ming Period it did 
not belong to China.
Ming people did not think of Tibet as the territory of the Ming Empire. The 
same view is expressed in many of the Ming sources. For example, the Ming 
shi 75, the Shu yu zhou zi lu (Comprehensive reference for
remote regions) 76 and the Xian bin lu 11 speak of many foreign
74 Edmonds, Jane. Philip’s Atlas of World History. London: George Philip 
Ltd. 1999.
13 Ming shi, 331, (219), Western Region 3, Wu Si Cang PlfifUjU
7b Yan Cong Jian H f lt® edited by Xu Sili . Shu yu zhou zi lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Tibet
77 Luo, Yuejiong ju ren 1585, edited by Xu Sili .Xian bin lu
JgScjEÜ .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Tibet
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countries, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Portugal and so on. Tibet was put in 
this group 78.
"Many not yet know that China has been reunified". Of course, from this 
sentence we can judge that Tibet was not included in the Ming’s territory. 
"Tibet Abbot Nanjiabacangpu sent an ambassador to give local products as 
tribute. '9 ~ here the use of the phrase 
"sent an ambassador" implies going to a foreign country.
In the Ming Period, Tibet was closer to Mongolia than it was to Ming China80 . 
The internal wars in Tibet were often decided by Mongol military 
intervention. In addition, after the third Dalai Lama (1507-1582) accepted 
the invitation of Altan Khan (1507-1582, Chinese called to visit 
the Mongol territory, Altan Khan proclaimed Tibetan Buddhism as the official 
religion for all Mongols (Tartars). The 4th Dalai Lama was the great- 
grandson of Altan Khan81, and the only Dalai Lama who was not a Tibetan. From
78 Yan Cong Jian gtfjtfifi edited by Xu Sili . Shu yu zhou zi lu 
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Tibet, p359
In the second year of Hongwu of our dynasty, an ambassador was 
sent to Tibet with an Imperial Edict: "'When previously our 
emperors governed China their concerns were for moral behaviour 
- most important [U+2013] that people lived in harmony, and that 
foreign peoples in the four corners of the world were at peace, 
too. Now that barbarians have occupied China for more than a 
hundred years, order has turned to chaos .... The people’s lives 
have been made unbearable. Therefore I have ordered my generals 
to lead troops to subdue China, and the people have supported me 
to become the ruler of China. The name of the state is "Ming", 
the Reign-Name is Hongwu. We are following the way of our 
ancient emperors so as to appease our citizens. Your Tibet, a 
land in the west region, may not yet know that China has been 
reunified. So I take this opportunity and send an Imperial Edict 
to notify you. "
fflfiÄ - - « ■ - £ «
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Ming shilu, Taizu, 77, 12 month, 5 year of Hongwu, pl416.
Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p700.
(Tsong-Kha-pa 1357-1419 as the first Dalai Lama)
The Emperor Yongle entreated Tsong-Kha-pa (1357-1419) to visit 
the Ming capital but was spurned .... Tibet’s relations with 
Mongolia during Ming times were, by contrast, very close.
H1 Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard
his time, of course, the re la tionships  between Tibet and Mongolia became 
closer.  This means that  the Ming Empire had a bigger th reat  from the Mongol 
force, because Tibet was an a l ly  of the Mongol power.
Confusion between trade and t r ibu te  -  always in the archives
In 1405, Timur died on an expedition to China. In 1407.6, ambassador Fu An 
and others were released from the Timur Empire a f te r  13 years detention. 
Subsequently, Ming China’ s Emperor Yongle sent other missions to the Timur 
Empire. “I ts  (The Timur Empire) t r ibu te  came every year or every two or 
three years”82. This record is  not, of course, accurate. The sentence comes 
from the Ming shi, which is one of the most s ignif icant  sources for research 
of the Ming his tory83.
I t  was impossible to make the Timur Empire 8,1 pay t r ibu te  to, or subject 
i t s e l f  to, the Ming Empire. The Timur Empire was a Muslim country85. For 
Muslims, Chinese and Hindus are both in f ide ls ;  they are more a lien  than 
Christians.  In religion,  Judaism, Chris t ian ity  and Islam have only one true 
God. The Chinese are dif ferent.  Today, many researches have c learly
University Press. 2003. p701.
s" Ming shi, 332, (fH 220), Samarkand, p8599.
Emperor (Yongle) was generous to i t s  (the Timur Empire’ s)
ambassador .......... and bestowed s i lv e r  on the new king and tr ibe
..........  In the seventh year of Yongle, Fu An (the Ming
ambassador) and others returned to China, and la te r  the king 
sent a mission to bring tr ibu te . Later, t r ibu te  came every year 
or every two or three years . . . .
• % w m  • i h m a i  •
’ M l h ¥  * ’ - f c . i l  ’ lit A m --
Li, Zhuoran (Lee, Cheuk Yin) Mao, Peiqi •Ming Chengzu Shi
Luan .Taipei: Wenjin Publish ,1994.
Often quoted to demonstrate the in ternational re la tions  between 
China and Timur Empire.
Also known as Timur Lenk ' Timur "the Lame”
Luck, Steve. P h ilip ’s Encyclopedia. London: George Philip  Ltd. 1997.
"In 1990 i t  was estimated there were 935 million Muslims worldwide. "
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indicated  th a t  the Ming Empire described as t r i b u t e  what other count ries  
ca l led  trade. In fac t ,  i t  was often ju s t  a t rade  a c t iv i ty .
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<5> Splendid Sources - Ming shilu and the 24 Dynastic 
Histories
Ming shilu - great, original, complete but treacherous
Ming shilu (Veritable Records of the Ming) is a first hand source,
which collected the most significant state events, "Imperial Edict",
"Memorial to the Throne", affairs of foreign relations and the "Emperor’s 
words". It was recorded by court officials, and completed by the next
emperor. Each emperor had a shilu\ in Emperor Hongwu’s time, each chapter 
(juan) covered two months, but from Emperor Yongle onwards, one chapter held 
one month.
Ming shilu, Qing shilu 8b and the 24 Dynastic Histories are the most 
substantial original historical sources for Chinese history studies. It is 
most unusual that China has so many historical records, as other countries 
do not have sources which can compare with Ming shilu, Qing shilu and the 24 
Dynastic Histories. In this research Qing shilu has not been used, only Ming 
shilu and the 24 Dynastic Histories have been referenced.
However, there is so much material that it is easy to make misjudgements 
from them, and these mistakes still occur today. Thus it is necessary to
analyse them methodically. It should be emphasised that the Ming shilu 
contains much Sinocentrism, particularly when it deals with foreign
relations, and often exaggerates Ming China's prestige (the Ming shi
exaggerates more than the Ming shilu) and it needs careful interpretations, 
not only in classical Chinese linguistic grammar, but also in a speiial 
language of court ritual), especially the "Imperial Edict". Empenrs’ 
words were often mixed with an empire’s posture", so the real meaning Bust 
be carefully reviewed. However, everyone in the early Ming Dynasty xnew
Zhang Shun Hui . Zhang Shun Hui Xue Shu Luan Zhu xian
jlfül .Wuhan: Hua Zhong Shi Fan Ipcju®jig University Press, 1997. p68
The Ming shilu and the Qing shilu are the best original 
sources for obtaining historical descriptions of national rulers.
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that the whole of China was ruled by Mongol for about 90 years, and 
that the population of Mongolia was far le ss  than China.
Many records of the Ming sh i are taken from Ming sh ilu  87. Ming sh ilu  is  the 
more comprehensive and detailed, but also the more treacherous88. For records 
of the Ming Empire’ s foreign p o lic ie s ,  the entries  in Ming sh ilu , based on 
the "Court Etiquette", always exaggerate the glory and prestige of Ming 
China, but in fact the Ming Government well understood the rea l ity  of i t s  
international relations.
There are many intentional errors in Ming shilu . For example, the records 
claim that Emperor Yongle’ s blood mother was Empress Ma 89 , but in fact i t  
was Princess Gong ( T E iJ f  ] > a Korean, as shown by many researchers 90. This
87 Xie Gui An .Ming Shi Lu Yan Jiu  .Wuhan: Hu bei Ren Min 
chu ban she . 2003. p435.
The essentia l sources of the Ming shi [almost] a l l  come from the 
Ming shilu.
( W $ . )  « O T Ü »  •
88 Dardess, John Wolfe. “ Background fac tors  in the r is e  of the Ming Dynasty” . 
New York: Thesis (Ph.D.) -  Columbia University, 1968. p11.
The Ming History (shi) s t i l l  faces a quagmire of errors, 
omissions, and uncertain ties . Yet the Ming History is  a more 
re l iab le  account than one of i t s  chief sources, the Ming shilu, 
or '"Veritable Records", a chronological account which each Ming 
emperor had written up for his predecessor. The "Veritable 
Records" covering Zhu Yuan-zhang’ s reign were rewritten three 
times.
89 Ming shilu, Taizong, 10, 7 month, 35 year of Hongwu, p 143.
[1402. 7] (Emperor Yongle) I, Emperor, am the son borne by the 
legal empress of Empress Hongwu. Emperor Hongwu had defin ite  
policy: i f  there is a lack of good ministers, but instead evil
persons in the Imperial Court, the King (Prince) would lead 
troops to resovle matters.
° saw « I  ■ w iuE g  ■ r w f  s  • •
90 Two famous scholars of Ming history, Wu Han ^  [ 0j=3 ] and have
both established th is  in th e ir  researches. A famous scholar of the Ming 
Period, Tan Qian, has the same opinion, and a scholar of the Qing 
Period, has a clear description of the matter.
Wu ^ | [ 0 l 3 ' ] :  “The research for Emperor Yongle’ s mother” .
m  ( i i i i )  ^_i935 3 m.
Huang, Yunmei jEfft/il .Ming shi kao zheng Beijing: Zhonghua shu
zhu 1984. Vol. 1, « B J 5 ^ S % § i»  , P62.
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example proves t h a t  the Ming s h i lu  con ta ins  e r r o r s ,  p o s s ib ly  i n t e n t i o n a l  
l i e s ,  in some s i g n i f i c a n t  cases.
Ming s h i  -  an e s s e n t i a l  source with some mistakes
The Ming s h i  (Ming h i s t o r y )  was compiled in the e a r ly  Qing Dynasty, 
fo l lowing the remarkable Chinese t r a d i t i o n  tha t ,  once a new Dynasty had 
been e s ta b l i s h e d ,  the h i s t o r y  of  the former Dynasty was completed. The 
Ming s h i  was compiled and modified over about  100 years ,  i t s  co n te n t s  
confirmed by a most c a r e f u l  p o l i t i c a l  review during the Qing government91. 
Chinese o f f i c i a l  h i s t o r i a n s  have always had a s p e c i a l  Confucian s p i r i t ,  and 
have sought to  d e l i v e r  the t r u t h  of  h i s t o r y  as t h e i r  duty. However, 
p o l i t i c a l  ques t ions  were decided by the Qing government.
The l i t e r a r y  q u a l i t y  of  the Ming s h i  i s  very good, and r eco rds  in the  Ming 
sh i  a re  o f t e n  quoted during r e s e a rc h  of  Ming h i s to r y .  The Ming s h i  i s  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  and i s  o f t e n  thought  one o f  the b e t t e r  work in the  24 D ynastic  
H is to r ie s , but  because many fo re ign  reco rds  were j u s t  copied from the  Ming 
sh ilu , and i t s  focus i s  on i n t e r i o r  a f f a i r s ,  i t s  f o re ig n  rec o rd s  co n ta in  
c r i t i c a l  mistakes,  which must be c a r e f u l l y  examined i f  used in h i s t o r i c a l  
r esearch .  There a re  four  p o i n t s  of  view to  be considered.
(1) Ming s h i  makes obvious mistakes:
Tan, Qian , 1594-1657, edited by Zhang Zongxiang JMzhW. Guo que 
[104 juan] [ g i f  [104 .Bei jing:  Gu j i  chu ban she 1958.
Juan 12, the fourth year of Jianwen.
Zhu Li zun 7^ # #  . Jing  zh i ju  shi hua
Tso, Keung Ming Gilbert. “ The study of the compilation of Mingshi and i t s  
lunzan” . Canberra: Thesis (Ph. D.) -  Austral ian National University, 1994. 
<abstract>, p4, p215.
Previous scholars have tended to argue that  the compilation of 
[the] Ming Shi was a means by which the Manchu emperors intended 
to mollify the Ming loyal is ts .  However, although the compilation 
of [the] Ming Shi was primarily p o l i t i c a l l y  orientated,  i t s  
nature la t e r  changed and the project did not serve th is  purpose.
The h i s to r ica l  accounts in the Ming Shi were not en t i re ly  
impartial. The history of the Manchus under the rule of the Ming 
Dynasty in the Ming Shi was erased.
49
Much important information about Zheng He in the Ming shi needs amendment. 
For example, Yoshimochi was Japan’s Shogun, not king (i. e. , emperor), so he 
was not Japan’s head of state. Japan has its own emperor. So the Ming shi 
has this obvious mistake92 , but some modern Chinese books still quote this 
statement from the Ming shi as fact93.
(2) Ming shi is poor in its foreign records
The foreign records in the Ming shi are not good. One example is the Ming 
Shi ’ s records on Persia, it is mistake obviously. The author of the foreign 
records for the Ming shi in the early Qing period seemingly did not 
carefully read the 23 Dynastic Histories (this should be blamed).
Sumatra, is located to the west of Malacca, could be reached in 
nine days (from Malacca) if the wind was suitable. It was said 
that because of its location it belonged to the Tiao Zhi country 
in the Han Period, or Persia and the Arabic Empire in the Tang 
Period. This country is at a vital shipping crossroads. 91
• mmmwm • mm  * *
Of course, Persia is not located in Sumatra. In fact, in Shi ji, the Han 
shu, the Tang shu and the Song shi, there are more accurate records on 
Persia and the Arab Empire 95 9fi. Persia was recorded in the Song shi with an 
accurate geographic location, for example:
Ming shi, 322, (Zhuan 210), Japan, p8345.
nwi ttnmziunmmmziu • mmmsc • ±m±.c m o  x
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(the fourth year of Yongle) naming Japan’s mount as Guarding 
State Mount, Emperor (Yongle) wrote the inscription of stele,
and put it on the mount ....  (the sixth year of Yongle), (he)
also sent an official bringing the Imperial Edict, which named 
Yoshimochi as king of Japan. At that time also, because the 
Activity of Japan’s pirates, he sent an official to instruct 
Yoshimochi to destroy and capture these pirates.
Chao, Zhongchen .Ming Chengzu juan .Beijing: Ren min chu
ban she A ß t B U S f i  ,2003. p316.
94 Ming shi, 325, (fl| 213), Sumatra, p8411.
Jiu Tang shu, 10, (10), 2nd year of Zhide Mill , p247
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Gaochang means Xizhou, a land which faces south towards Yutian, 
southwest towards the Arab Empire and Persia,  west towards 
Xit ian Balushe , Snow Mountain and the Plateau of Pamirs. I t  is  
several  thousand Li d i s t a n t  from each of these. (Song s h i ) .9‘
nmmmm • m * m
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(3) Ming sh i exaggerates more than Han shu and Tang shu in foreign r e l a t i o n s  
matters
The ear ly  Han Empire and the early Tang Empire enjoyed a higher p re s t ige  
and pos i t ion  in Asian h i s to ry  than the ear ly  Ming Empire, but the Ming 
sh i exaggerates the dynasty’ s in te rna t iona l  s t a t u s 98, more than the Han 
shu and the Tang shu. Probably because many of the Ming s h i ’s  foreign 
records were copied from Ming shilu , a l l  Ming people were aware of the 
humil ia t ing h is to ry  of the Mongol ru le  over a l l  China. The Ming 
government wished to r e s to r e  China’ s p res t ige ,  so fore ign records in Ming 
sh ilu  always exaggerate China’ s in te rna t iona l  posi t ion.
(4) Ming sh i takes a negative addit ion  to the Ming emperors:
[757] In the ninth month .......... The Marshal, Prince of
Pacification, led 200,000 troops including Shuofang, Anxi, 
Vighurs, Nanman, and the Arab Empire, east to quell the bandits.
[757] Ain.... m  * mm * a^ ao- ah
% Xin tang shu, 126, (51), Zi Huang, Zi Gao AM  ' Alf*
Zi Huang sent a memorandum to the throne: "Tibet has feloniously 
occupied the areas along the Yellow and Huang Rivers for a long 
time. In recent years i t  has been gradually declining. In
addition, i t  is pressured by the Arab Empire on the west,
opposes the Uighurs in the north and confronts Nanchao in the 
east. I ts  military forces have been divided in order to fight 
these external wars.. . "
-S±H : - SX  • jfiIS«§i ’ - 4ÜT0« • «S t*
IS ■
97 Song shi, 490, (249), Gaochang
98 Perhaps there was no such thing a “ international s ta tu s” at this
time; however, for example, Japan had sent many scholars to study in 
Tang China, but has not in Ming China.
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One thing should be emphasized, in the early Qing Period, the movement 
called '"Against the Qing for res to ring  the Ming" had existed. In 1912, the 
Republic of China was established and Dr. Sun Yatsen became the temporary 
president. He and his o f f ic ia l s  went to the tomb of Emperor Hongwu and 
paid th e ir  respects at a s ta te  ceremony in Nanjing. This suggests tha t the 
Ming Dynasty was s t i l l  admired by some of Han Chinese 269 years a f te r  i t  had 
fallen. Why would the compilers of the Ming shi have not smeared the 
Emperors of the Ming? Why indeed! They were in a position to choose 
which events to record. Thus many records in the Ming shi must be treated 
with care.
The Dynastic H istories  -  Chinese Empire’ s s tra teg ic  guides
The Dynastic H istories  are of course the standard works of Chinese history. 
They are always considered to be the most important study for the conduct of 
the Empire 99 . Records about Persia in the 23 Dynastic H istories  were 
available to Emperor Yongle (his advisers) and Admiral Zheng He (the 23 
Dynastic H istories  not 24, because the Ming shi was compiled in the early 
Qing Dynasty). The scale of Zheng He’ s voyages was so great that of course 
the Emperor would have needed much information to prepare for them. Thus the 
Dynastic H istories  (pa rticu la r  the foreign records) would have been a 
s ign if ican t reference point for th is  plan.
In Confucius’ discussions of the documents of the ancient kings, 
he advised tha t the in s t i tu t io n s  of former dynasties should be 
examined. Thus a review of the r is e  and f a l l  of the House of 
Zhao can show the achievement of the Great Yuan in unifying the
Empire..............  because the magnificence and supreme rule of your
Majesty, follows the great trad ition , and because you take 
pleasure in discussing the past actions and previous speeches
..........  (you) ordered your subject, Alutu,..........  to compile
essen tia l materials into th is  work. From the Northern Song
Shi j i  was finished in about BC 87, i t  might seem too ancient for Emperor 
Yongle in 1405. However the Confucian Analects fmlo » Meng j i  , 
Shi j i  j£li6 and the other 22 Dynastic Histories were often thought of as 
textbooks and models for emperors in the Ming Dynasty. As i t  happens, 
the f i r s t  three books are not just famous in present-day China, but also 
in present-day Japan.
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through to the Southern Song Period, more than 300 years are
recorded ........... [1345] In the 10th month, f i f t h  year of Zhizheng
........... your subject ,  Alutu, and others  send th i s  statement to
the throne. 100
...m •
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The Liao sh i was f in ished  in 1344, the Song sh i was completed in 1345, and 
both are r e l a t i v e l y  close to the s t a r t  of Admiral Zheng He’ s f i r s t  voyage in 
1405. The "Statement for  presen ting the Song shi" emphasizes tha t  the 
achievements and records of former dynast ies  could be of relevance to the 
cur ren t  Imperial Court. This may well have been the a t t i t u d e  of Emperor 
Yongle towards the 23 D ynastic H istories.
The “Statement for  presen ting the Liao sh i” al so  demonstrates tha t
the ch ief  purpose of wri t ing  the Dynastic H is to r ie s  was for  the in s t ru c t io n  
of future emperors 101. Emperor Yongle was an outstanding emperor, and he 
could have read the 23 Dynastic H istories, or they would have been drawn to 
h is  a t t e n t io n  by his  advisors.
Examining the 23 Dynastic H isto rie s  for  the Ming’ s s tr a tegy
In the f i r s t  month of 1421, the Ming Empire moved i t s  c a p i ta l  from Nanjing 
to Beijing.  In view of i t s  importance, the ambassador of the Timur Empire 
should not have been absent from the ceremony which marked th i s  occasion. 
The Timur Empire might have been expected to be put in the f i r s t  posi t ion,
100 Song shi, Appendix, Statement for presenting the Song shi
101 Liao shi, Appendix, Statement for presenting the Liao shi
[1344] .......... although the Official Historian described the
insti tut ions and policies of former Dynasties, the main purpose
was to ass ist  the reflect ions of the emperors.............  the Liao
Dynasty began in the late Tang Period .......... and the empire
lasted 219 years. . ..
’ xmmts xmzmm..................m&mm...................m - h
.......
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and the name of Hormuz was f i r s t  on the l i s t  for Zheng He’ s voyages. However, 
Hormuz is a port in the Timur Empire’ s te r r i to ry .
[1421. 1] The ambassadors of 16 countries from Hormuz and 
elsewhere returned to th e ir  countries; money and the Imperial 
Statement were bestowed. Grand Supervisor Zheng He and others 
were sent to take the Imperial Edicts and also luxurious clothes, 
cotton cloths, s i lk s  and other things for granting to the Kings. 
Zheng He with ambassadors went together. 102
'  mmmva > i °wtmmmi •
As Timur was the s tra teg ic  partner of the Early Ming Empire during 
1395-1449 (see chapter 4), there should be a focus on the re la tions  between 
Ming China and the Timur Empire. The Timur Empire controlled Persia, and as 
the history of re la tions  between Persia and China was important to Ming 
China’ s s tra teg ic  design, i t  could well be relevant to the orig inal motive 
for Zheng He’ s voyage.
The 23 Dynastic H istories  were considered very important in the imperial 
in s t i tu t io n  of China 103. During 1395 to 1405, the Ming Government sent many 
missions to the Timur Empire’ s te r r i to ry ,  including Zheng He’ s f lee t ,  
and the Persian language was used between Ming China and the Timur Empire. 
Of course they needed to know the history  of diplomatic re la tions  between 
China and Persia. Thus the foreign records on Persia in the 23 Dynastic 
H istories  are of significance in determining the stra tegy of the early Ming 
Empire.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu. Taizong, 233. 1 month, 19 year of Yongle, p2256.
Tashakori, Abbas. “ Iran in Chinese dynastic histories : a study of Iran’ s 
relations with China prior to the Arab conquest” . Canberra: Thesis 
(M. A.)- Australian National University, 1974. pH.
The Chinese were pioneers in the art of compilation of history 
and possess the longest and most continuous historical records.
Sima Qian W]J§3I (145-86 BC), the author of Shi j i  
(Historical Records), and generally known as the father of 
Chinese history, laid the foundation of systematic
historiography.
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The Dynastic H is to r ie s  were always the Chinese Empire’ s s t r a t e g i c  guide, 
having been w r i t t en  for  Emperors and Imperial ministers ,  not for  common 
scholars.  A new way to e s t a b l i s h  Ming China’ s s t ra tegy  has been suggested -  
a search of the Dynastic H is to r ie s  for  the Ming’ s s t r a t e g i c  design. This 
idea is  unusual but very important. Emperor Yongle (his advisers)  needed 
knowledge about western Asia, and so Hormuz in Pers ia  was designated as the 
ch ief  de s t ina t ion  for  Zheng He’ s voyages.
55
Chapter 3
North and South -  strategy and route (before 
1392)
Introduction:
An analys is  of Dao y i  zh i luo  I | f j > [ 5 §  and Yi yu zh i  by Professor 
Roderich Ptak shows tha t  the t r a v e l l e r s  of  Yuan China had a s im i la r  a t t i t u d e  
to tha t  of the grea t  maritime explorers  of western Europe, a 100 years la te r .  
Yuan China’ s t r a v e l l e r s  were in te re s ted  in the geographical location,  
distances, so i l  condit ions  and cl imate,  local  customs, laws and punishments 
of  foreign countries  1 . The Dao y i  zh i luo  and the Yi yu zh i  are two 
s ig n i f i c a n t  works on China’ s maritime s t ra tegy  in the Yuan Period, each 
i l l u s t r a t i n g  Yuan China’ s already prosperous maritime a c t iv i t y .
On the other  hand, Professor Wang Gungwu has indicated tha t  the Ming Empire 
had a "reverse" s t r a t e g i c  pos i t ion  compared with tha t  of the Yuan Empire2, a
1 Ptak, Roderich .China and the Asian Seas: trade, travel, and visions o f  
the other (1400-1750) .Aldershot; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, c1998.
The formal structure of the Daoyi zhi luo ÜMScÄ and the Yi yu 
zhi SfiiSoS can also be analyzed on the level of individual 
country segments. In the case of the Daoyi zhiluo, most segments 
are organized in the following way: the text begins by defining 
the geographical location of a place in terms of its vicini ty to 
other nearby areas. Sometimes there is also information on 
distances. This is followed by brief remarks on the 
topographical and soil conditions and climate. After these 
in i t i a l ,  purely geographical statements, the author comments on 
the local customs of the inhabitants. Very often, examples serve 
to i l lu s tra te  the reason that the customs of a country were 
considered "evil", "strange" and so on. Such remarks may also 
include brief  references to local laws and punishments. 
(Professor Roderich Ptak)
Wang, Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore : Times Academic 
Press, 1991. p i l l .
The policies of the Mongols towards their Southeast Asian 
neighbours were predicated upon having safe northern frontiers.
The Yuan could afford to threaten these southern rulers and seek 
to extend its power as far as was feasible. The Ming founder
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very simple and significant interpretation of Emperor Hongwu’s "Maritime 
Forbidden Policy". After the Ming Dynasty was established, it needed to 
concentrate its resources to defend itself against any threat from the north, 
so the prosperous civil maritime activity of the Yuan period had to be 
restricted. During the period of the Ming Empire there was heavy pressure on 
defence of the northern frontier, as was true of many of the dynasties of 
China, not just the Ming. This heavy pressure on northern frontier defence 
lasted more than 2,000 years. However, the Yuan Dynasty was different; it 
had no northern frontier threat (and no need to construct the Great Wall) 
and there was therefore a more vibrant maritime activity during its era.
This chapter reviews the plan and route for the defence of the northern 
frontier, and for the southern maritime initiatives of China, before 1392. 
There were many approaches to defence on China’s northern frontier in 
Chinese history, of which the Qin Emperor Shihuangdi’ s construction of the 
Qin Dynasty Great Wall for defence and the Han Emperor Wudi’ s search for 
an alliance for advance (military expeditions) were two famous examples. 
Yet China was not just a great land power: there were many enthusiastic 
activities in oceanic development in its history.
Zheng He’s voyages demonstrate the sophisticated technology of Chinese 
maritime equipment in the early Ming Period. Zheng He’s fleet was bigger, 
and sailed greater distances, than Prince Henry the Navigator’s ships. 
Before Zheng He’s voyages there was a long history of traffic between China 
and Persia, both by land and sea. Also, the Yuan Empire had carried 
out large-scale oceanic expeditions, for example, during the war on Japan 
for which it mobilized more ships than Zheng He’s fleet. If the purpose was 
national security, or expansion of the empire’ s territory, the Chinese 
imperial government could always organise its resources to great effect.
(Emperor Hongwu) had a position which was exactly the reverse. 
As with so many Chinese dynasties, there was danger from the 
north. He needed to secure his southern and coastal frontiers so 
that he could concentrate on pacifying the great Mongol-Turk 
confederations and defending the long border between Western 
Manchuria and Eastern Tibet. (Professor Wang Gungwu)
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<1> Land strategy: China' s strategic models before 1392
Qin Dynasty Great Wall as a famous defence s t ra tegy
In the Qin and Han period, the Xiongnu (or Huns) were a f i e r c e  nomadic t r i b e  
and the most dangerous th rea t  to the Qin and Han Empires. They frequently  
invaded the Chinese Empires. Thus the Qin Dynasty Great Wall was a grand 
s t ra tegy  for  northern defence which is  famous in h is tory.  I t  provides an 
example for  Ming China’ s s t r a t e g i c  design.
Today’ s Great Wall of China is  the Ming Dynasty Great Wall, not the Qin 
Dynasty Great Wall, or the Han Dynasty Great Wall, or the Sui Dynasty Great 
Wall. The Ming Dynasty Great Wall was for  the most par t  a t o t a l l y  new 
construc t ion  (at huge cost  to the s t a t e ) ,  not simply a p ro jec t  to r e p a i r  the 
Qin Dynasty Great Wall. I t  was a su b s tan t i a l  undertaking, not often 
appreciated by the average student.  The routes  taken by the Ming Dynasty 
Great Wall and e a r l i e r  Great Walls3 are completely d i f f e re n t ,  because of the 
d i f f e re n t  t e r r i t o r y ,  and the technology both fo r  cons truct ion and for 
m i l i t a ry  requirements.
The Qin, Han and Sui Dynast ies’ Great Walls are simpler  in construct ion,  
with some sect ions  ju s t  f i l l e d  with so i l ,  to ac t  as a boundary and obs tac le  
to de ter  horses (cavalry) , and the g rea te r  par t  of these walls had become 
ruins  by the Yuan Period. The Ming Dynasty Great Wall is  quite  d i f fe ren t ,  
i t s  cons truct ion  having taken more than 200 years. The Ming Great Wall 
absorbed much of the Ming Empire’ s resources.
To p ro tec t  themselves against  the Xiongnu and other  nomads, ancient  Chinese 
kings b u i l t  walls  to prevent invasion of t h e i r  kingdoms. In 221 BC the Qin 
Emperor Shihuang 4 reunited  China, and s t a r t e d  to strengthen  and extend the
3 The route of the Qin Dynasty Great Wall starts from Minxian liiKL?, (ancient name Lintao 
Emhjfc), and runs northward along the east bank of Tao River. When it reaches Lanzhou M 
'ji'l it continues east and then north, parallel with the Yellow River MM, to Mount Yin
ill and from there turns east again to Liaodong
4 Emperor Qin Shihuang (259 BC - 210 BC)
His two greatest achievements in China were the Qin Dynasty Great Wall 
and the Terracotta Warriors and Horses. As the f i r s t  emperor of China, 
he had a profound influence on Chinese history and culture.
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ex i s t ing  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  (walls on the f r o n t i e r s  of three  countries)  5 6 . He 
aimed to combine a l l  the walls  into a s ingle  grea t  wall along the northern 
border of h is  empire. The population of the Qin Empire was about 20 million.  
According to the records of  Shi j i  and the Han shu, around 500,000 labourers 
p a r t i c ip a te d  in the construc t ion  of the Qin Dynasty Great Wall and the 
northern defences. These included so ld ie r s  from the Qin Empire’ s huge army, 
pr isoners  and forced labour. The majori ty of the workers were so ld ie rs .  The 
300,000 troops were led by General Meng Tian, and they were the primary 
force which both repe l led  a t tacks  by the Xiongnu and al so  constructed the 
Qin Dynasty Great Wall8. According to the record of Shi j i ,  the construct ion 
took 10 years (221-210 BC)7 , during which thousands died due to the harsh 
weather and working condi t ions8.
The Qin Dynasty Great Wall was cos t ly  to construct ,  and also  d i f f i c u l t  and 
expensive to s t a t io n  with large troop numbers. Many sec t ions  of the Wail 
were in very remote areas.  Garrisons were needed on the Wall to defend it, 
so food and supplies  had to be sent  to them. The Qin Dynasty Great Wall was 
a s ig n i f i c a n t  defence s t ra tegy  for  the empire’ s s ecu r i ty  aga ins t  tne 
northern steppe enemy. I t  remains very famous in Chinese h is to ry  and, of 
course, a l l  the emperors of  the Ming Dynasty knew of i t .
Han China joined the Yuezhi to a t tack  the Xiongnu
(1) Zhang Qian’ s mission: to seek an a l l i a n c e  fo r  expedit ions
Han China joined the Yuezhi to a t tack  the Xiongnu is  another famous 
s t r a t eg ic ,  scholars  in the Ming Dynasty should be fam i l i a r  i t .  In 139 BC, 
the Han Emperor Wudi switched the northern defence s t ra t egy  from defence 
(the Great Wall) to a t t ack  (a m i l i t a ry  expedit ion) in order to destroy the
5 Shi j i ,  110, (Zhuan 50), Xiongnu ,p2885.
6 Later dynasties followed Qin’ s technique, using the army as the major 
constructing force; the Ming Dynasty Great Wall used i t  also.
7 Shi j i ,  88, (Zhuan 28), Meng Tian, UfiS ,p2565.
8 Shi j i ,  89, (Zhuan 29), Zhang Er, p2573.
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northern threat from the Xiongnu. He sent Zhang Qian as ambassador on a 
mission to estab lish  friendship and join forces with the Daroushi (Yuezhi) 
to attack the Xiongnu 9. According to Shi j i  and the Han shu’s  records, 
Zhang Qian himself v is i te d  four countries 10, including Ferghana, which is  
present-day Herat. Herat was the active capital of the Timur Empire during 
the reign of Emperor Yongle.
The Emperor [Han Wudi] had heard that Dawan, Daxia and Parthia 
were a l l  large countries. They had many things in common with 
China, though their military forces were weak. They valued 
highly products from the Han Empire11. To their  north were 
Daroushi and Kangju, which had strong military forces. Thus they 
(Dawan, Daxia and Parthia) could be granted g i f t s  for the 
benefit of our empire. Also, i f  they became close friends, then 
their  vast lands, with tens of thousands of Li, could be used to 
set up comprehensive stations and improve their  customs, leading
9 Han shu, 61, (Zhuan 31), Zhang Qian (Mil ,p2687.
Zhang Qian .......... at that time the surrender to Xiongnu - said:
the kingdom of the Yuezhi was destroyed by Xiongnu, and the 
skull of the king of Yuezhi was used as a cup by Xiongnu. The 
Yuezhis who escaped hated Xiongnu, but no country could be 
persuaded to join in an attack on Xiongnu. The Han Empire wanted 
to exterminate Xiongnu, had heard this news, then sought to
communicate with Yuezhi by mission .........  Zhang Qian as Military
Official was recruited, as an ambassador to Yuezhi .........
ear l ier ,  Zhang Qian's mission involved more than one hundred 
people, and after 13 years, only two people returned.
• ^ i i ä  > m
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10 Han shu, 61, (Zhuan 31), Zhang Qian (MU ,p2687.
Zhang Qian arrived in Ferghana[a], Da Yuezhi[b], Da Xia and 
Kangju, and communicated information on these 5 or 6 great 
neighboring countries to the emperor. His reports all appear in 
the Records of the Western Regions.
mm fM#  > aba. am. K®  ’ • mma
a. The capital of Ferghana was Herat, in the period of Emperor 
Yongle was the active capital of the Timur Empire.
b. Hou Han shu, 88, (Zhuan 78), Da Yue(rou) Zhi ,p2920.
It should mean silk which was from the Silk Road. There remains today a 
l i fe-sized carved figure of Hercules set up in the Parthian period and 
placed by the Silk Road to guard the route.
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to the spread of imperial prestige  everywhere. The Emperor was 
delighted, and believed Zhang Qian’ s words were right.  (Shi j i ) 12
^  uwm) m&j&ükxsi'  * mu
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The information above is very important. Emperor Yongle must have known of 
i t ,  and probably i t  was connected to the original  motive for Zheng He’ s 
voyages. Shi j i  and the Han shu are two of the most famous works in China, 
from the Han Dynasty to 21th century. Their value is not limited to history, 
but also includes th e i r  l i t e ra ry  eminence and the l ight they throw on 
s ta te  s tra tegies .
""Foreigners memorised the old land, and favoured the products 
from the Han Empire. Indeed, at  th is  time generously bribing
Wusun ..........  the Han Empire dispatched a princess for marriage,
sealing a relationship,  in order to cut off  the right hand of 
the Xiongnu.........."" the Emperor approved th is  suggestion................13
■ Rum® •
.......j c t i i ........
According to Shi j i  and the Han shu, the strategy of making a l l iances  to 
""Cut off  the r igh t  hand of the Xiongnu"" was the original  motive for Zhang 
Qian’ s secret  mission. This s t ra teg ic  and diplomatic matter was so famous in 
Chinese his tory that  the Ming Emperor Yongle must have known of i t .  Thus i f  
Zheng He was sent to make friends with the Timur Empire, i t  was to ""cut down 
the right hand of Mongol force"" -  an absolutely reasonable strategy for the 
national defence of Ming China.
(2) Ma Huan’ s poem shows that  Zhang Qian’ s mission and Hormuz are linked to 
Herat
12 Shi Ji,  123,  (Chuan 6 3 ) ,  Da Wan XJü
13 Han shu, 61 ,  (Zhuan 3 1 ) ,  Zhang Qian iütllf ,p2692.
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Ma Huan was a senior o ff ice r  in Admiral Zheng He’ s f lee t ,  and he wrote
Ying Ya Sheng Lan (The Overall Survey of the Ocean’ s Shores), a
work which is  a s ign if ican t source for d e ta i ls  of Zheng He’ s voyages. This 
poem is contained in his book:
Hormuz close to the ocean’ s side;
To Dawan (Herat) and Mixi the trav e ll in g  merchants ride.
Of the embassy of Bowang to the '"distant region" we heard; 
how about the glorious favour in the present reign conferred?11
nnmmmm
The travels of the Marquis of Bowang flfiifll, Zhang Qian (?—113 BC), in 
the Han Period have become a famous story in Chinese history, and are 
recorded in Shi j i  ft? and the Han shu ^HÜ. To deal with the th rea t from 
the Xiongnu, in 139 BC, the Han Emperor Wudi sent Zhang Qian on a 
diplomatic/military mission. Han Chinese also found out from Zhang Qian 
tha t people outside China were eager to buy Chinese s i lk  (Admiral Zheng He 
made g if ts  of s i lk  to Hormuz on many occasions). The Xiongnus had received 
s i lk  as g i f t s  from the e a r l ie r  Han emperors and sold i t  to the people of 
Central Asia, and they wanted more. Zhang Qian’ s knowledge of the lands in 
central Asia helped to open an overland trade route from China to the west -  
the Silk Road.
What was the orig inal motive for Zhang Qian’ s mission? I t  was to make an 
a lliance  with the Yuezhi ^  J3? (a power in Central Asia) in order to destroy 
Xiongnu. Zhang Qian fa i led  to re c ru i t  the Yuezhi but he did estab lish  
another a lliance, and was successful in discovering much useful information. 
The exploration was ju s t  a secondary mission. Ma Huan’ s poem provides a 
link between Zhang Qian’ s mission and Zheng He’ s voyages.
14 Ma, Huan fSffc 1414-1451, Edited by Feng, Chengjun .Ying ya sheng
lan W h . .Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan jlSTIjEPlIfi ,1934. p2.
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Where was Dawan 15 ? In 138 BC, Zhang Qian was captured by Xiongnu, then 
went by way of Dawan to the Darouzhi. So Dawan was on the route to Yuezhi. 
During 1407-1433, Dawan was the c i ty  of Herat, the second (active) capital  
of the Timur Empire. And th is  poem has great significance -  i t  means that  
Hormuz (in Persia) was in communication with Herat, the capital  of the Timur 
Empire.
During the period of Zheng He’ s voyages, Emperor Yongle himself led large- 
scale expeditions to the Mongolian Plateau in order to destroy Mongol 
himself, the descendant of the Yuan and Ghengis Khan. These were s ignif icant 
and dangerous mili tary a c t iv i t i e s .  I t  was quite possible that  Zheng He’ s 
voyages might have involved a s t ra teg ic  role similar to Zhang Qian’ s mission.
Tang China’ s mil i t ary  victory in central  Asia
(1) The Tang Empire’ s mil i t ary  victory in central  Asia
The early Tang Empire's mil i t ary  in central  Asia should be an important 
example for the s t ra teg ic  design of the early Ming Empire. Because Emperor 
Yongle often mentioned about the Tang Emperor Taizong (and the languages 
were similar to Jiu Tang shu and Xin Tang shu ) according to Ming shilu. 
Many records in the early Tang Empire i l l u s t r a t e  that  the threat  from the 
northern nomadic enemy was very serious lfi. The Turki’ s invasion once came
15 I could not agree with Feng Chengjun’s note. Dawan was not Dashi j\1k ■ 
Dawan was Herat, as c lear ly  recorded in the Ming's work. Herat was the 
second capi ta l  of the Timur Empire (the other was Samarkand). Shah Rukh 
iddJp-ll' (1409-1447) was the third ruler of the Timur Empire, ruling from 
Herat.
Luo, Yuejiong Ü B I £  ju ren 1585, edited by Xu Si l i  .Xian bin lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. p98.
Herat was a great country, called Dawan in the Han Period ..........
> wm-zxkH > r » j  > mz vmmmj  s e a  • m
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lb J iu  Tang shu, 1, 8th year of Wude
[625] In the eighth month of the eighth year, the Governor of 
Province, Zhang Gongjin was fighting with Turki in Taigu. Our 
imperial troops were defeated, and the Minister of Zhongshu, Wen 
Yanbo, was killed  by bandits. In the ninth month, the Turki 
withdrew.
■ aspic* ’
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close to the cap ita l area. I t  was a very dangerous s itua tion , and the Tang 
Emperor even considered to transfe rring  the cap ita l  to avoid disaster.
[624] In Autumn, the seventh year, J i e l i  Khan and Tuli Khan of 
Turki came raiding from Yuanzhou, and invaded Guanzhong . . .
Gaozu . . . wanted to move the capital. Xiao Yu and the others a l l  
thought tha t was wrong, however they did not dare to admonish 
the emperor. Only Taizong spoke: "Huoqubing, the commanding
general of the Han empire, s t i l l  has the ambition to destroy the 
Xiongnu. I, as a subject and prince, am responsible, i f  the trace 
(dust) of the Xiongnu does not end, which leads to the emperor 
wanting to transfe r  the capital. . . . . .  Gaozhu thereupon
decided not (to move the cap ita l) .  17
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Circumstances then changed. After Tang Taizong succeeded to the imperial 
crown, he made su ff ic ien t  m ilitary  and diplomatic preparation for the 
ac tiva tion  of northern desert expeditions. Then a ser ies  of m ilitary  
expeditions were carried out and v ic to r ie s  achieved by the Tang Empire 
18 19, perhaps as a re su lt  of the s tra teg ic  ta len t of Tang Taizong, and the
M  • Aid ’ m m  •
17 Jiu  Tang shu, 2, before the 1st year of Zhen Guan
18 Jiu Tang shu, 3, 4th year of Zhen Guan j i tü
[630] In Spring, in Yihai, the f i r s t  month of the fourth year, 
the Branch Military General Commander of Dingxiang Province[3], 
Li Jing, greatly damaged Turki, capturing the Sui Empress Xiao 
and the grandson of the Sui Emperor Yangdi, Zhengdao, and sent 
them to the capital.
ffiJEM ’ m & M  ■
19 Jiu Tang shu, 3, 4th year of Zhen Guan j=tig
[630] In the second month .........  Jiachen, Li Jing damaged the
Turki again at Yin Mountain. J ie li  Khan with his light cavalry 
fled into the distance.
- U .......• w j R t f f l s n i s s i  •
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in t e rna t iona l  s i tu a t io n  a t  tha t  time.
Defeating the East Turki was not easy for  the Tang Empire, but 
conquering the West Turki was even more d i f f i c u l t ,  as i t  was a very strong 
country and al so  extremely d i s t a n t  (as well as over very d i f f i c u l t  
mountainous t e r r a in )  from Tang China 20 21 . Records show the Tang Imperial 
government knew the emerging Arab Islamic Empire was a great country, 
located to the west of the Turki 22. Because of  th i s ,  the f i e rc e  Turki could 
not withdraw to the west, s ince i t s  western border had another s trong 
m i l i t a ry  power. Today we can read the Jiu  Tang shu, in 1405, Emperor Yongle 
(or his  advisers)  could read i t ,  too. 23
In the records of in te rn a t io n a l  r e la t ions ,  the Jiu  Tang shu is  more 
ob ject ive than the Ming shi. The Ming Shi of ten  exaggerates China’ s world 
pos i t ion  and underestimates foreign countries.  The t ru th  is, the Arab 
Islamic Empire played an important s t r a t e g i c  ro le  in the early Tang Empire’ s 
m i l i t a ry  v ic to ry  in Central  Asia. Once a s trong Arab Empire rose  in the
20 Jiu Tang shu, 194, (144), the Turki
The Western Turki and Turki had the same ancestors as originally
.........  I ts  te rr i to ry  east extended to the Turki, west to Leiyu
Sea (today’ s Caspian Sea was then called Li Sea M'M in 
Chinese).
.......
21 Jiu Tang shu, 194, (144), the Turki,
.......... Tong Shehu Khan, was brave and an able strateg ist,
skilled in the conduct of war .......... west against Persia, and
south to Jibin a l l  belonged to the Western Turki. Controlling
100,000 cavalrymen, holding hegemony in the Western Area .........
a strong situation that had not existed previously among the 
western foreign peoples.
•■•«aiKRfiT • ftffi*!* ■ mmx • • a
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Jiu Tang shu, 198, (148), the Arab Empire
The Arab Empire: .......... At that time, the state of Kang and the
state of Shi were subjected to i t  (the Arab Empire) in the 
Western Region. I ts  te rr i to ry  stretched 10,000 Li from east to 
west . I ts  eastern boundary touched Turki.
:  -mmmmm * Gmzm ■ • g & r a s m  •
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2J The 23 Dynasty H istories  (from Shi j i  to the Yuan shi), after the 
Song Period, the editions today are similar.
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west, i t  became a blockade, and al so  the Arab Empire expanded, and th i s  
pushed the Turki east.  Tang China’ s t roops advanced west but the West Turki 
could not withdraw cont inually  towards the west.
In 651 and 655, the Tang Empire received two s ig n i f i c a n t  missions from the 
r i s i n g  Islamic Arab Empire 24 . Three years l a t e r ,  in 658, a la rge -sca le  
expedit ion was launched by the Tang Empire and gained a b r i l l i a n t  v ic to ry  25 
2b. This m i l i t a ry  success could be seen as the g rea te s t  in the whole of 
Chinese h is tory ,  excluding the Mongol m i l i t a ry  expedit ions.
In the ear ly  Ming Period, the Mongol’ s Tar ta r  and Oirot  played s im i la r  
ro le s  to the East Turki and the West Turki. Their f i e rc e  m i l i t a ry  
powers and the regions in which they were ac t ive  were similar .  The Tang 
Emperor Taizong’ s achievements and words were of ten  re fe r r ed  to by the Ming 
Emperor Yongle. The scale of the ear ly  Tang Empire’ s grea t  m i l i t a ry  
v i c to r i e s  was r a re  in Chinese his tory .  I t  is  logical  to conduct th a t  the 
Ming Emperor Yongle aspi red  to fu r th e r  conquests and searched for  a western
24 Jiu Tang shu, 4, 2nd year of Yong Hui
[651] On the Yichou of the eighth month, the Arab Empire sent an 
ambassador bringing t r ib u te  to the Imperial Court for the f i r s t  
time.
A E z . a  ’ •
Jiu Tang shu, 4, 6th year of Yong Hui
[655] In the sixth month, the Arab Empire sent an ambassador 
bringing tr ib u te  to the Imperial Court.
a ü  > •
Jiu Tang shu, 4, 3rd year of Xianqing
[658] Su Dingfang attacked and defeated the West Turki ..........
Helu (prince of the West Turki) fled to the s ta te  of Shi. Deputy 
General Xiaoye pursued and captured him, took people and herds
numbering more than 400,000 ..........  The Western Region was
put down. The two "Military Headquarters", Mengchi and Kunling, 
were set up in th is  land. The "Stabiliz ing West Military 
Headquarters" was also set up in the s ta te  of Qiuzi. The original 
land of the s ta te  of Gaochang[8] was renamed Xizhou..............
..... • « a m ü m
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Xuanzang (AD 600? -  664) passed through the s ta te  of Gaochang in
his pilgrimage, and received a warn welcome.
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block (a new alliance) to a s s is t  in a long-distance expedition that would be 
rewarding.
(2) Emperor Yongle’ s c r i s i s  model -  the Tang Emperor Taizong
[1405.2] <<Imperial Edict)): (to: Regional M ilitary Commander of 
Gansu. .. Song Cheng...): The Muslim Dao Wu said: " The Samarkand 
Muslim (Timur) and the King of Moghulistan, Shamichagan, have 
commanded troops to advance east". Perhaps, they would not dare 
to take such unprincipled action [th is  is imperial ceremonial 
language]. Nevertheless m ilitary  preparedness on the f ro n t ie r  
can never be neglected. In e a r l ie r  times, the Tang Emperor 
Taizong’ s m ilitary  was strong, but the Turki [Tujue] came r ig h t  
to the Wei (river) bridge; th is  is a lesson to us. Troops and 
horses should get into training, and we should pay a tten tion  to 
in te lligence, and organize supplies and advance preparations.
m  ■ i  = 0 0 m m :
m m z . m  °
This record was from the Ming shilu, demonstrating that the Jiu Tang shu or 
the Xin Tang shu (two of the 23 Dynastic H istories  ) were read by Emperor 
Yongle (or by his ad v ise rs ) ; he could obtain his s tra teg ic  model from the 23 
Dynastic H istories. The m ilitary  achievement of the Tang Emperor Taizong28 
was always admired by him.
The Tang Emperor Taizong used m ilitary  force and stra tegy to change the 
balance of power in northern Asia. Taizong’ s general Li Jing conquered the 
once mighty Eastern Turki Khanate and allowed Tang to become the major 
p o l i t ic a l  and m ilitary  power of the region. He also extended Chinese control
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 39, 2rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p659.
The Tang Emperor Taizong (Li Shimin 599 - 649)
He was the second emperor of the Tang Dynasty of China from 626 to 649.
He encouraged his father, Li Yuan, to start the uprising that 
established the Tang dynasty, and many now consider Taizong to have been 
the co-founder of the dynasty.
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to parts of Mongolia, Central Asia, Tibet and northern Korea. After he died 
his son succeeded to the crown, and the Tang Empire continued a series  of 
m ilitary v ic to r ie s  and extended i t s  t e r r i to ry  in Central Asia.
The whole of China had been ruled by Mongol, and th is  was seen as a tragedy 
of history which damaged the glory of the Chinese Empire. In 1368 the Ming 
Empire was established, but Mongol was s t i l l  a te r r ib le  threat. Emperor 
Yongle wanted to destroy the Mongol power completely, and th is  was to be the 
Ming Empire’ s s tra teg ic  focus.
The Tang Empire’ s d is tan t expeditions were successful in destroying the 
Eastern Turki Khanate and the West Turki Khanate in the early Tang Period. 
At th is  time the te r r i to ry  of the Chinese Empire was enormous. Not u n ti l  the 
early Ming Empire was i t  expanded further. Except for one thing, Emperor 
Hongwu’ s  dictum -  "No war countries" A A E A . Ü I  ~ did not include Mongol.
The Arab Empire helped Tang China against An Lu~shan’ s revolt
The year 751 was the only time that a m ilita ry  power from Samarkand 29 
fought with China, at the b a t t le  of Talas River 30. During th is  ba ttle ,  the 
Tang Empire was defeated by the Arab Empire 31. However the re la tionship  
between the two 32 33 was soon repaired. In 755 the revolt of An Lu-shan
Drury, Ian. & Brooks, Richard. History o f War. London: Times Books.
2003. P43.
Barnes, Ian. The history a tlas o f Asia. New York: Macmillan. 1998. p58
31 Jiu Tang shu, 109, (59), Li Si Ye
[751] In the tenth year (of Tianbao).........  Earlier, Gao Xianzhi
had made a peaceful agreement with the King of Shi, but 
commanded a military operation to destroy i t  by surprise. They 
killed its  old and weak people, captured its  young, and took its  
gold, jewelry, camels, horses and so on. The people of the
country cried and wept .........  Foreign countries [in central
Asia], angered at this, planned to cooperate with the Arab 
Empire, to attack the Four Military Strongholds. Gao Xianzhi, 
concerned, led 20,000 troops deep into central Asian territory,
and in the battle Gao Xianzhi was seriously defeated .........  No
more than a few thousands of soldiers survived.
+ «c......w > iiusxfäm&fcmm • m »  * m&m • mnr
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In 661, The Arab Empire transferred the capital from Medina to Damascus
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occurred. This r e v o l t  te rm ina ted  the  g lo ry  (ended the  power) of the  Tang 
Empire in  C en tra l  Asia. The Tang Im peria l  troops  withdrew from C en tra l  Asia 
to  f ig h t  with the  re b e ls ,  and as a r e s u l t  the  Tang Empire l o s t  i t s  p o s i t io n  
in  C en tra l  Asia. A f te r  755, the  Abbasid Arab Empire and the  Uighurs power 
took co n tro l  of  much of C en tra l  Asia.
In 757, j u s t  two years  l a t e r ,  the  Tang Empire and the Arab Empire formed an 
a l l i a n c e  34. An Arab c a v a lry  fo rc e  from C en tra l  Asia a s s i s t e d  the Tang 
Empire to  f ig h t  the  r e b e l l i o n s  of An Lu-shan and Shi Si-ming 35.
This was an im portant episode in the  r e l a t i o n s  between the  Arab Empire and 
China. This h i s to r y  would have been well-known to  the  sc h o la rs  a c t in g  as 
Emperor Yongle’ s a d v ise rs .
[757] In the  n in th  month ...........  The Marshal, P rince  of
P a c i f i c a t io n ,  led  200,000 t roops  inc lud ing  Shuofang, Anxi,
Uighurs, Nanman, and the  Arab Empire, e a s t  to  que ll  the  
band its .  36
[757] .......* mm *
(The Arab Empire): ...........  In the  e a r ly  year of  Zhide (756-758),
sen t  a m ission w ith  t r i b u t e  to  the  Im peria l Court. At th a t  time 
(the fu tu re  Emperor) Daizong was the  Marshal, and used h i s
(capital of present-day Syria), and Muawiya became the f i r s t  Umayyad 
caliph. This dynasty lasted  un ti l  750, when i t  was overthrown by the 
Abbasid Dynasty. The f i r s t  caliph moved the capital to Baghdad in 762, 
and adopted many Persian trad i t ions .  In contrast, Chinese paper-making 
technology spread f i r s t  to the Arab world, then to Europe. Thus, the 
b a t t le  a s ign if ican t cu ltu ra l  exchange to world history.
The b a t t le  also inaugurated a process of Islamification in Central Asia 
and loosened the Tang Imperial control in the region. The b a t t le  can not 
be explained by saying that the Arab Empire was a th rea t  to China, i t  
took place because the Tang Empire’ s m ilita ry  force had been extended to 
remote Central Asia. Also, th is  con fl ic t  was due to the bad behavior of 
General Gao Xianzhi, a Korean serving in the army of the Tang Empire.
34 J iu  Tang shu, 121, (71), Po Gu Huai En
33 Although the rebellion  was eventually put down, the prestige of the Tang 
Empire was greatly  weakened, as was Tang Imperial central control. Other 
revolts  followed, un til  the end of the Tang Empire in 907.
ib J iu  Tang shu, 10, (10), 2nd year of Zhide
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soldiers to recover the two capitals. 37
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An Lu-shan was from the steppes, serving in the Tang Empire. If  the Tang 
Empire could a l ly  with a Muslim power to fight against An Lu-shan’ s revolt,  
why could the Emperor Yongle not a l ly  with a Muslim power against the 
Northern Yuan, the Tartars?
The Arab Abbasid caliphs gradually los t  power, las t ing  un t i l  1258. In 1220, 
the Mongols overran western Asia, f ina l ly  destroying and occupying Baghdad 
in 1258. From the “Foreign Records” in the Dynastic H istories, Emperor 
Yongle might well have judged that  China and West Asian Muslim countries had 
had the same enemies in the past -  An Lu-shan’ s revolt  and the Mongols -  and 
there might be the poss ib i l i ty  of China’ s a lly ing i t s e l f  with them. This may 
be why there were so many Muslims in Admiral Zheng He’ s flee t .
J iu  Tang shu, 198, (148), the Arab Empire
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<2> Land travel- a long history for western traffic
The Arab Empire helped Tang China against the Tibetan Empire
In 648, the Tibetan Empire invaded the State of ''Middle Hindu". Their 
trophies were sent from the Indian Peninsula to their capital, Lhasa, 
and then some were transferred to the capital of Tang China, Changan, as 
tribute. The distance is very great, considerably more than was covered by 
Napoleon’s disastrous expedition to Moscow in Russia in 1812. This incident 
demonstrated that Tibet had a form of tributary relationship with the Tang 
Empire in 648. Further, Tibet had at this time a strong capability for long­
distance expeditions, as recorded in the Jiu Tang shu. 38
Tibet had a strong military force during the Tang Period. In 755, as a 
result of the rebellion of An Lu-shan, the troops of the Tang Empire had 
withdrawn from Central Asia, to be replaced by the Uighurs and Tibetans. The 
territory of the Tibetan Empire gradually expanded to central Asia and the 
Indian Peninsula 39. It dominated the area of present-day Bangladesh and had 
a sea port on the Indian Ocean. Currently, many Chinese historical works 
neglect this point. 10
18 Jiu Tang shu, 3, 22th year of Zhen Guan
[648] The Zanpu (king) of Tibet attacked and defeated the State 
of ''Middle Hindu", and sent an ambassador to the Imperial Court to 
present the spoils of victory.
■
39 Jiu Tang shu, 104, (54), Gao Xian Zhi (§HLlj2l
The King of Xiaobolu was summoned by Tibet, and given the 
princess of Tibet in marriage. More than 20 countries in the 
northwest were controlled by Tibet, and the tribute routes were 
blocked.
m-
10 Xin Tang shu 215, (140), the Turki
After the rise of the Tang Empire, changes occurred in the power 
of foreign peoples. There were four peoples who could confront 
China: the Turki, Tibet, the Uighur and Yunnan.
mm > ' tt# * tun * ©mu*
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In 763 (the f i r s t  month), the r evo l t s  of An Lu-shan and Shi Si-ming were 
almost a t  an end. However, some leaders of t h i s  revo l t  were not s incere  in 
t h e i r  surrender to the Tang Empire. In the same year (the tenth month), 
during the chaos, the Tang Empire found i t s e l f  suddenly at tacked by Tibet, 
and the cap i ta l ,  Changan11, was sacked. Tibet then became the most dangerous 
foreign th r e a t  to the Tang Empire. 12
In 787, the Tibetan Empire almost occupied the Tang cap i ta l ,  Changan, again, 
and in 791 t h e i r  m i l i t a ry  power defeated the forces of the Tang Empire and 
the Uighurs near  Beshbaliq (present-day Xinjiang, close to Turfan) 43. This 
b a t t l e  completely ended Han Chinese domination of Central  Asia u n t i l  the 
ear ly  Ming P e r iod .44
In 800, the Tibetan Empire reached i t s  s t ronges t  pos i t ion  in Asian h is tory.  
I t s  t e r r i t o r y  included present-day Tibet, Qinghai, southern Xinjiang 
including Turfan and Hami (in China), Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan (the 
language of Bhutan and Tibet  is  same) and the northern par t  of the Indian 
Peninsula beyond the Ganges River .45
" Jiu Tang shu, 36, (16)
[763] Next year, in October, the Tibetans occupied Changan, 
Daizong fled to Shanzhou to evade Di (ancient western foreign 
people, meaning the Tibetans). (Jiu Tang shu)
(U tex#)  ’ ntwm&g ’ • (s i d
4‘ Xin Tang shu 107, (32), Chen Zi Ang htTPIp
Later, in fact Tibet made an incursion. Until the end (of the 
Tang Dynasty), i t  was the gravest threat to the frontier.
43 George Philip Ltd. P h ilip ’s A tlas o f World History. London: George 
Philip. 1999. P73
44 Jiu Tang shu, 40, (20)
Tibet raided the tribes of Shatuo and Uighur. Beiting and Anxi 
were given no reinforcements in the third year of Zhenyuan 
(787), and finally  they fe l l  to Tibet.
n • mjiejz > m m m  ■
4n Barnes, Ian. The H istory A tlas o f  Asia. New York: Macmillan. 1998. P68
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The Arab Empire: ........... in the middle period of Zhenyuan
(785-805), became a powerful opponent of Tibet. (Then) the major 
pa r t  of the Tibetan Empire's army moved westward as a defence 
agains t  the Arab Empire. As a r e s u l t  i t  became less  of a th rea t  
to the f ro n t i e r ,  because i t s  s trength  was i n s u f f i c i e n t  . (J iu
Tang shu) 16
: ....... M tc^  ’ *
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In the l a t e  Tang Empire, the th rea t  from the Tibetan Empire was not very 
serious  because the l a t t e r ’ s major m i l i t a ry  force was deployed in defending 
i t s e l f  aga ins t  the Arab Empire.
((Memorial to the Throne)): (by: Zi Huang): "Tibet has s to len  and 
occupied the areas along the Yellow and Huang Rivers for  a long 
time. In recent  years, t h i s  has been gradually declining.  Also, 
i t  is  under th rea t  from the Arab Empire on the west, opposes the 
Uighurs in the north and confronts Nanchao in the east.  I t s  
m i l i t a ry  forces are divided up to f ig h t  ex ternal  wars. ..  "(  Xin 
Tang shu) 17
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According to these records,  the Arab Empire s t r a t e g i c a l l y  a s s i s t e d  the Tang 
Empire against  tha t  of Tibet.  These h i s t o r i c a l  records were ava i lab le  to 
Emperor Yongle and his  advisers .  The c lea r  precedent was tha t  i f  the Islamic 
Arab Empire had become a s t r a t e g i c  par tner  for  the Tang Empire against  the 
Tibetan Empire i t  could al so  become a s t r a t e g i c  par tner  for  the Ming Empire. 
There was, of  course, a reason for  the presence of so many Muslims in 
Admiral Zheng He’ s f l ee t .
Monk Fa Xian’ s t r ave l  could be an in sp i r a t io n  for  Zheng He’ voyages
4b J iu  Tang shu, 198, (148), the Arab Empire
4‘ Xin Tang shu 126, (51), Zi Huang, Zi Gao -pM  ' -p-Jpc
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In ancient China, Chinese Buddhist monks who travelled to foreign countries 
made great contributions to historical and geographical knowledge. One of 
the most well-known of these Buddhist pilgrims was Fa Xian. His work "Record 
of Buddhist countries" 18 was introduced in the Geographic Record FfeTi. 
^  of the Sui shu ,49 and is still studied today.
Fa Xian lived in the 5th century AD. His purpose was to find the original 
writings on Buddhist scriptures in India00. There are not many works which 
mention travel from Sri Lanka to Samarkand before Admiral Zheng He’s voyages. 
His travels were recorded in the 23 Dynastic Histories'- the Wei shu and the 
Sui shu .51
[337-422] Buddhist Fa Xian felt that exisiting Buddhism classics 
were not complete, so he travelled from Changan to India, 
through more than 30 countries, to places that had Buddhism 
classics, learned the language of each, and made translations.
After ten years, he travelled home from Sri Lanka in south seas, 
on a merchant ship sailing east. 52
mil ’ • m h -h m  *mmmz-rn»m
> wmnz. ■ + ¥  ’ • mmAw&MT •
Fa Xian’s y£Hf Buddhist pilgrimage route could have been an inspiration for 
Emperor Yongle’s strategic design and Zheng He’s strategic mission. It went
18 Fa Xian Lfell ,337-422, edited by Yang Weizhong . Fo Guo Ji f^ülgB
. Taipei: San Min Shu Ju ,2004.
49 Sui shu, 33, (Zhi 28), Biography.
Sui shu, 33, (Zhi 28), Geography, Record of Buddhism countries
10 Fa Xian visited India during the reign of Chandra Gupta II - a brilliant 
period in Indian history. He was quite impressed with the harmony and 
order found there.
31 Sui shu, 35, (Zhi 30), works on Buddhism
Buddhist Fa Xian ... he returned to Nanjing, and Indian Buddhist
Baluo cooperated to discuss and establish, the Rule of Seng Zhi 
(Buddhism), the scholars continually preached it.
...rjtnmm...i m i  • • mmm • m
■
52 Wei shu, 114, (Zhi 20)
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from Sri Lanka and the Indian Continent to v i s i t  Herat and Samarkand, two 
cap ita ls  of the Timur Empire.
Fa Xian’ s route was from Changan via Khotan, Samarkand, Peshawar, 
Pata lipu tra  and Nalanda then to Sri Lanka by sea, continuing on to Java, and 
f in a l ly  returning to Nanjing 53, the s ta r t in g  place of Admiral Zheng He’ s 
voyages. Fa Xian’ s travels  provide evidence tha t i t  was possible to go from 
the South Seas to central Asia. Monk Fa Xian and Admiral Zheng He both 
v is i ted  Sri Lanka, and Zheng He set up a s te le  in Sri Lanka, whose 
inscrip tion  mentions the Buddha. Indeed, Zheng He may well have been aware 
tha t Fa Xian had been to Sri Lanka.
The Song knew: the real geographical location of Persia
The Song sh i was compiled in the la te  period of the Yuan Dynasty. Some 
records in the Song sh i demonstrate tha t the Song government was 
well-informed about the Arab Empire and the r is e  of Islam. There are 
de fin ite  records about prophet Muhammad (570-632), founder of Islam. In 610, 
while meditating in a cave on Mount Hira outside Mecca, Muhammad experienced 
the f i r s t  revelations brought to him, which Muslims believe were from Allah 
(God).
The Arab Empire was o r ig ina lly  a division of Persia, in the Daye 
Period of the Sui Dynasty. There was a prominent person who 
explored a cave and obtained an inscribed stone , thought i t  an
oracle, so organized people ..........  then proclaimed himself as
king, occupying the western te r r i to ry  of Persia. After the 
Yonghui Period of the Tang Dynasty, th is  country often brought 
tr ib u te  to the Imperial Court. Before Caliph Marwan II i t  was 
called the Umayyad Arab Empire, a f te r  Caliph Abu al-Abbas [750] 
i t  was called the Abbasid Arab Empire. (Song shi) 54
»nmm * tj
53 Faxian, 337-422, tr. by H. A. Giles . The travels o f  Fa~hsien (399-414 
AD); or, Record o f the Buddhistic kingdoms .London: Rout ledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1956.
54 Song shi, 490, (249), the Arab Empire, p 14118.
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Caliph Abu al~Abbas is t ra n s l i te ra te d  to > and Caliph Marwan II is 
t r a n s l i te ra te d  to these are accurate. There are some other records 
which are not quite correct, however the general background is accura te55. 
This proves tha t the Song Dynasty and the Yuan Dynasty understood western 
Asia. This awareness was recorded in these works which were studied in the 
Early Ming period, as well as la te r .  Admiral Zheng He was a Muslim, he would 
have had th is  knowledge, a good reason for the number of Muslims in Zheng 
He’ s f lee t .
The Arab Empire: ..........  [968] in the f i r s t  year of Kaibao, a
tr ib u te  mission was sent to the Imperial Court. [971] In the
fourth year local products were also sent as t r ib u te ..............
[974] in the seventh year, the Caliph of the Arab Empire, 
Helifo, sent an ambassador, Buluohai. [976] In the ninth year 
another ambassador, Puximi, was sent. In both cases local 
products were brought as tr ibu tes . 56
’  yLWhty)...................
This record shows that there were good and frequent re la tionsh ips  between 
the Arab Empire and the Song Empire, and indicates tha t th e ir  attendants 
were African slaves5'. I t  also presents one in te res t ing  thing: the attendants
According to this record, Arabia had belonged to Persia. Muhammad got 
the oracle from a cave then proclaimed himself as king. Sassanid Persia 
collapsed when the newly inspired Muslim Arabs conquered the area in 
637, eventually converting the Persians to Islam.
Song shi, 490, (249), the Arab Empire
This record is checked against sources in English from western Asia, The 
Caliph of the Arab Empire, should be Al-Mustakfi (944 - 946).
Song shi, 490, (249), the Arab Empire, pl4118.
[977] In the second year of Taipingxingguo, the ambassador, 
Pusina, the deputy ambassador, Mohammed, and a Judge, Puluo 
brought local products as tribute. Their attendants had deep 
eyes and black bodies and were called Lun slaves.
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of the Arab Empire’ s ambassador might have been African black people, which 
surprised the Song h is to rian  and therefore was recorded in the imperial 
archives. The Ming Dynasty was a Han Chinese Empire and often declared 
i t s e l f  the successor to the t rad it io n  and culture of the Song Dynasty. After 
about 90 years of Mongol rule, the new r is in g  Ming Empire might well have 
been thought to have a desire to restore  re la tio n s  between China and the 
Arab Empire.
One record in the Song shi also demonstrates that in the Yuan Dynasty and 
the early Ming Dynasty, people in China knew that one could reach the Arab 
Empire and Persia from present-day Xinjiang. (Gaochang is  in present-day 
Xinjiang.)
Gaochang means Xizhou, which faces south towards Yutian,
southwest towards the Arab Empire and Persia, and west towards 
Xitian Balushe, Snow Mountain and the Plateau of Pamirs. This 
is several thousand Li d is tan t from each of them. (Song shi) B8
* « i f  ■ * m
• ( s £ £ )
Furthermore, th is  record shows tha t the Emperor and Admiral Zheng He knew 
the accurate geographic location of Persia and China and Persia could 
communicate by land. Thus, the Song Empire had a good knowledge of western 
Asia geography.
Hulagu Khan in Persia and Kublai Khan in China were brothers and had a 
fr iendly  re la tionsh ip
Kublai Khan (1215-1294) n9 was a famous Mongol emperor in Asian history, 
founder of the Yuan Dynasty in China, Korea and present-day Mongolia (1279—
58 Song shi, 490, (249), Gaochang fl] |! p 14111.
M Kublai Khan
From 1251 to 1259 he led m ilitary  campaigns in south China. He succeeded 
his brother Mongke (Mangu) as Khan (1260-1294) of the empire that th e ir  
grandfather Genghis Khan had founded. The empire reached i t s  g reatest 
t e r r i t o r i a l  extent with Kublai’ s f ina l defeat (1279) of the Sung Dynasty 
of China; however, his campaigns against Myanmar and Vietnam (by land), 
Japan and Indonesia (by sea) were not very successful, but demonstrated 
his great power and influence in Asia. Kublai’ s rule as the overlord of 
the Mongol empire was nominal except in Mongolia and China. He recru ited
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1294). His reign and his magnificent military and political powers were 
respected by Emperor Yongle, and recorded in Ming shilu, though he was 
thought a foreigner in the early Ming Dynasty. He is also famous as a result 
of his record in the “Travels of Marco Polo” .
The Yuan shi was compiled in the early Ming Emperor Hongwu period. This 
record demonstrates that the first emperor of the Yuan Empire in China, 
Kublai (4th son), and the first emperor of the I1-Khan Empire in Persia, 
Hulagu (6th son), were close brothers, and that there were amicable
relations between these two countries. Emperor Yongle would have been
familiar with this record.
Emperor Ruizong h0 had 11 sons, the eldest being Emperor
Xianzong ....  the fourth was Emperor Shizu (Kublai Khan) ....
the sixth was Great King Hulagu, and the seventh was Great 
King Alibuge. {Yuan shi) 61
* # - b
The alliance with the I1-Khan Empire in Persia was the most significant 
for Kublai Khan’ s empire. Two strong powers were opposed to Kublai Khan, 
his younger brother Alibuge and his cousin Kaidu. Kaidu, based in Central 
Asia, fought with Yuan China because of the question of Kublai Khan’ s
succession. The head of the 11-Khan empire, Hulagu, gave Kublai Khan
important support to confront these two serious "rebellions” b2, and this was 
recorded in the Yuan shi.
men of all nations for his empire’ s service, but only the Mongols were 
permitted to hold the highest government posts.
The Yuan Emperor Ruizong was the fourth son of Ghengis Khan. He had not 
become emperor, but this title was later given to him out of respect by 
his fourth son, Kublai Khan.
hl Yuan shi, 107, ( ^  2) Emperor Ruizong p2720.
Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research institute. 2003. History.
Before setting off on his campaign against China, Monh Khaan 
temporarily left his younger brother Arigboh in command of the 
headquarters in Kharkhorum. At the urgently convoked Hurildai 
after Monh’s death in 1259, the last acknowledged ruler of the 
Mongol empire, Arigboh, seized the opportunity to declare 
himself Khan. In 1260, having heard this news at his
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The II-Khan Empire, or Il-Khanid, was a Mongol dynasty (1256-1335), 
established by Hulagu Khan (1217-1265), the grandson of Ghengis Khan. In 
1256 Hulagu sacked the fortress of the Assassins at Alamut in Northern 
central Iran. By 1258 he had captured all of Iran and the capital of the 
Abbasid Arab Empire, Baghdad h3. Hulagu established an empire that included 
the Iranian Plateau, much of Iraq, eastern and central Anatolia and Northern 
Syria.
After the accession of his elder brother Kublai, Hulagu stopped military 
expeditions, and the succession thereafter continued through his family, 
this being the true start of the Il-Khans 6h Then Persia was ruled by the 
11-Khan Empire. Hulagu’s descendants ruled Persia for the next eighty years, 
ultimately converting to Islam. The Empire was at its height during the 
reign of Mahmud Ghazan (1295-1304). In 1295 Ilkhan Mahmud Ghazan converted 
to Islam. Oljeitu moved the capital from Tabriz to Soltaniveh.
It was once thought that the title "Il-Khan" meant "local ruler" in Persian65. 
However, recent research from Iran proves that it means "subordinate khan", 
and refers to their initial deference to Kublai Khan’ s ultimate
sovereignty 6fi. Some records in the Yuan shi demonstrate that the I1-Khan
headquarters in Kaipin, Kublai proclaimed himself Khan of all 
Mongolia, in breach of the rules of electing a Khan.
b,i Yuan shi, 3, 3rd year of Xianzong U t k
64 The 11-Khan Empire (1256-1394)
The Mongol invasions in the 13th century changed life in Iran radically 
and permanently. Genghis Khan’ s invasion in the 1220s destroyed lives 
and property in north-eastern Iran on a large scale. In 1258 Hulagu 
Khan, Genghis Khan’ s grandson, finished the conquest of Persia, and 
consolidated his control over Iraq, Iran and much of Anatolia. With his 
capital in Maragha in north-western Iran, he founded the Il-Khanid 
Dynasty nominally subject to the Great Khan, Kublai, ruler of China and 
Mongolia.
After Abu S a ’ id’s death in 1335, the II-Khan Empire began to
disintegrate rapidly, and split up into several rival successor states. 
The last of the obscure II-Khan pretenders was assassinated in 1353. 
Timur later carved up the Timur Empire, ostensibly to restore the old 
II-Khan Empire.
George Philip Ltd. Philip’s World History Encyclopedia. London: George 
Philip. 2000. pl94
The historian Rashid al-Din wrote a universal history for the II-Khan 
Empire around 1315 which provides much material.
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Empire and the Yuan Empire had a close and harmonious relationship 6' 68. 
The Great King of Abaha was the son of Hulagu, the second ruler of the 
11-Khan Empire. It could be said that the II-Khan Empire was the most 
important alliance for the Yuan Empire.
Thus in the period from 1256 to 1335 the Mongols ruled Persia as the I1-Khan 
Empire. In a similar period, from 1276 to 1368, the Mongols ruled China as 
the Yuan Dynasty. Both these countries were world powers at that time. 
Hulagu Khan and Kublai Khan were close friends. The I1-Khan Empire and the 
Yuan Empire had friendly relations, and formed a strategic alliance.
h7 Yuan shi 83, 35), Ministry of War, p2141
Earlier, Yuan Taizhu allocated .......  more than 7000
households of Imperial Falcon Office to the Great King of
Hulagu. [1261] In the second year of Zhongtong, it began to be 
set up formally. [1275] In the 12th year of Zhiyuan, the Great
King of Abaqa sent an ambassador to carry a memorandum to
the throne, setting out their allegiance to our Imperial Court.
w ’ .t • ■ m
Yuan shi, 107, (2) Emperor Ruizong p2720.
Abaqa (1265-1282) ( HA ^n rE ),  son of Halagu
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<3> Sea stra tegy*  The Yuan Empire’ s wars on Japan and Java
The Yuan Empire’ s war on Japan demonstrated considerable sea power
The Yuan Empire was not threatened from the north, so i t  was able to  
develop more important o f f i c ia l  maritime pursuits than the Southern Song 
Dynasty and later  the Ming Dynasty h9.
In 1274, the Yuan Empire’ s f i r s t  war on Japan was recorded in the Yuan sh i 
70. 900 ships and 15,000 so ld iers were mobilized and landed on Japanese 
so il .  This military operation was not successful, but i t  demonstrates the 
maritime military capability  of the Yuan Empire. It was called the Battle of  
Bunei , also known as the "Battle of Hakata Bay" by Japanese.
Mongol captured the islands of Tsushima and Iki easily , and landed on 19 
November in Hakata Bay, a short distance from Dazaifu, the ancient
administrative capital of Kyushu. The Mongols had superior weapons and 
tact ic s .  They were, however, vastly  outnumbered by the Japanese warriors who 
had been preparing for the attack for months, and who had received
h9 Ptak, Roderich . China’s seaborne trade with South and Southeast Asia, 
1200-1750 . Aldershot; Brookfield, V t. : Ashgate, cl998. pV 139.
When Kublai Khan had gained control over China, the Yuan empire 
made efforts  to establish o ff ic ia l  relations with various 
countries along the coasts of Asia. Missions were dispatched and 
i t  was expected that the foreign countries would pay tribute to 
the new power holders in China and subordinate themselves as 
vassals.
70 Yuan shi, 208, (Zhuan 95), Japan
[1274] In the third month of the 11th year, orders were given to 
the "Manage and administration Official" of Fengzhou, Yi Dou, 
General Governor of Korea, Hong Chaqiu, to employ "1000 Liao 
ship", "Badoulu slight and fast ship" and "Draw water small 
ship" each with 300 men, to ta l 900 ships, to carry 15,000 
troops, to sail to conquer Japan in the 7th month. When winter 
began, in the tenth month, they were forced to admit defeat. At 
the same time, the offic ia l troops were not well disciplined, 
their supply of arrows was exhausted, so after only looting 
bordering areas they returned.
• «MfflilNHRtFr* - ftM M BM Vims. • U T » #  - iS» 
S iS S #  - äbM'ÄS-HB ’ Ä A B fi - « ± ^ - S S = f  - ü-UfcHffiB 
*  ■ - A * H  ’ s t e  • • j z ä *  • m m m m m m  ■
81
reinforcements as soon as they learned of the losses of Tsushima and Iki. 
They held out a l l  day, and a storm that night persuaded the Mongols to 
re trea t .
In 1281, the Yuan Empire’ s second war on Japan is  also recorded in the Yuan 
shi 71 '2. 600 warships were despatched from China’ s four provinces. 100, 000
troops were commanded to leave from Qingyuan, Dinghai and other places in 
China'2. These places are close to Liujiagang (and Nanjing), which means that 
both th is  exercise and Zheng He’ s voyages s ta r ted  from a sim ilar area, and 
the ship building technologies for Zheng He’ s f le e t  may well have been 
derived from th is  time. In addition, 40,000 troops were sent from the Korean 
peninsula (15,000 Korean so ld iers  and 900 Korean ships were sent for th is  
war, and another 25,000 troops were made up of Mongols and Han Chinese). In 
to ta l  140,000 so ld iers  were mobilized for th is  m ilitary  operation, which 
therefore was larger than Zheng He’ s voyages in the number of i t s  troops. 
The Battle  of Kouan A-fiz! , called the Second Battle  of Hakata Bay by
Japanese, took place in the summer.
Yuan shi, 10, (Ji 10), 16th year, Zhiyuan
[1279] In the second month ..........  because the Empire wished to
conquer Japan, Emperor ordered Yangzhou, Hunan, Ganzhou and 
Quanzhou, four provinces, to build 600 warships.
- E - j a t i E B *  > mm * *  > m \ ' •
Yuan shi, 11, (Ji 11), 17th year, Zhiyuan
[1281] In the 12th month ..........  King of Korea, Wang Zhuang,
leading 10,000 troops, 15,000 sa ilo rs ,  and 900 warships, with 
110,000 Dan of food, departed to conquer Japan.
.....1 I E M Ä 1 A  ' ' fcfTnVLH® ' h
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Yuan shi, 154, (Zhuan 41), Zijunji
[1281] In the 18th year, he and Right Adviser, Xindu, commanded 
a naval force of 40,000, from Chinju and Mokpoin in Korea, to 
advance. At that time, Right Adviser Fan Wenhu with others 
commanded 100,000 from Qingyuan, Dinghai and other places to 
cross the sea. He arrived in Ika-shima, joined up with the 
m ilita ry  forces of Hirado shima, and landed in Japan. Before a 
b a t t le  could be fought, in the autumn (August), a typhoon 
destroyed many ships, and the remainder returned.
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The combined Korean/Chinese f le e t  occupied Ika-shima, and moved on to Kyushu, 
landing at a number of separate positions. After a number of individual 
skirmishes, the Mongol forces were driven back to th e i r  ships. The now- 
famous kamikaze” , a massive typhoon, assaulted the shores of Kyushu for 
two days s tra igh t,  and destroyed much of the Mongol f le e t .
The war of 1281 created an immediate social and economic impact in 13th 
century Japan, which had been attacked by the grea test naval power world 
his tory  had ever seen 74. The attack was not successful, but the extent of 
mobilization was larger than tha t of Zheng He’ s f le e t .  I t  demonstrated 
that for the Ming Imperial government to send a great f le e t  to Persia in 
the early  Ming Period cannot be considered strange, as the Chinese Empire 
was obviously capable of mounting such great sea power.
The Yuan Empire’ s war on Java showed i t s  long-range sea power
From Beijing to Java is  a great distance, and i t  was one of the most 
s ign if ican t operations in Chinese naval m ilitary  history, to mobilise 1000 
ships, 20000 soldiers  and one year’ s supply of food for such an expedition.
Kublai Khan subdued foreigners, he sent troops overseas to wage
wars, of which the war on Java was the greater ..........  to conquer
Java, with a to ta l  of 20,000 soldiers  from three provinces,
Fujian, J ix i  and Huguang ..........  1000 ships were dispatched, and
with one year’ s supply of f o o d ..........75
täffiw rra« ■ jtfcüBifi&S'f-Bii# ’ ..... t o ®
Dr Li Narangoa, <Nightmare and promise: Japanese memories and the Mongol 
invasions), Japan Centre, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National 
University. Nov. 2004. (This is an unpublished paper.)
No one ever tr ied  to invade Japan, apart from the Mongols in the 
13th century. Even these Mongol attempts failed because of the 
Kamikaze (the divine wind, typhoon). Before the end of the 
Second World War statements of this kind were very common in 
Japanese popular h is torical writings. In contemporary Japan, 
too, more than 700 years a f te r  the attacks, s tories  of the 
Mongol invasions are s t i l l  vividly re-told to a variety of 
audiences.
Yuan shi, 210, (Zhuan 97), Java, p4664.
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The Yuan’ s war on Java was an important precedent for Zheng He’ s expedition. 
Java was one of the destinations for Zheng He’ s voyages, but sources agree 
that Zheng He did not set out to conquer Java, and thus imperialism was not 
Zheng He’ s chief motive for his voyages. The Yuan sh i records many de ta i ls  
and comments 16 11 for th is  war, and i t  should have been well known to the 
Ming Government.
Emperor Yongle and Admiral Zheng He would have been aware of the Yuan 
expedition to Java. We should note tha t i f  the Yuan with 20,000 soldiers 
could not conquer Java then Admiral Zheng He’ s troops would cer ta in ly  not 
have been able to do so. This oceanic expedition was unsuccessful but i t  
showed the Ming Empire’ s po ten tia l to use i t s  maritime power to perform i t s  
po li t ica l/d ip lom atic  purpose in remote regions.
Wang Dayuan and Ibn Batuta proved that the Yuan Empire was a major sea power
Dao y i zh i luo was an outstanding work on Asian history, written in 1349, 
and whilst i t  is  fu l l  of Sinocentrism, nevertheless i t  re f le c ts  the 
confidence of someone who was the subject of a great empire. The writer, 
Wang Dayuan, in the Yuan Dynasty, was proud of the superb Yuan Empire. The
Yuan shi, 162, (Zhuan 49), Shibi, p3802.
Xibi, with his enemy at his back, withdrew fighting, ran 300 Li 
to board his ships, sailing 68 days to return to Quangzhou, with 
the death of more than 3000 military officers and soldiers-*-, so 
the Imperial Court, because of the heavy losses, punished him 
with 17 strokes and a fine of one third of his property.
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Yuan shi, 168, (Zhuan 55), Chenyou. young brother Tianxiang, p3948
Since the conquering wars for Japan, (south Vietnam), (north 
Vietnam), Java and Burma, took almost 30 years, there were no 
more land or people to be added into empire. The financial cost 
and loss of life  could not be justified.
R&mmm* sm * xnt' im ' « t«  »
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work also demonstrates the prosperous maritime activities of China during 
that time, for example:
[1349. Wang Dayuan] Our great Yuan Dynasty is a unified empire, 
its prestige and culture extends to the farthest bounds , the 
vastness of its territory has no precedent. . From the land and 
peoples beyond the sea, thousands of countries all bring their 
tribute and perform their duty as subjects. They travel across 
mountains and sea for their trade. Chinese merchants, too, roam 
far beyond our frontiers as readily as if they were still among 
our provinces. 78
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The stories told by Ibn Batuta79 were often thought as the most accurate and 
useful of all the accounts written by medieval travellers. His description 
of Chinese ships in the Indian Peninsula is a good example.
[1342. Ibn Batuta, Calicut] On the sea of China travelling is 
done in Chinese ships only, so we shall describe their 
arrangements. The Chinese vessels are of three kinds; large 
ships called junks, middle sized ones called zaws, and small 
ones called kakams. The large ships have anything from 3 to 12
sails, which are made of bamboo rods plaited like mats. . . . . . . .
....  A ship carries a complement of a thousand men, six
hundred of whom are sailors and four hundred men-at-arms, 
including archers, men with shields and arbalists, that is men 
who throw naphtha.......  These vessels are built only in the
Wang, Dayuan .edited by Su Jiqing • Dao yi zhi luo
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000.
79 Ibn Batuta (1304-1368, or 1377)
Like Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta kept records of interesting sites from his 
journies. He recorded how people lived and new ideas that he learned 
from them. Also like Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta dictated stories to a 
writer who could turn them into a good book after he returned to Morocco 
in 1354. Battuta’s book was called Rihla, or My Travels.
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town of Zaitun (Quanzhou) in China, . . .  or in Sin-Kalan, which 
is Sin a l-Sin [Canton]. 80
This source demonstrates that China had a great capacity for ocean-going 
ship building before Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages. His description of two 
Muslim leaders in Quanzhou , Buluhanding and Shelafuding
H T ,  can be found in the Yuan period Chinese work, Qing j in g  s i  j i  (the 
Record o f  Mosque ) 81. This shows tha t Ibn Batuta had undoubtedly been to 
Quanzhou. The works of both Wang Dayuan and Ibn Batuta indicate the great 
capacity of Chinese maritime a c t iv i t ie s  before Zheng He’ s voyages.
Ibn Batuta: China’ s embassy from Beijing via Quanzhou, Calicut to Delhi
(1) Zheng He’ s envoy was able to travel from Calicut to Delhi in the Timur
Ibn Batuta also had a s ign if ican t mention about the mission of the Yuan 
Empire from Beijing to Delhi.
[Sultan Muhammad Tughluq, Delhi in India] "I have expressly sent 
for you to go as my ambassador to the king of China, for I know
your love of travel and sightseeing”..............  He then provided me
with everything I required 82..........
The king of China had sent to the Sultan a hundred mamluks and 
slave g i r l s  83, five hundred pieces of velvet cloth, including 
a hundred of those which are manufactured in the c i ty  of Zaitun 
[Quanzhou] ..........  He [Sultan Muhammad Tughluq] requited his
80 Ibn Batuta, 1304-1377. The travels o f  Ibn Battuta A. D 1325-1354. Vol. IV 
/  translated with revisions and notes by C. Defremery and B. R.
Sanguinetti. Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press 
1994. p813.
Wu Jian . Qing jin g  s i j i  f t# # IS
Ibn Batuta 1304-1377. The travels o f  Ibn Battuta A. D 1325~1354. Vol. I l l  
/  translated with revisions and notes by C. Defremery and B. R.
Sanguinetti. Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press 
1971. p767.
hi Slavery system of China was abolished in the Ming Hongwu Period, thus 
Admiral Zheng He’ s gifts did not include slaves.
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present with an even richer one -  a hundred thoroughbred horses 
saddled and bridled, a hundred male slaves, a hundred Hindu 
singing -  and dancing -  g i r l s ,  a hundred pieces of bairami 
cloth, which is made of cotton and is  unequalled in beauty
..........  a thousand horsemen to escort us to the port of
embarkation, and we were accompanied by the ambassadors of the 
king of China, f i f t een  in number, the chief of whom was called
Tursi, along with the i r  servants, about a hundred men..............
Our Journey began on the 17th of Safar 43 [22 July 1342]... 81
We stopped in the port of Qaliqut (Calicut iJfM), in which there 
were at the time th i r teen  Chinese vessels, and disembarked.
Every one of us was lodged in a house, and we stayed there three 
months as the guests of the inf idel ,  awaiting the season of the 
voyage to China. 85
This record demonstrates two s ignif icant considerations. Chinese missions 
had v is i ted  Delhi by sea and land, from Beijing, Quanzhou, and Calicut. Many 
g i f t s  were bestowed by Yuan China on the kingdom of Delhi. Also, the King of 
Delhi sent a mission to take rich g i f t s  and accompanied the ambassador of 
Yuan China to Beijing via Calicut and Quanzhou.
Much research on Zheng He’ s voyages was limited to coastal areas, and Ibn 
Batuta’ s record clear ly i l l u s t r a t e s  that  Zheng He’ s f l e e t  harboured in many 
ports, and they could buy horses to v i s i t  many inland c i t i e s  and countries. 
Another example is  Marco Polo’ s journey from Beijing to Quanzhou and then 
by sea route to Hormuz; his travel  to the capi ta l  of the Il-Khan Empire by 
land; and then his return via Constantinople to Venice in Italy.  88
M Ibn Batuta, 1304-1377. The travels o f  Ibn Battuta A. D 1325-1354. Vol. IV
/  t rans la ted  with revisions and notes by C. Defremery and B. R.
Sanguinetti. Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press 
1994. p773.
8:1 Ibn Batuta, 1304-1377. The travels o f  Ibn Battuta A. D 1325-1354. Vol. IV
/  t rans la ted  with revisions and notes by C. Defremery and B. R.
Sanguinetti. Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press 
1994. p813.
8h The travels o f  Marco Polo. Chapter 198, Hormuz (arrived i t  again)
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(2) Fei Xin’s poem which indicates Calicut could link with the “Western 
Region”
Fei, Xin |=r{lf was an official on Zheng He’s voyages, and his work Xing cha 
sheng lan M  lii it provides a significant source for them. This poem was 
about Calicut. Why does Fei Xin’s poem discuss the traffic from Calicut to 
the Western Regions? The ’Western Regions’ often means ’Central Asia’ and 
’Western Asia’ in the writings of Ming China.
Calicut can communicate with the West Region.
The mountains are green and the sceneries are spectacular 
People will not pick up lost things from the road.
The families are rich, naturally there is no cheating 
The emirate’s rule is generous
The people regard politeness and justice as important 87
’ tisit 
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The first two of Zheng He’s voyages were to Calicut on the Indian Peninsula, 
the terminus for his sea route; then the 3rd to 7th voyages were to Hormuz 
in Persia as the chief destination (according to Zheng He and Zhou Wens’ 
steles). Fei Xin’s poem makes it clear that one could travel from Calicut to 
the Western Region.
This also emphasized the mission of Zheng He could be not limited on coastal 
cities; there were so many soldiers and logistics on Zheng He’s fleet, they 
could buy horses and entered inner city. So when Admiral Zheng and his 
great fleet visited Calicut from Quanzhou, they could also have sent an 
envoy to visit Delhi; at that time Delhi was ruled by the Timur Empire. So 
it was not impossible for Zheng He’s mission to have visited the Timur 
Empire during his first and second voyages. Also, it should be borne in mind
87 Fei, Xin fffs ,1388-1436? Edited by Feng Chengjun •Xing cha sheng
lan jiao zhu .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,1954.
Calicut.
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that in 1409 Zheng He set up a stele in Sri Lanka in three languages 
including Persian, a language only popular in the Timur Empire.
<4> Sea route: From Quanzhou (China) to Hormuz (Persia)
Monk Yijing went to Indonesia by Persian ship; Hui Chao’ s work on Persia
The Ming Empire’ s diplomatic l e t t e r s  to the Timur Empire were always 
in Persian. Surely th is  is powerful evidence for the Persia/Timur 
connection, for example:
On March 14, 1410 the Emperor (Yongle) sent . . . with coloured
s i lk  and a l e t t e r  addressed to . . . Shah Rukh (Timur’ s fourth 
son, ru le r  of the Timur Empire). This le t te r ,  with copies in 
Chinese, Persian, and Uighur made vast claims for the Chinese 
Emperor. 88
This is  an important concept which suggests tha t Emperor Yongle 
designated Hormuz as the chief destination for Admiral Zheng He’ s voyage 
which was to v i s i t  Persia. Thus the Timur Empire may well have been 
Zheng He’ s chief destination.
Professor Wang Gungwu’ s book: The Nanhai Trade (The early h is to ry  o f Chinese 
trade in the south China Sea) indicates "There was a Persian sea trade with 
the South China Sea, and therefore, probably also with South China 89. " Two 
in te res t ing  examples could prove th is  theory.
Emperor Yongle was an enthusiast of both Buddhism and Daoism. He himself 
transcribed several works of Buddhism in the 9th year of Yongle. He ordered 
8 people including Dao Cheng jjfj^ (? -  1431) and Yi Ru —-$P (1352-1425) to 
check on Da cang jin g  (a famous co llection  of s ign if ican t Chinese
Buddhist works) and made two copies, one of which was kept in Nanjing, and 
another in Beijing, in the 17th year of Yongle 90. Thus Emperor Yongle was
Rossabi, Morris. Ming China’s re la tion s with Hami and Central Asia, 
1404-1513: A re-examination o f  traditional Chinese foreign policy. New
York: Thesis (Ph. D.) -  Columbia University, 1970. p 115.
Wang, Gungwu. The Nanhai Trade (The early h is to ry  o f  Chinese trade in 
the south China Sea). Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998. pl24.
Li, Zhuoran (Lee, Cheuk Yin) .Ming shi san luan .Taipei:
Yun Chen Publishing jcffk ,1991. p 114.
13th chapter ’
90
probably fam iliar with Da cang jing , which consists of two works by Monk 
Yijing.
Yijing (635-713, also known as I-Ching) was a Buddhist monk who le f t  China 
in AD 671 for Malaya and Sumatra. Two years la te r ,  he was in Calicut (south 
of the Indian Peninsula, the c i ty  which was the terminus for Zheng He’ s 
f i r s t  two voyages; Hormuz being also the destination for Zheng He’ s 3-7 
voyages ). After that, he l e f t  for Palembang (Srivijaya) in 685. In the same 
year, he sailed  home to China. Yijing wrote two important manuscripts, one 
on Buddhism in the southern seas and another about eminent Buddhist monks.
In the second year of the Xian Heng (671) I kept the 
summer-retreat in Yang Fu. In the beginning of autumn I met 
unexpectedly an imperial envoy, Feng Xiaoquan of Gong Zhou, with 
whose help I came to the town of Guangdong, where I fixed the 
date of meeting with the owner of a Persian ship to embark for
the south ..........  a f te r  sa il ing  twenty days the ship reached
Bhoga (Palembang?) , where I landed and stayed six months, 
gradually learning the Sabdavidya [Sanskrit grammar]. The king 
gave me some support and sent me to the country of Malayu, which 
is now called Sriv ijava 91, where I again stayed two months, and 
thence I went to Ka-cha. Here I embarked in the twelfth month, 
and again on board the king’ s ship I sailed  to Eastern India. 92
^  °  °  h m j w  •  mmim
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, 1964. PÖ8-74.
91 This is Yijing’ s Note.
Srivijava was a kingdom that arose out of trade. Srivijava, which means 
’Glorious Victory’ in Sanskrit, was founded by chiefs in Sumatra around 
AD700. The soil where Srivijava was located was infertile, but there was 
a good port at Palembang, which was well-located midway between the 
Straits of Melaka and the Sunda Straits, along the sea trade routes 
taken by traders.
92 Yijing ,635-713 .Da tang xi yu qiu fa gao seng zhuan
fff#, ( { j üEf f i fä l MM)  No. 2066) .Tokyo:
1998. (pxxx)
91
This record was from Da cang jing, and shows that Monk Yijing boarded a 
Persian ship to southeastern countries, which is of significance. It also 
shows Monk Yijing arrived at Malayu, then went to the Indian Peninsula. 
Thus during the seventh century, there were Persian ships from China to 
the Malay Peninsula. Zheng He had contributed money to print Buddhist 
books, so he would know this story. Of course, it reveals another important 
consideration - if ships could reach Persia, it meant that there could be 
contact by sea with the Timur Empire.
On the other hand, there was another work illustrating this significant 
matter, although scholars knew little of it: that is Monk Hui Chao’s üia 
93 Wang wu tian zhu guo zhuan zn 11 fll . This work was found in
Dunhuang but it spoke of travel from Persia to China by sea 91.
Of course, Emperor Yongle and Zheng He did not see this work; however it
Hui Chao (8th century)
Possibly a Korean, he went to India for a Buddhist pilgrimage from China 
in the Tang Period, His work was written in Chinese (before 15th 
century, Koreans used Chinese as their writing system.) and concerns 
India and Buddhism. It is of interest that this work was found in 
Duihuang Cave, far from the sea. This cave was buried from the 12th
century to the 19th century.
91 Hui Chao 8th Cent. edited by Zhang Yi . Wang wu tian zhu guo
zhuan jian shi lifllllflp .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju
, 1994. plOl.
31, Persia
Again, if from Tokharestan we go westward and travel for one
month we reach the country of Persia. This kingdom had
previously held sway over the Arab Empire whose people had been 
camel drivers to the Persian Kings. Afterwards, they (the Arabs) 
revolted and killed this king (Yazdagird III) and they 
themselves became lords. Now this country (Persia) has been by 
force annexed to the Arab Empire. Their garment is the old one, 
a wide cotton shirt, they trim beard and hair. They only eat 
pastry and meat, although they have rice which is just ground
into pastry to eat. The land produces camels, mules, sheep,
horses and big donkeys, cotton cloth and treasures. The people 
speak different languages and have a natural bent on commerce.
They are accustomed to set sail into the western sea. They enter 
the south sea to the country of Ceylon to obtain all kinds of 
precious gems, for that country is said to produce treasures.
They also head for the Kun-Lun (ie. Malaya) country taking gold.
They sail too to the land of China, and directly to Guangzhou, 
where they get various kinds of silk and the like. This country 
produces fine textiles. The people like to kill animals. They 
worship Tien (Allah) and do not know the teachings of Buddha.
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shows that people in Dunhuang during the 8~12th century knew Persia and that 
i t  was possible to s a i l  from there to Guangzhou in China. This record 
demonstrates that during the 8th century Persians had often been to Sri 
Lanka, and even to Guangzhou in China, so i t  was possible to go from 
China to Persia by sea. During 1405-1433, Persia belonged to the Timur 
Empire, and Persian was the Timur’ s language. Therefore i t  would not 
be surprising i f  Emperor Yongle and Admiral Zheng He planned to contact 
the Timur Empire by sea.
Traffic  between Persia and China could be by land and sea
From 722 to 758, Persia sent ambassadors to China as frequently as ten times 
95. In West Asian history, Persia was under great pressure as a re su lt  of 
the expansion of the emerging Arab Islamic Empire during th is  period. 
Persia hoped Tang China would support i t  with m ilita ry  power against the 
Arab Empire. The Tang Empire did not send an expedition to rescue Persia. 
Later Persia was combined with the Arab Empire, and th is  was recorded in 
Chinese Dynastic Histories as Dashi . 96
[757] In the ninth month ..........  The Marshal, Prince of
Pacification, led 200,000 troops including Shuofang, Anxi,
Uighurs, Nanman, and the Arab Empire, east to quell the
bandits. 9'
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Jiu Tang shu, 198, (148), Persia
From the 10th year of Kaiyuan (722) to the 6th year of Tianbao 
(747), Persia sent missions to our Imperial Court, and 
presented local products 10 times.
1,1 In 742, the Great Mosque was established in Changan (Xian). (But most of 
the buildings in use today date from the Ming Dynasty, many buildings in 
the Chinese style.) I t  is evident that Islam f i r s t  took root in China in 
about AD 740. Perhaps Muslim traders from Central Asia brought with them 
the Koran, the holy book of Islam, by land.
97 Jiu Tang shu, 10, (10), 2nd year of Zhide
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[758] In the f i r s t  year of Qianyuan, Persians and Arabs looted 
Quanzhou, pillaged storehouses, set fire  to houses, then escaped 
by sea. In the sixth year of Dali (771), Persia sent an embassy 
to the Imperial Court, and presented pearls and so on. (Jiu Tang 
shu) 98
(ÄH*)
The Jiu Tang shu IfllMir records that Persia had sent tribute by land several 
times. In 757, the cavalry of the Arab Empire entered Tang China by land to 
assist the Tang Empire against the revolt. Next year, in 758, Persian and 
Arab elements invaded Guangzhou, looting then escaping by sea. These 
records demonstrate that Persia could be reached by land and by sea.
The record also indicates that this incident was conducted by ''soldiers'' of 
the Arab Empire and Persia ", whose troops could reach Guangzhou by sea. 
Why could the Ming Empire’ s troops not reach Persia and the Arab Empire by 
sea? Obviously there was good knowledge of the sea route to West Asia and 
China had the necessary maritime technology.
Shi j i  (this work was completed in the Han Dynasty, and was famous in the 
Tang Period, the Ming Period and today) suggests that i t  might be possible 
to reach central Asia from south China100. Thus travel to West Asia, or even 
Central Asia, would not be unfamiliar to Ming China. So Admiral Zheng He
98 Jiu Tang shu, 198, (148), Persia
99 Jiu Tang shu, 10, (10), 1st year of Qianyuan
(758), On the date Kuisi of the ninth month, Guangzhou sent a 
memorandum to the throne: Soldiers of the Arab Empire and Persia 
have attacked the city, and the Supervision Officer Wei Lijian 
has abandoned the city and run away.
ar ......f i e  ’ mwmx&m * • M&mmMsmm •
100 Shi j i ,  123, (Zhuan 63), Da Wan Jgfc
The Chinese knowledge of the world was also extended by the report 
brought back from Central Asia including Afghanistan by the 
ambassador-explorer Zhang Qian, which described an exotic land -  India - 
and suggested that i t  might be reached from South China.
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would have had no d i f f i cu l ty  in making contact with the Timur Empire by 
sea, as i t s  t e r r i t o ry  covered the whole of Persia.
Marco Polo, Quanzhou to Hormuz, enhanced re la tions  for Yuan China and Persia
Between 1271 and 1295, Marco Polo went from Venice in I ta ly  to Hormuz in 
Persia, then from Hormuz through Central Asian c i t i e s  such as Shibarghan and 
Balkh -  very close to Herat and Samarkand (future cap i ta ls  of the Timur 
Empire) 101; he then went to Beijing by land l02. Marco Polo went from Beijing 
to Quanzhou, then from Quanzhou through the Singapore S t r a i t  to Hormuz by 
sea.
He conveyed the Yuan Dynasty Princess Kuokuozhen [||]|^j|l to the 11-Khan 
Empire in Persia, landing at Hormuz. This was recorded in the “Travels 
o f Marco Polo” and was also recorded in the Yongle Encyclopedia 103. Marco 
Polo travelled  from Hormuz to the capital  of the Il-Khan Empire by land; 
he then returned to Venice in Italy,  also by land.
The or iginal  motive for Marco Polo’ s mission could be said to have been to 
enhance the re la tionship between Yuan China and the Il-Khan Empire in 
Persia. Therefore, i f  China’ s ambassador crossed from Beijing via Quanzhou 
to Hormuz by sea, then went to the capital  of the Timur Empire, Herat, by 
land, there would be nothing extraordinary about th is  route. In fact,  the 
sea routes of Marco Polo and Zheng He are similar. If  Marco Polo could cross
From Hormuz, via Shiraz, Mashhad, Samarkand, Kokand, Turfan to 
Dunhuang was the famous "Silk Road".
P h il ip ’ s Atlas of World History. London: George Philip. 1999. P104
Polo, Marco, 1254-1323? t r .  and ed. with notes by Sir H. Yule. The book 
of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian concerning the kingdoms and marvels of 
the East. London: J. Murray. 1903. Edition 3rd. Map.
Yongle Encyclopedia A IH A ft  (Yongle Da Dian), 19418
In the 27th year of Zhiyuan (1290), an embassy of the Yuan included 90 
people was sent to the Il-Khan Empire via the Vijayanagar Empire (south 
India). This record corresponds with the record in the Travel of Marco 
Polo.
OAftthlS ’ r IAII§Aft (EM S® )
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by a sea  r o u te  to  enhance r e l a t i o n s  between P e r s i a  and China in  1290, a 
m is s io n  which was a l s o  re c o rd e d  in  th e  Yongle E ncyclo p ed ia , Zheng He 
co u ld  a l s o  have done so in  1405.
I t  i s  im p o rtan t  t o  n o te  t h a t  d u r in g  Zheng He’ s voyages between 1405 and 1433, 
th e  Timur Empire c o n t r o l l e d  th e  whole o f  P e r s i a .  During th e  t r a v e l s  o f  Marco 
Polo, Hormuz be longed  to  P e r s i a  -  a f a c t  emphasized by Marco Polo. T h is  i s  a 
key concep t  f o r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  o r i g i n a l  m otive  f o r  Zheng He’ s voyages.
There a r e  many re c o rd s  from th e  " T r a v e ls  o f  Marco P o l o " , and t h e r e  a r e  
many r e c o rd s  from Zheng He’ s s t e l e s  105, and b o th  so u rc e s  r e p e a te d  th e  name
1 Polo, Marco, 1254-1323? t r .  and ed. with notes by S ir  H. Yule. The book 
o f  Ser Marco Polo the Venetian concerning the kingdoms and marvels o f  
the East. London: J. Murray. 1903. Edition  3rd. Bookl, pi 10, p90, p83, 
p78.
I should t e l l  you f i r s t ,  however, th a t  King Ruomedam Ahomet of 
Hormuz, which we are leaving, i s  a liegeman of the King of 
Kerman, (pi 10)
Kerman i s  a kingdom which i s  a lso  properly in Persia , and 
formerly i t  had a he red ita ry  prince. Since the T ar ta rs  [Mongols] 
conquered the country the ru le  i s  no longer hered ita ry ,  but the 
T ar ta r  sends to adm inister whatever lord he pleases. (p90)
Now you must know th a t  P e rs ia  i s  a very great country, and 
contains e igh t kingdoms. . . .  In t h i s  country of P ers ia  there  is  
a great supply of f ine  horses. (p83)
P e rs ia  i s  a great country, which was in old times very 
i l l u s t r i o u s  and powerful; but now the T ar ta rs  have wasted and 
destroyed i t .  (p78)
IOd Appendix 2: The s t e l e s  of Admiral Zheng He
The Empire mandated Regional M il i ta ry  Commander Grand Supervisor 
Zheng He to  proceed to  Hormuz and other coun tr ies  in the Western 
Ocean for o f f i c i a l  a f f a i r s ,
In the 11 year of Yongle, the ships and troops were sent to 
Hormuz and o ther countries .
-  > •
In the 15th year of Yongle, the f l e e t  was sent forward to  the 
West Region, Hormuz th i s  country sent lion, cheetah and "Large 
West Horse" (Arabic horse?) as a t r ib u te .
- '  > xmm •
In the 19th year of Yongle, the f l e e t  was charged with taking 
ambassadors of Hormuz and o ther countries ,  who had overstayed 
t h e i r  welcome in the c a p i ta l ,  back to  t h e i r  coun tries  forthwith.
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Hormuz. So travel from Quanzhou to Hormuz to reach Persia from China is 
perfectly reasonable. Zheng He could also have followed in Marco Polo's (The 
Yuan Empire's sea mission) footsteps in his voyages between Ming China and 
the Timur Empire in Persia.
The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389 shows a great sea route in the early Ming
The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389 106 (Da Ming hun yi tu, 3.86 m * 4. 75 m, 
illustrated in the thesis) proves that Ming China had a comprehensive 
geographic knowledge of Asia, Africa and Europe in 1389 107 . This map was 
stored in the Forbidden City, and according to the specialists in the First 
Historical (The Ming Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty) Archives Building 
(location in the Forbidden City) it was made in 1389. This world map is very 
important but was ignored by the world for a long time. It clearly shows 
the Indian Peninsula, the Arabic Peninsula, the Gulf of Persia, and the 
outline of Africa (including Lake Victoria, and the Cape of Good Hope).
This map was made in 1389 with great accuracy; it undoubtedly shows that 
Emperor Yongle and Admiral Zheng He were both well aware that the Timur
Li Hong-wei .Chen ji shu bai nian, yi ming chuan tian xia, the 
Grand Ming Map, Yin qi shi ren guan zhu * — E H f l l A T  ’ ( A H U f M  — H I )  , Li shi dang an 2004.1 .Beijing: Zhongguo 
di yi li shi dang an guan, 2004. pl34.
In 2001, the speaker of the People’ s Assembly of PRC - Li Peng - visited 
the Republic of South Africa, and gave a book - "Chinese ancient maps" 
(The Ming Dynasty volume, whose first page was printed with "The Great 
Ming Map 1389") to the Speaker of the National Assembly of the 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Ms. Frene Ginwala, who has a 
good knowledge of ancient maps. When she realised the great importance 
of this map, she asked the scholars of old maps and historians of South 
Africa to examine it and reached an astonishing conclusion: Chinese had 
a good geographical knowledge of Africa 600 years ago.
Ms. Frene Ginwala appealed to the PRC Government to provide a copy of 
"The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389" for the 12th November, 2002, the 
"Map Exhibition of the National Assembly of South Africa". The PRC 
government agreed to this.
The Department of National Archives of PRC thought highly of this 
mission, and instructed the First Historical Archives Building to carry 
it out. With the assistance of several experts the map was copied in a 
similar size and using similar material. During the five months of the 
copying process, Ms. Frene Ginwala sent letters to the First Historical 
Archives Building several times concerning this work.
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could be reached by sea. From Hormuz at the gate of the Gulf of Persia to 
Samarkand and Herat would be a significant route for the Ming Empire's 
diplomacy and military strategy.
On the 12th November, 2002, the "Map Exhibition of the National Assembly 
of South Africa" was opened at Cape Town; the map was located in the 
foyer, and it produced astonishment in South Africa. Many researches 
emphasise that "The Great Ming Map 1389" provides evidence that, before 
Europeans arrived in South Africa, Africa and East Asia had traded for 
more than 100 years 108 . This theory was corroborated after the map was 
checked with "The Kangnido Map 1402" (see chapter 4).
1<)H When Mr. Gavin Menzies published his famous book - "1421, The year China 
discovered the world', this map was still unknown. Thus Gavin Menzies 
missed the most significant evidence - "The Great Ming Map 1389" - for 
his basic theory: "Fra Mauro’s planisphere 1459", was possibly
influenced from Zheng He’s voyage map. Menzies, Gavin. 1421 - The year 
China discovered the world. London: Bantam. 2003. pl23
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<5> Conclusion: China had great land and sea traffic before 
1392
Arab-Persia had been a strategic alliance for Tang China
Making an alliance with Darouzhi to destroy Xiongnu was the original motive 
for Zhang Qian’s mission in Han China and exploration was just a secondary 
purpose. This is a very famous strategic story in Chinese history, and it 
was recorded in Shi ji and the Han shu, Emperor Yongle and Admiral Zheng He 
would have known it.
The rise of Islam and the Arab Empire in the 7th and 8th centuries was a big 
event in world history, and was recorded in the Jiu Tang shu and the Xin 
Tang shu. The Tang Empire knew of the powerful Islamic Arab Empire. Tang 
China destroyed the East Turki and the West Turki and gained brilliant 
victories in central Asia, in which the emerging Arab Empire played a 
strategic role. As the strong Arab Empire had become an obstacle, the 
Türkis could not withdraw to the west.
The Arab Empire sent embassies to Tang China several times, and despatched a 
military force from central Asia to China to assist the Tang Empire against 
the An Lu-shan Revolt. This is clearly recorded in the Jiu Tang shu and the 
Xin Tang shu. It is a significant event for the foreign relations history of 
China but it has often been ignored by many scholars.
Also, the Islamic Arab Empire had helped the Tang Empire against the Tibetan 
Empire, and the Tang government clearly understood that this meant the Tang 
Empire and the Arab Empire had a strategic alliance. It was recorded in the 
Jiu Tang shu and Xin Tang shu so, of course, Emperor Yongle and his advisers 
knew it.
Tang Song China: Persia could be contacted from China by land and sea
There are many records in the 23 Dynastic Histories showing that traffic
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between Persia and China could be by land or sea -a simple concept, but in 
the search for the original motive for Zheng He’s voyages, it could be very 
important.
When the Ming Empire designed their military and diplomatic strategy, they 
would, with this knowledge, have wished to improve relations with the Timur 
Empire. Certainly, they were able to build big ships in order to reach the 
Timur Empire in Persia by sea. And of course the Ming Government knew it, 
because many precedents could be found in the 23 Dynastic Histories.
The Liao shi even recorded that a princess of the Liao Dynasty married a 
Prince of the Arab Empire. Persia is not Arabia, but the route from the Liao 
Empire in northern China to Baghdad must pass through Persia. This marriage 
was evidence of the close relationship between Western Asia and China l09.
Furthermore, the 23 Dynastic Histories recorded visits by merchants from 
Persia and Arabia to Tang 110 and Song China * 111 , many of whom travelled by 
sea. Emperor Yongle and Admiral Zheng He would have noticed this, especially 
as there were many tomb steles in Quanzhou (today they are collected in the 
Quanzhou Museum). In addition, there are records on the Song shi showing 
that the Song knew the real geographical location of Persia. Thus the sea 
passage from Persia to China was not very unusual; Emperor Yongle and 
Admiral Zheng He would have reached the same conclusion.
The Yuan Empire’s missions reached Japan, Java, India and Persia by sea
Kublai Khan’s war on Japan showed that the Mongol Empire was a great sea 
power1IJ , as recorded in the archives of China, Korea and Japan; another 
independent source is the “Travels of Marco Polo” . Many Chinese scholars 
believe that if there had been no typhoons, perhaps the Yuan could have
l!IN Liao shi, 16, (16), 1st year of Taiping
110 Xin Tang shu, 17, (17), before 1st year of Baoli, p512.
111 Song shi, 490, (249), the Arab Empire
"J Lo, Jung-pang . China as a sea power, 1127-1368 : [a preliminary survey
of the maritime expansion and naval exploits of the Chinese people
during the Southern Sung and Yuan periods] .Berkeley, Calif, 1957.
100
conquered Japan, and Japan would have become another province of the Yuan 
Empire like Korea. In that way, the Yuan Empire could have possessed a great 
overseas territory, like the Spanish Empire in the 16th century. One 
Sinologist in the Australian National University thinks it unlikely, because 
the supply line of the Yuan Empire's troops were too long, and also Japan's 
resistance was too well organized. One scholar from Japan in the Australian 
National University told me that, in his opinion, Kublai Khan was very 
powerful, and if there had been no typhoons the Yuan Empire would have 
occupied the whole of Kyushu island.
The Yuan Empire’s war on Java showed that it could deploy its naval power 
over long distances. From Beijing to Java the distance is similar to that 
which Columbus sailed when he discovered America in 1492. The Yuan’ s wars on 
Japan and Java were both recorded in the Yuan shi. Of course, Emperor Yongle 
and Admiral Zheng He would have read these accounts.
Wang Dayuan and Ibn Batuta both spoke of China as a major sea power.
Their travels were at much the same period, and their books supply 
significant information on the maritime activities of China, and other 
Asian countries.
Ibn Batuta recorded Yuan China’s mission which travelled from Beijing, via 
Quanzhou and Calicut, to Delhi. Zheng He’s first two voyages - the main 
fleet -which terminated in Calicut, could thus have linked to Delhi, which 
belonged to the Timur Empire in 1405. China’s records also show that several 
missions were sent by Yuan China from Quanzhou to Hormuz by sea to create 
a bond between Yuan China and the I1-Khan Empire in Persia. Many historians 
have emphasized only the land power of the Yuan, though actually the Yuan 
Empire was one of the great maritime powers of world history,
Marco Polo’s travels from Quanzhou to Hormuz for China and Persia
According to the Yuan shi, the Ming Empire knew that Hormuz and Kerman 
belonged to Persia 113 . This is another extremely important clue in the 
search for the chief original motive for Zheng He’s voyages. Aware that
113 Yuan shi, 63, (15), Northwest land, Persia
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Hormuz belonged to Persia, the Ming Government knew that Zheng He went to 
Hormuz in order to v i s i t  Persia.
According to the Yuan shi, the Ming also knew that Mongol power destroyed 
both the Abbasid Arab Empire and the Song Empires. Important information in 
the Yuan shi shows that Hulagu Khan in Persia and Kublai Khan in China 
were brothers and close friends. Emperor Yongle and Admiral Zheng He would 
have understood th is. In the Yuan shi, there are many records which show 
that Quanzhou was a link between the 11-Khan Empire and Yuan China by sea 
route.
One independent sample is the record in the “Travels o f  Marco Polo” tha t 
Marco Polo’ s re turn  from China to Venice in I ta ly  was from Quanzhou to 
Hormuz by sea, then by land. Marco Polo’ s mission was to accompany Yuan 
China’ s princess to the 11-Khan Empire in Persia. This mission was recorded 
in the Yongle Encyclopedia, so Emperor Yongle would have known of i t .  Thus 
i t  appears that the s tra teg ic  a lliance  between the I1-Khan Empire in Persia 
and the Yuan Empire in China was founded on a sea link. Similarly, the 
s tra teg ic  a lliance  between the Timur and Ming China could also have depended 
on a sea link.
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Chapter 4
Diplomacy and m ilitary -  for a huge c r is is  
(1392 -  1404)
Introduction:
Professor Wang Gungwu indicates that the Ming Dynasty was established a f te r  
the Chinese had experienced nearly a hundred years of hum ilia tion1. This 
"humiliation" is  a very important background for understanding the 
s tra teg ic  options in early Ming China. Almost a l l  of the Ming Empire’ s 
archives boasted of the Ming Empire’ s splendour, especially  the Ming shi, 
but many scholars have not taken into account the true h is to r ic a l  background 
of the early Ming Dynasty: i t  followed a period when the whole of China had 
come under Mongol rule.
The Ming sh i recorded tha t Ming China had sent several missions to 
v i s i t  the Timur Empire2 . The Timur Empire was a great lo s t  empire'- a f te r  
1449 i t  quickly vanished into obscurity in Central Asia and Persia
Wang Gungwu. Early Ming relations with southeast Asia: A background 
essay. Fairbank, John King (ed.) . The Chinese world order ; traditional 
China’s foreign relations .Cambridge , Harvard University Press, 1968. 
p34.
The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) was founded after the Chinese had 
experienced nearly a hundred years of humiliation and 
subjugation under the Mongols. For the northern Chinese this 
humiliation had begun even earlier, in 1126, with the Jurched 
capture of Kaifeng. But the Mongol Yuan period (1279-1368) was 
particularly d ifficult to explain, because i t  was the f i r s t  time 
the whole of China had come under foreign rule. (Professor Wang 
Gungwu)
Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609.
[1395] In the 28th year (of Hongwu) "Palace Attendants" Fu An 
and Guo Ji and 1500 soldiers were sent to v is it Herat (the Timur 
Empire), and were detained in Samarkand (the Timur Empire). 
[1397] In the 30th year, Beijing Surveillance Commissioner, 
Chen Dewen, was also sent, and did not return for a long time.
> mmiR&mw  • *mm • •
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forever, while i t s  descendant moved into the Indian Peninsula and 
established another great power -  the Moghul Empire. However during Admiral 
Zheng He’ s voyages, 1405-1433, the Timur Empire was the greates t  power in 
the world with the exception of Ming China. During the early 15th century, 
the Chinese Ming Empire, the Mongols and the Timur Empire were the three 
great  mil i t ary  powers.
This chapter discusses the diplomatic and s t ra teg ic  operations of Ming China 
between 1392 and 1404. After the commencement of the Ming Dynasty, the 
Mongol powers were s t i l l  a serious threat , and how to defend Ming China was 
a primary question for Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle. From 1392 to 
1402 Ming China’ s in te ll igence would have reported Timur’ s b r i l l i a n t  
mil i t ary  performance and his plan for conquering China. After some 
consideration,  Ming China’ s strategy could be to seek to reach a posit ive  
agreement with the Timur Empire, and th is  may be seen as a reasonable 
strategy.
The Ming st ra tegy saw the Mongols, and the Tartar (the northern Yuan) 
together with the Oirot, as the only two enemies, and they were formidable. 
The Mongol powers had the super iori ty  on horses in the wars, 90 years before, 
when i t  had conquered China. Why could i t  not happen again? Ming China sent 
many fr iendly  missions to v i s i t  the Timur Empire, but the diplomatic 
s i tua t ion  did not improve between 1392 and 1405. Timur proclaimed himself as 
a descendant of Ghengis Khan and th is  meant he was the inheri to r of one part  
of the Mongol Empire; to separate the Timur and the other Mongol power was a 
ra tiona l st ra tegy for Ming China.
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<1> S t r a te g ic  t r i a n g l e :  The Ming, the Mongol and the Timur 
Empires
The destruction of Baghdad and the Arab Empire was recorded in the Yuan shi
The Abbasid Arab Empire was destroyed by the Mongol power in 1258 and a f te r  
18 years, in 1276, the Song Dynasty was destroyed by the Mongol power, too, 
a very humiliating year for Han Chinese.
In 1258, f ie rce  flames were burning in Baghdad’ s amazing palaces .......... these
beautiful buildings with onion sty le  domes are so often mentioned in the 
famous story, the "Thousand and One Nights". In 1253, the Mongol’ s m ilitary  
force was ordered to conquer western Asia3, and in 1258, Baghdad, the chief 
home town of the "Thousand and One Nights", was destroyed by the Mongol 
power. The Yuan shi recounts: ''palaces of heavy sandalwood were burned, i t s  
perfume could be smelt from 100 Li (around 50 km) away" ..........
[1258] In the eighth year of Xianzong: ..........  Prince Hulagu led
a punitive expedition against the Muslim caliph of the Abbasid 
Arab Empire. I t  was quelled, i t s  king was captured, and an envoy 
sent to the Imperial Court to present spoils. 4
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Thus the Abbasid Arab Empire 5, the great Islamic empire which lasted from 
750 to 1258, was destroyed, a huge event in world history. These matters
Yuan shi, 3, 3rd year of Xianzong
[1253] In the third year of Xianzong: .......... the Emperor ordered
Princes Hulagu and Wulianghatai, to command troops to attack 
Caliphate and Baghdad and other countries in the West Region.
■ .......
«  •
1 Yuan shi, 3, 8rd year of Xianzong 
The Abbasid Dynasty (750 -  1258)
In 750, the Umayyads were overthrown by the Abbasid family, who then 
became the most important family in the Islamic world for 500 years, 
from 750 to 1258. They traced their  descent from Abbas, the uncle of
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were recorded in one of the Chinese Dynastic Histories, the Yuan shi, and 
all the dates are completely accurate, demonstrating that early Ming China 
was familiar with west Asia.
[1258] (The Abbasid Arab Empire)' a great country in the western 
region, its territory on one side occupied 8,000 Li. The dynasty 
had lasted for 42 generations, and had several hundred thousands
of crack soldiers ....  70,000 soldiers were defeated, the
inhabitants of the Western City were slaughtered. Its Eastern City 
was also destroyed. The palaces of the Eastern City were all 
constructed of heavy sandalwood, as the fire burned them, its
perfume could be smelt from 100 Li away ....  More than 300
cities were occupied. The troops continued westward 3000 Li
arriving at Mecca ....  seriously defeated them ....  occupied
185 cities. They continued westward another 40 Li, reaching 
Egypt .... 6
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After checking against the history of the Abbasid Arab Empire, this record 
shows the early Ming scholars knew the history of western Asia, especially 
the history of its destruction by the Mongol power. The Ming shilu records 
Emperor Hongwu’s words, “our empire from Liaodong to Gansu is 6,000 Li 7
Muhammad. In 862 the Abbasids moved the capital from Damascus to 
Baghdad, where it achieved great cultural splendour. From the 10th
century Abbasid caliphs ceased to exercise political power, becoming 
religious figureheads. During the 500 years, the Abbasid Arab Empire had 
a flourishing culture; and Baghdad became one of the world’ s greatest 
cities. Its famous fiction, the "Thousand and One Nights", is still today 
popular in the world.
b Yuan shi, 149, (36) Sun Kai , p3524.
7 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming Shilu, Taizu, 253, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3656.
Our Empire from Liaodong in the East to Gansu in the west 
stretches over more than 6,000 Li. We have only 100,000 horses 
suitable for warfare.
- * b a =p « * s  • b j  .....
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the Yuan shi was completed in the same period. Thus, comparing these two 
records, i t  could be said tha t the Ming Government knew that the Abbasid 
Arab Empire was a great country, because i t s  te r r i to ry ,  s tre tch ing  for 8,000 
Li , was bigger than the Ming Empire.
In 1368 Emperor Hongwu8 proclaimed the new Dynasty, the Ming Empire, to have 
been established and then, following China’ s great trad it ion , had the former 
Dynasty’ s history  compiled. He ordered scholars to compile the Yuan shi
(the Yuan History), which was finished in 1370.
[1368] Autumn, in the eighth month, f i r s t  year of Hongwu, once 
the Emperor had pacified Shuofang, the whole of China (Nine 
Great Provinces) was reunified. In addition, a l l  archives were 
collected into the Imperial Archives Department. Winter, in the 
twelfth month, Confucian scholars were chosen by Imperial Edict, 
and the archives were used to compose the Yuan shi, making
essentia l records of the whole dynasty ..........  Earlier, Tang
Taizong as founder of an Empire, when wars were at end, promptly
turned his mind to the Jin shu, and ordered Fang Xuanling and
others to compose i t .  In the present-day, i t  is  s t i l l  read ........
................................................  [1370] On the 13th day, the 10th
month, the th ird  year of Hongwu, O fficia l Historian Song Lian of 
Jinhua fa i th fu l ly  published it .  9
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The records in the Yuan shi appear to re f le c t  early  Ming China’ s s tra teg ic  
thought, and i t s  background. I f  in 1370 the Ming knew of the looting of
Emperor Hongwu (1328 -  1398, Zhu Yuanzhang )
Hongwu was the founder of the Ming Empire, and the f i r s t  emperor of th is  
dynasty from 1368 to 1398. Among the Chinese populace there were 
strong feelings against the rule of "the foreigners" under the Mongol 
Yuan Dynasty, which f in a l ly  led to a revolution that pushed the Yuan 
dynasty back to the Mongolian steppes and established the Ming Dynasty 
in 1368.
Yuan shi, appendix, Song Lian’ s postscrip t of contents
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Baghdad in 1258, why would they not know of the looting of Baghdad by Timur 
in 1401? The Ming knew west Asia had had a very big Islamic empire, so if 
Admiral Zheng He visited Hormuz five times, his goal could not have been to 
form an alliance with a small island or city state, but rather with a great 
power.
The Ming Empire - lessons from the fall of the Song Dynasty
Also in 1258 (the same year as the fall of the Abbasid Arab Empire), Kublai 
(he was then a prince, not a Khan) was ordered to conquer the Song Dynasty10. 
In 1260, the Great Khan (Kublai’s elder brother) died, and Kublai proclaimed 
himself as the Great Khan of the Mongol Empire. In 1276, the Song Empire 
with its more than 300 years of cultural eminence had disappeared without 
trace (960-1276), and Kublai Khan became the emperor of all China.
The Yung shi’s records on the Song Dynasty’s surrender were a source of 
painful memories for the Ming Emperors Hongwu, Yongle and the others, and 
they were to try their utmost to ensure that such a disgraceful event would 
not happen again.
[1276] In the thirteen year of Zhiyuan: ....  Department of
Administration, Right Prime Minister, Bayan, sent an envoy 
bringing a Memorial to the Throne: The mother queen of the Song 
state, young head (emperor), ministers and officials of the Song 
Dynasty had brought the Imperial Seal and presented a statement 
of surrender on 18th of the first month. 11
...
Yuan shi, 3, 8rd year of Xianzong p52.
[1258] In the eighth year of Xianzong: .....  Emperor ordered
Kublai to command Mongol and Han troops in an attack the Song 
Empire.
mm/w • ....... * mmmt ■
Yuan shi, 9, 13th year of Zhiyuan ,pl79.
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In fact, Ming China was established after a humiliating history, recorded in 
the Yuan shi, when Mongol had ruled China, and the language of the empire 
was Mongolian, not Chinese. This was the only time when all China was 
governed by a foreign force - from the perspective of the early Ming period, 
although today Inner Mongolia belongs to China - as confirmed by a source 
from the Republic of Mongolia12. The Yuan Empire was a strong world empire, 
and Kublai Khan was an outstanding emperor, but he was a Mongolian. He died 
in 1294 and was followed by some mediocre emperors. According to the Ming 
archives the last Yuan emperor, Shundi, was a bad ruler, and the Chinese 
people were tired of being governed harshly by foreigners.
In 1368, after a gruelling 13-year war, Emperor Hongwu (Zhu Yuan Zhang) 
drove the Mongols back to Mongolia13 and founded the Chinese Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644). While Emperor Hongwu was still a child, his parents and brother 
all died of famine and disease. He had been a Buddhist monk, and during bad 
times a beggar (this rumour is famous in Chinese society). In the late 
period of the Yuan Dynasty, he was one of the revolutionary leaders, and 
also proved to be an excellent general.
Emperor Hongwu ruled China for 30 years (1368-1398) as a dictator, defending 
it against Mongol invasions and restoring prosperity and prestige to his 
empire. The newly emerging Empire did not kill or capture the last emperor 
of the Yuan Dynasty, the Yuan Emperor Shundi, which would become a problem
Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research institute. 2003
In 1271 Kublai adopted the Chinese appellation Yuan (the 
beginning) for his dynasty, which obviously corresponded to his 
plan to govern China by Chinese methods. But it was a Mongol 
rather than a Chinese dynasty, which relied mainly on the Mongol 
military feudal nobility ... in the administrative system the 
Chinese held minor posts ... On Kublai’s nomination the Pagva 
Lama, a scholarly Tibetan monk who invented the Mongol alphabet 
(square script), was appointed head of the lamasery. Mongolian 
was proclaimed a state language in China.
Ming shi, 327, (Zhuan 215), Tartars, p8463.
Tartar means Mongol, the successor to the Yuan Dynasty. [1368]
In the first year of Hongwu, the Grand General, Xuda, commanded 
troops to capture the head of the Yuan Dynasty, who fled from 
Beijing to beyond the Great Wall.
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in the f u t u r e 1"1. The Mongols were expelled and returned to the Mongolian 
plateau, though they s t i l l  wanted to restore  the i r  empire. The Ming called 
them the Tartar, but they s t i l l  called themselves the Yuan or the Northern 
Yuan.
Emperor Hongwu aimed to rule  l ike the splendid early Tang Empire. However, 
the shadow of Ghengis Khan s t i l l  covered the new Chinese Empire -  i t  was 
s t i l l  surrounded by his colossal t e r r i t o r i e s 15 . For geographical reasons, 
the Mongol powers had more horses, and th is  is  the or ig inal  reason why Ming 
China found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to win the wars between the Ming and the Mongol 
powers.
The Yuan shi was compiled and finished in 1370, when the future  Emperor 
Yongle was aged 12, and i t s  study would have been educational for him. From 
the records in the Yuan shi, Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle would have 
known the Mongol Empire was not jus t  the Yuan Dynasty. The Yuan shi also 
indicates that  the descendants of Ghengis Khan had another three empires in 
western Asia and central  Asia. In part icular,  Hulagu Khan of the II-Khan 
Empire in Persia and Kublai Khan were close brothers, and the two enjoyed 
amiable re la tions .
Genghis Khan ruled one of the greatest  land empires the world has ever known. 
His vast domains were divided among his sons and grandsons. Although his 
wars were marked by ru th less  carnage, Genghis Khan was a great ru le r  and 
most b r i l l i a n t  mil i t ary  leader. The Mongol powers s t i l l  had a superior 
number of horses. Since Mongol had produced a Ghengis Khan 100 years ear l ie r ,
14 Luo, Yuejiong ju ren 1585, edited by Xu S ili  .Xian bin lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Tartar , p 11.
General Xuda said: Your subject, the head of the Yuan, concerned 
about our advance, has fled to north. He will become a threat in 
the future, he should be pursued by our troops.
nwmtB ■ E j f ü f c B  ’ > m m  * •
15 Genghis Khan (1155? -  1227)
One of the most successful and most powerful military leaders in 
history. He united the Mongol tribes and founded the Mongol Empire 
(1206-1368), the largest contiguous and second largest empire in world 
history. In modern Mongolia, Genghis Khan is regarded as a national 
symbol, military and strategic genius and father of the Mongol people, 
for his h is torical role in uniting the Mongol tribes and giving them a 
common identity.
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why could i t  not now produce another? Before Zheng He's f i r s t  voyage in 1405, 
from 1390 to 1405 was Timur's era, and his b r i l l i a n t  mili tary performances 
shocked other countries from Asia to Europe. He looked l ike another Genghis 
Khan and he proclaimed himself as a descendant of Genghis Khan.
The Mongol Empire -  the Yuan Empire did not rea l ly  f a l l  in 1368
The 14th century was the century of the Mongol in world h i s to r y 16. In the 
15th century, the influence1' of Ghengis Khan’ s gigantic empires and the i r  
conquests s t i l l  remained. The Ming Empire was surrounded by the great 
empires that  were the legacy of Ghengis Khan. The heirs  to these were s t i l l  
a serious threa t  to Ming China.
Records from the Republic of Mongolia reveal the i r  version of the history of 
th is  period l8. The mili tary forces of the Ming Empire invaded Mongolia and 
burned the capita l  of Mongol, Kharkhorum, in 1380. The two countries were 
continually at  war. On the other hand, the Ming Chinese records have a 
d if ferent point of view19, but agree that  the expedition of the Ming Empire
lb O’Brien, Patrick K. .Oxford -  A tlas o f  World History. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2002. 13th century.
17 Yuan shi, 1, 17th year of Taizu.
Returning passed the Arab Empire, and forayed i t  heavily
» « i j f l f f l  ’ -
1K Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I~team system science research ins ti tu te . 2003
The peace achieved between China and Mongolia following the fa ll  
of the Yuan dynasty did not last long. In 1378, under Togstomor 
Khan, war again broke out between them. In 1380 Chinese troops 
invaded Mongolia and burned a large part of Kharkhorum. 
Togstomor himself was killed in battle  in 1388. According to 
h istorical sources, a fte r his death five Khans succeeded to the 
Mongol throne, each in turn becoming the victim of a palace 
revolution.
19 Ming shi 327, (Zhuan 215), Tartar, p8463.
[1380] Spring, in the 13th year [of Hongwu], the "Marquis of 
Pacify West", Mu Ying, commanded troops from Linzhou, ferried 
the Yellow River, crossed Mount Helan, marched across the 
shifting desert, and captured Tuohuochi, Aizu and others at 
Kharkhorum, and the whole of their  subordinates before 
returning. [4]
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entered the present-day Republic of Mongolia and captured many people before 
returning to Ming China. Some Imperial Edicts sent from the Ming Emperor 
Hongwu to Mongol were of significance.
In the early time, you governed the Desert, I governed China; 
but you and your ministers were so stubborn, thus frontier alerts 
often occurred. 20
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This Imperial Edict was sent from the Ming to the Tartar (the Northern Yuan). 
The reign of the Northern Yuan in the Mongol plateau included today’s Inner 
Mongolia, the Republic of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) and the south of Siberia. 
Many such Imperial Edicts could be understood to mean that Ming China 
recognized the Mongol power as an equal empire with the Ming Empire. I need 
to emphasise this point because present-day nationalist viewpoints often 
obscure it.
It also needs to be emphasised that no Khans of Mongol (or the Northern Yuan) 
ever received any title granted by the Ming Empire during 1368 to 1449 
(according to Chinese tradition, if a head of state received a title from 
the Chinese emperor, this meant the state was a vassal country). Some of the 
Mongol forces' ministers (those of the Tartar and the Oirot) had received 
the Ming Empire’s titles, but not as Khans, and that was just a piece of 
diplomatic strategy from the Mongol powers. Records from the Republic of 
Mongolia 21, and from the Ming 22 23, indicate that the emerging Ming Dynasty
20 Ming shilu, Taizu, 116, pl936.
21 Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research institute. 2003
Attempts by Togoontomor (1320-1370), the last emperor of the 
Yuan dynasty, to restore the Yuan dynasty were unsuccessful; the 
Mongols returned to their homeland and Kharkhorum once again 
became the political centre of Mongolia.
Ming shi, 91, (Zhi 67), Frontier Defense, p2235.
The Yuan people who returned to the north often planned to
restore their empire .....  Thus over the Ming period the
pressure on frontier defence was very heavy. East from Yalu, 
west to Jiayu, stretching more than 10,000 Li, regions were 
spread out for defense.
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did not capture the last emperor of the Yuan Dynasty. This failure might 
have led to a disaster for Ming China in the future, since the Mongol powers 
surely would still want to restore their dynasty.
In addition, the descendant of the last emperor of the Yuan Dynasty, 
Benyashili , went to the capital of the Timur Empire, Samarkand,
appealing for assistance to destroy the Ming Empire and restore the Yuan 
Dynasty (this was recorded in Ming shilu). The Ming Empire faced a potential 
strategic crisis, an alliance between the Timur Empire and the Northern Yuan. 
In reality, the threat from the Mongol powers was a strategic focus for 
Emperor Yongle. Professor Mote’s comment is a perfect description of the 
real northern crisis for the Ming Empire 24, and the critical nature of 
the defence strategy of the early Ming Empire.
Emperor Shundi left Yuyang for the north and moved around in 
the deserts. He restored the former capital, with its old 
possessions intact. The Yuan Dynasty had ''fallen*, but in truth 
it had never begun to fall.25
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Luo, Yuejiong ju ren 1585, edited by Xu Sili .Xian bin lu
fMk .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ^IpfUr^ ,2000. pll 
Ming Shi 327, (Zhuan 215), Tartar, p8463. same.
At that time, the crown prince Ai-xian-shi-li-da-la named 
himself the emperor at Kharkhorum . . . [1373] In the sixth year, 
the head of Yuan died. His second son, Tuogusi Timur succeeded 
to the crown.
mm ’ .......5Ej£ °
Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p609.
Throughout Ming Taizu’s (Emperor Hongwu) reign, the Ming court 
treated the Mongol heirs to the Yuan Dynasty with respect and
sought favourable diplomatic relations with them ....  The
Chinese court clearly recognized that the Mongols had the 
potential for again becoming powerful and aggressive neighbours
....  Chengzu’ s (Emperor Yongle) northern border problems would
have all become insignificant compared with an invasion from 
that quarter: as it was, the Mongol threat fully occupied him
for the next twenty years.
10. Gu, Yingtai , 1620-1690 .Ming shi ji shi ben mo : [80 juan]
: [80 4?] -Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan jllfliEPillfit ,1937.
Juan 10, the military force for the old Yuan °
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This quotation was from an outstanding scholar, Gu Yingtai , in the
la te  Ming Period, and i t  sets out a very essentia l  concept for the 
understanding of early Ming history. I t  shows that scholars of Ming China 
knew that  the Mongol Empire was s t i l l  a serious threat  to the Ming Empire. 
The Mongol powers always had more horses (of great significance in war) than 
Ming China, and the threat  from the north was real  and unavoidable for the 
newly r i s ing  Ming Empire.
However, considering the h is to r ica l  legacy, whereas the Mongol power had 
conquered the whole of China (before the Ming was established),  China had 
almost never controlled the whole of Mongol t e r r i t o ry  (except perhaps for a 
short period in the early Tang Empire). Ming Chinese called Mongol ,/Tartar ,/ 
ra ther than ''Mongol" , but the Mongol power called themselves the
Yuan, the Northern Yuan or "Mongghul" (Mongol). Emperor Hongwu’ s army 
invaded Mongolia in 1380. In 1388 a huge victory was gained by Ming China; 
about 70,000 Mongols were taken prisoners, and Karakorum (the Mongol's holy 
capital )  was destroyed. The ba t t le  was not decisive, however, and i t  cost 
many casualt ies  to the Ming Empire -  the wars continued.
The Timur Empire -  a great empire subsequently lost  from history
The Timur26 Empire is a great  lost  empire, often ignored by h is to rians  of 
East Asia and other countries. After 1449 the t e r r i t o ry  of the Timur Empire 
declined rapidly in Persia and Central Asia. Finally, i t  lost  the whole of 
i t s  t e r r i t o ry  in Persia, but was successful in expanding i t s  t e r r i t o r y  in 
the Indian Peninsula. Timur’ s descendants continued to rule India and became 
the Moghul Empire, in the Indian Peninsula, which prospered from 1504 to
Timur (1336 -  1405)
He was the founder of the Timur Empire (r. 1370-1405, Timurid dynasty), 
which survived un til  1506, and was known for his daring m ilitary  
adventures, audacious campaigns and aggressive t e r r i t o r i a l  expansions. 
The word Timur means iron in Mongolian.
Muhammad Hosseini-Nasab is  a Muslim from Iran, studying Phd in ANU. He 
introduced me to a book written by Timur -  "I am Timur; who captured the 
whole world'. He asserted that Timur was very clever; he memorised the 
whole Koran, from the f i r s t  sentence to the las t ,  and more surprisingly 
-  from the la s t  word to the f i r s t .
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1707. The la s t  Moghul emperor was deposed by the B ritish  in 1805, and the 
empire formally ended in 1858.
In 1370, Timur came to power as King of Transoxania (present-day Uzbekistan), 
and proclaimed himself as a descendant of Ghengis Khan. Toward the end of 
the 14th century, the Mongol Empire had splin tered into 3 empires, the 
Chagatai, the Golden Horde, and the I1-Khan Empire in Persia. Timur 
established his power base in his capital, Samarkand, and waged wars against 
Georgia, Armenia and Turkestan (the Chagatai Empire).
Timur conquered a vast Asian empire that stretched from southern Russia to 
Mongolia and southward to Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush, northern India, and 
Mesopotamia. In 1385, Timur occupied Azerbajan, in 1390 he took Sultaniya, 
and in 1393 he took Baghdad, occupying a l l  of Persia and Iraq. Afterwards, 
he proclaimed himself the re s to re r  of the Mongol Empire.
The Ming sh ilu  had a p a r t icu la r  way of recording foreign countries. I t  used 
the names of one of several c i t i e s  instead of the names of big countries, 
for example, the Timur Empire could be called Samarkand 27, Herat or Hormuz. 
This method creates some confusion for the h is tory  of in ternational 
re la tions. Many foreign records of the Ming shi were copied from the Ming 
shilu, so the same problem is there also. The Ming shi is  the 24th Dynastic 
History', the other 23 Dynastic H istories  do not employ th is  method, i. e. , 
they do not use the name of a c i ty  to replace a country or empire.
After Timur died in 1405, there were two years of c iv i l  war, a f te r  which the 
fourth son of Timur, Shah Rukh, 1407-1447, succeeded to the throne. This 
s itua tion  was sim ilar to tha t of Emperor Yongle during 1398-1402. Certainly
Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8597
[Samarkand] . . . Han, Si and Tang Periods a l l  communicated with 
China, Yuan Taizu ( Ghengis Khan ) conquered the Western Region, 
kings of these countries were a l l  appointed from princes and 
Imperial sons in law . . . the distance between i t  and Jiayuguan 
is  9,600 Li [about 4,800 Km, Samarkand, Jiayuguan and Beijing 
have a similar degree of la t i tude] .  In the period of the late  
Yuan, Imperial son-in-laws, Timur as king of Samarkand.
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the Ming knew of th is  s i tua tion  from th e ir  records. The period of Admiral 
Zheng He’ s voyages, 1405-1433, was also the zenith of the Timur Empire. I t  
should be kept in mind tha t during Zheng He’ s expeditions Hormuz was part of 
the Timur Empire’ s te r r i to ry .  This could be of importance in the search for 
th e ir  o rig inal motive.
The period of Timurid government in Iran extends from 1405 to 
1507.28
Under h is [Shah Rukh’ s] rule (1407-1447), i t  remained a cohesive 
dominion of considerable extent in central Asia and the Near 
East. 29
Shah Rukh transferred  the capita l from Samarkand to Herat. His eldest son 
was appointed governor of Samarkand. So at th is  time the capital of the 
Timur Empire was at Herat -  today west of Afghanistan -  located between 
Samarkand and Hormuz. From Hormuz to Herat was an important section of the 
Silk Road. Many exquisite examples of Timurid arch itec tu re  remain in 
Samarkand and Herat today. Timur’ s mausoleum Gur-e Amir at Samarkand is  a 
b r i l l i a n t  example of Islamic architecture.
Jackson, Peter. The Cambridge H istory o f  Iran, volume 6, The Timurid and 
Safavid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986. P98
29 Jackson, Peter. The Cambridge H istory o f  Iran, volume 6, The Timurid and 
Safavid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986. pl04
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<2> 1395. The Ming Emperor Hongwu’ s missions v i s i t e d  the 
Timur
1392: Ming China feared that Muslim Timur had sent spies into China
According to Professor Rossabi’ s research, Timur’ s preparation for the 
conquest of China began in about 139730. Rossabi's work is a s ign ifican t 
piece of research into the re la tionsh ip  between these two powers. Further 
investigation for th is  thesis  showed tha t according to Ming sh ilu  Timur's 
war preparations for the conquest of China begun as leas t  from 1392, and 
that Emperor Hongwu was well aware of th is . These war preparations, from 
1392 to 1405, were extremely thorough -  i t  would be the most crucial c r i s i s  
since the establishment of the Ming Empire.
In [1392.2], Timur had planned to conquer China, whilst the Ming Emperor 
Hongwu suspected that Timur had sent spies to China. As i t  was recorded in 
Ming sh ilu , i t  must therefore have been considered as a s ign if ican t event by 
the Ming government. Besides, Timur was called the Islamic king, meaning 
that the Ming Dynasty knew Timur was a Muslim.
[1392.2] ....... .because of his contacts with ambassadors bringing
tr ib u te  from the Islamic king (the Timur Empire), Emperor Hongwu
was concerned th is  would generate f ro n t ie r  trouble ..........  then
Emperor Hongwu feared that they were spying for China.31
.............. •
Rossabi, Morris. Ming China’s relations with Hami and Central Asia, 
1404-1513: A re-examination o f traditional Chinese foreign policy. New
York: Thesis (Ph. D.) - Columbia University, 1970. pill.
Timur’ s preparation for his Chinese campaign probably began 
around 1397, though he only started moving eastward in 1404
.........  From 1397 on, he sent several military detachments to
found colonies in the east. They built forts and revived and 
fostered agriculture in these areas, anticipating the arrival of 
the large force led by Timur.
1 Appendix 1: Ming sh ilu , the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizu, 216, 2 month, 25 year of Hongwu. p3181.
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In the same year, the Ming Empire sent an embassy with g i f t s  to Heart 
(second capital  of the Timur Empire) but there was no response32. There are 
many records to demonstrate that  Ming China had paid serious a tten t ion  to 
the Timur Empire33. The Ming Empire’ s mil i t ary  expedition which advanced to 
the Mongolian plateau fought f iercely ,  and captured merchants from the Timur 
Empire who were thought to be sp ies3h I t  seems therefore that  the Ming had 
feared the potent ia l  threat  from the Timur Empire combined with the Northern 
Yuan.
Some scholars think Ming China did not understand Timur’ s r i s e  and vast 
ambitions 35 , but th is  cannot be accepted. The Ming government had
32 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609
[1392] Herat (the Timur Empire) did not send a mission, because 
of the distance. In the 25th year [of Hongwu], an o f f ic ia l  was 
sent to proclaim i t s  king. Silk, cloth, and money were granted 
to the Timurs; However, the country s t i l l  did not come.
* mxm' •
3,1 Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8598.
[1387] In the ninth month of the 20th year, Timur f i r s t  sent 
Muslim Mania Hafeisi and others to the Imperial Court, bringing 
15 horses and 2 camels. They were entertained lavishly by 
Imperial Edict. [1392] The Muslims from th is  country [the Timur 
Empire] priva tely  brought horses to Liangzhou for trade. Emperor 
[Hongwu] did not agreed to th is ,  ordering them to the capital 
for sale. In the Yuan Period, Muslims had spread a l l  over China, 
at th is  time many s t i l l  lived in Gunsu. The Emperor instructed a 
defence o f f ic ia l  to deport them completely, and more than 1200 
people were returned to Samarkand.
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" Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizu, 223, 12 month, 25 year of Hongwu. p3266.
[1392.12]<<The Imperial Edict>>: ( to : .. . Gusu.. . ) :  Muslim m ilitary  
people and c iv i l ian s  wishing to return to the Western Region a l l  
depart. In to ta l  1236 people returned to Samarkand.
i§:
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Mote, Frederick W, Twitchett, Denis . The Cambridge H istory Of China -  
the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1988. p257.
[Cambridge H istory]: The Ming court had l i t t l e  understanding of 
Timur’ s r i s e  and vast ambitions.
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intelligence about the Timur Empire and understood its outstanding military 
capacity. The Etiquette of the Imperial Court required that the records of 
the Ming Empire be written to show the eminence of China, however the Ming 
knew the Timur Empire was a big empire and a potential threat.
(1) The Ming knew Timur was a relative of Ghengis Khan
[Samarkand] .. . this country was in contact with China during 
the Han, Sui and Tang Periods. The Yuan Taizu ( Ghengis Khan ) 
conquered the Western Region, (the Mongol) princes and Imperial
sons-in-law were appointed as ruler for these countries.....
the distance between it (Samarkand) and Jiayuguan is 9,600 Li 
[about 4,800 Km, Samarkand, Jiayuguan and Beijing being on 
similar degrees of latitude]. In the period of the late Yuan 
Dynasty, the king (of Samarkand) was the (Mongol) Imperial 
son-in-law Timur.36
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This record shows that the Ming knew Timur and Ghengis Khan were relatives. 
Timur proclaimed himself as the descendant of Ghengis Khan; the Ming shilu 
and the Ming shi recorded him as the *Imperial son in law of the Yuan*, thus 
the Ming government knew Timur and the Yuan Dynasty were related.
(2) Emperor Hongwu thought Samarkand’s merchants were spies
Emperor Hongwu’ s fears that merchants from the Timur were spies were 
recorded in the Ming shilu and other the Ming’ s work37, meaning that the
,b Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8597
37 You, Tong Jl {[5] ,1618-1704 .Ming shi wai guo zhuan • Taipei:
Taiwan Xue sheng shu ju , 1977. pi78
Earlier, people from Samarkand [the Timur Empire] who had traded 
in the north of the desert, were captured in Bu Yu Er Hai [by 
the expedition of the Ming Empire]. Emperor [Hongwu] feared they 
might be spies who could take back intelligence and therefore 
sent them back home.
M IS5ä¥A®Til4t • iJf&JäigmSft * f l f f l  > •
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Ming government thought the Timur Empire was p o te n t i a l l y  a huge th rea t ,  
otherwise the Ming would not have worried about spies.
1392: Northwest defence as primary importance
After  1368, The Yuan Dynasty s t i l l  existed in Mongolia, being ca l led  the 
Yuan or the Northern Yuan. According to Chinese p o l i t i c a l  orthodoxy, the re 
could be only one leg it imate  empire, and so each dynasty denied the 
legitimacy of the other, although modern Chinese h i s to r i a n s  tend to regard 
the Ming Dynasty as more legit imate .
The Khans of Mongol had never accepted any t i t l e s  granted by the
Ming Dynasty ........... the Ming ca l led  them "Khan of Tartar" ,  too
........... the Ming could not e s t a b l i s h  i t s  sovereignty over Mongols
even a t  the zenith of the Ming Empire. In the h i s t o r i c a l  sources 
from Mongol the Ming Empire was always ca l led  enemy country .38
-  °  mm
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This opinion i s  quoted from a r e l i a b l e  research -  "The h i s t o r i c a l  
r e l a t i o n  between Mongol and China"; al though a secondary source, i t  is  
important (The w r i te r  is  Chinese Mongolian). The Tar tar  Empire con t ro l led  
the eas te rn  par t  of today’ s Republic of Mongolia, Chinese Inner Mongolia, 
and the western par t  of Northeast China. Emperor Yongle’ s grand expedit ions 
crossed Inner Mongolia and the present-day Republic of Mongolia, and entered 
Russia. The Tar ta r  Empire suffered serious damage from the f ive  deser t  
expedit ions,  but another Mongol power, the Oirot Empire, remained strong.
The Oirot Empire con t ro l led  Kirghizia,  today’ s Kazakhstan, the southern par t  
of S iber ia  in Russia, the western par t  of the Republic of Mongolia and the 
Chinese Xinjiang Province during the ear ly  Ming Period. The area con t ro l led
Zha Qi Si Qin fLifilt/fifc .The h istorical relation between Mongol and China
- Taipei: Continent Magazine , Juan 23, 6.
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by the Oirot Empire was considerable, but Ming China had a much greater 
population. Neither the Oirot Mongol Empire nor the Tartar Mongol Empire 
were subjugated by Ming China .
The Ming Empire has 16 emperors; the Northern Yuan has 28 Khans, 
generally one can say, the Northern Yuan and the Ming Empire are 
well matched, neither can subjugate the other.39
* Sfc*iS*IÄ »4bjmwm
This comment by a famous Taiwanese historian is historically accurate“10. 
Emperor Yongle was an outstanding leader and exerted his utmost strength on 
the northern military activities, However, Emperor Yongle did not win an 
absolute victory.41
1395, The Ming’s big mission - Fu An and 1500 people visited the Timur
The Mongol empire (the northern Yuan) had a very great history of conquests 
(it had ruled all the territories of the Ming Empire and the Timur Empire) 
and a very strong cavalry force, but a much smaller population and a lesser 
culture.
Ming China and the Timur Empire should be the two strongest empires in 1395, 
both with an advanced culture at that time (their brilliant architectural 
works are still preserved well in Beijing, Nanjing, Samarkand and Herat
M Li Dong Fang . Xi Suo Ming Chao . Shanghai: Shanghai ren
min chu ban she . 2003. p43.
1 Following this turbulent period, descendants of Khublai were restored to 
the throne. When Lingdan Khan, the last Grand-Khan of the Mongols, died 
on his way to Tibet in 1634, his son Ejei surrendered to the Manchu and 
gave the Imperial Seal of the Yuan Emperor to the Qing Taizong '/jfAzK 
Huang Taiji - As a result, Hong Taiji established the new dynasty
of Qing as the successor to the Yuan Dynasty in 1636. In short: Mongol 
Khans never received their title from the Ming Empire.
41 In 1424 Emperor Yongle died in the course of a desert expedition. His 
death alerted his successor to the difficulties of gaining a complete 
victory on the northern front. The Ming Empire would have to become 
defensive rather than aggressive. So the Empire took the reasonable 
decision to go on the defensive.
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today). The relationship between the Ming Empire and the Timur Empire was 
significant at that time. The Ming shi records that Ming China’s ambassador 
visited the Timur Empire, but uses Samarkand and Herat to replace the name, 
the Timur Empire.
[1395] In the 28th year the Supervising Secretary Fu An, Guo Ji 
and 1500 soldiers were sent to visit it [Herat], they were 
detained in Samarkand ( capital of the Timur Empire). [1397]
In the 30th year, Beijing Surveillance Commissioner, Chen Dewen, 
was also sent, and did not return for a long time.'12
c n & ^ n  *
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In 1395 the Ming Empire sent a mission including the Supervising 
Secretaries Fu An and Guo Ji f^üf and 1500 soldiers to visit
the Timur Empire. This diplomatic event showed that the Ming Empire
believed relations between it and the Timur Empire to be very significant. 
However, the Supervising Secretaries were detained for thirteen years 43, as 
was recorded in Ming shilu 44. Obviously, the relationship between these 
two countries was in fact very bad! An analysis of this event reveals 
significant details: it involved three aspects of importance.
(l) Very big mission: the Timur Empire was thought important
This mission was very big, more than 1500 people, indicating that Ming China 
thought of the Timur as a powerful empire (country), and the relationship
42 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609
1 Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8599
[1407.6] Fu An returned to the Ming. Earlier, Fu An arrived at 
this country [the Timur Empire] but was detained. At length, the 
mission was ended. Guides assisted Fu An to return, crossing many 
countries and travelling many thousands of Li, emphasising the 
enormous size of the empire.
• %wm • K i m  •
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44 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizong, 68, (H$P) 6rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p963.
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between the two empires to be of importance. In the D ynastic H isto rie s  i t  
is  d i f f i c u l t  to f ind another Chinese foreign mission of such s ize -  i t  might 
well be one of the la rge s t  missions to v i s i t  foreign countries  in Chinese 
his tory ,  excluding Zheng He’ s voyages.
(2) Mission was de ta in  but no anger: s t r a t e g i c  a l l y  than enemy
Ming China r e a l i s e d  tha t  the detent ion  of the mission could damage the 
Empire’ s p res t ige .  In addit ion,  the fami l ies  of t h i s  large number of people 
must have been very concerned. However the Ming Empire did not send troops 
to a t tack  the Timur Empire. Instead,  in 1397, they sent another f r iend ly  
mission to v i s i t  the Timur Empire. In 1402, the Emperor Yongle al so  sent  a 
mission bringing many g i f t s  to the Timur Empire.
(3) 1500 people are so ld ie r s :  m i l i t a ry  mission
This mission included 1500 so ld ie rs ,  and could be seen as one which involved 
a m i l i t a ry  content.  No records mention anger from the Ming Emperor, which is  
very unusual in Ming his tory ,  e spec ia l ly  t h i s  is  a m i l i t a ry  mission. The 
logica l  explanation is  tha t  the Ming government had accurate in te l l igence  
about the Timur Empire and i t s  b r i l l i a n t  m i l i t a ry  achievements and thought 
i t  could be more useful  as a s t r a t e g i c  par tner  than as an enemy.
The mission had 1502 people, of whom only 17 returned to Ming China. Some 
o f f i c i a l s  d i e d 15, some suffered  much during the deten tion period 46. This 
event shows tha t  the Timur Empire thought of Ming China as an enemy. How was 
the Ming to rescue i t s  ambassadors and improve r e l a t i o n s  between the two 
count ries? These were ser ious diplomatic questions.
40 Chen, J iru  (Ch’ en Chi-ju) ßHÜSffl ,1558-1639 . Jian Wen Lu .Ming
Dynasty Wanli HHf version
In th is  mission Supervisor Yao Chen $6(5, Grand Supervisor (Eunuch)
Liu Wei §!HH both died in the Timur Empire.
Ih Chen, J iru  (Ch’ en Chi-ju) ßjüSfH ,1558-1639 .Jian Wen Lu .Ming
Dynasty Wanli version
[Fu An] Torture was experienced often by mission members, but 
th e i r  hopes and moral fo rt i tude  helped them to survive.
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1395: Strategie cooperation with the Timur was important for the Ming
According to the Ming shilu’s record, the Emperor Hongwu admired the 
strategic style of the Han Emperor Wudi 47, '"after five expeditions in total 
beyond the frontier the Xiongnu were subjugated". It means that he supported 
military expeditions advancing to the Mongolian plateau to destroy or 
subjugate the Mongol forces. (Although peace was often emphasized in many 
letters which were sent from the Ming Empire to the Mongol powers).
[1373.8] (Emperor Hongwu): Steppe people became the threat to 
China, a danger that had existed since ancient times, even the 
renowned troops - 300,000 soldiers - of the Han Emperor Gaozu 
were still surrounded in Baideng. Emperor Wendi and Emperor 
Jingdi were conservative rulers, and did not overreact; China 
was invaded several times, but they were content to drive back 
their enemies. The great Han Emperor Wudi wished to avenge the 
insult of Baideng, so he sent troops on five expeditions, beyond 
the frontiers of remote regions, until the Xiongnu were 
subjugated. China's troops were exhausted but the Xiongnu were 
overpowered. Was the achievement not worthwhile? 48
’ ammmzm - a *
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47 The Han Emperor Wudi (Liu Che 156 BC - 87 BC)
He was the sixth emperor of the Han Dynasty in China, ruling from 141 BC 
to 87 BC. Emperor Wudi is considered one of the greatest emperors 
throughout Chinese history, ranking alongside Emperor Taizong of the 
Tang Dynasty, Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty, and Emperor Kangxi of 
the Qing Dynasty.
As a military campaigner, Emperor Wudi brought Han China to its greatest 
expansion, with borders spanning from Kyrgyzstan in the west, Northern 
Korea in the Northeast, to Northern Vietnam in the south. He was best 
known for his role in expelling the nomadic Xiongnu from the boundary of 
China. Emperor Wudi dispatched his envoy Zhang Qian in 139 BC to seek an 
alliance with the Yuezhi of modern Uzbekistan. Zhang Qian returned in 
123 BC and Emperor Wudi then sent many missions per year to Central 
Asia.
48 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizu, 84, 8 month, 6 year of Hongwu. pl503.
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Thus the strategy of "attack in order to defend" was promoted by Emperor 
Hongwu and Emperor Yongle. The two Emperors would have known that  in 139 BC 
the envoy Zhang Qian was sent to seek an a l l iance  in central  Asia with the 
objective of destroying Xiongnu.
The Mongol powers were the chief threa t  to the northern f ron t ie r  
defence in the Ming Period. However, the Timur Empire was close 
to the Mongol powers both in blood and geography. Thus the Ming 
government, while act ively continuing i t s  defence against Mongol, 
at the same time had to try  to maintain re la t ions  with the 
Timur Empire. (Present-day, China) 49
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This comment from Professor Zhu, Yafei 7^115^ , of present-day China, is 
very shrewd. Maintaining good re la t ions  with the Timur Empire was important 
for the Ming Empire’ s mil i t ary  campaigns against the cavalry empires of the 
Tartar and Oirot. I f  the Ming Empire launched a large-scale mili tary 
expedition into the Mongol Plateau, and then the cavalry empires of the 
Tartar and Oirot withdrew to the endless west and north, the Ming army would 
have found i t  very d i f f i c u l t  to destroy them.
I f  a western power had become an a l ly  against the Tartars and Oirots, the 
Ming Empire would have found i t  easier to destroy i t s  enemies completely. On 
the other hand, i f  the Timur Empire cooperated with the Mongol forces, there 
would have been a serious problem for Ming China. So s t ra teg ic  significance 
would be the primary reason for Ming China to maintain re la t ions  with the 
Timur Empire.50
Zhu, Ya Fei • "Luo Luan Ming Chao Yu Sa Ma Er Han De Guan Xi"
JFjIf w i W \ %,  Ming Dai Zhong Wai Guan Xi Shi Yan Jiu  | |
- Jinan: Jinan Publish ,1993.
Bai Shouli and Wang Yuquan . General Chinese History, A H
jMife Yol. 9. the Ming Period, Upper Vol. .Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu 
ban she . 2002. p407.
Thus, the purpose of the Ming in seeking good re la t ions  with the 
Timur was for p o l i t ic a l  p ro fi t  ra ther  than economic gain.
125
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<3> 1398. Emperor Hongwu’s strategic teaching and death
1397. Emperor Hongwu’s second mission visited the Timur Empire
In 1397, Ming China sent another mission to the Timur Empire, which was once 
more detained. Ming China was still not angry, and there was no suggestion 
of sending an expedition to attack the Timur and gain the release of the 
Ming mission. Clearly, Ming China wished to make the Timur Empire a 
strategic ally rather than an enemy. The Ming thought the Mongol Tartar (the 
Northern Yuan) and Mongol Oirot were its only two enemies. This diplomatic 
event was recorded in the Ming shi.
[1397] In the 30th year (of Hongwu), the Beijing Surveillance 
Commissioner, Chen Dewen, was also sent (to visit the Timur Empire 
), and for a long time also did not return (to China).51
Ambassador Chen Dewen and Ambassador Fu An were both released in the sixth 
month of 1407 52 . Ming China and the Timur Empire each had very large 
territories at that time. In some ways, the first emperor of the Ming, 
Emperor Hongwu, was in a similar position to Timur. Beijing and Samarkand 
were on similar latitudes and the area of their empires was also similar, 
though Ming China was wealthier and more populous. Just as the Timur 
overthrew the West Chagatai Khanate and the I1-Khanate, Emperor Hongwu 
overthrew the "Khanate of the Great Khan", the Yuan Dynasty.
1398: Emperor Hongwu’s concern was focused on the northern desert
The Ming shilu and the Ming shi contain attitudes of Sinocentrism which 
obscure much historical truth. Many other archives of the Ming Empire have
nl Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609
You, Tong Jl IIrI » 1618-1704 .Ming shi wai guo zhuan .Taipei:
Taiwan Xue sheng shu ju , 1977. p 178
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the same a tt i tude , but nonetheless Ming China indeed recognised the serious 
threat from Mongol.53
The Emperor Hongwu’ s concern was focused on the northern desert, 
and his a tten tion  never slackened for a single day.54
This record is ind icative  of Emperor Hongwu’ s a t t i tu d e  to the northern 
fro n tie r  m ilitary  threat. The Ming’ s archives are invariably exaggerated, 
but many passages s t i l l  reveal the truth. After 1368 the wars between Ming 
China and the Mongol powers continued. In fact, the consequences of Emperor 
Hongwu’ s desert wars were not very satisfac tory , with about ha lf  of the 
b a tt le s  won, whilst others were los t  or cost too much55. More than 150,000 
Ming Chinese so ld iers  died in these wars.56
If  the other Mongol empires (Ghengis Khan’ s descendants) and the northern 
Yuan had joined together, th is  would have been a te r r ib le  th rea t to the Ming 
Empire’ s security. Thus, how were the Mongol forces to be separated, and the 
Northern Yuan completely destroyed? How was the new Chinese empire to be 
defended, and the th rea t from the Mongol powers avoided? These were serious 
questions for Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle.
Emperor Hongwu proclaimed a famous and s ign if ican t defence strategy for his 
empire; some scholars describe i t  as "The no war countries'" TfCf]E ^ ü  .
Mote, Frederick. W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p609.
The Chinese court c learly  recognized that the Mongols had the 
potentia l for again becoming powerful and aggressive neighbors.
Tan, Qian Ijfcil! , 1594-1657, edited by Zhang Zongxiang • Guo Que
[104 juan]  g&fgf [104 # 7  .Beijing: Gu j i  chu ban she ijy ffM xti:  , 1958.
Waldron, Arthur. The Great Wall o f  China from H istory to Myth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990. p74.
[For example]: In 1372, Emperor Hongwu sent some of his best generals to 
attack Karakorum, and to campaign as well in the Gansu corridor, inner 
Mongolia and Manchuria. This time the campaign went badly, and Emperor 
Hongwu’ s forces were successful only in the Gansu corridor.
I t  was counted from the Ming’ s archives -  Ming shilu, Ming shi and Guo 
Que.
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Countries overseas such as Annam, Champa, Korea, Siam, Ryukyu, 
the countries of the Western and Eastern Oceans, and the states 
of the southern barbarians, which are separated [from us] by 
mountains and seas and located in far corners [of the world], 
are too small for China to gain any worthwhile advantage from
their territory or people. If they overrate their strength, come
and disturb our border, the blame will be on them. But if they 
make no trouble for us and yet we send our troops to attack 
them, then the blame will be ours. I fear that my descendants, 
prompted by China’s wealth and strength, and coveting the 
short-lived achievements to be won by war, may engage in
unprovoked aggression and slaughter. This is absolutely
impermissible and should be kept in mind. Nevertheless, the 
nomad people to our near north and west have for generations 
posed frontier problems. We must always mount careful defences 
against them with chosen generals and well-trained troops.5'
Fumnmmzm' ' m m ' m m *
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If it is carefully analysed, it emphasises two things: one is that the Ming 
Empire should not initiate attacks on some countries in the east and south, 
but the other is that it must prepare its frontier defence against invasion 
from the northern and western nomad people. The “no war countries'' did not 
include - Mongol.58
1398. Emperor Hongwu advised Emperor Yongle: Mongol must be defeated
Emperor Hongwu. Huang Ming Zu Xun Lu 1373, edited in 1395.
.Ming Chao Kai Guo Wen Xian. Taipei: Vol3. pi686— 1687
08 Fairbank, John King. Goldman, Merle. China: A New History. Cambridge, 
Mass. : Harvard University Press. 1992-1998. pl29.
Hongwu’s main concern, however, was military. Because China had 
to prevent a Mongol resurgence.
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In 1398.4, an Imperial Edict was sent to the "'King of Yan", Prince Zhudi59, 
the future Emperor Yongle, by Emperor Hongwu. From these records we can see 
that  Prince Zhudi enjoyed the confidence of Emperor Hongwu, who expected 
that  '"defence of the f ront ier"  was to be the Pr ince 's  (Emperor Yongle) chief 
duty.
[1398.4] <<The Imperial Edict)):  (To: King of Yan, [mperor 
Yongle]): In Cheng-Zhou period, though China was ruled well, the 
Duke of Zhou s t i l l  advised King Cheng: "to maintain an effect ive  
mili tary".  The reason is  that  danger could not be forgotten even
now the s i tua tion  is  safe ..........  the th reat  from foreign
countries which must be repelled.  Of my sons, your ta lent and 
inte ll igence is  the best, you are equal to the task . The King 
of Qin and the King of Jin are dead, now you are the eldest, 
the duty of defending against foreign invasion will be yours,
who else? I have ordered ........  to be under your management. You
are expected to lead a l l  kings (some princes were granted as 
kings), measure the opportunity and judge the condition for the 
defence of the f ron t ie r  and s tab i l i z e  the c iv il ians .  So as to 
make response to the heart of the Heaven, and to achieve my 
t r u s t . fi0
: r f§lW c^j ’
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This record is very s ignif icant;  i t  demonstrates the real  pressure on the 
northern f ron t ie r  from the Mongol powers. The Ming Empire did not hold a 
dominant posit ion on the Mongolian plateau. Many exaggerated records in the
M Xia Xie 301,1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian BHÜSSl .Beijing: Reform Publish. 
1994:
[1398.4] This month (the fourth month), the Imperial Edict was 
sent to "King of Yan", Prince Zhudi, ordering him to lead kings 
for frontier defence.
H H  ’ •
60 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizu, 257, 4th month, 31st year of Hongwu. p3717.
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Ming shi cannot be believed. Admiral Zheng He’s splendid fleet placed a 
great burden on the Ming Empire’s finances, but if the original motive 
was national security, then it would be worthwhile.
In 1398.4, (same month) Emperor Hongwu died, ending his extremely 
spectacular career in which he grew from a beggar - a poor orphan - to be 
Emperor; historians have praised his achievements hl. Emperor Hongwu had a 
great influence on the Ming Dynasty and in Chinese history'12. He established 
a new empire, designed its strategy, and paid attention to the empire’s 
northern defence. So it would be consistent if the original motive for Zheng 
He’s voyages was to ally with the Timur Empire against the Mongol forces; 
such an expedition would not violate the ''Teaching of Emperor Hongwu".
1398-1402: Timur sacked Delhi, massacre in Baghdad, and defeated the Ottoman 
Empire
In 1401, terrible flames were blazing on a shocking pyramid in Baghdad
....  Timur ordered that every soldier should return with at least two
severed human heads to show. 20,000 human heads were piled up into a 
pyramid, then set alight, to demonstrate the consequences of war against 
Timur. It was very possible that this terrible act could be reported to the 
Emperor Yongle.
bl Roberts, J. A. G. .China - Prehistory to the nineteenth century. 
Gloucester: Sutton Publishing. 2000.
[Emperor Hongwu] There can be few comparable cases of a person 
of so humble a background ... achieving so exalted a position 
and leaving so distinctive a legacy. ... he established the most 
durable dynasty in Chinese history and laid the foundations for 
what was later to be defined as the requirements of good 
government.
Hucker, Charles Oscar. China’s Imperial Past. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1975-2002. p287.
[Emperor Hongwu] More than any other single person, he was 
responsible for the style and tone of life that characterized 
China into modern times. The dynasty he founded restored Chinese 
prestige and predominance in East Asia to its Tang level and 
gave the Chinese a long era of domestic peace and prosperity.
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The Ming had sent missions and spies to v i s i t  the Timur Empire63, and knew 
from inte ll igence  that the descendant of the la s t  emperor of the Yuan 
Dynasty was in the Timur Empire, thus proving the Ming’ s in te ll igence  to be 
good. Despite the remoteness of Baghdad, i t s  looting by Mongol in 1258 was 
c learly  recorded in the Yuan sh i in 1370. The Ming Empire needed to make the 
utmost e f fo r t  to prevent a similar d isas te r  happening in Beijing. 
Furthermore, improving re la t ions  between Ming China and the Timur Empires 
would have been an important s tra tegy61 i f  the Ming wanted to subjugate the 
Northern Yuan completely.
Timur65 was a very famous person in Asia and Europe during 1398-1405. The 
three Khanates of the Mongols, the I1-Khanate Empire, the Chaghatai Khanate 
Empire and the Golden Horde empire, were a l l  three in effect  brought down by 
Timur hh. His grea tes t  r ival ,  Tokhtamysh Khan of the Golden Horde Empire, was 
f ina l ly  subjugated in 1395-97 h7, when Moscow (present-day cap ita l  of Russia ) 
was burnt.
In 1398, Timur penetrated the Indian Peninsula through the Punjab, then 
attacked and entered Delhi (present-day cap ita l  of India), slaughtering 
100,000 Hindu people and sacking the city. Such cruelty and strong mili tary 
capabil i ty  would become his trademark68. These events and Timur’ s mili tary
b' The Ming Empire sent several missions to the Timur Empire, Fu An in
1395, Chen Dewen in 1397, and dispatched another in 1402, so i t  would
have known the strength of the m ilita ry  forces of the Timur Empire.
64 Persian was used mainly in the Timur Empire at that time. Zheng He had
not at that time been to any Persian area, but Persian was used in the
Zheng He Sri Lanka Stele of 1409. The s te le  has ju st  three languages -  
Chinese, Persian and Tamil. I t  might be thought that the Timur Empire 
was the chief goal of Zheng He’ s voyage. Because th is  s te le  uses the 
language of the Timur Empire -  Persian -  perhaps i t s  intended audience 
was the emperor of the Timur Empire.
Timur proclaimed himself a descendant of Ghengis Khan, succeeded to the 
Il-Khan Empire and the Chagatai Empire, and dominated Persia, including 
Hormuz. The descendant of Kublai Khan, Benyashili (the descendant of the 
la s t  Yuan emperor), f led  to Samarkand appealing for assistance from the 
Timur Empire to destroy Ming China. I t  was recorded in Ming shilu, and 
th is  means the Northen Yuan and the Timur Empire could combine to attack 
Ming China, and the Ming knew this.
bb Chen, Zhiping WYOlTY .General History o f China .Taipei: Li Ming
Wen Hui f g B , 1978. Vol 8. p279.
b7 Luck, Steve. Philip’s World History Encyclopedia. London: George Philip 
Ltd. 2000. p401.
68 Barnes, Ian. The history atlas o f Asia. New York: Macmillan. 1998. p95.
132
capacity were very famous during that  time. When the Byzantine Empire was 
almost ruined by the Ottoman Turkish Empire, they sent a secret  mission to 
v i s i t  the capital  of the Timur Empire, Samarkand, and appealed for help.
In 1401 the war with the Turks and Egyptians, which followed Timur’ s return 
from India, was rendered notable by the capture of Aleppo and Damascus. 
Baghdad (the present-day cap ita l  of Iraq) was invaded in June of 1401; a f te r  
the capture of the city, 20,000 of i t s  c i t izens  were massacred.
On July 20, 1402, Timur seriously defeated the Ottoman Turkish Empire in the 
Batt le of Ankara (present-day cap ita l  of Turkey). Sultan Bayezid ,l9 was 
captured by Timur. His sons however escaped, and fled  to Serbia, remaining 
there un t i l  Timur died. The Batt le of Ankara was a substantial  event in 
world history.  I t  saved the Eastern Roman Empire, which otherwise would 
have fa l len  to the Ottoman Turkish Empire in 1403, ra ther than 1453. 
After th is  b a t t le  the Timur Empire became the greatest  Islamic power. The 
Timur Empire and the Ming Empires were the two most powerful of th is  time.
Some contemporary reports claimed that  Timur kept Bayezid chained in a cage 
as a trophy. Likewise, there are many s to r ie s  about Bayezid’ s captivity,  
including one that describes how Timur used him as a footstool.  Another one 
describes how Timur made Bayezid’ s beautiful  Serbian wife dance naked at  his 
court; one exaggerated story describes Bayezid's skull being used as a 
urinal . (Today i t  is  thought these rumours were false, as writers from 
Timur’ s court reported that  Bayezid was t rea ted  well, and that  Timur mourned 
his death. ) However the rumours were spread and were popular at  that time.
Bayezid I (nicknamed Yildirim, "the Thunderbolt" 1354-1403)
He was the sultan of the Ottoman Empire from 1389 to 1402, largely 
responsible for creating a centralized Ottoman Empire. His rapid 
conquests brought huge areas of the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire’ s 
control. He also laid siege to Constantinople (the Eastern Roman 
Empire). In 1395 he invaded Hungary. On the demand of the Byzantine 
Emperor, John V Palaeologus, (and his son Manuel II Palaeologus) a new 
crusade was organized to defeat Bayezid. The Christian a llies ,  under the 
leadership of the Hungarian King and Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund. 
Battle of Nicopolis.
Bayezid gained a decisive victory over this Christian army at Nicopolis 
(1396). In 1391 he laid siege to Constantinople, and the siege of 
Constantinople lasted until 1401. The Emperor even fled from the city 
but salvation for the doomed Byzantine empire came unexpectedly from the 
Timur Empire which declared war on Bayezid. Timur seriously defeated 
Bayezid near Ankara (1402). Bayezid died in captivity.
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One year la ter,  Bayezid died -  some accounts claim that  he committed 
suicide. In the 12th month of 1402 Ming China Emperor Yongle’ s mission was 
sent to Samarkand again, where they (and Ming China’ s spies) heard and 
reported these shocking rumours to Emperor Yongle. Genghis Khan's b r i l l i a n t  
mili tary achievements were very famous during that  time, and Timur's 
mili tary performance could be judged as being equal. I f  the Ming Empire was 
defeated in the war by the Timur Empire combined with other Mongol forces, 
similar crucial  events could happen in Beijing. Avoiding war with Timur was 
a very c r i t i c a l  s t ra teg ic  option for Emperor Yongle.
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<4> 1402. Emperor Yongle ascended the throne; Timur planned 
to conquer China
1402: Emperor Yongle ascended the throne; a mission visited the Timur
(l) Emperor Yongle ascended the throne
Emperor Hongwu looked forward to his eldest son, the crown prince, 
succeeding to his throne. The crown prince was given the best education and 
training, but in 1392 (the 25th year of Hongwu), he became ill and died 
suddenly. Grieving, the Emperor decided that his eldest son’s eldest son, 
his grandson, the future Emperor Jianwen, should succeed to the Ming 
Empire throne. In 1398. 5, Emperor Hongwu died, and his grandson, Emperor 
Jianwen, succeeded to the throne. During the period from August 1398 to June 
1399, one of Emperor Jianwen’ s five uncles died, and the other four 
were stripped of their titles and property, two being jailed and two exiled 
to remote areas.
In 1399.7 Emperor Jianwen ordered Beijing officials to arrest the King of 
Yan (the future Emperor Yongle, Jianwen’ s uncle). The King of Yan killed 
these officials and proclaimed a "rising for cleaning out the emperor’s evil 
ministers". Then three years of civil war between uncle and nephew broke 
out. If the Prince of Yan had done nothing, he still might have been jailed 
or killed, because he was the eldest uncle (the 4th son of Emperor Hongwu, 
his three elder brothers having died before 1398.)
In 1402, Emperor Yongle ascended the throne of the Chinese Ming Empire, 
following the civil war. In fact, Emperor Yongle had far fewer troops, and 
it was difficult for him to win the war. He sent spies to get accurate 
intelligence and secret support. In 1402, the troops of the King of Yan 
outflanked the frontline to assault Nanjing by surprise. Some Nanjing 
officials betrayed Emperor Jianwen and opened the gate of the Nanjing Wall.
Emperor Yongle won the civil war but Emperor Jianwen disappeared, possibly 
having died in the fire of Nanjing palace, or escaped somewhere. After this 
civil war, the great majority of ministers, officials and princes quickly
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expressed th e ir  loyalty to Emperor Yongle, but a tiny group did not and were 
executed ( i t  was a source of controversy at that time, and in the Qing 
Period). Emperor Yongle proved to be a powerful and outstanding emperor in 
Chinese h is to ry .70
The Ming shi records tha t the orig inal motive for Zheng He’ s voyage was to 
find Emperor Jianwen. However, i f  Emperor Jianwen had fled  to Southeast Asia 
he would hardly have been a th rea t to Emperor Yongle’ s throne. (There is 
no record of anyone from the southern ocean becoming the Chinese emperor.)
(2) A mission v is i ted  the Timur Empire
Emperor Yongle knew tha t the two Ming missions led by Fu An and Chen Dewen 
were s t i l l  detained by the Timur Empire. In [1402.12] he sent another envoy 
to the Timur Empire with many g if t s  71 , which shows tha t the Ming 
s tra tegy  was to seek to estab lish  a friendly  re la tionsh ip  with the Timur 
Empire. The archives of the Ming Empire, because of i t s  boastful posture, 
often d is to rted  the truth. What is  clear, however, was that the Ming 
Empire’ s Ambassadors, Fu An, Guo J i  and Chen Dewen, were s t i l l  being 
detained, despite the la te s t  mission. Timur did not want to maintain peace 
with China, he wanted to a l ly  with the Mongol to conquer China.
[1402. 12] The embassy was sent to proclaim Herat, Samarkand (the 
Timur Empire) and other places. In addition, golden clothes were 
bestowed. The envoy brought the Imperial Edict to proclaim the 
king of Moghulistan [Eastern Chagatai], Hedeerfu , and a t r ib u te  
of money was granted. Hedeerfu was the descendant of the Yuan
1. Luck, Steve. Philip’s World History Encyclopedia. London: George Philip 
Ltd. 2000.
Rossabi, Morris. Ming China’s relations with Hami and Central Asia, 
1404~1513: A re-examination of traditional Chinese foreign policy. New 
York: Thesis (Ph.D.) - Columbia University, 1970. pl09
Emperor Yongle was disturbed that the two missions led by Fu An 
and Chen Dewen, sent by Emperor Hongwu, had not returned to 
China. He had two possible courses of action in seeking the 
release of the envoys. He could declare war or threaten to do so
.........  but this was impossible, while coping also with the
Mongols and other hostile powers. Instead, Emperor Yongle 
prepared an expedition outfitted with 800 camels, evidently to 
impress the ruler of Central Asia.
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This record shows the Ming knew that the Tartar (the Northern Yuan) and 
Moghulistan'3 were both descendants of the Yuan Dynasty. Moreover, Timur was 
called the imperial son-in-law of the Yuan, so the Ming knew the three 
Mongol powers were related. If these powers combined together they would 
offer a terrible threat. Also, the Ming appeared to want to make contact 
with Timur’s fourth son in Herat7,1 75. Other records clearly show this 
visit was not successful in improving the relationship between the Ming and 
the Timur.76
Mongol armies launched a shockwave of fear around Asia and Europe, 
conquering a vast area of land that formed the most enormous empire in 
history. Timur wanted to re-create the Mongol empire and dominate the 
Persian region, but he died on the way to China in 1405. During these years 
it would have been reasonable for Emperor Yongle and his advisors to have 
searched the historical records of international relations between China and
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 15, 12 month, 35 year of Hongwu, p270.
Tian Wei Jiang BBfllia • Si Chou Zhi Lu Yu Dong Cha He Tai Han Guo Shi Yan 
Jiu . Urumqi: Xinjiang ren min chu ban she
iriIAStK!tSf± 1994. p6. Moghulistan is SO A All
74 This sentence emphasized the importance of Herat and Samarkand, with 
Herat the greater of the two. At this time the capital of the Timur 
Empire was still at Samarkand. The fourth son of Timur - Shah Rukh - was 
stationed at Herat. This could be of significance. In 1402, Shah Rukh 
was only a prince, and the order that Herat ranked ahead of Samarkand is 
strange. Emperor Yongle and the future third ruler of the Timur Empire, 
Shah Rukh, may have collaborated before they became emperors, but this 
could not be confirmed. After 1407, Herat gradually replaced Samarkand 
as capital, and Herat was visited by the Ming’s official, Chen Cheng, by 
land, in 1413-1418, the city being his chief destination .
Chen, Cheng Edited by Zhou, Lian Kuan jWlillli . Xi Yu Xing Cheng Ji
, Xi Yu Fan Guo Zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju c^ lji
, 2000. pi3.
Ib Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609.
[1402] When Emperor Yongle ascended the crown, an official was 
sent bringing an Imperial Letter, luxurious cloths and money as a 
gift to its king, but there was no response, (the Timur Empire).
mmw  • •
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Persia (area of the Timur Empire).
1402: The Kangnido Map and the Ming Map 1389 show a sea route to the Timur 
Empire
(1) "The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389" 'H
This map is now preserved in the First Historical Archives Building — *
in Beijing. According to the Geographic Record of the Ming shi
n , this map was drawn in the sixth month of the 22nd year of
Hongwu (1389)7S. It is the biggest (with a width of 3.86 metres and length 
of 4.75 metres), oldest, and most complete world map which was drawn in 
China and is still well preserved.
(2) "The Kangnido Map 1402"
The Kangnido was drawn by Yi Mu , Kim Sahyong Li Hui and
Chuan Chin jfljfr in 1402 '9. Its material is ink on silk, it is now preserved 
in Ryukoku University Library in Kyoto, Japan. The preface of this
map indicates its sources, which include Li Zheming "The Culture
Covering Map" |f f£)ff } and Qing Jun "The Universe Map" (ti>— -§SJJ|
SÜ» , both drawn in the Yuan Period; these two maps have disappeared today.
On the Kangnido Map, the centre is dominated by China, and the Korean 
Peninsula is shown bigger than its actual size (for nationalist reasons?), 
with Europe located at the far left. The Mediterranean, Iberian and Italian 
peninsulas and the Black Sea are clearly drawn. Africa, although generally 
outlined correctly, is depicted with a large lake in the middle, Lake 
Victoria, accurately drawn. The Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea are 
clearly visible. Despite its proportions, the Kangnido Map is much more 
comprehensive than any contemporary European maps.
Ming shi, (Zhi, geography) : ’ fil'dÖUIB®c
1H Li Hong-wei .Chen ji shu bai nian, yi ming chuan tian xia, the
Grand Ming Map, Yin qi shi ren guan zhu —
— H »  U [lEfffAfHUL , hi shi dang an 2004.1 .Beijing: Zhongguo
di yi li shi dang an guan, 2004.
Chon, Sang-un. Science and technology in Korea : traditional instruments and 
techniques. Cambridge, Mass : Mit Press, 1974. p281.
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(3) Comparison
"The Kangnido Map 1402" (1.7m by 1.6m) is  smaller than "The Grand Ming Map 
1389" (3.86m by 4.75m), i t s  surface area jus t one six th  of "The Grand Ming
Map 1389", and i t  is  fa r  more well known. "The Grand Ming Map 1389" is  the 
g rea tes t ancient Chinese map, and perhaps the most precious in world history, 
but i t  has been kept out of sight in archives for a long time.
Thus before Zheng He’ s f le e t  departed, copies of "The Grand Ming Map 1389" 
and "The Kangnido Map 1402" could be available to them, demonstrating 
tha t the Ming Empire knew there was a sea route to the Timur Empire.80
1403: Spanish ambassador Gonzalez- Timur planning to conquer Ming China
No Chinese records mention the re su lt  of Emperor Yongle’ s mission to the 
Timur in 1402.12 (including Ming s h ilu  and the Ming sh i) , but Spanish 
Ambassador Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo made a valuable record of th is  event. 
According to his work, "Narrative of the mission of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo 
to the court of Timur, at Samarcand, AD 1403-6"81 , Timur thought of Spain as 
a friend but saw China as an enemy power. Ming China Emperor Yongle’ s 
mission v is i ted  Samarkand and granted many g i f t s  to the Timur Court, but 
the re la tionsh ip  did not improve.
[1403] One of the Meerzas of the lord [Timur] came and said to 
the ambassador of Cathay, that the lord had ordered that those 
who were ambassadors from the king of Spain, his son and friend, 
should s i t  above him; and that he who was the ambassador from a 
th ie f  and a bad man, his enemy, should s i t  below them ...8“
According to these two maps, Admiral Zheng He would have known the 
position of the Cape of Good Hope, but no existing record proves he went 
there.
81 The Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman Empire) also had sent a secret 
mission to v is it  Samarkand and to appeal for help. In 1402, the Timur 
Empire overcame the Ottoman Turkish Empire, a significant event in world 
history. This event saved the Byzantine Empire, because otherwise i t  
would have fallen to the Ottoman Turkish Empire in 1403, not 1453.
Gonzalez de Clavijo, Ruy. Narrative o f the mission o f Ruy Gonzalez de 
Clavijo to the court o f  Timur, at Samarcand, AD 1403~6. tr. with notes, 
by Clements R. Markham. New York: Burt Franklin, 1964. pl34.
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From Samarkand 1) :he chief c i ty  of the empire of Cathay, called
Cambalu 83, is  c journey of six m onths..........  In th is  year as
many as eight hundred camels, laden with merchandise, came from 
Cambalu (Beijirg) to th is  c i ty  of Samarkand, in the month of 
June. When Timoir 3eg (Turkish word meaning: governor = bey ) 
heard what the anbissadors from Cathay had demanded, he ordered 
these camels to oe detained, and we saw the men who came with 
the camels.84
This record demonstrates that the second mission from the Ming Emperor 
Yongle in 1402 was once again detained (Ming s h ilu  and the Ming sh i do not 
record th is  event). Relitions between the Timur Empire and the Ming Empire 
had not improved, since the Timur Empire s t i l l  regarded Ming China as an 
enemy power. I t  also siovs that Timur was angry at Ming China’ s diplomatic 
demands ( the ir  nature wis unclear) although Ming China had sent merchandise 
carried  by 800 camels Ming sh ilu  records them as g i f t s ) .  As the descendant 
of the Yuan, Benyashili, was in Samarkand (Ming s h ilu  records th is ) ,  Ming 
China s diplomatic demends could have concerned the re la tio n s  between the 
Timur and the Northern Yuan (Tartar), and the re lease  of the Ming’ s
former ambassadors.
The Spanish ambassador’ s records describe Beijing as the biggest c i ty  in the 
world and mention that Emperor Yongle had a great army85. They also s ta te  
tha t Emperor Yongle hac been converted to another relig ion. I t  appears that
Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research institute. 2003. History.
Even before China had been completely conquered, Kublai set out 
in 1267 to build a new capital, Khanbalig (city of the khan) or 
Dadu (great capital) which was later renamed Beijing. Cambalu 
and Khanbalig are the same.
Gonzalez de Clavi jo, Ruy. Narrative o f the mission o f Ruy Gonzalez de 
Clavijo to the court o f Timour, at Samarcand, AD 1403~6. tr. with notes, 
by Clements R. Markham. New York: Burt Franklin, 1964. p173.
Gonzalez de Clavijo, Ruy. Narrative o f  the mission o f Ruy Gonzalez de 
Clavijo to the court o f Timour, at Samarcand, AD 1403~6. tr. with notes, 
by Clements R. Markham. New York: Burt Franklin, 1964. pl74.
They related wonderful things, concerning the great power of the 
lord of Cathay: we especially spoke to one of these men, who had 
been six months in the city of Cambalu, which he said was near 
the sea, and twenty times as large as Tabreez. The city of
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the ambassador informed his government that t b  Ming Empire wanted an 
a ll iance  with the Timur Empire 8fi. The Ming sh ilu  ^ays that the mission 
to Timur l e f t  China on the day of J iayin  Epjj| in t b  12th month of the 35th 
year of Hongwu -  tha t  is the 29th of December in 1402 -  and the Spanish 
ambassador recorded that the mission arrived at Sama'kand in June of 1403.
A fu r th e r  important point emerges from these records The Spanish ambassador 
v is i te d  the cap ita l  of the Timur Empire, Samarkand, >y sea an<^  land, and the 
secret envoy of the East Roman Empire also visited Samarkand, and so i t  
would have been possible for Admiral Zheng He V  have sent his envoy to 
v i s i t  Herat by sea and land from Hormuz.
1404: Ming China’ s grand strategy: repel Timur and b ii1d ships
Both Central Asian and Chinese sources indicate that the Ming Empire faced 
a serious c r i s i s  from the m ilitary  expeditions of the Timur Empire combined 
with the Northern Yuan8'. Timur destroyed the Oitoman Turkish Empire in 
1402; h is  m ili ta ry  prestige  compared favourably with tha t of Ghengis Khan 
during th is  time.
[1403.9] ((Memorial to the Throne)): (by Gu Cheng )• About
Yunnan, Guangdong and Guangxi .............  th^re is  no need to be
worried. On the southeast coastal routes, even though there are 
regular appearances of Japanese p ira te s  they only engage in 
short-term looting. I f  we order the coastal Guard (military
unit) to in tensify  th e i r  defense ac tiv ity , then there is  no 
cause for worry. However, the northern enemy. The descendants of
Cambalu is the largest in the world............. He also said that
the lord of Cathay had so vast an army.........  ''.his emperor of
Cathay used to be a gentile, but he was converted to the faith 
of the Christians.
The original work is in Spanish, thus before Columbus discovered America, 
he could have read this work and learnt of the great country - China.
Manz, Beatrice Forbes. The r ise  and rule o f Tamerlane. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
In Samarkand, Timur . . .  received numerous ambassadors including 
some from China and the Spanish mission of Ruy Gonzalez de 
Clavijo. . . .  he began preparing for the greatest exploit of his 
life  - a campaign against China.
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the Yuan Dynasty, have formidable troops '• th e ir  hearts are 
cunning, day and night they spy on us and invade our frontier.
The strategy of (our) empire should be deeply concerned with 
them. My strategy is  to move before they launch any m ilitary 
ac tiv ity , send mission(s) to grant g if ts  and invite  th e ir  
submission, and spy on the ir  operations secretly. We should send 
Imperial Edicts in advance to fro n tie r  m ilitary  bases and
passes.................. We should farm on m ilitary  farmland, store
material, and get troops and horses into training, in
preparation for incidents. I f  we have made preparations in 
advance, the enemy w ill not be a threat to us. 88
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This best presents one of the orig inal motives for Zheng He’ s voyages. 
I t  c learly  explains why Zheng He went to the western ocean but not the 
eastern or southern. Also, Zheng He’ s western voyage would have been 
decided during th is  period, 1403.9 -  1404.1. Timur was called "the Yuan 
emperor s son-in-law, Timur"' in the Ming Shilu, so he was one of the 
northern enemy, the descendants of the Yuan.
Asian h is to r ians  in the early  Ming Period were in agreement that 1402-1405 
was Timur’ s era. He proclaimed himself the descendant of Ghengis Khan (of 
course, every Ming scholar knew Ghengis Khan), he destroyed the Ottoman 
Turkish Empire and saved the East Roman Empire in 1402. Furthermore, The 
Memorandum to the throne was recorded in the Ming Shilu, and i t  was thought 
of as s ig n if ic an t  by Emperor Yongle. The record below appeared in 1404.1.
[1404.1] Ordering the Ministry of Capital, b u i l t  50 sea ships
........... the embassy would be sent to the western ocean countries,
ordering Fujian (province) b u il t  5 sea sh ips.89
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu , Taizong, 23, 9 month, 1 year of Yongle, p422.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
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If all Mongol forces had combined together, it would have presented a very- 
serious threat to the Ming Empire. The Ming’s Archives are always boastful 
in foreign records, but it is clear from the Ming shilu that every emperor 
and minister of Ming China knew of the Song’s ruin, of Genghis Khan, and 
that all China was ruled by Mongol; why could it not happen again?
Ming shilu, Taizong, 27, 1 month, 2 year of Yongle. p498.
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<5> Conclusion: Ming China’s crisis from the Timur combined 
other Mongol forces
Ming China and the Timur empires were the two superpowers during 1392-1433
The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389 ^  I'M—  HI could be the most important 
Chinese map, but it stayed hidden in the Forbidden City for 600 years, 
ignored by many scholars. This map clearly indicates that it was possible to 
travel from China to the Timur Empire by sea. There are many records about 
the relations between China and Persia in the Dynastic Histories, and China 
had a friendly relationship with Persia in its long history. In 
particular, the royal families between the Yuan Empire in China and the 
I1-Khan Empire in Persia were relatives and had formed a special 
strategic alliance,
Because the Timur Empire disappeared from history after 1449, scholars in 
China and other countries were unfamiliar with it, and so the original 
motive for Zheng He’s voyages was a mystery for a long time. After Zheng 
He’s visit to Hormuz the relations between these two great empires markedly 
improved. The third emperor of the Timur Empire, Shah Rukh, and his sons 
sent friendly missions to visit Ming China several times, in particular a 
mission during 1419-1422 which is recorded in a Persian work.90
The threat from the Mongol powers was still dangerous for early Ming China
Cavalry is the key - the Ming Empire had more than one million troops, 
trained on the Confucius principle - loyalty to their empire (country) - and 
it had the enormous wealth and population to support the logistics for 
military operation. Still, it was difficult for the Ming Empire to win 
the war with the Mongol powers. Why? Due to the climate, the Mongol force 
had a greater number of horses and of a better quality, and during the 13th 
to 16th centuries, cavalry was the most important military equipment.
90 Hafiz-i-Abru edited, translated by K. M. Maitra, M. A. A Persian Embassy to 
China. New York: Paragon BookReprint Corp. 1970.
144
During 1392-1449, there were three great m ilitary  forces on the Asian 
Continent: the f i r s t ,  the Ming Empire, was established in 1368, but the Yuan 
Empire did not rea lly  f a l l .  The second, the Timur Empire was a b r i l l i a n t  
lo s t  empire, the successor to the western part of the great Mongol Empire. 
Timur had proclaimed himself as the descendant of Ghengis Khan. The third, 
Mongol, the Northern Yuan (Tartar), was the descendant of the Yuan Dynasty.
The Ming Emperor Hongwu sent several m ilitary  expeditions to advance north 
2000 km and enter the Mongolian plateau in order to attack the Mongol 
force. The Mongol Empire’ s old cap ita l Kharkhorum was mostly burned in 1380 
by the Ming troops. But the Ming Emperor Hongwu did not win a decisive 
victory and suffered many casualties, as the Northern Yuan continually 
sought to res to re  the Yuan Dynasty, and Ming China’ s f ro n t ie r  remained at 
risk.
From the point of view of grand strategy, the early Ming Empire was strong, 
but i t  was s t i l l  surrounded by empires belonging to Ghengis Khan’ s 
descendants, so the early Ming China’ s northern f ro n t ie r  continued to be 
under threat. Thus, in te rfe r ing  with cooperation between Mongol forces 
was extremely important for the Ming Empire’ s security.
S trategic  re la tio n s  with the Timur important for Ming China
Emperor Hongwu had a great influence on the Ming Empire, as he well 
understood and was concerned by the th rea t from Mongol, and so increased the 
f ro n t ie r  m ilitary  force which was defending his empire. He appointed his 
fourth son, the future Emperor Yongle, to undertake responsib il i ty  for 
f ro n t ie r  defence.
From 1392, Emperor Hongwu was aware of the poten tia l th rea t from another 
emerging Mongol Empire, the Timur Empire. In 1395, Emperor Hongwu tr ie d  to 
improve re la t io n s  with the Timur Empire, and a large mission was sent, 
including ambassador Fu An and 1500 people, to v i s i t  the Timur Empire. This 
strategy, however, was not successful. The Ming thought tha t good re la tions  
with the Timur Empire were very important, which was the reason for the size 
of th is  mission. One fac t that has been ignored is  that although th is
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mission was detained by the Timur Empire, the Ming Empire did not respond 
angrily. It could be judged that the Ming sought the Timur Empire as a 
potential strategic partner rather than as an enemy.
In 1397, another Ming embassy was sent to the Timur Empire, and was 
once more detained. From 1397 to 1402 was Timur’s time at the front of 
world history. He burned cities near Moscow, then his troops sacked Delhi 
in the Indian Peninsula, in 1398. He carried out a dreadful slaughter in 
Baghdad in 1401, almost destroyed the Ottoman Turkish Empire, and saved the 
Eastern Roman Empire in 1402.
In 1402, Emperor Yongle ascended the throne, and another embassy with gifts 
was sent to visit the Timur Empire, but relations still did not improve - 
Ming China’s missions of 1395 (ambassador Fu An) and 1397 remained detained 
by the Timur Empire. All evidence shows that the Ming government appreciated 
how important was the relationship between Ming China and the Timur Empire 
for Ming China’s strategy. If the Timur and the north Yuan joined together 
they would be a terrible threat to Ming China.
Emperor Yongle faced a crisis: war with both the Timur and Mongol
In 1403, Spanish ambassador Gonzalez had evidence about the relationship 
between Ming China and the Timur Empire: Timur considered the Ming to be an 
enemy and was planning a large-scale military operation to conquer the Ming 
Empire. However, the Ming Empire’s primary enemy was the Northern Yuan, 
Tartar Mongol. If the Northern Yuan could not be destroyed, Mongol’s 
ambition to extinguish the Ming Dynasty and restore the Yuan Dynasty would 
continue.
In 1404. 12, Timur’s huge armies moved east to conquer Ming China. Did Ming 
China know of this serious threat? This question was carefully checked with 
the Ming shilu for this thesis, and the answer is very clear: the Ming 
government understood this crisis. Emperor Yongle received intelligence that 
Timur’s military operation could threaten Xian (Ming China’s west capital). 
Northern Yuan joined forces with the Timur Empire to invade China, posing a 
very terrible threat for the Ming.
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In 1405.6, Zheng He’ s great f l e e t  sailed west for the f i r s t  time. This event 
and Timur’ s mil i t ary  operation to the east might be linked. Ming China 
always described people from the Timur Empire as Huihui (Muslim), and there 
were many Muslims on Zheng He’ s voyages; the fact  is that  China has a long 
his tory of making s t ra teg ic  all iances ,  of which the most famous is  the Han 
Empire's jo in t  at tack with the Yuezhi on the Xiongnu.
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Chapter 5
Northern desert wars and western ocean 
voyages (1405-1419)
Introduction:
Professor Frederick W. Mote indicates that when Emperor Yongle ascended the 
throne in 1402, China faced a new foreign threat from Central Asia, the 
Timur Empire 1 (from another point of view, Timur was the descendant of 
Ghengis Khan, and threatened to repeat Ghengis Khan’s attempt to conquer 
China). This is an objective historical background from research beyond 
China. On the other hand, the Ming shilu has definite records which shows 
that Emperor Yongle had accurate intelligence, and sent an Imperial Edict in 
the second month of 1405 to warn the Regional Military Commander of Gansu 
(northwest) to make good preparation for coping with this crisis2. This 
record is most important, but has often been ignored by scholars3.
Many sources all indicate there was a real military threat from the Timur
Mote, Frederick W. , Twitchett, Denis and others . The Cambridge History 
Of China - the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1988. p258. (Hok-Lam Chan, University of Washington)
When the Emperor Yongle ascended the throne, China faced a new 
foreign peril from Central Asia that, but for a stroke of good 
fortune, might well have plunged it into a major confrontation 
with the non-Chinese world. The new threat came from the rise of 
Timur (1336-1405) , who from his base at Samarkand had since the 
1360s established an empire embracing Transoxania, Khorassan,
Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kwarazm, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Armenia. In addition to these conquests, he had launched 
devastating invasions into Syria, Ottoman Turkey, India, and 
southern Russia. To the people of the Middle East and Central 
Asia, he must have seemed like a new Ghengis Khan. 
(Harvard University, Professor Mote, Frederick W.)
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 39, 2rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p659.
Many Chinese scholars just preferred to emphasise China’s prestige and 
strength, and did not wish to speak of a '"crisis* for the early Ming 
Empire.
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Empire to Ming China. From 1402 to the sixth month of 1407, the Ming Empire 
faced the possibility of an attack by the allied forces of the Timur Empire, 
the Northern Yuan and other Mongol forces. How this threat was to be 
countered was a crucial question for Ming China, Emperor Yongle. The answer 
is in the significant phrase, "Two prongs strategy".
One military approach was an advance to destroy the Northern Yuan (The 
Tartar) and The Oirot; another, diplomatic, way was to dismantle the 
Mongol power's alliance - with the Timur Empire. One of the purposes of 
Zheng He’s voyages could have involved a strategic role - to improve 
relations and seek an alliance with the Timur Empire and assistance in the 
Ming Empire’s large-scale wars on Mongol. Therefore Hormuz in Persia was his 
chief destination as demonstrated by Zheng He’s steles, Ming shilu and the 
imperial edicts. Why did Zheng He go to the "West Ocean", not the South 
Ocean or Southwest Ocean? Because Persia was the chief destination.
After a review of China’s strategic model, this chapter discusses the 
strategy behind the Ming Empire’s great northern wars and the objective of 
Zheng He’s voyages. If the Timur Empire continued to assist the Northern 
Yuan (they both were descendants of Ghengis Khan), the situation would cause 
great problems for Emperor Yongle’s expeditions (whose 500,000 troops had 
advanced 2000 km). If the Mongol’s military power withdrew to Samarkand, 
the Ming Empire’s military would find it impossible to destroy the 
Northern Yuan. However, Timur’s move east and Zheng He’ s move west in the 
same year was not just coincidence. Many considerations support this view.
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<1> 1405. Timur’s troops moved east and Zheng He’ s fleet 
sailed west
1404. 12•Timur’s troops and other Mongol forces moved east to conquer China
In the 12th month of 1404, three empires, the Timur Empire, the Northern 
Yuan (The Ming called the Northern Yuan "Tartar", its leader, Benyashili, 
was the descendant of the Yuan Dynasty’s last emperor) and Moghulistan 
(Eastern Chagatai in present-day Xinjiang province), combined together to 
conquer Ming China; all the leaders were descendants or relatives of Ghengis 
Khan. Timur prepared this big war for at least 13 years from 1392, and there 
was a precedent, Kublai Khan, had conquered the whole of China.
1405 military forces of the Timur group and Ming China
Mongol Coalition'1 * Ming China5
soldiers horses Area soldiers horses Area
size Size
The Timur 250,000 300, 000 1,200,000 100, 000
Moghulistan 50,000 50, 000
Tartar 150,000 300, 000
Oirot 150,000 300, 000
600, 000 950, 000 2 1,200,000 100, 000 1
1 My calculation from the Ming shilu, the Ming shi and other archives, 
source from Mongolia and source from Central Asia and following:
Gonzalez de Clavijo, Ruy. Narrative of the Spanish Embassy to the Court 
of Timur at Samarkand in the years 1403-1406. trans. , Guy Le Strange, 
London: Broadway Travellers Series. 1928.
Jackson, Peter. The Cambridge History of Iran, volume 6, The Timurid and 
Safavid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986.
Manz, Beatrice Forbes. The rise and rule of Tamerlane. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Ming shi, 90, (Zhi 66), military 2, p2193, 2196.
There were 329 Wei and 65 Suo in the 26th year of Hongwu
Wei 329 * 5600 (per Wei people) = 1,915,100
Suo 65 * 1120 (per Suo people) = 72,700 sum 1,915,100
However, some troops stationed in the south for security, logistics and
defense pirates from Japan, so the fighting troops in the northern
frontier line estimated about only 1,200,000
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Timur led 250,000 first rate experienced cavalry on the expedition to the 
Chinese Ming Empire. In the wars of Ghengis Khan and Timur the number of 
troops was often not very large, but horses outnumbered troops. (Many people 
think Ghengis Khan and Timur’s troop numbers were very big, but that is a 
mistake.) The expedition was joined by the Tartar and the Oirot, who wished 
to restore the Yuan Empire. The Mongol Coalition totalled about 600,000 
troops and 950,000 horses.
On the other hand, Ming China’s troops numbered about 1,200,000, but only 
about 100,000 horses were available, and cavalry was the key to victory at 
that time (see chapter 7). It was, in fact, the most serious threat to the 
Ming Empire since it had been established6 . Military specialists in the 
early Ming Period, taking account of the number of horses, might have 
made a judgement that Timur would win the war.
The Mongol coalition’s military force comprised more horses than troops, 
they were 100 % cavalry which made mobilisation easier. Thus, they could
attack Datong and Xian at the same time (some of the Ming’s troops would
have to stay behind to defend the capitals, Nanjing and Beijing), and the 
Ming’s troops would have to spread out along a long defensive line. Although 
the Ming’s troop numbers were large and presented a strong force when 
concentrated in one spot, spread out over a 3,000 km. defensive line they 
were considerably weakened. Timur’s cavalry could quickly mass to destroy
some points on the defensive line. Besides, with no wall to stop horses,
Timur’s cavalry could also quickly move to loot cities of munitions, causing 
alarm and disturbing the Ming’s military supply lines.
From 1392, Ming China considered the Timur Empire to be a potential critical 
threat, and the Ming shilu records this. In [1404.10], two Imperial Edicts 
and money were sent to the Regional Military Commanders of Ningxia and 
Gansu, to indicate the emergency and a wish to make peace with these 
"distant people".
Dreyer, Edward L .Early Ming China : a political history, 1355~1435 
.Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1982. p 177.
Timur marched eastward to conquer China, this campaign is one of 
the great might-have-beens of military history.
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[1404.10] <<Imperial Edict)) (to: the Regional Military Commander
of Ning Xia.... ) : ".........  you can proclaim my order, to
"pacify (make peace with) distant people"....  making peace on
border, if my concern for their welfare is not enough, a 
particular grant of money, 10, 000 Ding ..." the Imperial Edict 
and money to the Gansu Regional Military Commander was the 
same.7
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The "1431 Changle Stele of Zheng He" (one of the most important steles about 
Zheng He) has a clear inscription; the chief original motive for Zheng He’s 
voyages in 1405 had a similar purpose, to "pacify (make peace with) distant 
people"8 ; Zheng He and these two generals were all "Regional Military 
Commanders", thus the "distant people" could be the same, the Timur Empire.
[1404. 12] The Gansu Regional Military Commander, Song Cheng, 
appealed for assistance due to the inadequacy of frontier 
s t o r a g e.... 9
....
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 35, 10 month, 2 year of Yongle. p616.
K Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province)
Emperor appreciates its (or their) loyalty, and ordered Zheng He 
and others to command officials, military officers and many 
thousands of soldiers, to travel in hundreds of huge ships, 
carrying money to grant it (them). That is for proclaiming 
Imperial civilization to win over distant people (or peoples). 
(Zheng He: "The 1431 Changle Stele")
ü±HÄ&iic ’
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Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 37, 12 month, 2 year of Yongle. p634.
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In 1404.12, the Gansu Regional Military Commander reported the emergency 
These three records prove that Ming China clearly knew there was a 
critical threat from Timur’s eastern conquests. There were a number of 
strategies that could be used by the Ming Empire to cope with this crisis.
Emperor Yongle considered Mongol to be a rival country, not a subject 
country. Timur’s Empire was not the only heir to Genghis Khan’s great Mongol 
Empire of the thirteenth century. There were also the empires of
Moghulistan, the Tartar and the Oirot. Their total combined area was more 
than twice that of Ming China. This fact is often ignored in Ming dynasty 
sources. Two things were important for the Ming’s defence strategy:
1) Timur, his royal families and his troops were Muslims, the other 
Mongol forces were not. (This was a substantial difference.)
2) Timur was quite old by 1404, and his heir could well adopt different 
policies.
China could reach Persia by sea, so the Ming could send a grand fleet 
(to demonstrate the Ming’s power) and a Muslim mission (to show the 
Ming’s friendship) to make contact with the Timur Empire and Timur’s 
potential heirs (for political peace), in order to divide the Timur and 
other Mongol forces.
1405.2: The Timur threat: Ming China knew of it and treated it seriously
Did the Ming government know of this serious military threat? This could be 
of relevance to the original motive for Zheng He’s voyages. Many scholars 
thought the Ming was unaware of this incident 10. Examination of the Ming 
shilu, shows the answer clearly. The Ming government knew of this crisis, 
and Emperor Yongle treated it as very serious. These three records prove it.
10 Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p609.
They [The Ming Empire] did not know that Timur, the greatest 
conqueror of the age, also was planning an invasion of China.
.....  Chinese were never made aware of Timur’s ambitions.
(Harvard University: Professor Mote)
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(1) The Imperial Edict to Gansu: case of Tang Taizong
[1405.2] <<Imperial Edict)): (to: Regional M ilitary Commander of 
Gansu.. . Song Cheng...): The Muslim Dao Wu said: ” The Samarkand 
Muslim (Timur) and the King of Moghulistan, Shamichagan, have 
commanded troops to advance east*. Perhaps, they would not dare 
to take such unprincipled action [th is  is  imperial ceremonial 
language]. Nevertheless m ilitary  preparedness on the fro n tie r  
can never be neglected. In e a r l ie r  times, the Tang Emperor 
Taizong’ s m ilitary  was strong, but the Turki [Tujue] came righ t 
to the Wei (river) bridge; th is  is a lesson to us. Troops and 
horses should get into training, and we should pay a tten tion  to 
inte lligence, and organize supplies and advance preparations. 11
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This record is from Ming s h ilu  -  i t  is  important to present the real 
s itua tion . The Imperial Edict is  from Emperor Yongle to warn the Gansu 
Regional M ilitary Commander to be careful to watch Timur’ s m ilitary  
operations. No doubt Ming China saw Timur’ s moves to the east as a serious 
c r i s i s  12 . After Emperor Yongle received th is  m ilitary  intelligence, he 
ordered the Regional M ilitary Commander of Gansu to prepare carefully  for 
th is  c r is is .  Emperor Yongle even mentioned the event in the early Tang 
Dynasty, when the Turki had invaded Tang China and came close to the capital, 
Changan. In the records of Ming sh ilu , the Ming Emperors must always 
maintain the dignity of the empire, so th e ir  language could not be judged 
only by Chinese c lass ica l  grammar13. The s itua tion  should be judged as more 
serious than appears from the words used.
1 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 39, 2rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p659.
12 Rossabi, Morris. Ming China’s re la tion s with Hami and Central Asia,
1404-1513: A re-examination o f  traditional Chinese foreign policy. New
York: Thesis (Ph.D.) -  Columbia University, 1970. pi 12.
This work is outstanding and provides much valuable research, but there 
is an error in its  position.
11 Emperor could not say, ” now the empire is in danger” ; i f  he simply said 
”there is a matter of concern”, i t  would mean the situation was very
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(2) The Imperial Edict to Datong: enemy wil l  invade Xian
[1405.3] <<Imperial Edict>>: (to: D a to n g ...........) :  e a r l i e r  people
(spies) from the enemy country (the Timur Empire) returned to 
say, Timur has ordered h is  general commanding troops to invade 
the west cap i ta l  (Xian), t h i s  in t e l l ig e n c e  has yet to be 
ver if ied ,  you must t r a i n  troops and horses,  and be prepared to 
repel  an invasion. 14
m • 0 : it
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In the next month, Emperor Yongle sent an Imperial Edict to Datong, a c i ty  
close to Beij ing (300 km) and f a r  from Gansu province. This time the 
Imperial Edict indicated  tha t  the Ming China government had more prec ise  
in te l l igence  th a t  Timur would invade the western cap i ta l ,  Xian (Changan and 
Xian are not same, but these two c i t i e s  are close) .  This c i ty  is  some 
dis tance  from the northwest f r o n t i e r  (Yumen EEfJE3[|| and Jiayu J S ^ I S )  and is  
located in the geographic core of north Ming China. So Emperor Yongle was 
very mindful of Timur’ s m i l i t a ry  expedition.  The Ming sh i has a s im i la r  
record 1S. In [1405.4], the re is  a l so  a more s p ec i f i c  record in Ming sh ilu .
(3) Weapons were sent  to Ningxia and Gansu
[1405.4] Ordering the Ministry of Construct ion to provide weapons 
of gunpowder to the Regional Mil i ta ry  Commanders of Ningxia and
dangerous. This is  a very important concept for interpreting the real 
significance of the Imperial Edict.
11 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizong, 40, 3rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p664.
In Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8599.
•
[1405] In the third year of Yongle, Fu An and others s t i l l  did 
not return. However, the Imperial court heard about Timur from 
Moghulistan [Eastern Chagatai], and the Imperial Edict was sent 
to General Military Commander in Gao Suo, Song Chen, to prepare 
carefully.
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Gausu as preparation for garrison. 16
Checking with other records: the Ming’ s ambassador Fu An was s t i l l  detained 
in the Timur Empire in 1405; the records of the Ming Shilu in [1407.6] also 
show that Fu An was released and returned to China in 1407. 6, and a f te r  Fu 
An’ s report  Ming China knew (or confirmed) that  Timur had died in 1405 
during his campaign to the east. Timur's heir  was uninterested in th is  war 
and released the Ming’ s ambassador Fu An. So th is  huge c r i s i s  for the Ming 
Empire continued at  leas t  from 1404.10 to 1407.6. Thus when Zheng He 
departed from Ming China for his western voyage in 1405.6, he knew 
about th is  serious c r i s i s  and did not know that Timur had died.
In conclusion, the Ming Emperor Yongle was very aware of Timur’ s expedition, 
and th is  is of extreme importance in the search for the original  motives for 
Zheng He’ s voyages17 . But also, accurate western Asian his tory reveals that  
Timur enjoyed a b r i l l i a n t  mili tary career during that  time, creating a 
genuine c r i s i s  for the Ming Empire.
In March of 1405, a f te r  Timur and his enormous army departed from Samarkand 
and advanced to Ming China, he died suddenly in present-day China’ s 
Xinjiang province. His troops had come close to the Ming’ s border. (The Ming 
Empire’ s wetsern border was Hami in Xinjiang). I t  seems that  his death was 
kept secret  (for mil i tary reasons), and his expedition suspended. No one 
knew whether th i s  was permanent or jus t  temporary. However, according to the 
Ming Shilu, Ming China did not know (or confirm; i t  could be a mil i t ary  plot) 
th is  un t i l  [1407.6] when ambassador Fu An was released from the Timur Empire 
and reported i t .
There were inconsistencies in the intell igence,  However, i f  Timur had died, 
and his he ir  joined with the Northern Yuan, there was s t i l l  a serious
lh Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 41, 4 month, 3th year of Yongle. p669.
1 Everyone in the early Ming Dynasty knew that a l l  China had been ruled by 
Mongol, by Ghengis Khan’ s descendant, and that Timur had proclaimed 
himself as the descendant of Ghengis Khan.
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threat . Of course, the Ming government knew fu l l  well that  Ghengis Khan did 
not conquer the whole of China, but his grandson, Kublai Khan conquered 
China completely. The cessation of Timur’ s expedition presented a serious 
challenge for the Ming Empire and Emperor Yongle; the death of Timur could 
be to the Ming’ s advantage. The Ming’ s chief enemy were the other Mongol 
forces, and the Ming could attempt to improve re la t ions  with the Timur 
Empire, which might be a good strategy.
1405.6: Zheng He’ s f l e e t  sailed west with gold during the Timur c r i s i s
Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages were a s ignif icant event in Chinese maritime 
history,  and could be the greatest  maritime ac t iv i ty  of pre-modern China18, 
but in fact  Zheng He’ s f l e e t  sailed west with gold and soldiers  during the 
biggest threat , from the Timur Empire combined with the other Mongol 
forces, since the Ming Empire had been established. From the 10th to the 
12th month of 1404, and in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th months of 1405, Ming China 
had c lear in te ll igence of and made preparations for the a ttack from Timur 
combined with Mongols’ eastern advance. The Ming s h ilu  records th is  in the 
4th month of 1405 when the Ming were sending weapons to the northwest 
f ron t ie r  for defence.
In the f i f t h  month of 1405, Emperor Yongle entertained his subjects with a 
banquet during the Dragon Boat Fes t iv a l19, and Zheng He’ s fa the r ’ s s te le  
was set up on th is  day20. This means Zheng He and his f l e e t  had been on deck 
ready to depart. The inscr ip tion of th is  s te le  was writ ten by the Minister
18 Ptak, Roderich . China’s seaborne trade with South and Southeast Asia, 
1200-1750 . Aldershot; Brookfield, Vt. : Ashgate, cl998. pVIII, 71.
Chinese maritime activities reached i ts  peak at the beginning of 
the 15th century when Zheng He’ s fleets sailed to India and 
Africa.
19 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 42, 5 month, 3th year of Yongle. p675.
[1405.5] Emperor gave a banquet for civil and military personnel 
during the Dragon Boat Festival.
20 Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1405 Yunnan Stele, (father of Zheng He)
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of Rites and Education, Li Zhi Gang so Zheng He’ s mission was highly
thought of by Emperor Yongle.
On 11th of July of 1405, (Chinese calendar, the 15th day of the s ix th  month) 
in the 3rd year of Yongle, Admiral Zheng He’ s f l e e t  s a i led  to the Indian 
Ocean, comprising 27,800 so ld ie rs  on 317 ships. Did Zheng He’ s move westward 
and Timur’ s move eastward have a s ig n i f ic a n t  d i r e c t ly  l in k 21 ? F i r s t ly ,  the 
two records th a t  I give below are very important, and there  were four things 
to be considered.
[1405.6] Emperor apprec ia te s  h is  ( th e ir )  loya lty , and ordered 
Zheng He and o thers  to command m i l i ta ry  o f f ic e r s  and ten 
thousands of so ld ie rs  to t ra v e l  in hundreds of g reat ships, 
carrying money fo r  grants  so as to proclaim Imperial v ir tu e  to 
make peace with d is ta n t  people. (1431 Changle s te le )  22
’ A t i l  ° •
[1405.6] In the 6th month of the 3rd year of Yongle, (Emperor 
Yongle) ordered Zheng He and h is  colleague Wang Jinghong and 
others  to carry  out a mission to  the Western Ocean. 
Commanding more than 27,800 so ld ie rs ,  they brought much golden 
coinage. They b u i l t  62 la rge  s h i p s ...........(Ming shi) 23
21 According to the Ming shilu, s imilar g i f t s  were given when Ming China’ s 
mission v is i ted  the Timur Empire in [1402.12] and in Zheng He’ s f i r s t  
voyage in [1405.6].
[1402. 12] The mission was sent to proclaim Herat, Samarkand (the 
Timur Empire) and other places. In addition, the golden 
clothes were bestowed.
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[1405.6] Eunuch Zheng He and others were dispatched, brought the 
Imperial Edicts to proclaim the western ocean countries, and 
granted kings with golden clothes and s i lk  cloths 
d ifferen tly .
mm  • •
Appendix 2: The s te le s  of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province)
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Zheng He, p7767.
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(1) Why the "'Western Ocean'"?
Why the "Western Ocean", not the eastern ocean, southern ocean or 
southwestern ocean? If the original motive was to find the former emperor, 
trade or prestige, Zheng He would have visited Japan.
(2) The Ming knew that a severe military crisis was coming
In 1405, a most dangerous military situation was developing. Timur aspired 
to be another Ghengis Khan, and was making ready to attack China, and the 
Ming knew this. They were in need of more troops, logistics and gold, so why 
did Emperor Yongle send this great fleet, 27,800 troops and gold to the west 
ocean?
(3) Zheng He took much gold when he left China
Zheng He and his fleet took much gold when they departed from China and this 
is stressed by two substantial sources, the Ming shi and Zheng He’s stele 
(date). This is a very important point, but it is not usually noticed by 
many scholars. It means Zheng He’s voyage was peaceful and Zheng He’s
fleet did not want to rob gold from other countries. (In early 16th century, 
Spanish robbed gold from America which was one of the chief reason for their 
voyages.)
In Chinese tradition when official gold was taken to a foreign country, it 
was either to buy something precious, or to bestow for (buy) political peace 
(and a particular situation such as rescuing ambassadors who were detained.) 
No source has ever suggested that Zheng He went to the "Western Ocean" to 
buy precious goods. (The Ming government often thought that China had 
everything, and China did not need to buy anything from foreign countries.) 
Also, Zheng He and his fleet could take porcelain and silk for exchange and 
trade.
(4) The Ming could reach the Timur Empire by sea
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The Timur Empire’s emblem was three balls21, meaning the Timur’s territory 
occupied three fourths of the world. Several missions from the Timur had 
visited Ming China and many Ming China’s embassies visited the Timur, so the 
Ming should know this mark, and the Timur’s language was Persian. There are 
many records in the 23 Dynastic Histories which mention Persia and China 
could go to Persia by sea (see chapter 3).
(5) Samarkand could be reached by sea and land
Lions came to Ming China as a tribute from Samarkand by way of the South 
China Sea, and this was recorded in the Xian bin lu 25- Still, the 
''tribute route" of Samarkand could be changed to a land route - from the 
western boundary of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall - Jiayuguan. This source 
proves again that the Ming Empire could connect with the Timur Empire by 
land and sea.
(6) Two “Shah Rukhs” 2fi
24 Picture page 16.
Luo, Yuejiong i ü 0 § £  ju ren 1585, edited by Xu Sili .Xian bin lu 
JgScÄÜ .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. p73.
(Samarkand:) Lions were sent as a tribute from the South Sea. 
Etiquette official Ni Yue said: "the South Sea is not the 
tribute route of Western Region, please refuse it. " Thereafter, 
the tributes were all imported from Jiayuguan.
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26 Shah Rukh Mirza (or Shah Rokh) (1377 - 1447)
The ruler of the Timur Empire (Persia and Transoxiana) between 1407 and 
1447. He was the fourth and youngest son of Timur, who founded the 
Timurid dynasty and Timurid Empire, His mother was Persian.
In Persia and Transoxiana Shah Rukh was able to secure effective control 
from about 1409. His empire controlled the main trade routes between 
East and West, including the legendary Silk Road, and became immensely 
wealthy as a result. He was very friendly with Ming China Emperor 
Yongle and sent several missions to visit Beijing.
The devastation of Persia’s main cities led to the cultural centre of 
the empire shifting to Samarkand in modern Uzbekistan and Herat in 
Afghanistan. The cities benefited from the wealth and privilege of Shah 
Rukh’s court, which was a great patron of the arts and sciences.
His wife, the Persian princess Gauhar Shad, funded the construction of 
two outstanding mosques and theological colleges in Mashhad and Herat. 
The Goharshad mosque was finished in 1418. The mixed ethnic origins of
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Shah Rukh was the third ruler of the Timur Empire based in Herat; Ming shilu, 
Ming shi and Shu yu zhou zi lu are all very clear on this point 21. He 
and Emperor Yongle had a friendly relation, both were the leaders of two 
superpowers during that time. However there are other records in the Ming 
shi that describe Shah Rukh as a country on an island which sent missions to 
China by sea during the Yongle period28. An important detail is that Shah 
Rukh the "country" is listed below Herat.
[1418] This year Thailand, Champa, Java, Sumatra, Nepal, 
Malacca, Lambri, Herat, Shah Rukh, Qinglida and Samarkand 
brought tributes. Ryukyu sent tribute again. 29
»mm' sm' jm' * mAm* wwn' mw] * m  ' 
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(Shah Rukh): This country was on an island in west A-Su 
(Persia). 77 people brought tribute to China during Emperor 
Yongle’ s reign. Every day wine, dishes and fruits were supplied 
to them which were different from those of other countries. Its 
territory was surrounded by mountains and livestock was
the ruling dynasty led to a distinctive character in its cultural 
outlook, which was a combination of Persian civilisation and art, with 
borrowings from China, with literature written in Turkic and Persian.
Shah Rukh died during a journey in Persia and was succeeded by his son, 
Ulugh Beg, who had been viceroy of Transoxiana during his father’ s 
lifetime. Ulugh Beg was also a scientist, whose representatives visited 
Beijing in 1420, and were welcomed by Emperor Yongle.
J Yan Cong Jian JjtfttfiS edited by Xu Sili . Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. p497.
The Imperial son- in-law of the Yuan, Timur, whose son, Shah 
Rukh, was respectfully called Sultan - the meaning is similar to 
Chinese king.
m m  • •
28 Luo, Yuejiong ju ren 1585, edited by Xu Sili .Xian bin lu
liScÄÜfc .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. pi53.
(Shah R u k h ) : Our empire calls it Shah Rukh. There were 77
people bringing tributes.
2y Ming shi, 7, 16th year of Yongle
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abundant. 30
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It is very clear that this is the same Shah Rukh, whose missions had been to 
Ming China by land and sea. (It could be the most humorous mistake in the 24 
Dynastic Histories). Certainly, in the sixth month, 1405, improving 
relations between the Ming Empire and the Timur Empire was very important 
in the tactics of the Ming Empire for security and in seeking to 
destroy or subjugate the Mongol forces, especially the Northern Yuan.
1405.6: Zheng He’s fleet contained many Muslims - a special clue
Muslims were a small minority in Ming China. Emperor Yongle was not a 
Muslim, but Zheng He’s voyages included many Muslims. Admiral Zheng He 
himself, Wang Jinghong JEJUNA. Ma Huan Hfjfc, and Guo Chongli were all
Muslims, and there were many Muslim soldiers on the voyages31. This is one of 
the most important clues in the search for the original motive for Zheng 
He’s voyages.
This encouragement of Muslims to join the fleet could be because the 
Ming Empire was seeking alliance with a great Muslim empire or some 
Muslim countries. At that time, the Timur Empire was the greatest Muslim 
country, particularly after Timur defeated the the Ottoman Turkish Empire 
in 1402. Also, Timur himself was a devout Muslim.32
(l) Only the Timur Empire was mentioned as a Muslim country in Ming shilu
Which country was mentioned as a Muslim country in the Ming shilu in 1404 
and 1405? This is a very important point in the search for the original 
motive of Zheng He’s voyages, but it has been ignored by scholars. The
30 Ming shi, 332 (Zhuan 220), Shah Rukh
31 Chen Yan pjfj? • Hai shang si chou zhi lu yu zhong wai wen hui jiao liu
.Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002. p 155.
32 Barnes, Ian. The history atlas of Asia. New York: Macmillan. 1998. P95
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answer is very clear -  only the Timur Empire. In fact, from 1368 to 1405, 
only the Timur Empire (Samarkand and Herat) was often mentioned as a 
Muslim country, and Eastern Chagatai has l i t t l e  mention about Islam. For 
example:
[1392.2] because the t r ibu te  missions went and returned from 
the Islamic king (the Timur Empire) , Emperor Hongwu concerned
th is  could generate f ron t ie r  trouble ........  then Emperor Hongwu
feared that  they had been spying on China.33
................... °
[1392.12] <<Imperial Edict >>' (to: the Regional Military 
Commission . . Gusu. . . ) :  Military people and c iv i l ians  of Muslim 
who wish to return to the Western Region are a l l  sent off.
In a l l  1236 people returned to Samarkand.3,1
m: ° mmmsvp
A •
[1405.2] <<Imperial Edict>>: (to'- Regional Military Commander of 
Gansu. .. Song Cheng.. .) :  The Muslim Dao Wu said: " The Samarkand 
Muslim (Timur) and the King of Moghulistan, Shamichagan, have 
commanded troops to advance eas t”. 35
m ■ s : nnnmw •
• • •
Timur and his son Shah Rukh thought themselves the most important protectors  
of Islam. Zheng He and his entourage were enthusiast ic  about Islam 3fi. During 
the f i f teen th  century the majority of Turfan’ s res idents  converted from
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizu, 216, 2 month, 25 year of Hongwu. p3181.
34 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizu, 223, 12 month, 25 year of Hongwu. p3266.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming Shilu, Taizong, 39, 2rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p659.
!fi Tan Ta Sen ßjtiUzf. .Zheng He, Islam in Southeast Asia and Shan Bao Long 
Bian Nian Shi HflfO ' .Singapore: Asian
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Buddhism to Islam37. Islam was spreading in central Asia at that time. 
The Timur Empire was a Muslim country, and there was a possibility that it 
could extend its power to Turfan and Eastern Chagatai (Mogulistan).
(2) The Ming knew western Asia was historically a great Muslim Empire
Zheng He was a Muslim, and his father and grandfather had visited Mecca, and 
so he would have been impressed by the records about Islam in the 23 
Dynastic Histories. There are many records about the rise of Islam and the 
Prophet Muhammad in the Jiu (Old) Tang shu 38, the Xin (New) Tang shu and the
Culture, Vol 27, 2003. p86.
i7 Rossabi, Morris. Ming China and Turfan, 1406-1517. Central Asiatic 
Journal. 16. p212.
,8 Jiu Tang shu, 198, (148), the Arab Empire A Ä E I  , p5316.
[The Islamic Arab Empire]: It was originally in the west of
Persia. In the middle period of Daye (605-617), a steppe person 
of Persia was herding camels on Mount Hira (Yenbo - Medina) 
[outside Mecca] . .. then separated himself from the western 
territory of Persia, proclaiming himself as king. Persia and the 
Byzantine Empire sent troops to suppress him, and both
were defeated ....  In the second year of Yonghui (651), its
first tribute mission was sent to the Imperial Court. The king’s 
family name is Dashi (Umayyad), and his given name is 
Ganmimomoni (Othman). The ambassador said his country had been 
in existence for 34 years, and had had three rulers ....
This country produces camels and horses which are bigger than 
other countries. It has strong and sharp weapons. Customarily,
its people fight bravely and like to worship God ....  Mount
Hira (Yenbo - Medina) is in the southwest part of the country. 
Its king moved the Black Stone from the cave to set it up in his
state ....  In the early year of Longshuo (661-663)[5], the
Arab Empire defeated Persia, and also defeated the Byzantine 
Empire. Its troops in the south invaded Poluomen (in the 
northern Indian Peninsula). It annexed many countries, and had 
more than 400,000 crack troops ... at that time, the states of 
Kang and Shi were subjugated by it. Its territory stretched over 
10, 000 Li, its east adjoined the Turki.
In the early year of Zhide (756-758), a tribute mission was sent 
to the Imperial Court. At that time (the future Emperor) Daizong 
was the Marshal, and used his soldiers to recover the two
capitals ....  In the middle period of Zhenyuan (785-805), it
became a powerful opponent of Tibet. (Then) the major part of 
army of the Tibetan Empire move westward as a defence against 
the Arab Empire. Thus the Tibetan Empire became less of a threat 
to the frontier, because its strength was insufficient . (Jiu 
Tang shu)
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Song shi, and they are s t r i k i n g ly  accurate.
Thus Ming China knew of the r i s e  of Islam, and tha t  western Asia had long 
been a grea t  Islamic Arab Empire, with a t e r r i t o r y  s t re t ch ing  10,000 Li 39 
(the Ming was 6,000 Li)w. This Islamic Arab Empire had sent  missions to Tang 
China11 , and provided cavalry to a s s i s t  Tang China against  the Revolt 
of An Lu-shan in 757; This empire’ s people (so ld ie rs  in another record) , 
Arab and Persian,  had looted Quangzhou from the sea in 758. Moreover, 
the Arab Empire had been a s t r a t e g i c  par tner  with Tang China against  Tibet.  
Zheng He’ s f l e e t  was so g rea t  and there  were so many so ld ie r s  tha t  his  goal 
could not have been ju s t  coas ta l  c i t i e s  (the s t e l e s  of Zheng He ju s t  mention 
some c i t i e s ) ,  but r a th e r  a big empire. This idea is  very important but 
usually  ignored.
(3) The Is lamisat ion of Southeast Asia occurred a f t e r  Zheng He’ s voyage
The Majapahit Empire (Ming sh ilu  c a l l s  i t  Java) was the l a s t  of the 
grea t  Hindu empires of the Malay archipelago,  based in eas te rn  Java, and 
ru l ing  much of the southern Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Sumatra, and Bali from
mse' m ■ xnmm ■ n^wm • . . . .miu&mzmm • .................rnmn > »
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M Xin Tang shu 221, (146), the Arab Empire
The Arab Empire: i t s  land originally belonged to Persia.............
i t  destroyed Persia, and defeated the Byzantine Empire ..........
i t s  crack troops reached 400,000, (the states of) Kang and Shi 
were both subjugated by it .  I ts  te rr i to ry  stretched over 10,000
Li. To the east i t  adjoined Turki, i t s  southwest was sea ..........
In the second year of Yonghui (651), the king of the Arab 
Empire, Ganmimomoni (Othman), f i r s t  sent i t s  tribute mission [7] 
to the Imperial Court. The ambassador said the family name of 
i t s  king was Dashi (Umayyad), i t  had been 34 years since his 
country was established, and i t  had passed through two 
generations. (Xin Tang shu) [8]
* £  • .....mm  * mm ..... * m'
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10 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizu, 253, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3656.
It was just a mission, but Chinese records of the Imperial Court always 
wrote ^tribute mission”.
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about 1293 to around 1500. Its greatest ruler was Hayam Wuruk, whose reign 
from 1350 to 1389 marked the empire’s peak. The Majapahit Empire sent 
several missions to Ming China; the Majapahit was of course a Hindu empire 
and had not been mentioned as a Muslim country in the Ming shilu. Ma Huan J§ 
ftfc found Muslims in Java but that was only after Zheng He’s voyages.
Melaka was founded by a Hindu ruler, Parameswara, who left Sumatra in 1396. 
Parameswara decided on the spot to establish a new country, calling it 
"Melaka". Parameswara converted to Islam in 1414 12 and changed his name to 
"Sultan Iskandar Shah", after marrying the daughter of the Sultan of Pasai. 
Sultan Iskandar Shah died in 1424, and was succeeded by his son, Sri 
Maharaja.
It must be stressed that present-day Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei are 
Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, but Islam only became dominant in 
Southeast Asia after Zheng He’s voyage'13 . Thus, although there were many 
Muslims in Zheng He’s fleet but this was not in order to make friends 
with Southeast Asian countries.
Charles A. Gimon, Sejarah Indonesia, Gimonca Bookstore, 2001.
The Islamic religion had been common among traders in Sumatra and Java 
for some time. The Singhasari and Majapahit kingdoms probably had a few 
Muslims involved in their courts. Large-scale conversions to Islam began 
when local kings adopted the new religion. Aceh and Melaka were among 
the first. Most of Java did not become Muslim until the early 1500s. 
(Today, over 85% of Indonesians are Muslims.)
1409
Zheng He visits Melaka.
1411
Paramesvara visits Beijing on a state visit.
1414
Paramesvara converts to Islam, and takes the name Iskandar Syah, after 
marrying the daughter of the Sultan of Pasai. Melaka is now an Islamic 
sultanate.
Ptak, Roderich . China’s seaborne trade with South and Southeast Asia, 
1200-1750 . Aldershot ; Brookfield, Vt. : Ashgate, cl998. Ill p41.
In the 1460s Islam spread to the North Moluccas and, according to 
Pires, it was introduced to the Banda Islands in the 1470s.
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<2> 1407. The Timur released Fu An, 1409.3 Zheng He visited 
Hormuz
1407.6: The Ming embassy’s Fu An was released by the Timur
In 1407.4, Ming China had separated Eastern Chagatai (Moghulistan) and the 
Timur Empire, and, according to the Ming shilu’s record, Eastern Chagatai 
now saw Ming China as a friend and the Timur Empire as an enemy. This is a 
very significant record:
[1407.4] King of Moghulistan, Shamichagan, sent Tuoyibuhua and 
others with jade and local products as tribute, and said that 
Samarkand was the original land of their ancestors, requesting 
that troops should be sent to bring it under control. Emperor
(Yongle) ordered .....  to take an letter of state to proclaim
to Shamichagan: "You must consider carefully before taking
action; take care to do nothing imprudent which would court 
danger and humiliation. " In addition, silk and money were 
presented. 11
MtSM ’ mPAM&Z. - _hnp..>
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Perhaps this was just a strategy by Eastern Chagatai, but at least this 
country and the Ming appeared to have a friendly relationship, bearing in 
mind that Eastern Chagatai had cooperated with the Timur and the Northern 
Yuan (Tartar) in 1405 in order to conquer China. Also, Emperor Yongle asked 
the Eastern Chagatai to be wary of the Timur Empire, meaning that Emperor 
Yongle thought the Timur Empire had a strong military capacity which could 
threaten Eastern Chagatai and Ming China.
[1407.6] (10. July. 1407) <<Imperial Edict)): (to: Regional
" Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizong, 66, 4rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p929.
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Military Commander of Gansu . . .  Song Cheng . . .  ) ; The Imperial 
ambassadors [Fu An and others] have been detained [by the Timur 
Empire], we are not c lear about the policy involved. Recently 
the Muslim Anmingtiemuer and others have come and told us that 
Guilichi (leader of the Tartar) has often sent envoys to Hami to 
se l l  horses, and Benyashili (descendant of the Yuan Dynasty, 
operating in the cap ital  of the Timur Empire, Samarkand) has 
also sent people to go along with Guilichi. Now we secre tly  send 
Anmingtimuer there (Samarkand), we can choose people to go with 
him, for gathering inte ll igence on a c t i v i t i e s  there. 45
M  °
According to the Imperial Edict, by 1407 the Ming Imperial government was 
s t i l l  ordering the Regional Commander of Gansu to reinforce the frontier.  In 
addition, spies were sent following Muslims to Samarkand "to gain 
in te ll igence on a c t i v i t i e s  there". Thus i t  could be said Emperor Yongle took 
considerable notice of the mili tary ac t iv i ty  of the Timur Empire unti l  
1407. 6 .46
In 1395 Ming China’ s embassy Fu An, Guo J i  and 1500 soldiers were sent to 
the Timur Empire, and were detained for 13 years; however in 1407.6 they 
were released and returned to China, accompanied by the Timur Empire’ s 
ambassador. This means that  from 1407. 6, two years a f te r  Admiral Zheng He’ s 
voyage, re la t ions  between the Ming Empire and the Timur Empire improved.
n Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu, Taizong, 68, (jjcA) 6rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p956.
Ih Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8599.
In the sixth month of the f i f th  year [1407], Fu An returned to 
the Ming. Earlier , Fu An had arrived in th is  country [the Timur 
Empire] but was detained. Also, t r ib u te  ceased. Now Fu An was 
ordered to travel over 10,OOOLi through several countries, 
demonstrating the greatness of the Empire.
• 1«  • ihya^ o s ü »■sm > ha •
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Something happened which led the Timur Empire to change its thinking about 
Ming China.
[1407.6] (25. July. 1407) Supervising Secretary of Military
Ministry, Fu An and Guo Ji and others returned to China from 
Samarkand; Fu An and others from the mission to the Western 
Region stayed at Samarkand for 13 years, from the 28th year of
Hongwu.......  Fu An and others said: The Yuan emperor’s
son-in-law, Timur, has died... 4'
• w
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This is an extremely important record, but it has been neglected by many 
scholars. First: Ming China did not know that Timur had died in 1405; so 
from 1405.2 to 1407.6 the Ming Empire continued to think of the Timur 
Empire as a serious threat 48 , until late 1407.6 when the Ming knew (or 
was able to confirm) that Timur had died. Second: according to this 
record, Timur was called the “Yuan emperor’s son-in-law, Timur" so the Ming 
knew the rulers of the Timur and Khans of the Mongol powers were relatives.
Third: Ambassador Fu An was detained for 13 years; after he was released he 
would have returned to China as soon as possible and sent this significant 
intelligence to Emperor Yongle. So the decision to release Fu An, thus 
improving relations between these two countries, was not made until a little 
before 1407.6, maybe between 1407.3 to 1407.5. In my opinion, the Timur 
Empire would have sent horses for him to travel since they wanted to 
improve relations with Ming China, and as soon as ambassador Fu An
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 68, 6rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p963.
IK In the period 1404 to 1405 Timur and the descendants of the Yuan Dynasty 
launched a great expedition to conquer the Ming Empire. However, Timur 
died during the exercise. This was a key period in which to improve 
relations between the Timur Empire and the Ming Empire. If Emperor 
Yongle wanted to eliminate either the Mongol or northern Yuan force, an 
alliance with the Timur Empire would be a significant step.
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arrived at the border, Hami or Jiayuguan, the m ilitary  system would have 
sent th is  in te lligence to Emperor Yongle quickly (then Ming shilu  recorded 
i t ) .
Thus, i t  appears that there was a d irec t  connection between Zheng He’ s 1405 
voyage to the Western Ocean and re la tio n s  with the Timur. I f  Zheng He’ s 
western voyage was to develop fr iendly  re la tio n s  with other countries, the 
Timur Empire would have been the most important goal119 . So, two years a f te r  
Zheng He’ s voyage, the re la tionsh ip  between the Timur and the Ming improved, 
and Zheng He returned to China in 1407.9. The Ming shi has similar records 
for example: 50 51.
[1407.6] When Timur died, his grandson Hali succeeded the throne, 
and dispatched ambassador Hudaida and others to accompany Fu An 
on his re turn  to Ming China and brought local products as 
tr ibu te . Emperor Yongle entertained the ambassador generously. 
The Commander, Beiaeryitai, was sent to pay respects to the 
former king (Timur). Besides, the new King and his t r ib e  were 
granted with s i lv e r  coinage. 52
19 Taiwan’ s scholar Xu, Yuhu ^  has indicated that one of the original 
motives for Zheng He’ s voyage was to co llec t  in te ll igence  from the Timur 
Empire -  th is  seems reasonable. However, his second conclusion should be 
modified. I t  was then very d i f f ic u l t  to organize a great a ll iance  from 
overseas. Zheng He had to try  to improve the rela tionsh ip  between the 
Timur Empire and The Ming Empire, because the real enemy for the Ming was 
Mongol.
(Xu, Yuhu): To organize a great a lliance, so as to make a ha lf ­
encirclement of the Timur Empire in Central Asia.
o0 Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8610.
The chief of Samarkand, Hali, is  the son of the elder brother of the 
chief of Herat, the two people were not compatible, and several wars 
took place between them.
m > - a > mm ■
1 Ming shi, 329, (Zhuan 217), Liu Cheng $pi$c, p8527.
[1409] In the 7th year (of Yongle), Fu An returned from the 
Western Region, and the leader [Liu City] sent an ambassador to 
accompany Fu An, with t r ibu te . Promptly, Emperor Yongle ordered 
Fu An to take precious clothes in return . In summer, in the 
11th year, the ambassador was dispatched [from Liu City], 
followed Beiaeryitai, to bring tribu te .
’ zmmmmLKn ■
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Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Samarkand, p8599.
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After Zheng He's first voyage in 1405.6, the relation between the Timur 
Empire and Ming China had a great improvement. This operation could 
demonstrate Ming China's wealth and military capability to the Timur 
Empire, and the granting of gifts to this Empire could improve the 
relationship and secure the release of the Ming’s ambassadors Fu An and 
others. Most importantly, it was a essential strategy to separate the united 
Mongol forces, by dividing the Timur Empire and other Mongol’s forces.
In 1409, the Timur Empire’s language - Persian - appeared on the Sri Lanka 
Stele, and the important harbour of the Timur Empire - Hormuz - was 
designated by Emperor Yongle as the chief destination for Admiral Zheng He’s 
third voyage.
1407.9: Zheng He’s return; 1407.10: separating the Timur and Mongol
In 1407.6 Fu An and members of his mission returned to China. In 1407.9 
Zheng He also returned to China, and in the same month he was designated to 
carry out another mission53. During the same period, the Ming achieved a 
significant strategic success, the separation of the Timur and Mongol; it 
seems that the turning point was in 1407.6. Besides, the Ming government had 
collected some vital intelligence.
[1408. l] Previously Benyashili had lived in Samarkand, then fled 
to the Moghulistan. Now his earlier enemy sent people to meet 
him and he was crowned [as Khan of Yuan] ° The Frontier general
Appendix 1: Ming Shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming Shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 71, 9 month, 5 year of Yongle. p987, 988.
[1407.9] The Grand Supervisor Zheng He returned to China after a
mission to the Western Ocean countries........  Ordering
Commander Wang Hao, modifying 249 sea transport ships to prepare 
for mission to the western ocean countries.
....... * mtmwmm °
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also reports in te ll igence from sp ies .54
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This record i l l u s t r a t e s  that  the Ming’ s spies gathered accurate in te ll igence 
on the Timur Empire, the Northern Yuan and the Moghulistan. In 1405, the 
descendant of the la s t  emperor of the Yuan (Emperor Shundi), Benyashili, 
f led to the Timur Empire, and the Ming knew t h i s 55. He and his force had 
joined with the Timur Empire and Moghulistan to conquer Ming China and 
res to re  the Yuan Dynasty in China. Along the way, Timur died, (The Ming did 
not know th is  immediately) and a great expedition was at  an end; however, 
cooperation between the Timur Empire and the Northern Yuan was s t i l l  
possible.
In 1407, Benyashili returned to the Mongol plateau; obviously the Timur 
Empire had changed i t s  policy and would not a s s i s t  him to res tore  the Yuan 
Dynasty in China. The Ming’ s strategy was successful in severing re la t ions  
between the Mongol power and the Timur Empire. In 1408.3 the Imperial Edict 
shows Emperor Yongle sent a warning national l e t t e r  to the Northern Yuan, 
Benyashil i55. This l e t t e r  also could be interpreted to mean that  the Ming
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 75, 1 month, 6 year of Yongle. pl030.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 72, 10 month, 5 year of Yongle. pl003.
[1407.10] Report: King Wanzhetu will command troops together
with Moghulistan for south invasion ..........  Emperor [Yongle]
said: Wanzhetu is  the descendant of the Yuan Dynasty, whose name 
is  Benyashili, e a r l ie r ,  he commanded troops to Samarkand 
[capita l of the Timur Empire], his troops number ju s t  hundreds.
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Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 77, 3 month, 6 year of Yongle, pl043.
[1408.3] Proclamation: Benyashili: We know you fled  from
Samarkand [the Timur Empire] and lived in Moghulistan
..........  Since the end of the Yuan Dynasty, there were six Khans
a f te r  Yuan Emperor Shundi, in a short period, I never heard one
of them had good rule ..........  You are the descendant of the Yuan
Dynasty, of course, you can worship your ancestors: However the 
difference between d isas te r  and happiness, you should careful to
handle ..........  i f  you in s is t  the t i t l e  of emperor..........  please
careful to consider.
i f : » a s b  : • j^ ja a s.... Sjtwmz • eh
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government (Emperor Yongle) had good intelligence about the activities of 
Benyashili and the Northern Yuan. This letter also shows The Ming Empire had 
made good preparations to send expeditions for destroying the Northern Yuan 
and its force5'.
1409.2: Persian, the Timur’s (Hormuz) language on Zheng He’s Stele
In 1409.2, Zheng He set up a stele in Sri Lanka, This stele involves many 
significant considerations. Persian was used mainly in the Timur Empire
during 1405-1433. Zheng He (his main fleet) had still not been to any 
Persian area (according to Zheng He’ s steles), but Persian is used in the 
Sri Lanka Stele in 1409 58. The stele has just three languages - Chinese, 
Persian (few Arabic) and Tamil.
(1) Persian was the Timur Empire’s language
Why use Persian in Sri Lanka? This was checked with Indian, Sri Lankan and 
Iranian scholars at ANU. They all agree that Persian was the Timur Empire’s 
language and that Sri Lankan people did not understand this language. In 
1410.2, Emperor Yongle sent a letter to the Sultan of the Timur Empire, Shah 
Rukh, with copies in Chinese, Persian and Uighur - this provides 
further evidence09. It may be thought that the Timur Empire was the goal of 
Zheng He’s voyage.
(2) All the areas using Persian were ruled by the Timur Empire
During 1405-1435, Persian was used only in the Timur Empire. Or perhaps it 
could be said that all the areas using Persian were ruled by the Timur 
Empire. There was a small group of people called Parsees - Zoroastrians - 
who used ancient Persian (Parsee, one dialect of Persian, before Islam) in
mmz ’ .......mm±Lzm%........wmmz ■
There is a different year in the record of Ming Shi, however the Ming 
Shilu should be exact.
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1409 Sri Lanka Stele
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, 101, 2 month, 8 year of Yongle, p 1316.
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the western Indian subcontinent. They fled to India from Persia in the 
seventh to eighth centuries to avoid religious persecution from Muslims. 
However Parsee and Persian (after Islam) are different, this stele is 
written in Persian not Parsee. Moreover, Admiral Zheng He had no reason to 
address this small group.
(3) The Indian subcontinent has more than 20 important languages
In the Indian subcontinent there were more than 20 important languages at 
that time, but Persian was not among them'10. Admiral Zheng He had visited 
countries speaking several different languages, which included Thai, 
Malay, Burmese, Bangladesh, Arabic and Indis (Vietnam’s writing was Chinese 
during that time), but they were not used in this Stele. One Chinese 
scholar says, "'Persian was an international language at that time", but I 
cannot agree. Checking with Indian history, there was no "international 
language" at that time.
The present-day languages in Indian Peninsula was checked with Indian 
scholars in the Australian National University as following, and 600 
years ago was not very different; Persian was not one of the main 
languages in Indian Peninsula from 600 years ago to now.
List 1 Languages of India
Hindi* 28 %
Telugu* 8 %
Bengali* 8 %
Marathi* 8 %
Tamil* 7 %
Urdu* 5 %
Gujarati* 5 %
Kannada* 4 %
Malayalam* 4 %
Oriya* 4 %
Punjabi* 3 %
Assamese* 2 %
Santali 1 %
Kashmiri*, Sindhi* 1 %
Sanskrit* —
Other 12 %
List 2 Languages of Sri Lanka
Sinhalese* 66 % 
Tamil 33 % 
Other 1 %
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(4) In 1409 Zheng He’s fleet had yet to reach any Persian area
By the second month of 1409, Admiral Zheng He’s fleet had still not been to 
any Persian area, including Hormuz. However, Hormuz - the most important 
port of the Timur Empire - was designated as a future destination in the 
next month (the third month) by Emperor Yongle. To return to China from Sri 
Lanka and send a report to Nanjing or Beijing would have taken one month. 
When Zheng He returned to Nanjing, Emperor Yongle almost immediately 
designated Hormuz as the chief destination for the next voyage.
(5) The inscription of the stele involves the authority of the Ming Emperor
The Sri Lanka stele and the other steles of Zheng He are substantially 
different61. This stele speaks of the orders of Emperor Yongle, not of 
Admiral Zheng He. It makes it clear that Chinese Ming Emperor had dispatched 
Grand Supervisor Zheng He, Wang Guitong and others to proclaim the Ming 
Empire’s power and friendship to some particular audience.
(6) In 1398 Timur invaded Delhi: his military capacity was famous in India
Because this stele uses the language of the Timur Empire - Persian - it may 
be considered that the stele’ s intended audience (Andromeda) was the 
Timur Emperor. In 1398, Timur’s invasion into Punjab went as far as Delhi, 
where he massacred 100,000 Hindu citizens and pillaged the city. Such 
cruelty and strong military capability would become his trademark 62. These 
events were well understood in 1409, only a few year later.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Admiral Zheng He’s goal was alliance with the Timur Empire, 
and the use of Persian on the stele is substantial evidence for this. The 
Persian inscription indicates that Zheng He wanted to take some message to 
the Timur Empire, and therefore that the Timur Empire was the chief 
original destination of Zheng He’s voyage.
01 Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He
b" Barnes, Ian. The history atlas of Asia. New York: Macmillan. 1998. p95.
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1409.3: Zheng He assigned to visit Hormuz in the Timur Empire
Hormuz was designated by Emperor Yongle in the third month of 1409, prior to 
the third voyage of Zheng He. It is distant from China, and Zheng He had not 
yet been there. Hormuz was an important port of the Timur Empire. Four 
months later, General Qiufu commanded 100,000 calvary, launching the
first large-scale expedition to attack the Northern Yuan.
[1409.3] <<Imperial Edict>>: (to: the Grand Commandant of Nanjing
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ): Now dispatching
Grand Supervisor Zheng He on an official mission to Hormuz and 
other countries of West Region. I order the use of Gantai? to 
move money and food for officers and soldiers. You and other 
people according to number for specifying and payment 
immediately, no delay, it is. "Imperial Seal" the third month, 
the 7th year of Yongle.63
* mmmmmmm * wmm  •
The Imperial Edict is extremely important, there are several considerations 
must be emphasized:
(1) Hormuz is very distant from China
In 1409, (the 3rd month of the 7th year of Yongle) Emperor Yongle sent an
Imperial Edict to the Imperial son-in-law (Military Officer) in Nanjing - 
Song Biao 7 and the Commandant of Nanjing - Li Long ^|H, to prepare for 
the third expedition of Admiral Zheng He. Hormuz was very distant, farther 
than from Spain to America.
(2) There is no mention of Hormuz in the 23 Dynastic Histories
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Li, Shihou ^ z L I P - Z h e n g  He jia pu kao shi Kunming: Zheng
zhong shu ju lE^llr^U > 1937.
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There are no records in the 23 Dynastic Histories showing that the Chinese 
had sailed to Hormuz (the Yuan shi has a brief record but the 
transliteration is different, ). However before the imperial fleet departed 
from China for the third voyage, Emperor Yongle designated Hormuz as 
the chief destination. There is no mention of Hormuz in the 23 Dynastic 
Histories, from Shi ji down to the Yuan shi. Of course, the “Records 
of Foreign Countries" in the 23 Dynastic Histories would be an important 
reference for the Emperor Yongle.
The first record concerning Hormuz in the 23 Dynastic Histories is in the 
Ming shi, in the 10th year of Yongle (1412) 64. The second mention is in the 
13th year of Yongle (1415) b5, which records the first tribute (trade) 
from Hormuz to Chinese Ming Empire (because Zheng He and his fleet visited 
Hormuz), and it is the first tribute from Hormuz in the Chinese official 
record in the whole of Chinese history.
(3) Hormuz, Herat and Samarkand all belonged to the Timur Empire
In fact, during this time, 1405-1435, Hormuz Herat and
Samarkand f f all belonged to an Empire - the Timur Empire (Timurid 
Dynasty). This fact was not understood until the early Qing Dynasty (the 
Ming shi does not mention it), and some Chinese historians have still
not understood this. It was possibly due to intentional misstatements,
because of the strategic considerations of the early Ming Period. 
Emperor Yongle wished to bring about an alliance with the Timur Empire, and 
did not want to provoke the other Mongol forces - the Tartar and Oirot.
(4) Why did Emperor Yongle use the two characters "official affair"?
Why did Emperor Yongle use the two Chinese characters "official affair"
? The 1417 Quanzhou Stele of Zheng He uses the same expression. Why it did 
not say for tribute or trade?
(5) In the same year the first expedition of Emperor Yongle was launched
64 Ming shi, 326, (Chuan 214), Hormuz.
63 Ming shi, 7, (Ji 7), 13th year of Yongle.
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In the same year, ju s t  four months la te r  (in the seventh month), the Duke of 
Qiguo -  Qiufu commanded 100,000 "Outstanding Calvary" fffff- ,
launching the f i r s t  large-scale  expedition to attack the Northern Yuan 
Regime during the Yongle Period. The next year, from 1410 to 1424, Emperor 
Yongle himself began the command of five great desert expeditions. Of course, 
preparations for these expeditions would have required some years.
(6) Conclusion
Therefore, Emperor Yongle commanded Zheng He to go to Hormuz for "o f f ic ia l  
a f fa irs "  in 1409, not ju s t  for tr ib u te  or trade. I t  was a more serious 
mission -  an a c t iv i ty  corresponding to the northern m ilitary  expedition.
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<3> 1410. Emperor Yongle invaded Mongol after the Timur 
envoy arrived Beijing
1409.3: Zheng He visited Hormuz; 1409.7: the Ming Empire attacked the Mongol 
power
In 1409.3, Hormuz in the Timur Empire was nominated as the chief destination 
for Zheng He’s voyage; it meant that the Timur Empire and Ming China had 
improved their relationship. In 1409.7, (just four months later) Emperor 
Yongle began to launch his first desert war to destroy the the Northern Yuan 
(Mongol Tartar) and its military power. This was surely not just a 
coincidence.
During 1409 to 1424, the most critical events for the Ming Empire were the 
large-scale wars on the Mongol powers, which were the focus and the real 
strategic goal. Other events from 1405-1422 included the great voyages 
of Admiral Zheng He; in 1415, the completion of the Grand Canal; in 1421, 
moving the capital to Beijing, and during 1413-1422, the diplomatic affairs 
between the Ming Empire and the Timur Empire; all could be part of the 
same strategic goal.
Emperor Yongle’s plan to destroy Mongol forces completely certainly did not 
begin in 1409. This was a military operation which had been planned for many 
years. The Ming shi records just some incidents in 1409 as related to the 
war b6 6', but this is unlikely. To have amassed 100,000 cavalry by 1409 and
Ming shi, 6, 7th year of Yongle ,p87.
The Supervising Secretary, Guoji, as ambassador to Benyashili, 
but Guoji was killed.
* nfsm
h7 Ming shi, 145, (Zhuan 33), Qiufu frlS , p4088.
[1409] Benyashili killed the Ming’ s ambassador, Guoji. Emperor 
[Yongle] was very angry, would sent troop to quell him, ordered 
Qiufu to bring seal of the Grand General for Conquering 
Barbarian, as General Military Commander.
^  p • imÄtf °
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500,000 troops by 1410 for the war on the Mongol powers must have 
taken many years of preparation.h8
In 1402, Emperor Yongle sent his ambassador to the Timur Emperor, and in 
1409 Hormuz in the Timur Empire was designated as the destination for 
Admiral Zheng He’s next voyage. The whole of the goal for this grand design 
was to destroy or subjugate the Mongol power, especially the descendants of 
the Yuan Dynasty, completely. After the diplomatic activity by the Ming 
Empire 69, the Timur Empire changed its policy and would not support 
Benyashili. This was a strategic success allowing the Ming Empire to 
proceed with its large-scale war on the Mongol powers.
1409.7: The Timur envoy’s visit; the Ming’s 100,000 cavalry attacked Mongol
In 1409.6 (9 August 1409), the Timur Empire and other countries’ friendly 
missions arrived in China, and brought 550 horses as tribute (or trade). It 
meant that from this date the Timur Empire and Ming China had a very 
friendly relationship, and this was confirmed by the Ming government. Horses 
for Ming China were not common goods, they were precious and always used for 
military purposes.
[1409.6] (9 August 1409) Supervising Secretary Fu An and others 
had returned to China from Herat and Samarkand (The Timur). 
Herat and other places sent their ambassador Ma Lai and others. 
Further, horses from the west were brought as tribute by Herat,
h8 Lee, Cheuk-Yin. Ch’iu Chun (1421-1495) and his views on government and 
history. Canberra: Thesis (Ph. D)— Australian National University, 1984. 
p326. Cf. Huang-Ming Shih-fa-lu. 31/la-2a; Ming Hui-Yao, 62/1197-98.
In 1406, a special bureau named the Pasturage Office was
organised to be responsible for the pasture areas set aside by 
the government and the rearing of horses.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, 78, 4 month, 6 year of Yongle, p 1053.
[1408.4] The Chief of Samarkand, Sha-hei-nu-er-ding and others 
brought tribute then took leave to return, Supervising 
Secretary Fu An was dispatched for company: Besides, Herat and 
other chiefs were granted gifts with different.
■ fmimrmm  • mm  • .......m m
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Huozhou and others, 550 in total. Money also was granted. Soon 
ambassador Fu An was dispatched to accompany Ma Lai and others 
returning to their countries. In addition, their chiefs were 
presented with silk cloths and money.70
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[1409. 7] (13 August 1409) ....  (Emperor) ordered Duke of
Qiguo, Qiufu, as the Regional Military Commander with a title
"Grand General for Conquering Enemy" ...  He led crack cavalry
in an attack on the northern enemy. A mission was sent with a
letter to proclaim to Benyashili 71 : ....  "You killed my
ambassador, drove your rabble in an attempt to engage in looting 
and plundering, take now I am of on ordering “Grand General for
for Conquering Enemy” to command troops ...  I, Emperor,
certainly will my self lead a great army to punish your crime 
next year. "72
In 1409.7 (13 August 1409), the Duke of Qiguo - Qiufu , commanding 
100,000 cavalry fjfjfnf , launched the first large-scale expedition to attack 
the Northern Yuan Regime during Emperor Yongle’s reign. Just four days 
after the Timur’s mission came, war broke out between Ming China and the 
Mongol power; this could not have been by chance. This battle was just 
the beginning. Other great desert expeditions would follow it.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi: [1409.6]
Benyashili was the ruler of the Tartar (the Northern Yuan), he was the 
descendant of the last Emperor of the Yuan, just returned from the Timur 
Empire.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi: [1409.7]
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In 1409.9, bad news were transmitted to the Ming government, and recorded in 
the Ming shilu 73. In this battle, 100,000 soldiers were killed or captured'4. 
It illustrated the difficulties of the northern wars for the Ming Empire. 
In the same month, Zheng He departed from China for Hormuz'5 76. From 1410 to 
1424, Emperor Yongle himself commanded five great desert expeditions, 
and they were perilous. Ming China needed to mobilize more resources to 
support these wars, and diplomacy was also important.
1410.2: Emperor Yongle led 500,000 troops into Mongolia and Russia
15th March 1410 (2nd month of Chinese calendar) perhaps is the most 
important date between 1392 and 1449 (before the Tumubao Incident) for Ming 
China and Asian history. It may be seen as a key date for Ming China’s 
strategy from 1392 to 1449. In [1409. 3] Zheng He was appointed to visit 
Hormuz in the Timur Empire, In [1409.9] Zheng He departed from China. So in 
1410.2 Zheng He could already have been in Hormuz, or some other place 
in the Timur Empire’s territory.
[1410.2] (14 March 1410) Herat (the Timur Empire), Shah Rukh,
71 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi: [1409.9]
74 Xia Xie 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian BHiftlH .Beijing: Reform Publish.
1994, 7th year of Yongle, p564.
[1409.7] In the 7th month, ordering "Duke of Qiguo" Qiufu as 
Grand General for Conquering Savage; "Marquis of Wucheng" Wang 
Chung and "Marquis of Tongan" Huoqin became vice commander. 
"Marquis of Jingan" Wangzhong, "Marquis of Pingan" Leeyuan 
became left and right general, commanding 100,000 crack 
cavalries north to attack Benyashili. In August "Duke of Qiguo" 
Qiufu was defeated in Lugou River. Qiufu, vice generals Wang 
Chung and Huoqin, left right generals Wangzhong and Leeyuan all 
died. Leeyuan commanded 500 cavalrymen to break through the 
siege, hundreds of people were killed, his horse fell, he and 
Qiufu were both captured and did not surrender to die.
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Ma, Huan 1414-1451, Edited by Feng, Chengjun • Ying ya sheng
ian .Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan ,1934.
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sent the chief, Mier J i la ,  and others to bring local product as 
tribu te . Different g i f t s  were granted to them [by Emperor 
Yongle]. Shah Rukh was the fourth son of Timur, (the Imperial
son-in-law of the Yuan) ..........  (15 March 1410) (Emperor Yongle)
sent o f f ic ia l s  to pay respect to the prophet teacher, Confucius.
The Emperor himself would lead an expedition against the steppe
enemy..........  The Emperor’ s wagon (and 500, 000 troops) set out
from Beijing . 71
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In 14th March 1410 The ru le r  of the Timur, Shah Rukh (Shah, Khan, Emperor), 
sent his senior (chief) o f f ic ia l  to Ming China bringing g if ts ,  implying that 
now the Timur and Ming China were very friendly, the re la tionsh ip  
established '8 . Next day, 15th March 1410, the Ming Emperor Yongle 
launched his 500,000 troops to advance 2000 km, invade and subjugate 
the Mongol power and res to re  China’ s prestige. This was the greatest 
m ilita ry  operation for Han Chinese since the early period of the Tang Empire 
(from about AD 658 to 1410).
Emperor Yongle was the only Emperor to enter the present-day Republic of 
Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) and Russia in Chinese history. Certainly no other 
Chinese emperor did so. From the 10th of [1410. 2] to the 13th of 1410. 5, 
about 90 days, Emperor Yongle and a large number of troops, at leas t 
250,000, (other garrisons in Inner Mongolia secured t r a f f ic  and supply from 
Beijing) crossed the desert to enter the orig inal t e r r i to ry  of 
Ghengis Khan in the present-day Republic of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) '9.
77 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming sh i : [1410. 2]
78 From [1407.6] the Ming’ s ambassador Fu An was released from the Timur 
Empire, the Ming and the Timur began gradually to have a b e tte r  
relationship, so in [1410.2] Shah Rukh’ s mission meant Ming China’ s ""Two 
prong strategy"" had been very successful, the Ming Empire had severed 
the cooperation between the Timur Empire and Mongol.
79 Ming shi, 327, ({#215), Tartar , p8468.
[1410.2] Emperor [Yongle] himself led 500,000 troops departing 
from f ro n t ie r  for an expedition. Benyashili was worried a f te r
hearing th is  news ..........  Emperor pursued to River Wonan, where
he encountered opposition from Benyashili. The Emperor commanded
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They even entered present-day Russian territory, crossed the Onon River and 
fought the Mongol near to present-day Chita (in Russian territory), and 
Manzhouli80 . No other Chinese emperor penetrated so far north. This is a 
spectacular record in Chinese history.
They advanced almost directly northward, more than 1000 Km. It was most 
perilous. Many scholars in the Ming Dynasty did not like war, and many 
archives in the Ming Period oppose desert expeditions. However this was a 
great accomplishment for the Ming Empire. From the late period of the Tang 
to the end of the Yuan, Han Chinese governments were under pressure from 
steppe cavalry empires from the Mongolian plateau. Now Emperor Yongle 
sought to convert this situation to dominate the plateau.
1410.6: Zheng He visited Hormuz during Emperor Yongle’s war on Mongol
Each expedition required an extraordinary commitment of men and 
material and involved considerable hardship. ... No major 
victory was achieved despite this massive expenditure of effort, 
but the campaigns did ensure that the Mongols would remain 
divided and unable to threaten China for a generation.81
In 1410, 1414, 1422, 1423, and 1424, Emperor Yongle led five campaigns into 
the Mongolian plateau, with great and well-provisioned armies at 
enormous expense; they probably exceeded 250,000 troops, many of them 
cavalry, on each of the campaigns 82. These events were the real crux of Ming 
China’s strategy.
troops to attack, and defeated Benyashili. Benyashili gave up 
equipment and herds, escaping with just seven cavalries. The 
river Wonan was the original area of Ghengis Khan.
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Tsai, Shih-shan Henry . Perpetual happiness: the Ming Emperor Yongle
.Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. pl68.
81 Roberts, J. A. G. .China - prehistory to the nineteenth century. 
Gloucester: Sutton Publishing. 1996-2000. p 185.
The basic study, with translation of an important Ming Period account, 
is found in Wolfgang Franke 1949.
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Every time Emperor Yongle met the Mongol armies in battle, he always 
trumpeted those engagements as great victories. The Mongol Empire had 
enjoyed great military achievements, conquered vast lands from the Black Sea 
to the Sea of Japan, occupied many countries including China, so these wars 
were dangerous, victory was not assured.
Some points of view based on Sinocentrism underestimated the powerful 
Mongol cavalry 83 . Emperor Yongle could not destroy the Mongol powers 
completely, that is an absolute fact. However, none of the other emperors 
of the Ming Dynasty could have done so either, and from 1410 to 1448, the 
Ming Empire had a higher prestige in East Asia (until with the Tumubao 
incident in 1449 the Ming’s prestige declined sharply). After Emperor 
Yongle’s expeditions, the Mongols did not regain sufficient military power 
to pose a serious threat for about a generation (1410 to 1435 ).
According to the 1470 Zhouwen Stele 84, Zheng He visited Hormuz on his third 
voyage, and according to the Ming shilu 85, in [1411.6] he returned to 
China. Thus in 1410, during Emperor Yongle’s first large-scale war on
Mongol, Zheng He was probably visiting Hormuz in the Timur Empire.
83 Li, Zhuoran (Lee, Cheuk Yin) Mao, Peiqi .Ming Chengzu Shi
Luan .Taipei: Wenjin Publish ,1994. pl90.
• mm ° mumm > • j"Why did Emperor Yongle not solve the Mongol problem? The answer is that 
his military capability was not good enough, and neither was his 
strategy. " I cannot agree with this point of view.
84 Appendix 2: The 1470 Zhouwen Stele
[1409] In the year Jichou of Yongle, Grand Eunuchs were ordered 
to go to Western Ocean including Hormuz and other countries,
Xuan Marquis acompanied by Kuisi went again, both return in next
year ....  Totally Marquis had six times of departure, arriving
there for ....  In the 25 years, six times missions visiting
the "Absolute Region", Emperors rewarded his contribution, 
receiving golden gift and his ranking grew.
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[1411.6] Eunuch Zheng He and others returned from the western 
voyage ....
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<4> 1413-19. Emperor Yongle’s missions: sea and land
1411.11 The Stele of Zheng He’s father
According to the inscription of this stele, Zheng H e ’ s father’s stele was 
set up during the Dragon boat Festival of 1405 - about one month before 
Zheng He began his first voyage .8h
Senior’s given name is Haji, family name is Ma, generations
living in Kunyang county of Yunnan province ...  father is also
Haji.... [1405.5] In the Dragon Boat Festival of the third year
of Yongle....
• vtmmmh» na ° m m »
(Back of stele)
[1411.11] ....  Grand Supervisor Zheng He received orders to
visit his ancestor’s tomb for worship and remembrance.
mnmmmM»mmw ° •
This stele shows that Zheng He’s father and grandfather both had the name 
Haji8', indicating that they had both made an Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Possibly the journey was by land, and so Zheng He had a religious background 
involving knowledge of western Asia. At the time of Zheng He’s voyage, the 
strongest country in western Asia was the Timur Empire.
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1405 Yunnan Stele, (father of Zheng He)
Muslims have a duty to visit Mecca at least once in a lifetime. The 
Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca is called Haji, and it takes place during the 
12th month of the Muslim year. A Muslim who has completed this 
pilgrimage is called Haji and is respected by other Muslims.
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Zheng He was appointed to visit Hormuz, and he returned to China in 
1411.6. In 1411.11, he was sent by Emperor Yongle to worship at his 
father’s tomb, and this was recorded on the back of his father’s stele. This 
could mean that the primary mission of his voyages had been completed 
between 1405.6 and 1411.6.
In 1409.3 Hormuz was designated as the main destination for Zheng He’s 
voyage, and it was during this period (1409.6-1411.6) that Emperor Yongle 
and his 500,000 troops first made a large-scale and crucial war on Mongol 
Plateau. Thus it is very probable that Zheng H e ’ s voyages and Emperor 
Yongle's great northern wars had a significant link.
1413.4: Hormuz visit was the prime goal, thoroughly prepared
In preparation for visiting Hormuz, Admiral Zheng He went especially to Xian 
to ask the Mosque leader Ha San DpEi to accompany his voyage. Ha San 
was familiar with Arabic or Persian (After converting to Islam, 
Persian was strongly influenced by Arabic; about 70 % of Persian are similar 
with Arabic, this is proved by Iran’s scholars) and was learned in the 
religion, culture and history of the Islamic world. This is recorded in the 
1523 Xian Mosque Stele. The inscription of this stele also indicates that 
Grand Supervisor Zheng He received thelmperialEdict for going to the
Western Region and Mecca, not southeast Asia.
[1413.4] ....  Grand Supervisor Zheng He received the Imperial
Edict for going to the Western Region and Mecca. He passed 
Shanxi, looked for people who could translate different
Countrys' languages to assist his mission, thus got the head of 
our religion, Ha S a n ....  88
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Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1523 Xian Mosque Stele
I
At leas t  from the th ird  voyage of Zheng He, every expedition went f i r s t  to 
Hormuz, before going to other places in the Middle East 89. Fei Xin’ s work 
has a similar description90. Why is Hormuz given such an important 
place91? I t  was not a small country at  tha t  time, but a c i ty  in the Timur 
Empire, which in Iran extended from 1405 to 1447.92
1413-20: The Ming’ s sea and land missions: Zheng He and Chen Cheng
The Timur Empire’ s t e r r i t o ry  was v is i ted  by Ming China’ s missions using two 
d i f fe ren t  routes, one being Zheng He’ s by sea, the other Chen Cheng’ s by 
land. One thing must be emphasized: Chen Cheng’ s v i s i t  to the Timur Empire 
took place a f te r  the re la tionship  between the two countries had been 
improved. He could not take many g i f t s  to the Timur Empire, because along 
the way Ming China and the Mongols (Tartar and Oirot) forces were s t i l l  at 
war, and th is  land route might be cut off.
[1410.2] <<Imperial Edict)): (to: Shah Rukh in Herat [the Timur 
Empire]): Several embassies have been sent to you with Imperial
proclamations. You have been able to do your duty reverently, 
keeping peace among your people, and maintaining peace in the 
fa r western area. I, as emperor, am very appreciative of i t
..........  May we both enjoy the blessings of peace. (Silk, money in
addition were granted to Shah Rukh) 93
89 Chen Yan . Hai Shang Si Chou Zhi Lu Yu Zhong Wai Wen Hui Jiao Liu
.Beijing: Peking University Press, 2002. p 132.
90 Fei, Xin Jffg ,1388-1436? Edited by Feng Chengjun .Xing cha sheng
lan jia o  z'hu .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,1954. pi.
In the sixth year of Xuande, I followed Prime Ambassador Grand 
Eunuch Zheng He and other people forward to foreign countries, 
d irec tly  arrived at Hormuz and other countries, proclaiming 
Imperial Edict and bestowing g if ts .  By the eighth year of Xuande 
returning to capital.
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91 Ma, Huan’ s Ying ya sheng lan and Fei, Xin’ s Xing cha sheng lan both 
indicate only Hormuz as the "Absolute Region" faille. There were no 
other c i t i e s  called the "Absolute Region".
Jackson, Peter. The Cambridge History o f  Iran, volume 6, The Timurid 
and Safavid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986. p98.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming sh i :[1410. 2]
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In 1413, Chen Cheng was appointed by Emperor Yongle to take a mission to 
v i s i t  the Timur Empire by land 9\  proving that  re la t ions  between these two 
great empires had been improved. But Chen Cheng was not the f i r s t  
s ignif icant ambassador (a f te r  ambassador Fu An) sent to improve the 
re la t ions  between the Timur Empire and Ming China. I t  must be borne in mind 
that  Ming China was not an Islamic country, and these two empires had quite 
d i f ferent  religions .  In 1405.6 Zheng He began his f i r s t  voyage, in 1407.6 
ambassador Fu An was released. In 1409. 3 Zheng He was appointed to v i s i t  
Hormuz -  a substantia l  mission for Zheng He's f lee t .
I t  was clear, a f te r  Zheng He’ s voyage, tha t  the two empires enjoyed be t te r  
re la tions ,  and then a f t e r  th is  Chen Cheng was sent to the Timur Empire 
three times. Who were the ' 'distant people" to be pacified for Zheng He’ s 
voyage? The answer could be the ru le rs  of the Timur Empire -  Timur (Zheng He 
did not know Timur had died in 1405.6) and his fourth son, Shah Rukh (who 
ruled the Timur Empire from 1407 to 1447). The Timur Empire was the most 
s ignif icant power which deserved Zheng He to pacify (make peace with), and 
the only Muslim empire (the King of Melaka converted to Islam in 1414; he 
was s t i l l  a Hinduism ru le r  in 1405 ) that  Zheng he had vis i ted.
Chen Cheng v is i ted  the cap ita l  of the Timur Empire, Herat, three times 95, 
and Zheng He v is i ted  Hormuz at  leas t  f ive times. In the f i f t h  month of 1418,
94 Ming shilu, Taizong, 143. Ming Shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat. pl706.
Chen, Cheng PHijSc Edited by Zhou, Lian Kuan . Xi Yu Xing Cheng Ji
ElBlSctTfMiS > Xi Yu Fan Guo Zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju
,2000. pi 18, Poem of Lion HfjjjFTJC
[1413] On the seventh month of Autumn, West Region great leader 
Shah Rukh (Timur’ s fourth son, 1405-1447) sent mission to our 
court. Emperor advocated kindness, ordered Eunuchs, subject Da, 
subject Zhong, subject Gui, commandant subject Halanba, subject 
Timur Buhua, subject Mahamuhuozhe, to reward his politeness.
Also order Official subject Chen Cheng for secretary. On the 
ninth month of th is  year to depart. [2]
• h i t '
#  ’ m m zm  • r  •
9:1 Chen, Cheng PlfijSc Edited by Zhou, Lian Kuan JlOilljlE . Xi Yu Xing Cheng J i 
> 47 Yu Fan Guo Zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju c|=>lj§
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Chen Cheng’s official ranking was upgraded because of his diplomatic 
contribution to the missions of the capital - Herat - of the Timur Empire.96 
In the same period, Zheng He’s diplomatic missions by sea still played an 
important role in the relationship between Ming China and the Timur Empire. 
Zheng He visited Hormuz so as to visit the Timur Empire. Many records 
demonstrate that Ming China’s missions gave many gifts to the Hormuz. Ming 
China used the "two prongs strategy" to destroy Mongol - a sensible approach.
This tactic saw a great military force enter the Mongolian plateau to 
subjugate the Mongol powers, so as to restore the prestige of the Chinese 
empire and secure Ming China's northern frontier and, at the same time, 
important diplomatic missions entered the Timur Empire to enhance 
cooperation, thus separating the Timur Empire and the Mongol power, with the 
Timur Empire becoming the Ming’s ally. So the two missions of Ming China 
visited the Timur by different routes: Zheng He’s fleet by sea 97 98 "and 
Chen Cheng’s by land.
H / f  ,2000. pl3.
First : ninth month of 1413 - tenth month of 1415
Second: sixth month of 1416 - fourth month of 1418
Third : tenth month of 1418 - eleventh month of 1420
96 Ming shilu, Taizong, 200, the fifth month, 16th year of Yongle. p2085.
(1418, the fifth month) Upgrading Chen Cheng to become the Right 
Consultant of Guangdong Provincial Administration, prizing his 
contribution for being ambassador to the Herat (The Timur 
Empire).
97 The 1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province).
That is for proclaiming Imperial virtue to win over far-off 
people (or peoples).
98 Ming shi, 214, Hormuz.
[1412] Hormuz is a huge country in West Ocean. The ship From 
Calicut sails to northwest, 25 days could arrive at it. In the 
tenth year of Yongle ... Zhenh He was ordered bringing letter of 
Imperial Seal to countries, luxurious clothes, colorful cloths, 
silk were bestowed to its king. Also, queen and other ministers 
are all granted gifts.
’ -+EH bJS ■ *SI+ff-75tfrr
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Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi: [1421:1] 
[1421.1] The ambassadors of 16 countries from Hormuz and
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1417.5: The Quanzhou stele establishes Hormuz as a goal: its military role
(l) Regional Military Commander
The Imperial mandated Regional Military Commander Grand Eunuch 
Zheng He proceeding to Hormuz and other countries in the Western 
Ocean for official affairs, offers incense and prays for God’s 
blessing on the 16th day, fifth month, fifteenth year of Yongle. 
Judge Pu Heri recorded this and set up the stele.
AHMfifllO
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Zheng He is called "Regional Military Commander" in this stele. This 
underlines the military role of Zheng He. This was a military mission, not a 
commercial mission.
(2) Zheng He brought horses
Many records of the Ming indicate that during the Ming Empire several years 
of war resulted in a shortage of horses. And according to the Ming shi, 
Admiral Zheng He brought horses from Hormuz 101 exchanging them for "luxury
elsewhere returned to their countries, the money and Imperial 
Memoranda were bestowed. Grand Eunuch Zheng He and others were 
dispatched to take an Imperial Proclamation and in addition 
luxurious clothes, cotton cloths, silks and other things for 
granting to Kings. Thus Zheng He and ambassadors went together.
' mmw ’ üüai • wtmmmi °
The 1417 Quanzhou stele, in Fujian Province.
Ming shi, 326 (Zhuan 214), Hormuz.
[Hormuz] The king soon dispatched his close subject 1-Chi-Ting 
who brought a Memorandum to our Emperor decorated with gold 
leaves, sent horses and local products as tribute. They arrived 
at capital in the 12th year of Yongle. The Ritual Official was 
ordered to present banquet; the value of horses were rewarded.
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clothes, silk and cotton cloths". However, the distances were very great and 
horses were certainly very important military equipment during that time. 
Still, buying horses in Hormuz was not a practical way of supplying the Ming 
Army, but could encourage military cooperation between the Ming and Timur 
Empires.
mtmm •
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<5> Conclusion: Emperor Yongle contacted the Timur Empire 
by sea
Emperor Yongle believed Timur troops’ move eastwards was a crisis for China
In the 12th month of 1404, Timur joined other Mongol forces to launch a 
large scale military expedition to conquer Ming China. Emperor Yongle had 
accurate intelligence and understood this crisis, as is clearly recorded in 
Ming shilu. He had done many things to protect his empire. Many Chinese 
archives are limited by Sinocentrism and the Imperial ritual, so that many 
readers are confused by their accounts. For example, the record about the 
invasion from the Timur Empire.
In 1405.2, Emperor Yongle’s Imperial Edict was sent to warn the northwest 
Regional Military Commander of Gansu (for Timur’ s invasion), stating that 
the Turki had invaded China’s core area, the Wei River basin, in the 
early Tang Dynasty. This meant Emperor Yongle had recognized this as a 
very serious crisis (the Emperor could not say directly: "now our empire 
is in danger" , because of the Empire’s prestige). Next month another 
Imperial Edict was sent to Da Tong (north of Shanxi province), saying that 
Ming China’s intelligences were forecasting that the Timur Empire might 
invade the Ming’s west capital - Xian. Both edicts prove that Emperor 
Yongle was concerned and paid considerable attention to this possibility.
Hormuz, Samarkand and Herat all belonged to the Timur Empire, and the Timur 
Empire controlled the whole of Persia including Hormuz from 1400 to 1447. 
Many significant Chinese sources, for example, Ma Huan’s Ying ya sheng lan, 
and the Foreign Records of the Ming shi, do not indicate this point.
However, according to western Asia’s history, Hormuz undoubtedly belonged to 
the Timur Empire during Zheng He’s voyages. Zheng He’s fleet’ s visit 
to Hormuz was actually a visit to the Timur Empire. During that time the 
Timur Empire was the most powerful empire except for Ming China, so it was 
quite reasonable for it to be the chief destination for Zheng He’s voyage.
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The link between Fu An’s release in 1407.6 and Zheng He’s voyage in 1405.6
In 1404.12 Timur’s crack troops moved east to conquer China, and in 1405.6 
Zheng He’s great fleet began to sail west. Was there a link? The Ming 
Empire knew of Timur’s threat, and only when in 1407.6 ambassador Fu An was 
released from the Timur Empire did Ming China know that Timur had died, and 
the crisis was resolved102. This event has very clear records in the Ming 
shilu. That these two events happened within 6 months is surely not just by 
chance. This is a very essential concept in the search for the chief 
original motive of Zheng He’s voyages.
There were many Muslims (and a strong Islamic role) in Zheng He’s voyage, 
and this is an extremely important detail in research for the original 
motive for Zheng He’s voyage. The Timur Empire was the strongest Islamic 
Empire at this time; Ming China knew this and often referred to people of 
the Timur Empire as Muslim. The Ming wanted to improve its relationship with 
the Timur Empire, therefore to include so many Muslims in Zheng He’s fleet 
is quite understandable. In particular, the records in the Ming shilu from 
1402 to 1405 show that only the Timur Empire (Samarkand and Herat) was 
described as a Muslim country, and Java (the Majapahit Empire) was 
not. At that time Java was, of course, a Hindu empire.
Zheng He’s third voyage was to Hormuz in the Timur Empire. According 
to Ibn Batuta’s record, Yuan China’s mission travelled from Beijing via 
Quanzhou and Calicut to Delhi, so Zheng He’s first two voyages terminated in 
Calicut, but Calicut could link to Delhi, and Delhi belonged to the Timur 
Empire in 1405.
The Timur Empire was the most powerful empire, with the exception of the 
Ming empire, during 1405-1433; however, the positions of the Timur and 
the Ming were similar, especially for the Ming Empire, because the Yuan did 
not really fall in 1368, and the Northern Yuan was still a terrible 
threat. Furthermore, the Ming Emperor Yongle had accurate intelligence that 
a descendant of the Yuan Dynasty was in the Timur Empire’s capital, so
Timur’ s death did not mean the crisis had definitely ended, because the 
Timur Empire had an heir who might continue Timur’s policy; thus Timur’s 
death and the defusion of the Ming’ s crisis were not necessarily linked.
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ending the cooperation between the Timur Empire and the Northern Yuan would 
be an important strategic objective for Ming China’s security.
Zheng He’s visit to Timur was essential for China’s security
Emperor Yongle often mentioned the Tang Emperor Taizong, whose greatest 
achievements were his outstanding military exploits. The Tang Empire had 
gained brilliant victories in central Asia. The Tang defeated the east Turki 
and the west Turki completely, and this could be an encouragement for 
Emperor Yongle to destroy the Northern Yuan in his great wars, especially 
considering that the whole of China was once ruled by the Mongol Empire.
Zheng He began his first voyage in 1405.6; there was a turning point in 
1407.6 when the relationship between the Timur and the Ming improved. The 
Timur Empire gradually became a good friend instead of an enemy; the Ming 
ambassador Fu An was released. This was a very important diplomatic 
development for Ming China’s strategy. According to the Ming shilu, Timur 
was called "the Yuan Imperial son-in-law: Timur", and so the Ming clearly 
knew the relationship between Timur and Mongol.
In 1407.9, Zheng He returned to China from his voyage; according to Ming 
shilu in 1407. 10, the Ming was very clear that its grand strategy had been 
very successful, as the descendant of the Yuan Dynasty had been parted from 
the Timur Empire and had returned to the place of the Mongol power.
1409 may have been decisive for Zheng He’s voyages, and it was also a key 
year for the Ming Empire’s great northern wars. In 1409.2 Zheng He’s "1409 
Sri Lanka Stele" was set up, its inscription being in three languages, 
Chinese, Tamil and Persian; however, Persian was used primarily in the Timur 
Empire at that time.
Ming China has contacted the Timur Empire by sea
In 1409.3, Hormuz in the Timur Empire was designated as the chief 
destination for Zheng He’s third voyage. This event is extremely significant
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in the search for the orig inal  motive of Zheng He’ s voyages. The fact  that 
Hormuz was in the Timur Empire has been ignored by Chinese scholars (because 
Chinese archives do not indicate th is  fact) .  However Hormuz is very dis tant 
from China, and such a journey was not a common event. This is the key to 
the understanding of the real  goal of Zheng He’ s voyages.
Four months la ter,  in 1409.7, a f te r  the Timur Empire's mission had arrived 
at Ming China, the Ming Empire began to launch her huge mili tary  operation 
to attack the Northern Yuan and t ry  to restore  China’ s prestige  in Asia 
(a fte r a long history of decline).  The Ming Empire’ s 100,000 crack horsemen 
entered the Mongolian plateau to attack the Mongol power, and th is  was just  
the beginning.
The year 1410 was c r i t i c a l  for the Ming Empire’ s ''two prongs strategy". At 
about th is  time Zheng He could have v is i ted  Hormuz in the Timur Empire 
on his th ird  voyage. In 1410.2, the head of the Timur Empire, Shah Rukh, 
sent a fr iendly  mission to v i s i t  Beijing (according to Asian history,  these 
two superpowers improved re la t ion  was signif icant) ,  next day Emperor Yongle 
dispatched o f f i c i a l s  to pay respect to Confucius, a f te r  which 500,000 troops 
were commanded by Emperor Yongle himself and advanced 2000 km to enter the 
Mongolian plateau, resu l t ing  in a pa r t icu la r ly  large-scale war on the 
Northern Yuan.
In 1410.6, Zheng He returned to China a f te r  v is i t ing  Hormuz in the Timur 
Empire, and th is  v i s i t  was recorded in the the 1470 Zhouwen Stele (Jiangsu 
Province, Taicang). Later, in 1413-20, Chen Cheng, the Ming Empire’ s 
ambassador, was sent to the Timur Empire by land to promote friendly 
diplomatic re la tions .
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Chapter 6
From advance to defence - move capital to 
last voyage (1420-1434)
In troduction’•
Marco Polo had underlined that  Hormuz belonged to Persia (unti l  now) in 1305 
in his famous book, the Travels o f  Marco Polo 1 . This is extremely 
s ignif icant information in searching for the original  motive of Zheng He’ s 
voyages. I must emphasise that  th is  was understood both at th is  time and 
la ter.  Admiral Zheng He’ s s te les  make i t  quite c lear that Hormuz was the 
chief dest ination for his voyages.
Hormuz in Persia was Zheng He’ s chief destination, as is  obvious from the 
1417 Quanzhou s t e l e 2. China preserves many ancient paintings, one of which 
is a very c lear painting of the Persian ambassador to China, that  is  the Zhi
Polo, Marco, 1254-1323? tr .  and ed. with notes by Sir H. Yule. The book 
o f  Ser Marco Polo the Venetian concerning the kingdoms and marvels o f  
the East. London: J. Murray. 1903. Edition 3rd. Bookl, pi 10, 90, 83.
I should te l l  you f i r s t ,  however, that King Ruomedam Ahomet of 
Hormuz, which we are leaving, is a liegeman of the King of
Kerman .......... Kerman is a kingdom which is also properly in
Persia, and formerly i t  had a hereditary prince. Since the 
Tartars [Mongols] conquered the country the rule is no longer 
hereditary, but the Tartar sends to administer whatever lord he
pleases .......... Now you must know that Persia is a very great
country .......... (Greatest traveller, Marco Polo)
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1417 Quanzhou stele
The Imperial mandated Regional Military Commander Grand 
Supervisor Zheng He proceeding to Hormuz and other countries in 
the Western Ocean for o ff ic ia l  affairs, offers incense and prays 
for God’ s blessing on the 16th day, f i f th  month, fifteenth  year 
of Yongle. Governor Pu Heri recorded th is  and set up the stele. 
(Zheng He’ s stele)
mÄ s r n m i
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Gong Tu Ü$m EI 3 (meaning: p ic tu re  for  t r i b u t e  missions) in the period of 
the Liang Emperor Yuan Di (552-554) Xiao Yi ffffp. On th i s  p ic tu re  
there  is  a caption,  Ambassador of Pers ia This p ic tu re  shows tha t  
the Persian ambassador went to Nanjing (Zheng He’ s f l e e t  departed China from 
Nanjing) ; in China, such an event was not so astonishing.  This meant tha t  
the re was a mission from Pers ia  to Nanjing in China; so of course China 
could send an embassy from Nanjing to Persia.
After  a review of the northern deser t  wars and western ocean voyages, t h i s  
chapter d iscusses  the s t r a t e g i c  change from advance to defence. The Ming 
Empire’ s maintenance of f r i end ly  r e l a t io n s  with the Timur Empire in Persia 
was an important s t ra tegy  fo r  m i l i t a ry  secur i ty.  Pers ia  has a long history,  
the re are many records concerning Pers ia in Chinese 23 D ynastic H is to r ie s  
(avai lab le  to Emperor Yongle). Zheng He’ s frequent v i s i t s  to Hormuz were to 
v i s i t  Pers ia  in the Timur Empire. Thus the search for  the o r ig ina l  motive 
for  Zheng He’ s voyages should be focused on Pers ia  r a th e r  than Southeast 
Asia.
Pic tu re  page 19.
This p ic tu re  i s  specia l  s i g n i f i c a n t  because the r u l e r  of Liang 
) was a p a in te r  and t h i s  was a royal work.
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<1> 1421. Emperor Yongle moved capital to Beijing; Zheng He 
visited Hormuz
1421'- Moving the c a p i ta l  to Beij ing  for  northern f r o n t i e r  s ecu r i ty
The move of the cap i ta l  was a subs tan t i a l  event for  the Ming Empire. I t  
might seem strange,  because moving the c a p i t a l  to a border area could make 
i t  more vulnerable to enemy a t tack  I t  seems to imply tha t  the emperor was 
reasonably confident  about r e s i s t i n g  Mongol invasion.
Apart from the fac t  tha t  Zheng He led some spec tacu la r  expedit ions by the 
f l e e t s  (with a s t r a t e g i c  ro le ) ,  obviously the main focus of  Emperor Yongle 
was to the north, the inner Asian land f r o n t i e r  and China’ s opponents on the 
Mongolian plateau.  Nothing demonstrates tha t  more c l e a r ly  than his  decision 
to t r a n s f e r  the c a p i ta l  to Beijing.  There are some theses which discuss t h i s  
quest ion1, and many reasons have been given for  t h i s  decision,  including:
1. Northern defence5.
2. Returning to the c i t y  tha t  had been the c a p i ta l  under the J in  and 
Yuan dynasties .
3. Returning to the s i t e  of h is  former p r in c ip a l i ty .
4. Managing the reac t ion  to h is  usurpation and regic ide.
5. Recognition tha t  the c a p i ta l  of a united China had usual ly  been in 
the n o r th .6
All these may have been con t r ibu ting  reasons, but the primary reason was the 
s t r a t e g ic  cons idera t ions  for  the defence of the northern f r o n t i e r ' :  Moving 
the cap i ta l  to the north was ju s t  a s tep  in the process of t r a n s f e r r in g
For example, Zhang, Yi Shan
Zhu Ming Wang Chao Luan Wen J i  -  Taizu, Taizong Pi an ’
A tkIH .T aipei: Guo Li Bian Yi Guan. 1991. p277.
Tang, Gang tW'M , Nan, Bingwen .Ming sh i BtjfE .Shanghai: Shanghai
ren min chu ban she JrlSA KiAftixli ,2003. p 135.
Zhang, Y i Shan jit A l l  • Zhu Ming Wang Chao Luan Wen J i  -  Taizu, Taizong 
Pian A^i^AIraAf^A/Tfl ’ Ax^fl .T aipei: Guo Li Bian Yi Guan. 1991.
p280.
Mote, Frederick W, Twitchett, Denis . The Cambridge H isto ry  Of China -  
the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University
199
resources north for national security. The main reasos are given in the 
following:
(l) Strategic position: To lose Beijing was to lose half empire
In approximately the last 30 years of the Ming, the Ming Dynasty Great Wall 
became a border. However the Ming Empire already had many strongholds beyond 
the line of the Great Wall. These strongholds were located on average about 
250 km beyond the line of Great Wall (except in the Northeast area), and 
they should be taken as the line of the border. For example, the Hami 
stronghold was about 500 km beyond the line of the Great Wall. The northern 
defence lines of the Ming could be said to have three layers: the 
strongholds, the Great Wall, and the military bases to the south of the 
Great Wall.
Emperor Hongwu described Beijing as China’s gate, and declared that the 
steppe enemy must be resisted 8 . This means Ming China clearly knew the 
strategic position of Beijing 9. The area to the north of Beijing has the 
Yanshan mountain range 5nE[JL[|j_(M, forming a significant military defence line.
Press. 1988. p237.
The strategic considerations that underlay these wars and 
diplomatic missions also led the emperor to undertake another 
prodigious task: the transformation by degrees of Beijing, his
former princely fief, which had once been the Great Capital of 
the Yuan dynasty, into a new capital for the Ming empire.
K Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizu, 257, 4 month, 31 year of Hongwu. p3715.
[1398.4] Beijing as China’s gate .....  the steppe enemy escaped
out of sight for a period, however the evil was not exterminated, 
it must be defended.
(Ä Ä S i f  ] R ?  • Ärftit2? ’ ..m• ruM'te ■
H Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, 182, 11 month, 14 year of Yongle, pi965.
[1416.111 <The Statement to Throne): .....  The situation of
mountain and rivers could give control of four directions of 
foreign countries and manage China .....
ixmtp, ’ m±mm2M • Mmm • mmMi • Mmium • ■
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The area to the south of Beijing, as far as the Yangzi River (Chang Jiang 
jütr) is a huge plain, there are no mountains (or big lake or sea gulf) to 
form a military defence line for resisting the Mongol cavalry. The Song
Dynasty had not controlled the Beijing area (before the Song was established, 
this area had been controlled by the Liao Empire), so it was always weak in 
military terms, and at last was comprehensively defeated and collapsed 
suddenly.
Besides, if the Ming Empire could not control the Beijing area, of course, 
the northeast (Manchuria) would be lost; the Mongol force (Present-day Outer 
Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, northern Xinjiang and south Siberia) could
combine with Manchuria (and even Korea), and the Ming would face an even 
greater threat. Moving the capital to Beijing seems to imply that the
emperor was reasonably confident about resisting Mongol invasion. However, 
another explanation is that Emperor Yongle thought highly of the defence of 
Beijing. From a view of strategy, losing Beijing could be equal to losing 
half the empire, so Beijing could not be lost.
(2) The threat from the Mongol force was still serious
The Mongol was the primary enemy for the Ming Empire, many researches all 
prove this, for example;
In the north, the Mongols continued to dominate the entire
Chinese defence strategy until early in the seventeenth century
....  Emperor Yongle was obsessed with the northern borders. By
placing his capital within the zone exposed to the steppe, he 
could at all times oversee its problems and take immediate 
action against them. 10
The Ming’s archives contained too many boastful records, the real situation 
was that everyone knew that Mongol had once ruled all China; Song China 
had been destroyed by the Mongol power, why would it not happen again? 
Emperor Hongwu had conducted wars in the desert. What had been their results?
Mote, Frederick W, . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p619.
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The answer must be "terrible casualties". More than 150,000 soldiers from 
the Ming Empire died in these wars . 11
(3) Half the troops in the north, they could act in defence, but also could 
revolt against the Government
With about 900,000 troops 12 necessarily deployed on the northern frontiers, 
how could the capital of the Ming empire be located in Nanjing? It is 1000 
km from the northern frontier. The frontier troops could defend against the 
steppe enemy but could also become a source of rebellion.
In the Tang Period, An Lu-shan’s revolt from Beijing area was a lesson. He 
had been thought of as a very loyal general by the emperor (which became an 
ironic joke in the Tang Period) before his revolt and was appointed to be in 
charge of three of the Regional Military Commands (the whole empire had 
ten) leading a large army in Beijing. (Emperor Yongle himself was another 
example, he commanded troops defending the northern frontier, then led this 
force from Beijing to capture the capital, Nanjing.)
If the capital was in Nanjing, the deployment of military power could have 
been 320,000 troops in Nanjing (and its neighbouring province) and 80,000 in 
Beijing (and its neighbouring province); It could not be 200,000 troops in 
Nanjing and 200,000 troops in Beijing, because if that were the case then 
Beijing could revolt or become a half-independent state. In pre-modern China, 
the capital (and its neighboring area) had to maintain a great (maybe 
one third) military power. In the late Tang period, many provinces 
became half-independent states; they often did not respond to the emperors 
in Changan.
(4) The northern wars were continuing
In the Yongle period, the northern military situation remained severe, with 
six large-scale wars still in progress. Emperor Yongle himself commanded 
500,000 troops which advanced to the Mongolian plateau and fought fiercely, 
which proves how essential was the defence of the north. The Ming did not
" My calculation from the Ming shilu.
u My calculation from the Ming shilu.
202
win a decisive victory, and casualties were still terrible. 100,000 soldiers 
died in these wars, and the northern frontier remained under heavy pressure.
250, 000 soldiers in total died in the desert wars for their Empire - which 
was imperative to the Empire’ s survival. Fang Xiaoru (1357 - 1402)
has been admired by some scholars for his self sacrificing nobility (for 
his loyalty to Emperor Jianwen). What, though, of these 250,000 soldiers 
sacrificed for Ming China? They died in the service of their Emperor, and 
defending their country. For each of them his death was as weighty as his 
own was for Fang Xiaoru, and their fate demonstrates how terrible a problem 
the northern defence of the empire was in fact. The other reasons for the 
move north are insignificant by comparison.
(5) The north bred better horses
The availability of first class cavalry was crucial for Ming China’s 
northern wars and defence. (This concept will be analysed in Chapter seven.) 
During the early Ming period, the Mongol powers always had more than two 
million horses, but the Ming had only 100,000. Beijing was much better 
suited to horse breeding than Nanjing, which is particularly hot in summer, 
a climate making it hard to breed Mongol or Manchu horses.
(6) If Beijing was lost, Nanjing would soon be in danger
Cavalry needed about 5 days to travel from Beijing to Nanjing. Infantry 
marching from Nanjing to Beijing, over the same distance, needed about 30 
days, according to Ming shilu, and this is obviously correct, because horses 
move faster than humans). Mongol’s troops were 100 % cavalry; they had as 
many soldiers as horses. Of course, the number of the Ming’s soldiers was 
greater than the Mongols' but the majority of the Ming’s troops were 
infantry. Thus if Beijing was lost, Nanjing would soon be in danger.
In 1402, Yongle won the civil war, in part due to his spy system, but also 
because although his soldiers numbered far less than Emperor Jianwen, his 
horses’ numbers were not much smaller than Emperor Jianwen's. Emperor Yongle 
himself provided an example, that to move from Beijing to capture 
Nanjing was not difficult. The capital of the Northern Song was in Kaifeng. 
Although this empire had a large number of troops and a capital far from the
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border, i t  s t i l l  collapsed suddenly under attack from the northern steppe 
enemy. The cap ita l  of the Southern Song was in Hangzhou; i t s  fa te  was 
similar,  and both provided lessons for Emperor Yongle.
After moving the capital  to Beijing, one of the special in s t i tu t ions  of the 
Ming Empire was the "Two capita l  system". The capital  was in Beijing but a l l  
systems of the central  government had a "copy" in Nanjing (including the 
imperial university),  although much of i t  functioned jus t  in t i t l e .  This 
means the Ming Empire had made preparations;  i f  Beijing was lost,  Nanjing 
could organize government immediately to r e s i s t  invasion from the north.
On the f i r s t  day of the nineteenth year of the Yongle period, corresponding 
to 1421, Beijing became the capi ta l  of the Ming Empire. In th is  same year, 
the northern c r i s i s  continued: "In winter, the tenth month, Alutai (the 
Tartar) once more made incursions along the f r o n t i e r " 13 . The next year, on 
the 18th day of the th i rd  month, "Alutai mounted another large-scale 
incursion, and k i l led  the Regional Mili tary Commissioner, Wang Huan"H. These 
records show jus t  how serious the Mongol threat  was.
1421: Ghaiassuddin: Timur's son, Shah Rukh, becomes friendly with Ming China
In the early 15th century there were -  apart from Zheng He’ s f l e e t ’ s v i s i t  
to Hormuz in the Timur Empire -  two s ignif icant diplomatic missions 
exchanged between these two empires by land. One was the Ming ambassador 
Chen Cheng’ s v i s i t  to the Timur Empire during 1413-20. He wrote two works -  
Xi yu xing cheng j i  fMIS (I t inerary of West Region Travel) and Xi yu 
fan guo zhi (Record of West Region Foreign Countr ies).15
Ki Xia Xie X jIl 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian  BPjj!§fi§ .Beijing: Reform Publish. 
1994. p616.
#  ’ • nmis'imM •
" Xia Xie X S I 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian  BdÜllS .Beijing: Reform Publish. 
1994. p617.
13 Chen, Cheng [ijflljjSc Edited by Zhou, Lian Kuan jW Jii |J= [  . Xi Yu Xing Cheng J i  
, Xi Yu Fan Guo Zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju
H J f  ,2000.
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The other was the mission sent by Shah Rukh, son of Timur, to Beijing during 
1419-1422. One member of th is  mission was Nakkash, Khwaja Ghaiassuddin, who 
wrote in Persian the work, A Persian Embassy to China, which provides a 
substan tia l source for the re la tions  between these two big powers. The work 
was transla ted  into English and collected in Cathay and the way th ith er , 
which was compiled by Henry Yule in UK in the 19th century. He provided th is  
introduction:
[A Persian Embassy to China] The mission embraced 
representatives not only of Shah Rukh himself but of several 
princes of his family governing d iffe ren t provinces of the
empire founded by Timur..............  The party l e f t  Herat, the cap ita l
of Shah Rukh, on the 16th of Dhulqadah A. H. 822 (4th December 
1419), and proceeded via Balkh to Samarkand. The envoys of Mirza 
Ulugh Beg 16 (the astronomer, and eldest son of Shah Rukh), who
governed there, had already s ta r ted  ..........  the whole party l e f t
Samarkand on the 10th Safar 823 (25th February 1420) ..........  17
Comparing th is  with the record of the "Spanish embassy in Samarkand"18, i t  
might well be thought that Admiral Zheng He’ s v i s i t  to Hormuz was highly 
successful, since the re la tionsh ip  between the Timur Empire and the Ming 
Empire was greatly  improved. The mission sent by Shah Rukh, the son of Timur, 
to Beijing provided strong evidence of th is . The mission from Shah Rukh and
lh Ulug Beg (1394-1449), Son of Shah Rukh, Grandson of Timur, created the 
best-equipped observatory in the medieval world. He plotted the position 
of the moon, the planets, the sun and 1018 other stars with amazing 
precision, and calculated the length of the year to within 58 seconds 
(or even less - the earth spun slower then than i t  does now). He was 
friendly with Ming China Emperor Yongle, his embassies were always 
entertained by Emperor Yongle, and he himself visited Beijing in 1420, 
his name was recorded in the Ming shilu and Ming shi.
17 Nakkash, Khwaja Ghaiassuddin. A Persian Embassy to China. Yule, Henry, 
Sir, 1820-1889. Cathay and the way thither Vol. I: being a collection of 
medieval notices of China. London : Hakluyt Society. New edition /
revised throughout in the light of recent discoveries by H. Cordier. 
1915. p271.
Ih Gonzalez de Clavijo, Ruy. Narrative o f the embassy o f Ruy Gonzalez de 
Clavijo to the court o f Timour, at Samarcand, AD 1403~6. tr. with notes, 
by Clements R. Markham. New York: Burt Franklin, 1964. p134.
[ Spanish embassy in Samarkand, Timur:] . . .  ambassadors from the 
king of Spain, his son and friend, should s i t  above him; and 
that he who was the ambassador from a thief and a bad man, his 
enemy, should s i t  below them.
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his eldest son, Mirza Ulugh Beg, was recorded in the Ming shilu and Ming shi 
19; Mirza Ulugh Beg became the next ruler (1447-1449) of the Timur Empire. So 
the Timur and Ming Empires were very friendly during this time.
As further evidence of the importance of this mission, it included the 
representatives of Prince Abu’ 1-Fath Ibrahim (second son of Shah Rukh), 
Prince Baysunqur (third son of Shah Rukh), Prince Suyurghatmish (fourth son 
of Shah Rukh), and Prince Mohammad Juki (fifth son of Shah Rukh). These 
princes were governors of several provinces of the Timur Empire. Thus the 
Ming government should be well aware of the vast territory of the Timur 
Empire, and this mission proves that Ming China and the Timur Empire had a 
very friendly relationship between these two superpowers at that time.
The Timur Empire’s records show that their embassy to Ming China had to pass 
through Mongol territory 20 . This was important, because there were wars 
between Ming China and the Mongol power, so the Ming’s missions went to the 
Timur Empire particularly by two routes, land and sea. The situation was 
similar for the route taken by missions between Yuan China and the II-Khan 
Empire in Persia, because Yuan China and Kaidu were at war. If missions 
travelled by sea they did not need to cross Mongol territory. Thus Zheng
19 Ming shi, 332, ({# 220), Samarkand, p8599.
[1415] (the Timur Empire, Samarkand) In the 13th year (of 
Yongle), embassy followed Li Da and Chen Cheng to bring tribute.
Chen Cheng and eunuch Lu An were ordered to accompany with their 
return, granted the chief, Ulugh Beg, and others with silver, 
cloths and money. This country sent embassy followed Chen Cheng 
to bring tribute again. [1420] In the 18th year, again, Chen 
Cheng and Eunuch Guo Jing brought the Imperial Edict, cloths and 
money to reward them. During Autumn and Winter, [1430] in the 
fifth year of Xuande, the chief, Mirza Olugh Beg, and others 
sent embassy to bring tribute again.
' i ü A i  • mim ’ • mnm.Bxmm&m * mm ■ nmmmmmmmxm ■ 
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20 Nakkash, Khwaja Ghaiassuddin. A Persian Embassy to China. Yule, Henry,
Sir, 1820-1889. Cathay and the way thither Vol. I: being a collection of 
medieval notices of China. London : Hakluyt Society. New edition /
revised throughout in the light of recent discoveries by H. Cordier. 
1915. p272.
Passing by Tashkand, Sairam, and Ashparah, they entered the 
Mongol territory on the 25th April ... From Turfan [ left 13th 
July] they reached Karakhoja [arrived 16th July] and five days 
beyond this they were met by Chinese officials ....
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H e ’ s visits to Hormuz were of significance in promoting friendly relations 
between these two powers.
1421: Zheng H e ’ s steles and the Ming shilu prove Hormuz to be the chief 
goal
In 1421, the Ming Empire’ s transfer of the capital from Nanjing to Beijing 
was for the reason of northern defence, a major event during that time. To 
attend the ceremony of establishing the new capital, Beijing, the Timur 
Empire sent a substantial mission to visit the Ming Empire. The year 1421 
was significant for the Ming Empire, and it was the year Zheng He launched 
his 6th grand voyage. Was 1421 the year China discovered the world? The 
chief objective for Zheng H e ’ s voyages will be discussed, using four most 
important sources - Zheng H e ’ s steles, the Ming shilu, the Ming shi and the 
Imperial Edicts.
(l) Zheng H e ’ s steles indicate Hormuz as the chief destination
Hormuz was the main destination for Zheng He’s voyages, as shown by many of 
Zheng He’s steles. For example, the Quanzhou Stele in 1417 has a clear 
inscription, and this stele also indicates that Zheng He had a strategic 
role; on the stele Zheng He is called Regional Military Commander. Also, 
Hormuz was always the first destination in the Middle East for Zheng He’s 
voyages.
1) The 1417 Quanzhou Stele 21
In 1417, the Quanzhou Stele of Zheng He was set up, with an inscription 
recording that Admiral Zheng He’s assignment is to go to Hormuz and 
other countries in the Western Ocean, on official missions.
[1417.5] The Imperial mandated Regional Military Commander Grand 
Supervisor Zheng He to proceed to Hormuz and other countries in 
the Western Ocean for official affairs, to offer incense and pray
21 Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1417 Quanzhou stele
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for God’ s blessing on the 16th day, f i f t h  month, f i f teen th  year 
of Yongle. Judge Pu Heri recorded th is  and set  up the stele.
A B M f T f l l
2) The 1409 Sri Lanka Stele 22
Persian was used as the inscription of th is  stele,  during that  time 
un t i l  now, Persian was the language of Hormuz, (chapter 5)
3) The 1431 Liujiagang Stele 23
From Taicang entered ocean, via Champa, Thailand, Java, Cochin 
to arr ive  at Hormuz in West Region, to t a l ly  more than 30 
countries.
» ö M ' mmm * imm * m&m' ' mm&M
22 Appendix 2: The s te les  of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1409 Sri Lanka Stele
23 Appendix 2: The s te les  of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Liujiagang Stele
In the 12 year of Yongle, the ships and troops were commanded to 
Hormuz and other countries.
In the 15th year of Yongle, the f le e t  was commanded forward to 
the West Region. Hormuz th is  country sent l ion(s),  cheetah (es) 
and “West Horse” as a tribu te .
* M m  * mm •
In the 19th year of Yongle, the f le e t  was commanded to return 
ambassadors of Hormuz and other countries who had stayed too 
long in the capital to th e ir  countries.
• s s «  °
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4) The 1431 Changle Stele 2,1
This stele is well preserved, and it is always thought as one of the 
most informative stele for Admiral Zheng He.
In the 11 year of Yongle, the ships and troops were commanded to 
Hormuz and other countries.
' 71
In the 15th year of Yongle, the fleet was commanded forward to 
West Region. The country, Hormuz sent lion(s), cheetah(es) and 
"Large West Horse(s)" (Arabic horses?) as a tribute.
- '  * M m * •
In the 19th year of Yongle, the fleet was commanded to return 
ambassadors of Hormuz and other countries who had stayed too 
long in the capital to their countries.
5) The 1470 Zhouwen Stele 25
[1409] In the Jichou year of Yongle, Inner Vassals (Eunuchs) 
were ordered to the Western Ocean, Hormuz and other countries, 
Xuan Hou went together, Kuisi went again, both return in 
next year.
E lite s  • ’ > ??ew± •
f f i W E p f f i ü  °
All steles prove that Hormuz was the chief destination, so Southeast Asian 
countries were not the main goal for Zheng He’s voyages. Hormuz should be 
the focus for researching the original motive for Zheng He’s voyages. If the
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province)
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He
The 1470 Zhouwen Stele (Jiangsu Province, Taicang)
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Timur Empire ruled this area during this time it indicates that the Timur 
Empire was the chief goal.
(2) Ming shilu proves Hormuz was the chief destination
In particular, Ming shilu presents the original thoughts of Emperor Yongle. 
In all the records in Ming shilu about Zheng He’s voyages Hormuz was often 
put first as the chief destination for Zheng He’s expeditions. For examples:
[1420.5] In the fifth month of the 18th year of Yongle, ordering 
mobile Military Ministry, Every military officers and soldiers 
returned from Hormuz and other countries twice to four times all 
upgrade one degree.26
’ tsrfr££si5 •
» \m-rn. °
[1421. 1] On the first month, the 19th year of Yongle, The 
ambassadors of 16 countries from Hormuz and so on returned to 
their countries: the money and the Imperial Statement were
bestowed. Grand Supervisor Zheng He and others were dispatched 
to take the Imperial Edicts, luxurious clothes, cotton cloths, 
silks and other things for granting to Kings. Thus Zheng He and 
ambassadors went together.2/
mrnmmm * * mmmw»m i  ° mmm&mi •
In 1420, Emperor Yongle ordered some military officers to upgrade their 
ranking because they had visited Hormuz; all the comments in Ming shilu 
show that Hormuz had a most significant position in Zheng He’s voyages 
for Emperor Yongle. There are too many examples .2S
Appendix 2: Significant Imperial Edicts and records: [1420.5]
Ming shilu, Taizong, 119, 19th year of Yongle, 1st Month..
28 Ming shilu, Xuanzong, 67.
[1430.6] On the day Wu~yin, the sixth month, the fifth year of 
Xuande, Grand Eunuch Zheng He was dispatched taking the Imperial 
Edict to proclaim to foreign countries. Totally travelling
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1421: The Ming shi and the Imperial Edicts prove Hormuz to be the chief goal
(1) The Ming shi proves Hormuz to be the chief destination
In the records of overseas countries in the Ming shi, during Emperor 
Yongle's reign, Hormuz was always put first, even when these records do not 
mention Zheng He and his voyages. So Hormuz was thought important regardless 
of Zheng He's judgement or approval.
[1421] This year ....  Hormuz, Aden, Suhar, al~Ahsa, Mogadishu,
Calicut, Cochin, Cail, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Lambri, Sumatra,
Aru, Malacca, Koyampadi, Sulu, Bangladesh, Brunei and the king 
of Gumalalang all brought tributes. Thailand brought tribute 
again. 29
.&mm' MR' ' mm * * xmm * * m
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[1421] Calicut: In the 19th year (of Yongle), Calicut also
together with Hormuz and others brought tributes. [1423] In the 
21th year together with Hormuz brought tribute again. 30
mmm>m
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Hormuz, Sri Lanka, Calicut, Malacca, Cochin, Baarawe, Mogadishu, 
Lambri, Sumatra, al-Ahsa, Maldives, Aru, Koyampadi, Aden, Suhar, 
Jobo and Cail twenty countries, in addition the Department of 
Pacification in Palembang. Their monarchs and leaders were all 
to be presented with appropriate gifts and money.
>s t^ ssa^ iiiss ia ftM  - Kpmnnmm* mMai' ' » jsp' ms ' hmm' ' mmn* mnmo' mit' m\u' h# ' tres ' wft' mm * * ijummxm&mm*.mn • °
Ming shi, 7, 19th year of Yongle 
30 Ming shi, 326, (Zhuan 214), p8440.
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[1430.6] In the s ix th  month of the f i f t h  year of Xuande, Emperor 
(Xuande) re flec ted  tha t although he had been on the throne for a 
long time, yet the most d is tan t foreign countries had s t i l l  not 
brought tr ib u te  to Imperial Court. Thus Zheng He and Wang 
Jinghong became ambassadors again, and v is i ted  Hormuz and 16 
other countries, before returning. 31
> m m m m x  * mmmmmmmmm * 
mm ’ •
In a l l  the records about Zheng He’ s voyages or overseas countries involving 
Hormuz in the Ming shi, Hormuz was always put in the most important position. 
This means Hormuz was a great country (empire) and the chief destination for 
Zheng He’ s voyages. This is  very clear, and there are many other examples .
(2) The Imperial Edicts prove Hormuz was the chief destination
[1420. 12] <<Imperial Edict >>'• (to: Grand Supervisor Yang Qing,
..........  and o th e rs ) : ..........  go to Hormuz and other countries for
an o f f ic ia l  mission. Ordering to use s i lk  and cotton cloths with 
various c o lo u r s .......... 32
m ■ ±%imm... m ■ oooo 33 out mm)
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[1409. 3]<<Imperial Edict>>: (to: Nanjing . . )  : Now dispatching
Grand Supervisor Zheng He on an o f f ic ia l  mission to Hormuz and 
other countries of the West Region. Ordering to use the Gantai(?) 
to transport money and food for o ff ice rs  and soldiers. You and 
other people according to the number of designated to payment 
immediately, could not be delayed. This is Imperial 
proclaimation.
31 Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Zheng He, p7767.
32 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
This document is too old which some words are obscure.
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The th ird  month of the 7th year of Yongle.3,1
’ mmmwMmm • zimm*
The Ming Empire’ s Imperial Edict was very s ignificant,  and could only be 
sent by the Emperor, and would be sent only for a very important matter. 
I t s  contents re f lec ted  the emperor’ s policies.  Some of Ming China’ s Imperial 
Edicts were recorded in Ming shilu , but there are many Imperial Edicts which 
were not recorded in Ming shilu  (with so many imperial edicts,  Ming shilu  
could not include them al l )  which can be found in the F i r s t  His torical  
Archives Beijing in Beijing. Some Imperial Edicts were recorded in other 
works in the Ming period, some (the actual documents) were preserved in 
museums.
Many of the Ming Imperial Edicts prove that the Ming government was very 
c lear in i t s  choice of Hormuz in the Timur Empire as the chief dest inat ion 
for Zheng He’ s voyages 35, despite Hormuz being so far away, fur ther  than 
Southeast Asian countries and the Indian Peninsula.
Appendix 1: Significant Ming Imperial Edicts. [1409.3]
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
[1430.5] <<Imperial Edict>>: (to: .........  ): Now ordering Grand
Supervisor Zheng He and others on an official mission to Hormuz 
and other countries of West Region, with 61 big and small ships
m ■ n  ' ü ' mm • -k\mm ■
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<2> 1423. Hormuz in the Timur Empire the chief destination 
for Zheng He’s voyages
1423: Hormuz a small island; Hormuz visited, but not the Korean coast
(l) 1423: Hormuz was a 8. 1 x 5. 6 km island, arid, part of the Timur Empire
Hormuz (Hormoz or Ormuz), is a mostly barren, hilly island (1989 pop. 
2,500), 5 mi (8.1 km) long and 3.5 mi (5.6 km) wide, part of southern Iran, 
in the Strait of Hormuz (Hormoz), between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman. Salt and red ochre are produced there. The town of Hormuz, originally 
built on the mainland, was moved (c.1300) to the island after repeated 
attacks by marauding raiders. It was not a big city, in 1300 as now, and it 
had no treasure.3fi
[Xing cha sheng lan'-] This country’ s residents is on the 
sea coast, people come together for marketing, there is no 
grass or tree on the land.37
« m « n »  ■ • mmm* •
There are different records about Hormuz in Xing cha sheng lan, Ying ya 
sheng lan and the Ming shi. Xing cha sheng Ian’s record is better; it 
describes Hormuz thus: "there is no grass or tree on the land", which is 
perfectly true. Ying Ya Sheng Lan’s record about Hormuz was: "thus its 
citizens are all rich” 38, which is difficult to believe. The Ming shi’s
Britannica encyclopedia.
Fei, Xin Jffg , 1388-1436? Edited by Feng Chengjun 'MjiYcjL1 .X ing cha sheng 
lan j ia o  zhu .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,1954. p36.
IK Ma, Huan 1414-1451, Edited by Feng, Chengjun . Ying ya sheng
lan .Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan ,1934. p63.
[Ying Ya Sheng Lan:] This country borders on sea and mountain, 
foreign ships and land merchants from everywhere come to here 
for market and trade, thus its citizens are all rich.
« « i t »  nmmmm • • mmmmmm  >
214
record about Hormuz was: " th is  country has lo ts  of t reasu re"39, a mistake, 
because Hormuz did not have any treasure.
One point is of great s ignificance; a f te r  Zheng He and his f le e t  v is i ted  
Hormuz, why did none of the three books above indicate tha t Hormuz was an 
island? These three books have always been thought to be the most 
s ign if ican t resources for Zheng He’ s voyage. All the information from 
English and Iranian sources proves tha t Hormuz was, and s t i l l  is, an island. 
And, the "Voyage Map of Zheng He" makes i t  c lear tha t Hormuz is an island. 
According to Zheng He’ s s te les , the Ming Empire's f le e t  v is i ted  "Hormuz" on 
five  occasions. On the Hormuz voyage Zheng He took more than 20,000 men. 
This raised in te res t ing  questions: How long could a small island such as 
Hormuz (with limited water supplies?) support so many v is i to rs?  Did a l l  of 
the f le e t  go to Hormuz?
The most reasonable in te rp re ta tion  is that the "Hormuz" in the three books 
refered not jus t to Hormuz i t s e l f ,  but to the Timur Empire. Hormuz was jus t  
a small island and small city, which belonged to the Timur Empire. The 
reason might have been a s tra teg ic  consideration or a diplomatic secrecy, 
perhaps they didn’ t want to ra ise  the suspicions of the Mongol Powers, so 
they used “Hormuz” to represent the Timur Empire.
(2) Ming and Korea were on good terms, but Zheng He never v is i ted  Korea over 
29 years
The reign of the great King of Korea, Se-jong, 1418-1445 10, was a great 
period in Korean history. During th is  time, Korea was very prosperous, and
49 Ming shi, 326 (Zhuan 214), Hormuz.
[Ming Shi:] Hormuz is a huge country in West Ocean. The ship 
From Calicut sa ils  to northwest, 25 days could arrive at it. 
.......... This country has lots of treasures.
«To t » • g * s ® b f r * - + e smmzm • * mmwx •
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40 Great King Se-jong, Yi To (1397-1445)
Ruled 1418-1445, King of Korea. Succeeded on the abdication of his 
father, 7th September 1418. Enthroned at the Kunjong-jon, Kyongbok 
Palace, Seoul. Abdicated in favour of his eldest son 1445. He was one of 
the greatest rulers in Korean history, responsible for inventing the
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friendly with Emperor Yongle. Furthermore, there was a secret: Emperor
Yongle’s blood mother was Korean (chapter 2). There are many records in 
Ming shilu concerning the relationship between Emperor Yongle and King Se- 
jong. For example:
[1420. 12] The King of Korea, Yi To, (Se-jong) sent his
ministers, Cao Beiheng and others, to present a ''Statement to 
the Throne", and brought local product as tribute to express 
congratulations on (Chinese) New Year’s Day. The Ministry of 
Rites was ordered to entertain them with a banquet. 11
The Ming and Korea had land links, but the sea route was still important. 
For instance, in 1403, Emperor Yongle used the sea route to supply military 
logistics for Liaodong and Beijing 42. However Zheng He and his great fleet 
did not visit Korea to demonstrate the Ming Empire’s prestige even once 
during 29 years, but visited Hormuz at least five times and these visits 
were recorded as such. Thus "Hormuz" seemed to be more important than Korea. 
In fact Hormuz belonged to the Timur Empire during 1405-1433, so to visit 
Hormuz was to visit the Timur Empire, and this is a perfectly reasonable 
explanation of the situation.
1423: Hormuz depicted accurately on Zheng He’s map - Satellite proof
"The Voyage Map of Zheng He" demonstrates that Hormuz island has a very 
obvious and significant position in relation to Admiral Zheng He’s 
expeditions. The sea route of this map particularly notes that Hormuz was an 
important location for Zheng He’s fleet to harbour 13. Mr. Xu Yuhu indicated
han’ gul alphabet, reforming the administration and establishing the 
Confucian social system on a new footing.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizong, 232, 12 month, 18 year of Yongle. p2243.
Ming shi, 6, 1st year of Yongle.
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Xu, Yuhu Zheng He ping zhuan ftpfHjFF'®* Taipei: Zhonghua wen hua
chu ban shi ye wei yuan hui 1958. pi23.
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that according to the sea routes of the map, "the Voyage Map of Zheng He" 
can be divided into four parts:
1. Factory of Treasure Ship to Bras Island several sea routes
2. Bras Island to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), simple, only one sea route
3. Sri Lanka to Hormuz, one sea route but with more details.
4. Hormuz to the eastern coast of Africa, no sea route.'14 (but the eastern 
coast of Africa was drawn, and the outline is accurate).
Analysis of "the Voyage Map of Zheng He" shows that Hormuz was the chief 
destination for Zheng He’s voyages. Furthermore, the eastern coast of Africa 
could not have been an important destination for the imperial fleet.
The "Voyage Map of Zheng He’s Voyage" was checked by me with satellite 
photos45 and the current map of Hormuz Strait. It is obviously extremely 
close46. Today, Hormuz island is still called Hormuz in the Mid-East (Iran’ s 
territory), but sometimes the name Hormoz is used instead of Hormuz.
The whole of the Hormuz Strait is not a small region. There is one confusing 
aspect: "the Voyage Map of Zheng He" is not proportional. The proportions of 
this island are shown as far greater than the surrounds, in fact twenty 
times larger than in reality. However, the outlines of the island and 
seashore are surprisingly close to the real situation.
I compared the "Voyage Map of Zheng He" with my collection of pictures 
painted by European explorers in 16th and 17th century. Portugal once 
occupied this island because of its strategic position, so Europeans made 
these maps and pictures. It is surprising that Hormuz in "the Voyage Map of 
Zheng He" has a far more accurate outline than in the European 
representations (maps)4' of the 16th and 17th century. It has to be concluded
H Xu, Yuhu Zheng He ping zhuan Taipei: Zhonghua wen hua
chu ban shi ye wei yuan hui 1958. p 127.
Picture page 18.
John C. Bartholomew. The Times Atlas of the World. New York: Times 
Books. 1983. Plate 33.
Picture page 18.
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that  th is  comparison requires serious thought:
1. The "Voyage Map of Zheng He” is  of great value. The f lee t  of 
Zheng He undoubtedly arrived at  Hormuz, and they thought highly 
of th is  region.
2. Zheng He’ s f l e e t  made a comprehensive study and paintings of the 
area of Hormuz S t ra i t .  Their technology in map draft ing was 
outstanding. The map was indeed finished by Zheng He’ s flee t .  As 
fa r  as geographic knowledge about Hormuz is concerned no other 
Chinese maps can compare with th is  one, even 450 years a f te r  
Zheng He’ s voyages.
1423: Hormuz visi ted,  but not Mecca because Hormuz in the Timur Empire was 
the goal
(l) Hormuz v is i ted  but not Mecca
Comparison between Qian wen j i ,  Xi yang fan guo zhi and the Ming shi 
confirms the r e l i a b i l i t y  of Qian wen j i ,  which shows that  the Islamic holy 
c i ty  -  Mecca -  was not the primary destination for Zheng He’ s voyages '18. The 
main part of the f l e e t  from Calicut to Hormuz returned to Calicut. I t  was an 
unplanned coincidence that  led one detachment of the f l e e t  to sa i l  from 
Calicut to take the opportunity to go to Mecca and back, in the 7th voyage.
[Tianfang (Mecca)]: I t  is  also called Tiantang (the Heaven), or 
Mecca [Mojia]. From Hormuz to Mecca by sea takes 40 days. From
Gong, Zhen fl.  1430-1434, edited by Xiang Da [pjl|| . Xi yang fan guo
zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. p46.
"The country of Tianfang" re fe rs  to the country of Mecca. On the 
tenth of December every year, Muslims make a long journey over 
one or two years to the Mosque here to pray. In the f i f t h  year 
of Xuande, Grand Eunuch Hongbao and a branch of the f le e t  
arrived at Calicut. At that time ambassadors were there from 
Mecca. He chose seven people including Translators and
accompanied them to Mecca. The journey there and back took a 
year.
a a b  • wmmm -
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Calicut sa il ing  to the southwest i t  takes three months to arrive 
at Mecca. I t s  t r ibu te  missions have often come through Jiayuguan 
by land. In the f i f t h  year of Xuande (1430), the mission of 
Zheng He went to the Western Ocean and his colleagues were 
dispatched to v i s i t  Calicut. Hearing Calicut would send people 
to Mecca, (Zheng He’ s) men were sent to join the ships for the 
voyage, taking goods along with them. 19
’  5(011 •
• h e &m  • nmmmmxmmm • » mmmff»
This record demonstrates one very important point, the Mecca v i s i t  was 
coincidental, not in the i r  original  plan. There were many Muslims, including 
off icers  and soldiers, in Zheng He’ s flee t .  They knew that they could sail  
to Mecca from Hormuz, but they never did so. The f l e e t  stayed at Hormuz for 
52 days (Qian wen j i ) .  Therefore, there must have been an important reason 
for i t  to have remained so long, otherwise they could have gone to Mecca for 
an Islamic pilgrimage'90. Bear in mind that  Admiral Zheng He’ s fa ther  and 
grandfather had completed the Hajj, thus his fa the r ’ s name was Haji BpJ^.
This voyage was the f i f t h  v i s i t  to Hormuz, and they s t i l l  did not v i s i t  
Mecca. Why did Zheng He not use these 52 days to v i s i t  Mecca? Perhaps he 
stayed at  Hormuz to wait for the return of envoys he had sent to Herat, 
, the capital  of the Timur Empire, or he did something which was very 
important for Ming China.
(2) Zheng He granted Hormuz many Gifts
Hormuz is a small island, at  present i t s  population is  only about 2000 
people, and i t  was jus t  a par t  of the Timur Empire’ s te r r i to ry .  Maybe i t
IH Ming shi, 332, (Xuan 220), Tianfang, Mecca.
"" Mecca is the birthplace of Muhammad, and every Muslim tr ie s  to v is i t  the 
holy city at least once in a lifetime. On Fridays, Muslims, especially 
the men, v is i t  the mosques and pray in the direction of Mecca. The 
pilgrimage to Mecca is called the hajj. Muslims who have completed the 
Hajj pilgrimage are respected by other muslims.
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could have had about 20,000 people 600 years ago, however this is still a 
very small number; the Ming’s neighboring ally, Korea, had more than 6 
million people at this time.
[Hormuz]: It is a large country in the Western Ocean [According 
to Iran’s history, this is a big mistake, Hormuz is not a 
country, is part of the Timur Empire during Zheng He’s voyages].
Ships from Calicut, sailing to the northwest, take 25 days to
arrive at it. In the tenth year of Yongle ....  Zheng He was
ordered to take a Letter of State (with Imperial Seal) to visit 
countries. Luxurious clothes, colourful cloth and silk were 
bestowed on the king (of Hormuz). Also, the queen and other 
ministers were all granted gifts. 51
%Mwm *
The Ming shi, compiled in the early Qing Period, noting from the records of 
the Ming shilu that Zheng He visited Hormuz many times, makes the mistake of 
judging Hormuz to be a big country. According to the Ming shi, Ming shilu 
52 and Xing cha sheng lan 53 both provide important information regarding
" Ming shi, 326, (zhuan 214), Hormuz
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu. Taizong, 233. 1 month, 19 year of Yongle, p2256.
[1421.1] The ambassadors of 16 countries from Hormuz and 
elsewhere returned to their countries, the money and Imperial 
Memoranda were bestowed. Grand Supervisor Zheng He and others 
were dispatched to take an Imperial Proclamation and in addition 
luxurious clothes, cotton cloths, silks and other things for 
granting to Kings. Thus Zheng He and ambassadors went together.
w>m' mmmw • mmm • •
Fei, Xin Jflg , 1388-1436? Edited by Feng Chengjun ?|§7p;i=J .Xing cha sheng 
lan jiao zhu .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,1954. pi.
In the sixth year of Xuande, I followed Prime Ambassador Grand 
Eunuch Zheng He and other people forward to foreign countries, 
directly arrived at Hormuz and other countries, proclaiming 
Imperial Edict and bestowing gifts. By the eighth year of Xuande 
returning to capital.
> mmm »
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Zheng He’ s f l e e t ’ s many v i s i t s  to Hormuz and the many g i f t s  granted to 
Hormuz.
Why should Zheng He’ s great f l e e t  bear so many g i f t s  to a small is land? Why 
were g i f t s  sent repeatedly, and why were diplomatic r e la t io n s  between China 
and a small is land  -  "Hormuz" -  so important? In fac t ,  there  was no king in 
Hormuz, Hormuz was simply a port of the Timur Empire, and the only king 
(Sultan) was Shah Rukh, the ru le r  of the Timur Empire.
1423: Emperor Yongle: great expeditions re s to red  China’ s p res t ig e
The Ming Empire mobilised enormous resources fo r  the f ive  m il i ta ry  
expeditions of Emperor Yongle, which t r a v e l le d  more than 2000 km deep into 
the Mongolian pla teau  (present-day Inner Mongolia in China and the Republic 
of Mongolia) and Russia, ( th is  was the re a l  focus fo r  the Ming Empire 
foreign policy, Zheng He knew th i s  c e r ta in ly ) .  Genghis Khan's hometown was 
invaded by Emperor Yongle and h is  troops several times. From around AD 800 
to AD 1911, Han Chinese had the highest p o l i t i c a l  po s it io n  during the period 
of Emperor Yongle's reign (1644-1911, Manchu, another ethnic group, from 
Manchuria to dominate China fo r  269 years). Emperor Yongle was always 
v ic to rious , did not lose any b a t t l e  and cost few c a s u a l t ie s ;  he res to red  
China’ s p res tige ,  but never gained a complete v ic tory .
From the th i rd  expedition of Emperor Yongle, two Mongol forces, the T artar 
and Oirot, used g u e r i l la  t a c t i c s  to f ig h t  Emperor Yongle’ s ex p ed i t io n s5,1.
54 Xia Xie H 'll 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian BfjMil .Beijing: Reform Publish.
1994, 7th year of Yongle, p563, p572, p585, p616, p617, p617.
1409, Benyashili (the Northern Yuan) invaded frontier.
1410, Shuonikan invaded the east bank of Yellow River, Regional 
Military Commissioner of Ningxia, Wang Shu, fight to death; 
Shuonikan is the son of Alutai.
1413, Oirot invaded frontier
1421, Alutai (Tartar) invaded frontier fortifica tion , again.
1422, Alutai large-scale invaded Xinghe again, killed defense general, 
Regional Military Commissioner, Wang Huan.
1424, Alutain also invaded Datong and Kaiping.
1409, « A M « * » «
1410, w s i g A t t j t s j t w  > r  -
1413, b m « ® * «
1421, H t Ö X f f i E i i «
1422,
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When Ming China’s troops advanced, the Mongol forces withdrew to the north 
or west. After the Ming Empire’s troops returned to the frontier line, 
the Mongol troops gradually approached Ming China’s border attacking and 
looting the frontier.55
The military power of the Mongol forces were still a threat after the death 
of Emperor Yongle. That "the Ming Empire did not gain a decisive victory" is 
a very important point for the strategic options of Ming China, and many 
Chinese scholars have failed to notice this. As Ming China could not win a 
decisive victory it gradually changed its military strategy from advance to 
defence. The allocation of the Empire’s resources had to be reconsidered. 
The choice between the Ming Dynasty Great Wall and Zheng He’s imperial fleet 
was an important one for Ming China.
In 1424.7 (12 August), Emperor Yongle died at Yumuchuan ^frj7ftjl[, far beyond 
his empire’s frontier line, and the future Ming Dynasty Great Wall. He was 
on his fifth desert expedition, aged 64. He has protected China and restored 
Han Chinese political/military prestige, a magnificent and spectacular reign 
was admired by later Ming government.
Emperor Yongle himself commanded the troops which entered present-day 
Republic of Mongolia and Russia. Apart from him, no Chinese emperor went so 
far north and entered Russian territory. His only loss was in 1409, when 
general Qiufu was defeated; after that he won every battle and sustained 
very few casualties. The Han Emperor Wudi had successfully expanded China’s 
territory to the east, west and south, but in the north he won and lost many 
battles in fierce wars with Xiongnu, never gaining a decisive victory. 
Similarly, in Emperor Hongwu’s north desert wars, half the battles were lost 
or cost too many casualties.56
In 1424, Alutain once more invaded Datong and Kaiping. Datong is very 
close to Beijing, I have been to this place and researched it. This city 
is on a plateau, Beijing is on a plain; an invasion from Datong, a high 
place, of Beijing, a much lower place, would have caused a serious 
problem for the Ming Empire.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi [1397.6]
Ming Shilu, Taizu, 253, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3658.
222
<3> 1424. Emperor Yongle died and three incidents 
delayed 7th voyage
1424'- Emperor Yongle died and this delayed Zheng He’s voyage
Very few Han Chinese emperors died beyond the frontier or the Great Wall. 
The Song Emperors Huizong and Qinzong had been captured by the Jin Army and 
died beyond the line of the Great Wall. Emperor Yongle died on his fifth 
desert expedition. On that same day (12th August), the Crown Prince and 
Imperial court ministers proclaimed an Imperial Edict. The first thing was 
to reinforce the defence of capital - Beijing57. At that time the guard 
garrisons of the capital had accompanied the fifth desert expedition of 
Emperor Yongle.
In 1424.8 (7 September), Emperor Yongle’s son, Emperor Hongxi [JtEiE (eldest 
son of Emperor Yongle), ascended the throne. On the first day of his reign, 
he proclaimed an Imperial Edict58. This edict can be interpreted in two ways. 
In one, the emperor intended to put a stop to the ocean expeditions. In the 
other, the intention was to recall Admiral Zheng He from Fujian to Nanjing 
for imperial stability (because Emperor Yongle had died, and the new emperor 
had just ascended the crown), but not to stop the expedition permanently.
[1425.2] (the new Emperor) ordered Grand Supervisor Zheng He to 
command the "troops for going the western ocean" to defend 
Nanjing.59
Ming shilu, Renzong, 1, 8th month, 22th year of Yongle
Choosing 10,000 crack cavalrymen Zheng He returned to capital 
immediately. Because at that time, soldiers of capital guard 
(almost) completely followed expedition, preserving defence 
soldiers of capital not nearly enough.
amt >b, °
Ming shilu, Renzong, 1, 8th month, 22th year of Yongle. (TTE)
Xia Xie M'M 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian HfJilll® .Beijing: Reform Publish. 
1994. p644.
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The defence of the second capital ,  Nanjing, was a very important job. At 
that  time Admiral Zheng He and the majority of the "Western ocean 
expedition forces" were in Fujian Province waiting for the wind so as to 
depart from China on the next expedition. After Zheng He received th is  
Imperial Edict th is  voyage was discontinued. When Admiral Zheng He returned 
from Fujian to Nanjing, he became Nanjing mil i t ary  commander, the "troops 
for going to the western ocean " was s t i l l  under his command.
I t  must be emphasized that  Emperor Hongxi considered moving the cap ital  back 
from Beijing to Nanjing60; so when Zheng He was appointed to defend Nanjing, 
th is  meant tha t  he was trus ted  and his posit ion upgraded. Moving the capi ta l  
was a serious decision and many imperial ministers did not support i t .  Just 
11 months into his reign, Emperor Hongxi died suddenly, and th is  proposal 
was cancelled.
Another reason for the t rans fe r  of Zheng He’ s forces to Nanjing was that  i t  
was feared that the "King of Han" -  the Prince Zhu Gaoxun (second son 
of Emperor Yongle) -  would rebel, so that  the emperor needed a loyal general 
and troops to guard Nanjing. This was a crucial  task, and i t  is evidence 
that  the new Emperor Hongxi s t i l l  t rusted Zheng He and the "troops for going 
the western ocean " . 61
1426: The rebell ion of the "King of Han" delayed Zheng He’ s voyage
In 1425.6, Emperor Hongxi's son Emperor Xuande la j*  ascended the throne. In 
my opinion, whether Emperor Hongxi favoured or opposed the ocean expeditions 
of Zheng He had no great influence on the i r  cessation, because his term
Xia Xie 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian .Beijing: Reform Publish.
1994. p647.
[In the third month of that year] The Emperor wanted to move the 
capital back to Nanjing, renaming Beijing Ministries to 
Auxiliary Ministries, and restoring the Beijing Auxiliary 
Departments and Auxiliary or Back Military Headquarters.
ra il® * » : • is j ts if  Biswfrffi • -
bl Ming shiLu, Renzong, 1, 8th month, 22th year of Yongle. (JT^)
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lasted only 11 months. Thus he was not responsible for ending Zheng 
He’s voyages. In fact, it can be shown that Emperor Hongxi trusted Admiral 
Zheng He.
In 1426.6, Emperor Xuande sent an Imperial Edict to the Commandant of 
Nanjing - Li Long ^ | H  , and this source shows Emperor Xuande’s trust in 
Admiral Zheng He and the significance for defending Nanjing:
[1426.6] <<Imperial Edict)): (to: .... Li Long): The duty of 
defending Nanjing is not light, so you need not go to Beijing on 
ceremony. Every thing should be consulted with the "Grand 
Supervisors for Defence", Zheng He and Wang Jinghong, 
day and night carefully manage the troops, and organise the 
garrison meticulously to prepare against incidents. Emphasise 
discipline among the officers and soldiers, bringing stability 
to the military and civilians alike, so as to fulfill important 
duties of the state.62
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In 1426.8, the ''King of Han", prince Zhu Gaoxun rebelled, wishing to repeat 
the story of "the uncle replacing nephew and becoming emperor". The Central 
Commandant of Zhu Gaoxun’s five military headquarters, Zhu Heng 7^ 1 M , had 
emphasised the importance of occupying Nanjing for their revolt63. Civil war 
broke out but ended in a short time with the surrender of Prince Zhu Gaoxun 
to his nephew, Emperor Xuande.
Admiral Zheng He and the "troops for going the western ocean” were 
appointed for the "Nanjing defence" by Emperor Hongxi. Admiral Zheng He 
was also given the title of Regional Military Commander. The new Emperor
Ming shilu, Xuanzong, 20, 6th month, 1st year of Xuande .
bi Ming shilu, Xuanzong, 20, 8th month, 1st year of Xuande.
Excellent troops should be led to occupy Nanjing, and then the 
great enterprise will be successful.
ll[G '
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Xuande asked the Grand Commandant of Nanjing to consult with Admiral 
Zheng He. Obviously, Admiral Zheng He and the "Western ocean expedition 
forces" were trusted by three Emperors, father, son and grandson - Yongle, 
Hongxi and Xuande.
The temporary delay to Zheng He’s expedition was primarily due to the Ming 
Imperial government not having enough excellent and trusted troops, because 
the northern frontier had required the deployment of more than 900,000 
soldiers. In addition, the two emperors required Admiral Zheng He and his 
soldiers to carry out other, more crucial work - defending Nanjing, this was 
a very important job at this time.
1427-1430, The Vietnam War delayed Zheng He’s sailing
From 1427 the Annam (Vietnam) War of the Ming Empire entered a critical 
period. Admiral Zheng He's force, the "troops for going to the western 
ocean", were appointed to join the Annam War according to the record in Ming 
Shilu. On the surface, this seems strange, but in reality it was reasonable, 
because these troops had good foreign experience and they had previously 
visited the area that is now south Vietnam - the kingdom of Champa
[1427.3]....  the 10,000 original crack “troops for going
to the western ocean” of Nanjing ...  followed "Margrave
of Stabilizing Distance", Liu Sheng, ...  go to Jiao Zhi
(Northern Vietnam) for a expedition.h1
..............................
In 1427, the population of Annam was in a state of general rebellion against 
the Ming (The Ming was called the Minh in Vietnamese) Empire, and revolts 
broke out throughout the north in support of Le Loi65. Le Loi styled himself
64 Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Xuanzong, 26, 3rd month, 2nd year of Xuande. p673.
65 Le Loi (1384-1443, r. 1428 - 1443, Le Dynasty 1428-1788)
Le Loi was born in Lam Son (Thanh Hoa province) in 1384. He was known 
for his courage, wisdom and generosity. The Ming dynasty wanted to make 
use of his talent, but Le Loi refused. He changed the country name from 
An Nam to Dai Viet and started reconstructing the teritory after the
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as Binh Dinh Vuong and raised his flag against the Chinese. Le Loi had time 
to consolidate his forces while the Chinese were occupied with quelling 
people’s rebellions elsewhere. In 1427, Le Loi organized a mock defeat to 
fool the Chinese reinforcements. Lured into the trap; in 1427.9, the Ming 
Empire general, "Margrave of Stabilizing Distance" Liu Sheng, was ambushed 
and beheaded, and the rest of his army was defeated in later battles in the 
same year.
The Ming Empire still had a great army on the north of the empire; they 
could be transferred to the south cracking down the revolt of Annam, however 
the question was whether the Annam (Vietnam) war was worth fighting for? Th 
Ming Empire’ s military intervention and rule in Vietnam was from 1407-1428, 
The Vietnamese did not like Ming China's rule, continually war had last more 
than 20 years. In the early Yongle period, because Annam had a civil trouble, 
the Ming Empire sent troops to intervene it and thought this is a little 
thing (according to Ming shilu) \ then 10 years later it became a big trouble 
gradually.66
With tremendous help from his loyal friends, Nguyen Trai and Le Lai, Le Loi 
founded Vietnamese Le Dynasty in 1428 and became king under the name of Le 
Thai To. In 1429, (the fourth year of Xuande), the Annam War was close to 
its end. h' The King of Vietnam, Le Loi and Ming China came to an agreement
devastation caused by the war. It was during this period that 
Christianity was first introduced to the country. The romanised Quoc Ngu 
script was developed by a missionary, Alexandre de Rhodes; and this form 
of writing later supplanted the then-current Chinese-type Norn 
characters.
At the Australian National University, I had a conversation with a 
Vietnamese student about international relations in the Chinese Ming 
Dynasty. Her name is Nauyen To Tran, studying a master’s degree at the 
ANU. She said that the Ming Empire had invaded her country 600 years 
ago, and she told me, "China always threatened its neighbouring 
countries, and now it is just the same".
Another Vietnamese student, Mr. Lei, told me, "China has always depended 
upon its military force to seek tribute; Vietman even had to send women 
to Chinese Imperial Court (in my opinion, it should be beautiful women, 
not just women!) and this was so unreasonable; Vietnam fought defensive 
wars against China for 1000 years. " Some southeast Asia countries hated 
the imperial attitude of the Ming Empire very much; other countries 
had little knowledge about this enormous country to their north.
Yan Cong Jian edited by Xu Sili . Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. pl99.
[1429.2] The second month, [Luo] Rujing and others returned, and
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and then Ming China withdrew her troops from Vietnam in 1430.3 68. Thus 
Admiral Zheng He and his troops could continue the i r  mission for a greater 
s t ra teg ic  purpose.
The northern f ron t ie r  had permanent garrisons of more than 900,000 troops. 
This crucial  fact  explains why the Ming Empire did not have enough troops to 
commit to the Annam War at  th is  time. The Annam war was affected by the 
exigencies of northern defence.
In 1430. 1, the Minister of Revenue pnßfniÜ  (involving In te r ior  Affairs and 
Finance), Xia Yuanji M M pT died. He had worked through the reigns of three 
emperors, managing finance for 27 years, and he was adept at managing on a 
large s c a l e 69. Some writers  believe Xia Yuanji was responsible for the 
abandonment of Zheng He’ s voyages70. However, th is  can hardly be the case, 
since he died before the l a s t  of Zheng He’ s expeditions.
In my judgment, the three emperors a l l  trus ted Admiral Zheng He and his 
"Troops for going to the western ocean". The next ocean expedition was 
delayed jus t  for three reasons.
Le Loi sent people to offer t r ib u te  of local goods. In the th ird  
month, O ffic ia ls  of Transmission Xu Qi, Yong Da and Messenger 
Officer Zhang Chung were sent taking the Imperial Edict to Le 
Loi.
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Yan Cong Jian ütßtBS edited by Xu S i l i  .Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu ^igicMl
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. pl99.
[1430.3] Xu Qi returned, Le Loi sent people to offer  t r ibu te  of 
gold and s i lve r  clasps and other local goods. He asked to be 
given the task of of ruling Annam, to become a tr ibu ta ry  ru le r  
in perpetuity, and to send the t r ib u te  appropriate to his 
appointment. [6]
tmm ’ mmxmMmnmxw > • acn?§e > mmm °
Xia Xie 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian .Beijing: Reform Publish.
S S d f f i d  1994. p693.
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Menzies, Gavin. 1421 -  The year China discovered the world. London: 
Bantam. 2003. p82.
Cai Dong Fan .Ming Shi Yan Yi Taipei: Wen hua Tu Shu
Gong Si 1994.
This book has a similar opinion.
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1. Emperor Yongle had died in the desert expedition.
2. The rebellion of the King of Han had to be countered.
3. Zheng He’s troops were sent to join the Vietnam War.
1430: Emperor Xuande’s pleasure at Zheng He’s 7th voyage
Emperor Xuande and his grandfather Emperor Yongle had complete confidence in 
Admiral Zheng He. Emperor Xuande was supportive of and pleased with Zheng 
He’s 7th voyage, as shown by the Imperial Edict 71. The fleet departed from 
Nanjing in 1430, and from Fujian Province in 1431. The first of these 
dates is very close to the end of the Ming Dynasty’s Annam War.
[1433] In the earlier, Emperor sent Zheng He on his 7th 
expedition to the Western Ocean, only when fleet arrived at the 
state of Calicutu, then knowing Mecca was to the southwest.
Taking the opportunity that Calicut was sending people to Mecca 
Zheng He sent people with goods to accompany with Calicut's 
ship. This journey went and back took one year, and they bought 
and brought back exotic treasures, giraffe (s) and lion(s).
Thus the missions of Mecca and Medina brought tribute following 
the Imperial mission (Zheng H e ’ s fleet). The Emperor was 
delighted, and bestowed much gifts.72
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Appendix 2: Significant Ming Imperial Edicts.
[1430. 7]<<The Imperial Edict)) : (Grand Supervisor Zheng He): Your
building of the dragon ships ....  shows your heart of loyalty
and respect .... I, your emperor, am very delighted ....  again
in Nanjing Treasure, funding cash 100,000 Guan to you for the
fees of going foreign country ....  the mission for sailing to
the Western Ocean countries is put on you ....  you as the
distant ambassador of the Imperial Court ....  the fifth year
of Xuande.
m m m  ■ > ......• w i m « i .mm
Xia Xie M ‘M  1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian .Beijing: Reform Publish.
1994. p718.
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This record shows tha t Emperor Xuande approved of th is  expedition of Zheng 
He, and never opposed i t .  In 1435. 1, Emperor Xuande died. I t  is  c lear  the 
decision to abandon the large-scale  maritime expeditions was not made by 
Emperor Xuande. I t  was made by the next Emperor. In tha t same year the great 
Admiral, Zheng He, died, aged 65. His b r i l l i a n t  voyages has made a 
spectacular maritime record in Chinese history.
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<4> 1431. Zheng H e ’ s visit to Hormuz was a visit to 
the Timur Empire
1432: Qian wen ji indicates Hormuz was worth a serious mission
Qian wen ji fijKilE is a small book, written by Zhu Yunming 
(1460-1526) in the middle period of the Ming Dynasty. This work speaks of 
many things about Ming China, with only a small section on Zheng He’s 
voyages, but it provides some unofficial and essential details about
Zheng He’s 7th voyage.
Qian wen ji is to be taken as unofficial first-hand data. "Old Mr. Deng" 
told the writer, Zhu Yunming, about his actual experiences on Zheng
He’s voyage 73 . In this source, Hormuz has a slightly different
transliteration - |§' Z) lit • This indicates that the work is an 
independent source of data, not directly influenced by official ideas. The 
table was set out according to Qian wen ji’s data 74, and it provides the
7,1 Zhu, Yunming 1460-1526, Edited Wang Yun Wu. Qian wen j i  ffijMlE
.Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan k§fi£EPljffil ,1937. p76.
Constellations
One of the soldiers for "Sailing Western Ocean" - old Mr Deng - 
said to me: "Formerly I had travelled to countries. Only things 
on ground were different. The constellations in the sky whether 
large or small, distant or close, light or adumbral (clouded) 
even in very distant countries all looked no different at all 
from these in China . " Therefore now I know, the old idea that 
the 28 planets and stars separately belonged to air of China’s 
Nine Grand Provinces was a mistake.
' m m z m  • m u ®  • m z - w m x m & M  j - « g u t m u  •
7-1 Zhu, Yunming WUtß)! 1460-1526, Edited Wang Yun Wu. Qian wen j i  f u M l S
.Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan ,1937. p74.
MM :
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dates and c i t i e s  tha t  Zheng He’ s f l e e t  had v i s i t ed .  There are four 
cons idera t ions  for  th i s  data, ( table, next page)
AHABUSftT (fH-H ) • A A B » P ^ f J  •
A Ü A B P Ä  At H A A B )  -
+-ÜABmmmiummm) ° abpbmi (a a s ) - 
a a b msmm • -  a-  b rm c b ) •
+ r ^ - + 7N B i ^ Z «  -
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Table: Qian Wen Ji'- The last expedition of Zheng He 1431-1433
(The dates in this list all use Chinese Lunar Calendar)
Xuande-year Location Sail--day Arrive Depart Note
5 (1430) Longwan 12. 06 (departure)
5 (1430) Liujiagang (Jiangsu) 12. 21 [The 1431 Liujiagang Stele]
6 (1431) Changle (Fujian) 2. 26 [The 1431 Changle Stele]
6 (1431) Fudoushan (Guangdong) 11. 12
6 (1431) Wuhumen (Guangdong) 12. 09
7 (1431) Champa (Vietnam) 16 12. 24 1.11 (New Year: 17 days)
7 (1432) Java (Indonesia) 25 2. 06 6. 16
7 (1432) Palembang (Indonesia) 11 6. 27 7. 01
7 (1432) Malacca (Malaysia) 7 7. 08 8. 08
7 (1432) Sumatra (Indonesia) 10 8. 18 10. 10
7 (1432) Sri Lanka Galle 36 11. 06 11. 10
7 (1432) Calicut (India) 9 11. 18 11.22 (52 days includes
7 (1432) Hormuz (Iran) 35 12. 26 2.18 Chinese New Year)
(return)
8 (1433) Calicut (India) 23 3. 11 3. 20
8 (1433) Sumatra (Indonesia) 17 4. 06 4. 12
8 (1433) Malacca (Malaysia) 9 4. 20
8 (1433) Saigon (Vietnam) 5. 26 6. 01
8 (1433) Champa (Vietnam) 5. 26 6. 01
8 (1433) Wailuoshan (Hainan) 2 6. 03
8 (1433) Nanaoshan (Guangdong) 6. 09
8 (1433) Taicang (Jiangsu) 6. 21
8 (1433) Beijing 7. 06
8 (1433) Beijing 7. 11 (grant awards)
(1) This table strikingly illustrates that Hormuz was the main destination 
for Zheng He’s voyage. The fleet arrived at Hormuz from Calicut, then, after 
52 days, they ''sailed back to the ocean" (tiepin]#, and returned to Calicut.
(2) After the departure from Hormuz, the fleet (main ships) returned to 
Calicut; it did not visit any other place. Thus exploration or Islamic 
pilgrimage was not their purpose.
233
(3) From the 26th of the 12th month of seventh year of Xuande (17th January 
1433) to the 18th of the 2nd month of eighth year of Xuande (9th March 1433), 
they stayed 52 days at Hormuz. This period included the Chinese New Year. 
Hormuz and i t s  neighbouring area were Muslim land, but Zheng He's f l ee t  
stayed here with no wine or pork, to celebrate th e i r  Chinese spring fe s t iva l .  
They must cer ta in ly  have had an important mission here.
(4) No previous Chinese works had mentioned there was something very 
important in Hormuz. However, i t  is very obvious Hormuz (and i t s  
neighbouring area) was the terminus for Zheng He’ s voyages according to 
Qian wen j i  and other re l i ab le  works. There was cer ta in ly  a s ignif icant 
reason for this.
1433: Emperor Yongle and Japan were friendly,  but Zheng He did not v i s i t  
Japan in 29 years
All the inscr ip tions  of Zheng He’ s s te les  prove that  Zheng He did not v i s i t  
Japan in his seven voyages'5, th is  is  a very important consideration in the 
search for the original  motive of Zheng He’ s voyages. Ming China Emperor 
Yongle and Japan had a pa r t icu la r ly  fr iendly  re la tionship  in Sino-Japan 
history.  In the 1st month of 1406 Emperor Yongle sent an Imperial Edict to 
Japan’ s Shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu76, and bestowed one s te le  for one mount
7r> Although recently there was a new thesis -  "A Verify of Cheng Ho (Zheng 
He) visited Japan in 1404", this point of view was s t i l l  doubted by 
other scholars. However Admiral Zheng He did not v is i t  Japan officially , 
and there is no record in his steles.
Chen, Hsin-Hsiung , Chen Yunu . Zheng He Xia Xi Yang Guo J i
Xiao Shu Van Tao Hui Luan Wen J i  t f i f P W I J # . T a i p e i :  
Dao Xiang Publish W t f Ä ± ,  2003. p86. p361.
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (MTÜÄ'/ffi 1358 -  1408)
was the 3rd shogun of the Ashikaga shogunate who reigned from 1368 to 
1394 during the Muromachi period of Japan. Yoshimitsu was the son of the 
2nd shogun Ashikaga Yoshiakira. In the year a fte r the death of his 
father Yoshiakira in 1367, Yoshimitsu became Seii Taishogun. Yoshimitsu 
constructed his residence in the Muromachi section in the capital of 
Kyoto in 1378. As a result, in Japanese, the Ashikaga shogunate and the 
corresponding time period are always referred to as the Muromachi 
shogunate and Muromachi period.
Yoshimitsu united the Northern and Southern Court (Nanboku-cho) in 1392, 
ending the more than 50 year long Northern and Southern Court Period. 
This at last firmly established the authority of the Muromachi shogunate
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in Japan - the “1406 Japan Mount Stele for Guarding Country” (Emperor 
Yongle himself wrote the inscription), and it was recorded in Ming shilu"
and the Ming shi 78. During the 23 years of the reign of Emperor Yongle
(1402-1424), few countries were granted the stele for Guarding State
Mount. Japan was one of them.
In the 12th month of 1408, Emperor Yongle sent another Imperial Edict to 
Shogun Yoshimochi , this edict is significant and the material of
which (the Imperial Edict was written on a special silk cloth) is well
preserved in present-day Japan’s museum:
[1408.12] <<Imperial Edict >>: (to: the King of Japan
Yoshimochi): Currently, pirates have come several time to places 
on our coast, and stolen the property of farming people. Earlier 
your father, King Gongxian (Yoshimitsu), hearing the order from 
me, your emperor, straight away mobilized troops to destroy the 
pirates, clear the sea route and bring peace to the border.
In the 26th of the 12th month, sixth year of Yongle. 79
£  *« ’ 7 j °  • wmfm&MM,
and suppressed the power of the regional daimyo. In 1394, Yoshimitsu 
retired and his son became the 4th shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimochi. However, 
Yoshimitsu still maintained authority over the shogunate until his death 
in 1408. His villa became Kinkaku-ji, the Temple of the Golden Pavilion.
Appendix 1: Significant Ming Imperial Edicts. [1406.1]
78 Ming shi, 322, (Zhuan 210), Japan, p8345.
(0GH) • m m & s t  > ..c m o
(Ming Shi) Granting Japan a mount as Guarding State Mount, 
Emperor (Yongle) wrote the stele inscription, and put it on
mount ....  (the sixth year of Yongle), also sent official
bringing the Imperial Edict, bestowed Yoshimochi as king of 
Japan. At that time also because of the problem of Japan’ s 
pirates, sent official to proclaim Yoshimochi to destroy and 
capture these pirates.
7y Appendix 1: Significant Ming Imperial Edicts. [1408.12]
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This shows that  re la t ions  with Sino-Japan were good at th is  time; i f  Admiral 
Zheng He and his great f l e e t  had v is i ted  Japan, they would have received a 
great welcome, i t  could have increased the prest ige  of Emperor Yongle, 
and much trade would have been done. Why did Zheng He not v i s i t  the 
Eastern Ocean? Japan was always thought of as a very important foreign 
country for the Ming Empire. I f  the chief orig inal  motive for Zheng He’ s 
voyages was “p res t ige” , or “trade” or “searching for emperor Jianwen” , 
a v i s i t  to Japan by th is  great f l e e t  would have been essential .
(l) Prestige
1. Japan Shogun accepting nominal vassalage
In 1401 (JjS^kA^),  Shogun Yoshimitsu using the name "Japan
Zhunsanhou" sent a l e t t e r  to the Ming Empire. The t r a f f i c  and
trade between China and Japan was entering a new era80. According to 
Japanese books, Shogun Yoshimitsu called himself "Your subject, king of
Japan, Yoshimitsu" B 81 in the l e t t e r  from Japan to the Ming 
Emperor Yongle.
2. Achievement of Monk Ganjin in Japan
In 753, Monk Ganjin |§[]pL went from China’ s Yangzhou to Japan to preach 
Buddhism. His contributions in both re lig ion and culture were very 
successful. He promoted exchange between China and Japan. He remains a 
famous person in Japan at the present time. Emperor Yongle would have known 
th is  from his advisors. I f  promoting the empire’ s prest ige was the original  
motive of Zheng He’ s voyage, Emperor Yongle would have ordered Zheng to 
v i s i t  Japan.
3. Japan was always put ahead in the 23 Dynastic H isto rie s
80 Sato, Shin’ ichi ' , 1916- .Nihon chuseishi ronshu B ^
.Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten ,1990. p52.
81 Sato, Shin’ ichi —* , 1916- .Nihon chuseishi ronshu B
.Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten ,1990. p45.
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Japan was often mentioned in the foreign records of the 23 Dynastic 
Histories, and it was always given a high position. For example, Japan was 
put in the second position in the Yuan shi just behind Korea82; the Xin Tang 
shu also has a detailed record about Japan83.
(2) Trade
1. Largest trade partner
Japan was the largest overseas trading partner for the Ming Empire. For 
example, in 1433, Japan exported 3,052 "Japanese swords" to China, in 1453, 
9,900 84, in 1481, 38,610 85 . In total, over 11 episodes of trade, more 
than 200,000 swords were exported to Ming China88 . On the other hand, Ming 
China’ s silk cloth and porcelain were popular in Japan. Present-day 
Japan’ s kimono store is called ^  ( “go” in Japanese) ,§1x141 , because in 
the pre-modern era the best cloth was imported from (Jiangsu province)
in China.
2. Problem of Japanese pirates
From the beginning of the Ming Dynasty the question of Japanese pirates, or 
Chinese pirates stationed in Japan, was a problem for the Ming Empire. 8' If 
Zheng H e ’ s grand fleet had visited Japan, it could have given proof of the 
Ming’ s power to these pirates and to Japan’ s government.
(3) Searching for Emperor Jianwen
1. Location for Emperor Jianwen’s exile
Yuan shi, 208, (Zhuan 95), Japan, p4625.
Xin Tang shu, 220. (Zhuan 145). Japan, p6207.
Kl Ming shilu, Daizong, 236, 4th year of Jingtai.
Zheng, Shun’gong 16th cent, . Riben yi jian. Qiong he hua hai. 5.
Ji yu 0;$;— Ho • 5. Tokyo: Kasama Shoin ,1974.
8b Mu Gong Tai Yan 7 f , trans by Hu Xi Nian . Ri Zhong Wen Hui
Jian Liu Shi 0  - Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan
1980. p575.
Yan Cong Jian edited by Xu Sili .Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Japan.
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Japan was the most likely overseas location for Emperor Jianwen as an exile. 
Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan were the closest foreign territories to 
Nanjing. Many leaders of revolts in the late Yuan Dynasty fled to Japan, 
especially the group of Zhang shi-cheng JUdr!^.
2. The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389 shows Japan as a big country
The Grand Ming Universe Map 1389 may reflect the objective thinking of the 
Ming Empire. On this map Japan is a bigger country than Malacca or Sri Lanka, 
and also Nanjing is close to Japan. If Emperor Jianwen had fled overseas, 
Champa was too far off compared with Japan, and besides Champa particularly 
needed protection from the Ming Empire, as it was threatened by Annam. 
Champa was also not an important international trade partner.
Admiral Zheng He’s first stop was Champa (present day South Vietnam).
The Ming Empire made contact with Champa to destroy the resistance of Annam 
(present day North Vietnam), just as it sought an alliance with the 
Timur Empire to destroy the Mongol forces - the Oirot and Tartar.
Also, Zheng He’s main route to his first two destinations was Calicut; then 
from the third voyage was Hormuz. Needing logistics, this great fleet sought 
them in Champa. Ming China and Japan did more trade with each other than 
with other countries, so the fleet’ s visits to Calicut and Hormuz were 
obviously not for trade. In short, Zheng He did not visit Japan during a 
period of 29 years, proving that it was not prestige, trade nor “searching 
for Emperor Jianwen” that were the chief original motive for Zheng He’ s 
voyages.
1433: No visit to Taiwan, the Ryukyu, Philippines or Brunei in 29 years
(1) Why did Zheng He not visit the Ryukyu Islands?88
Wang, Dayuan fEJvMj .edited by Su Jiqing M U D ®  • Dao Yi Zhi Luo 
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Liuqiu fuJJc.
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The Ryukyu Islands and the Ming Empire had close re la tions .  The Ryukyu 
Islands were the most close to Nanjing, so i t  was the second most l ike ly 
overseas location for Emperor Jiawen, but Zheng He did not v i s i t  the Ryukyu 
Islands.
(2) Why did Zheng He not v i s i t  Taiwan?
Wang Dayuan had v is i ted  Taiwan in the la te  Yuan Dynasty. Therefore, 
Emperor Jianwen might have fled from Nanjing to Taiwan. The Yuan Empire 
v is i ted  Taiwan twice89. Thus i t  would not have been unusual for Admiral 
Zheng He and his splendid f l e e t  to have v is i ted  Taiwan.
Taiwan was very close to the Ming Empire, and especially close to 
Quanzhou90. I t s  location is opposite Fujian Province, but Zheng He’ s f lee ts  
went d i rec t ly  to the southwest91. At that  time Taiwan and Penghu often became 
the refuge of Ming China's criminals. If  Emperor Yongle wanted Admiral Zheng 
He to search for Emperor Jianwen, an intensive search of Taiwan would have 
taken place .92
(3) Why did Zheng He not v i s i t  the Phil ippines and Brunei?
The Kingdom of Sulu (in the south Phil ippines)93 and the Kingdom of Brunei94 
had close re la t ions  with the the Ming Empire. The Kings of Sulu and Brunei 
had both v is i ted  the Ming capita l  and were warmly received by Emperor Yongle. 
But Admiral Zheng He did not v i s i t  the South Phil ippines or Brunei. Zheng He
89 Yuan shi, 16. 28th year of Zhiyuan Z&7C 
Yuan shi, 210, (Zhuan 97), Liuqiu [ ZEU)
90 Yuan shi, 19. 1st year of Dade ^ 7 ^
91 «jw ib » , , arm) ,
» °  1967 ’ r
However, the s te les  of Zheng He do not mention on Taiwan.
Cheng Daxue fMJvH • Taiwan Kai Fa Shi • Taipei: Zhongwen Tu
Shu , 1998. p47.
Yan Cong Jian jggf&fgj edited by Xu S i l i  .Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Shu Lu
91 Yan Cong Jian edited by Xu S i l i  . Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu fjbilScJn]
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Brunei.
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voyage’s destination was to the west, so promoting Ming prestige and 
international relations were not the chief original motives.
Zheng He visited some big empires but "Hormuz" was always put on the first
An analysis of the countries that Zheng He visited is a substantial way to 
establish the chief original motive for Zheng He’s voyages. According to
Zheng He’s most important three steles: the 1417 Quanzhou stele95, the 
1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province) % and the 1470 Taicang Zhouwen Stele97, 
Hormuz are mention 5 time98, other 6 “countries” each is mention only once
or twice! and the Ming Empire were familiar with these 6 countries, thus
the "Hormuz" in the Timur Empire must be significant.
The real political situation of these places 600 years ago must be
understood if the real chief purpose of Zheng He's voyages were to be 
established. There were six principal areas visited during Zheng He’s 
voyages. They are listed below, and only the Timur Empire in these countries 
was an Islamic empire (country) in 1405. (As previously emphasised, Zheng 
He's fleet had an unusual number of Muslims, and there must have been a 
reason for this. ) The Kingdom of Malaka was converted from Hindu to Islam in 
1414. These six places, together with two others, Champa and the Khmer 
Empire, are now reviewed:
Hormuz: Timur Empire (1370-1506, Islam) 
n^ü. ' Calicut, Cochin: Vijayanagar Empire (1336-1565, Hinduism, south
India)
/f\n]£r: Java: Majapahit Empire (1293-1500, Hinduism)
iHHi: Siam: Kingdom of Ayutthaya (1350-1767, Buddhism)
t U B H [_LjiSI: Sri Lanka: Gampola Era (1341-1415, Buddhism-main, Hinduism-sub)
: Melaka: Kingdom of Melaka (1402-1511, 1414, from Hinduism converted
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1417 Quanzhou stele
96 Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province)
Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1470 Taicang Zhouwen Stele
9K Picture page 24.
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to Islam)
(1) Champa (192-1697) 99
Champa was a Hindu-Buddhist country. I t  was not Zheng He’ s chief goal, 
simply because i t  was not recorded in Zheng He's s te le  (but i t  was recorded 
in the biography of Zheng He in the Ming shi).
Champa was an important link in the Spice Route which stretched from the 
Persian Gulf to Southern China. I t  also had close trade and cu ltu ra l 
re la tio n s  with the Srivijaya Kingdom (in present-day Indonesia) and the 
Malay Archipelago. Champa was a confederation of 4 (at times 5) 
p r in c ip a l i t ie s ,  each named a f te r  a h is to r ic  region in India. Champa was 
established in 192 in the region of present-day Hue by the rebe llion  of a 
local o f f ic ia l  named Kiu-lien against Chinese authority.
(2) The Khmer kingdom (802-1462) 100
Majumdar, R. C. , .Champa : h istory & culture of an Indian colonial 
kingdom in the Far East, 2nd~16th century A. D. .Delhi : Gian Publishing 
House, 1985.
Champa (192-1697)
More than a century of war between the Chams and the Khmers, during 
which each nation saw i t s  cap ita l  repeatedly captured and looted, ended 
in 1203 when Jayavarman VIII occupied the country and made i t  a Khmer 
province, although the Chams regained th e ir  independence in 1220. In 
1471, the Chams suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese, 
sustaining at leas t  60,000 dead and 30,000 taken into captiv ity  and the 
destruction of th e ir  cap ita l  at Vijaya. Finally, i t  was annexed by 
Vietnam.
100 Roveda, V ittor io  .Khmer mythology : secrets of Angkor .Bangkok : River 
Books, 1998.
The Khmer kingdom (802-1462)
The beginning of the Khmer kingdom dates from 802. Jayavarman II lived 
as a prince at the court of Java, then returned to Cambodia and 
conquered a se ries  of competing kings. In 802 he declared himself 
Chakravartim (King of the World). Suryavarman II (who reigned from 1113 
-  1150) united the kingdom in te rnally  and extended i t  externally. Under 
his rule, the largest temple in Angkor was b u i l t  over a period of 37 
years: Angkor Wat, dedicated to the god Vishnu. King Jayavarman VII 
(1181-1219) b u i l t  the new capital now called Angkor Thom ( l i t e r a l ly :  
"Great City").
In 1283, the Khmer Kingdom was threatened by the Mongol Empire Kublai 
Khan’ s general Sagatu. The king Jayavarman VIII avoided war by paying 
annual t r ib u te  to the Mongol Empire. Jayavarman VIII’ s rule ended in 
1295 when he was deposed by his son-in-law Srindravarman (1295-1309). 
The new king was a follower of Theravada Buddhism. In August of 1296,
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Ma Huan’s HÜfc Ying ya sheng lan M.'MMfW was deeply influenced by Dao yi 
zhi luo 10‘. Moreover, it provides significant information about other Asian 
countries, especially the civilization of Angkor (Cambodia). This record 
also proves that Wang Dayuan visited Cambodia or heard accurate information 
about it, and thus that Yuan China had long-range maritime activities, 
enabling knowledge of Angkor Wat to be carried to China.
Cambodia: Indeed, it is a metropolis, there is a city wall of 
more than 70 Li, and a river with stone banks whose width is 20 
Zhang', and there are more than 400, 000 war elephants. It has a 
total of more than 30 palaces, which are extremely ornate. The
wall is decorated with gold, and silver is used as bricks ...
hence one proverb : wealth belongs to Cambodia. 102
Ä H  :
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Records on Angkor Wat are to be found not only in Zhen la feng tu ji (the 
Customs of Cambodia) but also in Dao yi zhi luo and Ming shilu 103 (several 
missions were sent to visit Ming China). They demonstrate that the Ming knew 
that Cambodia was a rich country with brilliant palaces and wealth (China 
never had such a number of elephants). However, there was no mention of
the Chinese diplomat Zhou Daguan jaHHt! arrived at Angkor, and remained 
at the court of king Srindravarman until July 1297. Zhou Daguan later 
wrote a detailed report on life in Angkor (The custom of Cambodia J I J I t M  
rhlB)• His portrayal is today the most important source in an 
understanding of historical Angkor.
After 1352 there were several assaults on the Khmer kingdom by the Thai 
kingdom, Ayutthaya (Siam), although these were repelled. In 1431, 
however, the Thai army captured Angkor. In 1434, after the Thai captured 
Angkor, the capital was transferred to Phnom Penh; this event marked the 
end of the brilliance of the Khmer civilization.
The preface of Ying ya sheng lan: Earlier, I read Dao yi zhi luo which 
records the difference in geography and climate << >> »
Wang, Dayuan .edited by Su Jiqing Hittjif ■Dao yi zhi luo
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. p69.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and the Ming shi 
Ming Shilu, Taizong, 44, 7 month, 3th year of Yongle. p697.
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Cambodia in Zheng He’ s s te le  m (only in the Biography of Zheng He in the 
Ming shi) but invariably ,/Hormuz,/ was placed f i r s t ;  so Zheng He’ s v i s i t s  to 
Hormuz were very significant.  ''Hormuz'' could not be jus t  an island -  i t  had 
to be a great country (and fortune), bigger than the Khmer Empire.
The Khmer kingdom was a powerful kingdom based in what is now Cambodia. The 
great achievements of the Khmers were in a rchitec ture  and sculpture. The 
kingdom’ s o f f i c i a l  re l ig ions  included Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism, unti l  
Theravada Buddhism prevailed a f te r  i t s  introduction from Sri Lanka in the 
13th century.
Cambodia was recorded in Dao y i zhi luo as a great and rich country, with 
400,000 war elephants and b r i l l i a n t  palaces ( e .g . , Angkor Wat). I t  was not 
recorded in Zheng He’ s s te les  (but i t  was recorded in the biography of Zheng 
He in the Ming shi), and thus i t  was not the main destination for Zheng He’ s 
voyage. This country was a Hindu kingdom.
(3) Kingdom of Ayutthaya (Siam 1350-1767) 105
This was a Thai kingdom, Ayutthaya being named a f te r  the c i ty  of Ayodhya 
in India, the birthplace of Rama ( Rama is the most famous and
popular manifestation of the Supreme God for a vast majority of the 
900 million Hindus across the world). King Ramathibodi I founded Ayutthaya 
as the capital  of his kingdom in 1350 and absorbed Sukhothai, 640 km to the 
north, in 1376. He made one important contribution to Thai history: the 
establishment and promotion of Theravada Buddhism as the o f f i c i a l  re l ig ion  -  
to d i f f e ren t ia te  his kingdom from the neighboring Hindu kingdom of Khmer 
(Angkor).
104 Appendix 2: The steles of Admiral Zheng He 
The 1431 Changle Stele (Fujian Province)
l(n Kennon Breazeale .From Japan to Arabia : Ayutthaya’ s maritime relations 
with Asia. Krung Thep: Sun Nangsu Chula, 2002.
Kingdom of Ayutthaya (Siam 1350-1767)
Ayutthaya was friendly towards foreign traders, including the Chinese,
Indians, Japanese and Persians (for contacts between Safavid Iran and 
Ayutthaya see Christoph Marcinkowski), and la te r  the Portuguese,
Spanish, Dutch, British and French, permitting them to set up villages 
outside the city walls. The court of King Narai (1656-1688) had strong 
links with that of King Louis XIV of France, whose ambassadors compared 
the city in size and wealth to Paris.
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The kingdom expanded to become the nation of Siam, whose borders were 
roughly those of modern Thailand. It was a Buddhist country. It was recorded 
in the Zheng H e ’ s steles but only once (second voyage), so it could not 
have been Zheng He’s chief goal.
(4) Kingdom of Melaka (1402-1511) 106
Parameswara, Founder of Melaka, was originally a Hindu ruler. Parameswara 
converted to Islam in 1414. The kingdom’s most important regional rivals 
were Siam in the north and the declining Majapahit Empire in the south. Siam 
attacked Melaka three times, but all attacks were repelled. At the same time, 
Melaka had a good relationship with Ming China, resulting in Zheng He’s 
visits.
In 1409 Parameswara and an entourage of 540 visited Ming China with Zheng 
He’s fleet, met Emperor Yongle, paid tribute to Ming China, and asked for 
Protection against Siam. This Sino~Melaka relationship helped deter Siam 
from further threatening Melaka. It was a smaller country during that time, 
unlikely to be Zheng He’s chief destination, and recorded only once in a 
stele (4th voyage). Its location may have provided an important logistics 
base for Zheng H e ’ s voyages between Quanzhou and Hormuz. Parameswara’ s 
name is recorded in Ming shilu.
(5) The Majapahit Empire (1293-1500)
l0h Wade, Geoff. ” Melaka in Ming Dynasty Texts” . Journal of the Malaysian 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. LXX Part 1 (1997), pp. 31-69.
Kingdom of Melaka (1402-1511)
It was founded by Parameswara in 1402. With the the town of Melaka at 
its centre, its territory stretched from southern Thailand in the north 
to Sumatra in the southwest. The Portuguese invaded its capital in 1511, 
and in 1528 the Sultanate of Johor was established to succeed Melaka. 
Parameswara was a Hindu Srivijayan Palembang prince who escaped to avoid 
the Majapahit Empire. He then settled on Temasek island - now Singapore 
- then he fled to Melaka and made it his capital in 1402.
In 1414, Parameswara converted to Islam after marrying a princess from 
Pasai. His conversion also encouraged his subjects to embrace Islam. The 
kingdom thrived on trade and became the most important port in Southeast 
Asia during the 15th and the early 16th centuries. Muslim missionaries 
were also sent by the Sultan to spread Islam to other communities in the 
Malay Archipelago, such as Java, Borneo, and the Philippines. Most of 
South East Asia at that time was Hindu.
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The Majapahit Empire was a great Hindu Empire, based in eastern Java, with 
te r r i to ry  extending roughly to present-day Indonesia. This empire is called 
Java in Ming shilu ; several missions were sent from Java to Beijing during 
Emperor Yongle’ s reign.
(6) Sri Lanka, Gampola Era (Ceylon 1341-1415)
The King, Buwanekabahu V (1374-1408), may have been arrested  by Admiral 
Zheng He and sent to Beijing, where Emperor Yongle accepted his apology and 
released him (according to Chinese records, th is  king wanted to rob 
Admiral Zheng He’ s f le e t  and property). So between 1409 and 1411 there was 
no king, and for 30 years th is  kingdom paid tr ib u te s  to Chinese Ming 
Empire. This was a Hindu and Buddhist country.
(7) Vijayanagar Empire (1336-1565 AD)
Zheng He v is ited  Calicut, and Cochin was to v i s i t  the Vijayanagar Empire, a 
great Hindu Empire in south India. I t  was recorded in the Yuan shi as Vabaer 
/ÜA5E- According to the Yuan shi, the Ming could have known that from 
here i t  was possible to reach the 11-Khan Empire in Persia.
U S  • ’ 7jcl&?#MU ’ m -S S S S J  ’ tk&mm.*.) When Zheng 
He v is i ted  Calicut he was v is i t in g  a big country, not a c ity  s ta te , as he 
well knew. (Many present-day scholars s t i l l  do not know th is ) .
(8) The Timur Empire (1370-1506)
Hormuz was the chief destination  for Zheng He’ s voyages; the name 
appears 5 times in Zheng He's three s te les  . I t  was only reasonable for 
Zheng He to v i s i t  Hormuz, tha t is, to v i s i t  the Timur Empire, since the 
Timur Empire was the superpower during that time and was needed as a 
s t ra teg ic  partner for the Ming Empire. I t  was the strongest Muslim country 
a t  that time. The many Muslims in Zheng He’ s f le e t  could have helped to 
promote friendly  re la tions  between the Timur Empire and Ming China.
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<5> Conclusion: The link between northern wars and
western voyages
Zheng He’s visits to Hormuz must have had a strategic purpose
Emperor Yongle moved his capital to Beijing for reasons of strategic 
defence, and Zheng He’ s visits to Hormuz could have had a similar strategic 
role. Zheng He’s voyages indeed had a chief destination. All the records 
show Hormuz as the primary destination for Zheng He’s voyages, including 
Ming shilu, the Ming shi, the Ming Imperial Edicts, Zheng He’ s Steles, Qian 
wen ji and the poems of Fei Xin and Ma Huan. Southeast Asia was not the 
chief destination, Hormuz in Persia was the real focus for Zheng He’s 
Imperial Fleet.
The journey to Hormuz was undertaken after thorough preparation. The voyages 
to Hormuz were in accordance with the original plan; but the visit to 
Mecca from Calicut in the 7th voyage was not in the original schedule. Zheng 
He knew he could travel from Hormuz to Mecca, but had not planned to do so. 
Thus Hormuz in the Timur Empire was the real goal; something in Hormuz was 
thought to be very important for Ming China.
Many scholars researching Zheng He’ s voyages have concentrated on Southeast 
Asia or South China Sea, but this focus for Zheng He’s voyages is incorrect. 
Because of this mistake the puzzle of Zheng He’s original motive has 
persisted. Zhenh He’ s chief destination was more distant than previously 
believed, and the focus for research into Zheng He’s voyages should be 
changed from Southeast Asia to Persia.
Hormuz belonged to the Timur, and Zheng He’s visit involved a strategic role
Satellite photos prove that the Voyage Map of Zheng He is reliable, thus 
Zheng He with his fleet had certainly been to Hormuz in the Timur Empire. Ma 
Huan’s poem reveals both Zhang Qian’s mission, and the link between Hormuz 
and Herat. These two pieces of information are extremely valuable in
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searching for the original motive for Zheng He’s voyages. The link between 
Hormuz and Herat is especially significant.
The Liao shi records that Yelu Dashe’s troops went from Beijing via 
Samarkand to Kerman (close to Hormuz) 10' then established the Western Liao 
Empire, and this is a most revealing clue. Furthermore, Monk Yijing went to 
Indonesia by Persian ship, and Hui Chao’s work mentions Persia. Specifically, 
the Grand Ming Universe Map 1389 *ffl and the Kangnido Map 1402 both 
show a sea route to the Timur Empire.
The Timur Empire was still the chief goal for Zheng He’s 7th voyage
As a result of Zheng He’s voyages, diplomatic relations between Ming China 
and the Timur Empire changed, from enemy to friend. Undoubtedly, the 
threat from the Northern Yuan was greater than had been thought, and the 
Ming Empire needed considerable resources for security. For example, an 
alliance existed between the Mongol power and Tibet. Tibet was not part 
of the Ming Empire’s territory, and it maintained a close relationship with 
the Mongol power.
In 1421, Emperor Yongle formally moved his capital from Nanjing to Beijing, 
demonstrating that frontier defence was always more important than others. 
During this time, the Ming Empire was fighting fiercely with the Mongol 
power. Emperor Yongle himself five times commanded large-scale military 
operations to destroy the Mongol power, and he and his troops even entered 
present-day Russian territory.
By 1423, after great five expeditions against the Mongol power, the Ming 
Empire had yet to win a decisive victory; Ming China could not completely 
destroy its enemy, but Ming China’s troops were dominant on the Mongolian 
plateau. In other words, Emperor Yongle had restored China’s prestige, 
because he was the first emperor since the middle period of Tang China to 
reach this military position, especially in comparison with the Song Dynasty. 
However, the “two prongs strategy” to destroy the Mongol power was the 
focus for the Ming Empire during this time.
107 Liao shi, 30, (ji 30) Yelu Dashe, p355.
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In 1424 Emperor Yongle died, but his mil i t ary  achievements remained 
controversial in the Ming and Qing periods. However he restored China’ s 
position,  and protected Ming China from a serious c r i s i s ;  and th is  should be 
understood and recognized. In fact,  a f te r  Emperor Yongle, Ming China s t i l l  
did not abandon her “two prongs s t ra tegy” , although three incidents 
delayed Zheng He’ s 7th voyage: in 1424, the death of Emperor Yongle, the 
rebe ll ion  of the "King of Han" and, in 1427-1430, the Ming Empire’ s Vietnam 
War, were the cause.
The "two prongs strategy": a l l iance  with the Timur, and war on the Mongol
In 1419, a member of the Timur Empire’ s mission, Ghaiassuddin, was sent to 
v i s i t  Ming China, and l a t e r  he wrote a remarkable book: A Persian Embassy to 
China, which recorded the key factor in the diplomatic re la tionship  between 
these two countries:  Timur’ s fourth son, the head of the Timur Empire, Shah 
Rukh, was fr iendly  with Ming China. There are many de ta i ls  in th is  work, but 
most s ign if ican t ly  i t  proves that  the Timur Empire a f te r  1407.6 slowly 
developed a very friendly re la tionship  with Ming China.
In 1430, according to Zhu, Yunming’ s 1460-1526 Qian wen j i  fuHBIE and 
the Ming shi, Emperor Xuande designated Hormuz in the Timur Empire as the 
chief destination  for Zheng He’ s 7th voyage. When Zheng He returned to China 
in 1433, Emperor Xuande expressed himself pleased with th is  expedition, and 
there is no indication tha t  he wanted the voyages to cease. So Emperor 
Xuande did not abandon Zheng He’ s Imperial f lee t ,  but s t i l l  encouraged 
diplomatic re la t ions  with the Timur Empire, and th is  remained a grand 
strategy for Ming China.
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Chapter 7
The Great Wall replaced the Great Fleet 
(1435- 1449)
I n t r oduc t ion :
P ro fe s s o r  Morris Rossabi i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  1434 was a s i g n i f i c a n t  tu rn in g  po in t  
fo r  the Ming Empire’ s no r the rn  f r o n t i e r  defence 1 ; a f t e r  t h a t  year  Ming 
China faced a r e u n i t e d  Mongol fo rce  once more, meaning t h a t  Ming China 
would now f ind  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to send an e xped i t ion  to  des t roy  Mongol 
fo rces .  As we know, a f t e r  improving h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the Timur, 
Emperor Yongle launched f iv e  g rea t  d e s e r t  exped i t ions  to  des troy  Mongol 
fo rces .  Although these  increased  Ming Ch ina ' s  p r e s t i g e  and no b a t t l e s  were 
l o s t ,  i t  a l s o  became c l e a r  to  the Ming government t h a t  a d e c i s iv e  v i c to r y  
would be d i f f i c u l t .
Ming s h i lu  has d e f i n i t e  reco rds  fo r  the 12th month of  1436 t h a t  the nor the rn  
t h r e a t  was becoming c r i t i c a l 2. Af te r  Zheng He’ s l a s t  exped i t ion  r e tu r n e d  to
1 The Cambridge H istory Of China -  the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 Part2. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998. In the section, "The Ming
and Inner Asia" Written by Morris Rossabi. p232.
In 1434, a f t e r  a ser ies  of mil i tary engagements, the Tuohuan 
(head of Oirot) defeated and k i l l ed  Alutai. China now faced a 
strong, unchallenged Mongol group on i t s  borders and encountered 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  in employing the policy of divide and rule. 
(Professor Morris Rossabi)
Appendix 1: Ming shilu , the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu. Yingzong, 25. 12 month, 1 year of Zhengtong, p508.
[1436. 12] ((The Statement to Throne)): (from: Duke of Chengguo Zhu 
Yong): "Recently, the Oirot Tuohuan and the Tartar Duoerjiba 
attacked each other in revenge and are i rreconcilable.  Your 
subject, I am worried that i f  i t  annexes another then i t  will 
become stronger. I request that  a l l  f ron t ie r  forces be ordered 
to prepare more provision for any incident ." Emperor Yingzhong 
was pleased and accepted th is  advice.
> m&fä-x ■ zm&m •  mnmm •  w i  • j  -
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Ming China in 1433; the Mongol powers were reunited,  in 1434, and became a 
more c r i t i c a l  th rea t .  On the o ther  hand the Timur Empire’ s m i l i t a ry  s t reng th  
had begun to decl ine  in Central  Asia; so the Ming Empire abandoned plans fo r  
another l a rge -sca le  oceanic expedit ion,  and began systematic cons truc t ion  of 
the Ming Dynasty Great Wall. After  a review of the s t ra tegy  of "'from advance 
to defence' ' ,  t h i s  chapter d iscusses the real ignment of s t r a t e g i c  policy:  the 
b r i l l i a n t  F lee t  had disappeared but the g igantic  cons truc t ion  of the Ming 
Dynasty Great Wall had begun.
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<1> 1435. Crisis from Mongol reunification led to 
construction of the Great Wall
Horses the key - The Ming Empire could not completely win the war
Early Ming China could not win a decisive victory in the north. Ming China’s 
records always boasted of the eminence of the Ming empire, and this has 
often misled scholars. The truth is that the Mongols were still a serious 
threat to the early Ming Empire, and thus the Ming Empire needed to find an 
effective defence strategy. In 1397.6, there is a statement from Emperor 
Hongwu in Ming shilu, which explains the importance of cavalry - why the 
Ming Empire could not win the war completely.
[1397. 6] Our Empire from Liaodong in the East to Gansu in the 
west stretches over more than 6,000 Li. We have only 100,000 
horses suitable for warfare. In the area around Beijing, there 
are no more than 20, 000. If we were to encounter a cavalry force 
of 100,000, the most famous generals of ancient times would find 
such an engagement difficult! Even though we have infantry 
forces, we can merely use them interspersed with our cavalry to 
buttress our strength on the field. If we were to try to mount a 
pursuit to the north to capture enemy forces, it would be 
impossible. Now our lack of horses means that if the nomads 
mobilize their cavalry in the hundreds of thousands their 
military superiority will be total. Throughout history, the 
steppe people have long been the greatest threat to China.3
m m m  ’ * mx±m * i M f + n
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu, Taizu, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3656.
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Cavalry were important to northern defence, but the the southern part of the 
line of China’s Great Wall produced few horses, and insufficient to 
undertake expeditions over long distances, in order to completely destroy 
China’s enemies.
So, due to lack of cavalry, the Ming Empire could not win the war with the 
Mongols, and completely keep the peace1 *4. Many scholars in the Ming Period 
indicated the military importance of horses, and Ch’iu Chun is an example; a 
present-day scholar also makes this point 5 . Thus enormous resources 
inevitably had to be used on the northern frontier for defence. The Asian 
continent had three important breeds of horse: the Mongol, Manchu and Arab 
strains. The Mongol and Manchu horses were accustomed to the cold to cool 
climate. This is a very crucial factor for Ming China’ s military strategy.
The Ming government indeed gave serious thought to breeding horses for 
military purposes. Emperor Yongle had emphasized that '"The administration of 
horses is a significant affair of state ” to the officials in the Ministry 
of War6. The Ming government set up the Horse Breeding Department of Taipu 
in the Ministry of War7. Geographically, the summers were too hot to
1 Drury, Ian. & Brooks, Richard. History of War. London: Times Books. 
2003. p70.
The Chinese had invented gunpowder weapons in the late 13th 
century, but the speed and strategic flexibility of their 
nomadic opponents outweighed theoretically superior weaponry.
Lee, Cheuk-Yin. Ch’iu Chun (1421-1495) and his views on government and 
history. Canberra: Thesis (Ph. D)~ Australian National University, 1984. 
p326.
Horses were very scarce during the Ming Dynasty, and of course 
this considerably affected military strength. Thus, horse 
administration became a matter of primary concern to the Ming 
Government.
Ming shilu, Taizong, 257, 1 month, 1 year of Yongle, p295.
Shen Shi Xing ^07fff .Ming Hui Dian HJjUfÄ , Wanli version 228 Juan. 
.Taipei: Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan Juan 150, Bing 33,
p3065.
< Horse administration >: The horse administration of our empire 
has the Horse Breeding Department of Taipu which belongs to the 
Military Ministry ... In the fourth year of Yongle started to 
establish the "'Pasturage Office". The Office has three 
classifications which depend on the size of land. The first 
class of Office has 10, 000 horses, the middle class has 7, 000
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breed Mongol and Manchu (in the northeast) horses in Ming Chinese 
territories, so the number of horses was seldom enough to supply the Ming’s 
wars. This factor led to the Ming army’s difficulties in facing the 
cavalries of the Mongols and eventually the Manchus. It was one of the cruel 
realities of Chinese history.
The horses on the Mongolian plateau often numbered more than two million8 
during the Ming Period9, but the Ming Empire’s horses sometimes totalled 
below 100,000. Many books which were written by literary men in the Ming 
period underestimated the real danger from Mongol, and these works are still 
quoted in present-day research. Any analysis of Ming China’s strategy must 
take into account the real threat from the Mongols.
1436: The Ming adopts a new grand strategy: a defensive Great Wall
and the third class has 4,000.
T f E  °
According to data of the Republic of Mongolia, source from Inner Mongolia 
in China and a discussion with Mongolian scholar.
H Mongol had a much great military role in world history. On the campus of 
the Australian National University, I talked with a Mongolian scholar, 
Bata Galsandorj, in English. He said that up until recently Mongolian 
was written using the Russian Alphabet. A little while ago, the 
government made a change, however, using traditional Mongolian 
characters as their writing medium. However, he himself can not read it.
He told me that in Mongolia now only very old people or very young 
children can read!
He does not know Chinese, but can speak Russian. He also told me that 
his surname, Bata, was the same as Ghengis Khan’s grandson, Bata Khan, 
the establisher of the Golden Horde Empire in Russia. Bata in Mongolian 
means reliable, trustful. (Chinese archives translate it as IJtfP or 
). His hometown is the present-day capital, Ulaan Baatar; he said the 
distance between Ulaan Baatar and old capital, Kharkhorum, was about 300 
Km.
He told me much about the Republic of Mongolia; currently, it has 2.4 
million people and 6-7 million horses. Then he said jokingly, "riding 
a horse is better than riding a bicycle". He also said that every 
Mongolian can ride, with children from age 3-6 was taught by adults; 
age 7 was little bigger, riding Mongolian horse slighter is better. I 
replied that, due to the Mongol having many more horses, the Ming Empire 
could not achieve a complete victory, and therefore the Great Wall had 
to be constructed to defend the South, with which he agreed. Horses were 
the key to the northern defence of the Ming Empire. He introduced me 
to many books about Mongolian history and other Mongolian scholars.
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In 1433, Admiral Zheng He completed his seventh voyage. In the next year, 
1434, the s i tua t ion  on the northern f ro n t ie r  changed c r i t i c a l l y 10. The Oirot 
Empire swallowed up the Tartar Empire; the great power in central  Asia, the 
Timur Empire, declined a l i t t l e  both in t e r r i t o r y  and mili tary force (the 
Sultan of the Timur Empire, Shah Rukh, who was very d i fferent from his 
father,  did not l ike mil i t ary  operations). Incidents between 1434 and 1449 
had a serious influence on the decision to deal with the northern c r i s i s  
and withdraw the southern f lee t .
After 1368, when Mongol powers had been expelled from. Ming China, they 
became divided into three groups, the Tartar Mongol, the Oirot Mongol and 
the Wuliangha Mongol TEJlPp .The Tartar Mongol and Oirot Mongol * 11 were at 
no time under the authority  of the Ming government 12 and there were 
intermit tent wars between them and Ming China. This fact  is  of importance 
to the understanding of Ming China’ s f ron t ie r  defence problem.
10 The source from the Republic of Mongolia also proves that in 1434, the 
year a f te r  Zheng He’ s last voyage, the northern defence situation had 
become c r i t ica l .  The Ming Empire was under growing pressure in the 
defence of the northern frontier; therefore, re-examination of the 
strategic option was necessary.
Mongolian University of Science and Technology. Inspiring Mongolia. 
Ulaanbaatar: I-team system science research ins ti tu te .  2003.
By 1434 a l l  of western and eastern Mongolia had come under the 
rule of Prince Tuohuan (Togoon-taishi) of the Oirad (Oirot). His 
son Esen (1440-1455) fu lf i l le d  his fa ther’ s plan, regaining 
almost a l l  the land inhabited by the Mongol nationalities  from 
the Ming court. Relations between Esen and China had continued 
to deteriorate until 1450, when peace was achieved.
11 Tian Wei Jiang • Si Chou Zhi Lu Yu Dong Cha He Tai Han Guo Shi Yan
Jiu  . Urumqi: Xinjiang ren min chu ban she
i T i l A S m »  1994. p 139—143
Earlier Oirot Mongol tribes had inhabited the Yenisey River area, then 
they migrated to Kebuduo . Aertai » and the north of Hami
during the early Ming Period. Later the Oirots divided into four 
Khanates: the Zhungeer , Heshite Duerbate and
Tuerhute • In the early Qing Dynasty, the Zhungeer tribe was a
major threat to Qing China. The Oirot Mongol had strong cavalry forces 
from the early Ming to the early Qing period . In 1680, the Zhungeer 
destroyed Moghulistan ("Land of the Mongols", in present day Southern 
Xinjiang) and became stronger.
12 Tang, Gang '{WM » Nan, Bingwen • Ming shi • Shanghai: Shanghai
ren min chu ban she A$§AKiAftM(ti , 2003. p i70.
s u t H f f M .stsufrmRmn •
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In 1434, Tuohuan of the Oirot Mongol attacked and killed the Tartar
Mongol Alutai, and "took over the Tartar tribes completely" 13 . Tuohuan 
"wanted to proclaim himself as the Khan, but people disagreed, so he 
supported Tuotuobuhua (descendant of Kublai Khan, the Yuan Dynasty) as the 
Khan, so as to put the Tartar (Alutai) people which he had earlier taken 
over under his authority"14 . Later, Tuohuan "called himself Prime Minister" 
(Ell fi Z& ^  i ) • Therefore, it can be said that in 1434 Tuohuan reunited the
Oirots and the Tartars and this amounted to a move toward restoring the Yuan 
Dynasty, a new serious threat to Ming China.
In the first month of 1435 Emperor Xuande died and Emperor Yingzong 
became the new emperor, aged just nine. Next year, 1436, the Title of Reign 
was changed to Zhengtong. In the third month, the Proofreader of Huguang 
(Province), Cheng Fu ^Mli> put a significant proposal to the throne, and it 
was approved by the Emperor (the Qing Dynasty had a Regent System, but the 
Ming Dynasty did not; since the Emperor’s age was 10, approval must have 
been given by his advisors).
[1436.3] ((Memorial to the Throne)): (by: Proofreader, Cheng Fu 
’ f M g  ) : From ancient times the barbarian peoples have been
a threat to China ...  The area along the frontier, from
Liaoyang in the east to Gansu in the west, approaching on the 
territory of the enemy. The strategic defences formed by 
mountain and rivers are certainly many, but plains which may be 
made into battlefields are also not few. Your Majesty, I suggest 
that great ministers should be selected to patrol the frontier. 
Wherever the enemy appears is making incursions, the
fortifications should be built higher and the trenches dug
deeper, and we should be vigilant at the passes......  The
Emperor approved and agreed to this. 15
’ Ming shi 327, (fH 215), Tartar.
1 Ming shi 327, (fJj 215), Oirot.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shilu. Yingzong, 15. 3 month, 1 year of Zhengtong, p297.
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This was recorded in Ming shilu, so i t  was thought important at the time. I t  
is the f i r s t  “Statement to the Throne” in Ming shilu  which mentions the 
construction of the fo r t i f i c a t io n  l ine from Liaoyang to Gansu (this distance 
is more than 3000 Km), and i t  was the s t a r t  of the erection of the Ming 
Dynasty Great Wall. I t  also meant that  the Empire had switched i t s  s t ra teg ic  
option from advance to defence, and that  Zheng He’ s f l e e t  and i t s  s t ra teg ic  
role  had become redundant.
Furthermore, in the f i r s t  year of Zhengtong JEM, Supervising Secretary Zhu 
Chun made a suggestion for constructing a f ron t ie r  wall 16 . His suggestion 
was received by the Imperial Court. In 1436, a long section of the Ming 
Dynasty Great Wall was constructed 17. The incursions of the Oirot Mongol 
power close to the f ron t ie r  l ine were causing great anxiety to Ming China.
1439: The Ming understood the c r i s i s  caused by the Oirot re joining Mongol
In the 12th month of 1436, the threat  from the Oirot power became more 
serious. The s i tua t ion  troubled the Ming Imperial Ministers, and the 
Emperor (or his trusted advisors) shared the i r  concern. The report  from the 
Duke of Chengguo, Zhu Yong (he was to die in the Tumubao Incident in 1449) 
was a good example.
lh Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu. Yingzong, 15. 3 month, 1 year of Zhengtong, p299.
Ming shi, 91, (Zhi 67), Frontier Defence jSPj
[1436.3] In the f i r s t  year of Zhengtong, Supervising Secretary 
Zhu Chun suggested construction of a frontier wall.
i E £ j t 7 E ¥ » •
17 Liang J ia  Bin . Zhong gao Li Shi Tu Shui .Taipei: Shi
Xin Publish ,1984. p47.
Ming shi, 91, (Zhi 67), Frontier Defence iJJKl
East from Longmen flPT to Heiguguan , and west from
Huamachi tCMhfe to Halawusu When there were northern
incursions by Mongol cavalry, smoke was used by day and f ire  by 
night to summon troops for defence.
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[1436.12] ((Memorial to the Throne)): (by: the Duke of Chengguo,
Zhu Yong) : ''Recently, the Oirot Tuohuan and the Tartar Duoerjiba 
(Alutai) have made revenge attacks on each other in and are 
irreconcilable. Your Majesty, I am worried that if one annexes 
the another then it will become stronger as a result. I request 
sending an Imperial Edict to every frontier force asking it to 
lay in more material in preparation for any incident. " The 
Emperor approved and agreed to this. 18
\mzM * m&fäx • • j  m f f e  •
The Ming had clear military intelligence that the Oirot had reunited the 
Mongol powers and was thus a terrible threat. More resources were therefore 
transferred to the northern defensive line.
[1439.1] At this time, Court officials and frontier generals all 
reported: "The Oirot is gradually becoming stronger, and the two 
steppe enemies have combined together. A situation is emerging 
that will be difficult to control. Such problems as are 
presented that the remnant forces of Alutai cannot be compared 
with this. " 19
— - mm ■ = rE f j a ®  •
wmztm • j
Yang Shiqi fJIdrnf was an important minister in Ming China’s Imperial Court, 
who had emphasised that the Oirot would be a serious threat; and that 
these "horses of frontier troops" were insufficient20; therefore adequate 
defence would be difficult.
Ih Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
Ming shilu. Yingzong, 25. 12 month, 1 year of Zhengtong, p508.
Ming Shi. 328, (Zhuan 216), Oirot, p8499.
Xia Xie M'sSi 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian BIüHH .Beijing: Reform Publish. 
Q f c S W K t t  1994. p734.
14 Xia Xie 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian .Beijing: Reform Publish.
1994. p744.
■0 Ming shi, 148, (f|| 36), Yang Shiqi ,p4137.
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1441: Northern c r i s i s  the major concern for Ming China
The Mongol forces were a l l  cavalry and so were more mobile. When the Ming 
Empire’ s troops advanced in strength, then Mongol forces withdrew to the 
endless west and north. After the Ming Empire’ s troops returned to the 
f rontier ,  Mongol force followed to loot d if ferent par ts  of the frontier .  The 
Mongol powers always wanted to res to re  the Yuan Empire.
Neither the grand Emperor Hongwu nor Emperor Yongle managed a decisive 
victory, so the Ming changed i t s  strategy gradua l ly21 . After 1435, the 
threat  from the Mongol cavalry was becoming more and more dangerous22. Also, 
the re la tionship between the Ming Empire and Mongol was growing more 
d i f f i cu l t .  The comprehensive, large-scale  construction of the Ming Dynasty 
Great Wall gradually became inevitable. In 1441, the Expositor -  in -  
Waiting iff Liu Qiu §flj analysed the condition of northern f ron t ie r  
defence, indicating:
[1441.1] ((Memorial to the Throne)): (by: Liu Qiu): The Oirot, 
cer ta in ly  will be a f ro n t ie r  threat . I f  we move the defence 
forces of Gansu to the south, i f  (northern) threat  happened 
suddenly, how to defend (north)? The northwest f rontier ,  should 
be ordered to make rounds trenches and walls should be
In the early year of Zhengtong, Yang Shiqi said that should the 
Oirot grow stronger, i t  would become a frontier threat, but 
frontier troops’ horses were insufficient, and defence would be 
d iff icu lt.  Not long a f te r  the death of Yang Shiqi, Esen (head of 
Oirot) invaded, resulting in the disaster of the Tumubao 
Incident ..........
mm  > ’ nffiäB.»warni • ...
AÜ > ......
21 Da Li Zha Bu iltAfLTh .Ming Qing Mongol h is to ry  Luan Gao ÖA/IfliAAIraT®
.Beijing: Min Zu Publish ,2003. pl32.
After the Xuande Period, the Ming Empire’ s military was on the 
defensive, especially, after Zhengtong Period [1436], the Ming 
Empire would not send a mission to Mongol.
• sfcgiE •
22 Yan Cong Jian edited by Xu S il i  .Shu Yu Zhou Zi Lu
.Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. Juan 17.
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constructed and repaired, forts should be increased or repaired, 
there should be strict training and a close watch should be kept 
so as to prepare for incidents, it is the way that preparation 
then no worry.23
’ mmmm»mmm »®i/n«»
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He underlined that the Oirot power would be a serious threat; and that the 
government should put military forces and resources on the northwest 
frontier for defence. In addition, he emphasized the need for construction 
of the wall and forts, and that soldiers should be well trained. Ministers 
in the Imperial Court always had to respect the Empire’s prestige, so 
a statement to the throne often exaggerated the emperor’s greatness. 
Thus the real situation was probably more severe than appeared from this 
statement.
Zheng He’s fleet was expensive, and some scholars have suggested that it was 
because it cost too much that it was abandoned. Of course, the Ming Dynasty 
Great Wall was more expensive than Zheng He’s Fleet 2d . Therefore, it could 
be said that the great oceanic expeditions of Admiral Zheng He were brought 
to an end by the northern crisis of the Ming Empire; but also the Timur 
Empire had ceased to be aggressive and militarily inclined. So now that 
Timur was an ally there was no point in sending the fleet anymore; it had 
already served its purpose, and in any case the Timur Empire was no longer 
effective militarily. Thus a strategy centred on the Ming Dynasty Great Wall 
replaced a strategy in which the Ming Dynasty Great Fleet had played a 
crucial part.
Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi 
Ming shi, 162, (ff 50), Liu Qiu g p f  , p4402.
Ming shilu. Yingzong, 75. 1 month, 6 year of Zhengtong, pl468.
1 The last expedition of Admiral Zheng He ended in 1433. According to my 
statistics, the majority of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall was constructed 
between 1435 and 1644, and enormous resources were transferred from the 
southern to the northern frontier.
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<2> 1449. 500,000 troops routed; Great Wall proposed as 
strategic option
1449: The Tumubao Incident, Ming China’s 500,000 troops routed
In 1449, the Tumubao Incident shocked the Ming Empire25, but it 
also proved that the Ming’s change in strategy, from advance to defence, was 
sensible. So too was the decision to abandon the Ming Imperial fleet in 
order to reinforce the northern defences. With an end to grand northern 
expeditions, the Ming Empire no longer needed to liase with the Timur Empire 
by sea.
In 1449.7, the Oirot launched a large-scale invasion of the Ming Empire. 
Many strongholds beyond the line of Great Wall were lost, and troops in 
Datong were defeated. Following Emperor Yongle’s expeditions, an additional 
500,000 troops were hurriedly recruited and, commanded by the young Emperor 
Yingzong, they advanced to confront the Mongol power. The outcome, however, 
was quite different, and very terrible. Ming China’s 500,000 troops were 
routed, and the Emperor was captured by the Mongol Oirot at Tumubao, only 
about 100 km northwest of Beijing.
The northern army of the Ming Empire was almost exterminated. Many Imperial 
ministers, officers and officials were slaughtered, and huge quantities of 
booty were taken by the Oirot Mongol power. In Beijing some senior 
officials suggested that the Imperial capital, Beijing, should be abandoned. 
The Deputy Minister of Ministry of War - Yu Qian - responded:
Ming shi, 10, (10), 14th year of Zhengtong, pl38.
[1449.7] Oirot’s Esen invaded Datong, general Wu Hao died in 
battle; Emperor proclaimed himself to command troops for
expedition ....  troops of Oirot came and struck . .. Emperor
with troops arrived at Tumu, and were besieged then routed, 
several 100,000 died ... Emperor was captured by enemy ... 
capital heard the failure, Ministers gathered crying in the 
Imperial Court, Expositor-in-waiting, Xu Ying, appealed for 
transfer of capital to south, Deputy Minister for Ministry of 
Military, Yu Qian fplfl against it ....
* • rnmrn • Ttmm-n-ftit• m&mm® • mmt mmmm • .....
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Those talking about moving the capital south should be beheaded.
The capital is the foundation of the empire. Once you move it 
the empire will be lost. Don’t you know what happened to the 
Song Dynasty after it moved south?26
Wimmernm ! ° ?
If it were not for the efforts of Yu Qian and other loyal generals, the Ming 
Empire might have lost her capital, or lost half her territory like the 
Southern Song Dynasty; it might possibly even have been wiped out. 
Inevitably, after this “incident” , a change in strategy from advance to 
defence, and reinforcement of the northern frontier, became the first 
priorities for Ming China.
In contrast, after the death of Shah Rukh in 1447, from 1449 the Timur 
Empire went into decline. In a short time, this empire disappeared in 
Central Asia and Persia, but expanded successfully in India, and became 
the Moghul Empire in Indian Peninsula - another significant event in Asian 
history. But for Ming China it was absolutely essential to adapt its 
strategic options to the changed circumstances, by reducing or abandoning 
the navy so as to reinforce the army, and by deploying more soldiers on the 
northern frontier. To ensure its survival Ming China had to employ a 
different approach - Zheng He’s spectacular voyages were a thing of the 
past.
1449: The Ming Dynasty Great Wall planned as strategic option
The Tumubao Incident proved that the Ming Dynasty Great Wall was absolutely 
necessary. Ming China had tried using diplomacy and large-scale desert 
military expeditions to destroy the Mongol powers completely in the Hongwu 
and Yongle periods, but Ming China could not win a decisive victory, 
so a change in strategy from advance to defence was a reasonable, if not
'b Ming shi, 170, (Zhuan 58), Yu Qian, p4545.
Xia Xie M'M: 1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian BliÜfÜ .Beijing: Reform Publish. 
1994. p800.
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inevitable, decision. The Tumubao Incident had a huge influence on the Ming 
Empire's strategic options.
Toward a new strategy: the Ordos crisis and the first walls - 
The defeat at Tumubao was a disaster for the Ming. The dynasty’s 
military prestige was shattered at a stroke . . . But even though 
immediate disaster was averted, the strategic position of the 
Ming had been gravely affected by Tumubao. The dynasty had been 
put on the defensive.2'
From 1434 Tuohuan reunified the Mongol powers; it was now more than obvious 
that the Ming Empire could not destroy the Mongol forces completely; 
furthermore, the outstanding leader of the Timur Empire, Shah Rukh, died in 
1447 and his son Ulugh Beg died in 1449, and from then on the Timur Empire 
quickly declined. The Ming Empire’ s defence strategy needed a dramatic 
change. After the Tumubao Incident of 1449, many scholars in the Imperial 
Court advocated the importance of a great frontier wall. The prominent 
thinker of the Ming Dynasty, Qiu Jun (Chiu Chun fxtlt 1421-1495) 28 , was 
among them.
Great Wall for defence was the only option, Qiu Jun
Emperor Yongle had put great effort into strategies for diplomacy and 
military action29, and the Ming Empire reached its zenith during Emperor 
Yongle’s reign, but it was clear that Ming China could not win a conclusive
Waldron, Arthur. The Great Wall of China from History to Myth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990. p91
28 Qiu Jun (Chiu Chun 1421-1495)
He was one of the local people of Qiong Shan fj|[JL[ county in present-day 
Hainan Island, a high-ranking official of the Cheng-Hua Period and
a Grand Secretary and Chief Minister in the early Hong Chi JA'/n Period. 
His outstanding performance as a government official was recognised both 
by his contemporaries and historians of later times. He is one of the 
most prolific writers of the Ming Period, his treatises and articles on 
a variety of subjects, especially those dealing with government 
institutions, established him as a leading political thinker as well as 
a writer of stature.
Emperor Yongle’s decision to withdraw from two strongholds, Da Ning 
and Dong Sheng was a source of controversy. It was criticized by
scholars in the early Qing Dynasty, and by some modern scholars. The 
issue was researched for this thesis, and my conclusion was that these 
two strongholds were difficult and dangerous to defend, for reasons put
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vic tory in the war agains t  Mongol forces. However, most of Chinese h is to ry  
shows tha t  i t  has always been d i f f i c u l t  fo r  Han Chinese empires to subjugate 
the northern steppe enemies. There were many defence s t ra tegy  were suggested 
by the Ming scholars  in the middle period of 15th century.
Punish them when they invaded and garr ison  to defend against  
them a f t e r  they r e t r e a t .  Receive them with courtesy when they 
o f fe r  t r i b u t e  as a sign of admin is tra t ion  for  our r ighteousness.  
Keeping them under loose r e in  without severing the re la t ionsh ip ,  
so tha t  a l l  the wrongs are on th e i r  side.  This is  the proper 
policy  of the sage ru le r s  towards the b a rb a r i an s .30
mmmmz ■ • nmmmmm • mmzmm •
The Ming scholar  Qiu Jun quoted from the Han shu, comparing the d i f f e re n t  
m i l i t a ry  s t r a t e g i e s  of China in h is to ry ,  including the s t ra tegy  of the Qing 
Emperor Shihuang and of the Han Emperor Wudi31. He emphasized the d if ference  
between the desert  steppe people and Han Chinese32, and in s i s te d  tha t  defence 
was a b e t t e r  m i l i t a ry  s t ra tegy  for  the Ming Empire. Due to i t s  geographic 
locat ion,  the question of horses, and al so  tha t  of  m i l i t a ry  lo g i s t i c s ,  Ming 
China’ s only option was the construct ion  of the Great Wall.
After  the Tumubao Incident  in 1449, m i l i t a ry  s t r a t eg y  was changed completely! 
the decision was made to cons truct  the enormous Ming Dynasty Great Wall,
forward below.
The two strongholds were lonely buildings in remote areas, surrounded by 
virtually  desert land. On the one hand, i f  too few soldiers were sent to 
defend them, this would be dangerous. On the other hand, i f  many 
soldiers were deployed, logistics could become in short supply, and that 
would also be dangerous. If too many materials were stored there, then 
the strongholds would become a target for the enemy, bearing in mind 
that Ghengis Khan’ s troops had destroyed many very formidable
strongholds in these areas.
Waldron, Arthur. The Great Wall o f  China from H istory to Myth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990. p80. This work has a
similar opinion.
30 Han shu, 94, (f# 64), Xiong Nu, p3834.
31 Han shu, 94, (flj 64), Xiong Nu, p3813.
32 Han shu, 94, (flj 64), Xiong Nu, p3834.
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completely covering the whole of the northern defence line of frontier, and 
the great Ming Dynasty Imperial fleet was to be abandoned. The Ming Empire 
continued to prosper for some time33. Following the Tumubao Incident, more 
than 900,000 troops were permanently deployed for northern frontier defence, 
and a full commitment was made to the building of the Ming Dynasty Great 
Wall. From 1449 to 1644, the Great Wall was continually under construction.
The strategy of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall
The Ming Dynasty Great Wall covers 6300 km, from the Shanhai Pass in Hebei 
Province in the east to the Jiayu Pass in Gansu Province in the west, and is 
possibly the greatest single architectural achievement in human history. The 
strategic effectiveness of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall has been disputed34, 
but when Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide after the civil revolt in 1644 
the northern foreign enemies were all still beyond the Ming Dynasty Great 
Wall. Two hundred years is a long time; the Ming Dynasty Great Wall should, 
perhaps, be seen as a successful defence strategy for the Ming Dynasty35.
Mongols grew up on horseback, hunting, playing and fighting from the backs
Lee, Cheuk-Yin. Ch’iu Chun (1421-1495) and his views on government and 
history. Canberra: Thesis (Ph. D)— Australian National University, 1984. 
p3.
Although the Tumubao Incident of 1449 created great frustrations 
for the Ming government at the beginning of the middle period, 
and posed some threat to the continuance of the Ming, the 
dynasty recovered quickly and subsequently enjoyed several 
decades of stability and prosperity.
Mote, Frederick W. . Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
University Press. 2003. p696.
It was based on strategic miscalculations.
Was the Ming Dynasty Great Wall effective, or not? There are various 
opinions. It was researched by me for more than four years in Beijing. 
As a result, I made this suggestion. Soldiers (human beings) could climb 
the Ming Dynasty Great Wall using ropes and ladders. However, horses 
could not do so therefore the function of the Wall was to keep out 
horses (cavalry), not men.
Mongol soldiers could perhaps have built somewhere a structure to enable 
horses to cross the Wall, but if the number of horses was very big 
(Mongol cavalry was often more than 50,000 horses), it would have been a 
very slow process. With a concentration of horses at one point, Ming 
forces would quickly become aware of the situation, and without their 
horses the Mongol soldiers would not be able to dominate the Ming 
troops, as they usually did. The Wall was indeed effective.
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of their tough, grass-fed mounts. A mounted Mongol was a formidable enemy, a 
superb cavalryman. However, if on foot (no horse), a Mongol would be only 
equal to the Ming soldier in fighting capacity. This is the reason why the 
Great Wall was effective. An interesting point is that soldiers could climb 
the Great Wall by rope or ladder easily, but it was very difficult to move 
horses across the Great Wall, especially in numbers.
After the Sui Dynasty Great Wall in the early 7th century, there was no 
large-scale construction of the Great Wall for a long time, and many of the 
old walls became ruined. In early Tang China, the Empire’s troops advanced 
to central Asia. In the middle period, Tibet became the major threat, and a 
Great Wall was unnecessary. After the Tang Dynasty, the period of the “Five 
Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms” was made chaotic by civil wars, so China 
still did not need a Great Wall. The Northern Song Dynasty was not equipped 
to build such a construction, because her northern border was not extensive 
enough to reach the natural frontier. The Southern Song Dynasty was even 
less capable of construction of a Wall. The Yuan Dynasty belonged to the 
Mongol, and it certainly had no need to build one.
After 1435, the young emperor and his advisers moved gradually toward a new 
strategy (or an old, ancient strategy)3fi, constructing the Ming Dynasty Great 
Wall and garrisoning a very large number of troops on it permanently. The 
Ming Dynasty Great Wall had only one side, the north side (the side facing 
beyond China), with battlements which were manned by bowmen in times of 
attack. The Ming Empire’s soldiers were housed in forts located at strategic 
intervals. Also situated in a regular pattern were beacon towers which gave 
warning along the full length of the wall and far inland of the approach of 
the enemy. Besides defending the northern border, the Ming Dynasty Great 
Wall also enabled orders to be communicated from the capital, Beijing, to 
other parts of the Ming Empire by using smoke or fire to send signals from 
one watchtower to another.
The Wall retains its dignity, and the Ming’s aura, as a result of good 
architectural material. It has hundreds of passes and over 10,000
!b By early Ming China, the strategy of Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle 
was security without a lengthy wall. They wanted to destroy (or 
subjugate) Mongol completely, although their diplomacy often spoke of 
peace.
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watchtowers. The wall crosses steep terrain and displays every variety of 
the Ming’s military architecture. For more than 200 years the Ming Dynasty 
Great Wall was continually being reinforced and extended to ward off attacks 
by the Mongol cavalry and the Late Jin kingdom; most of it still towers over 
valleys and the summits of mountains. It consists of fortified walls and 
watchtowers, in which it differs from the Qin Dynasty Great Wall.
Not only was this Wall costly to build, but it was permanently garrisoned by 
more than 900,000 troops of the Ming Empire. The cost of completing the 
construction of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall, over the period from 1435 to 
1644, totalling 210 years, has been estimated by a USA specialist to be some 
30 billion US dollars37, and probably at least 10 times more than the cost of 
Zheng He’s fleets over the 30 years (these ships were built at least from 
1404), between 1404 and 1433.
The Yuan people returned to the north, often planning to restore 
their empire. Emperor Yongle moved his capital to Beijing, close 
to the frontier in three directions. [1436] From the period of 
Zhengtong, the threat from the enemy gradually increased. Thus, 
over the Ming period, there were heavy demands on frontier 
defence - East from Yalu, west to Jiayu, stretching over ten 
thousand Li, the Wall required different designs for different 
sections. (Ming shi)3S
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tmwzM > mmm. • Mmm  • mmmm»asms» frtmm °
This Historical Comment |$j ff from the Ming shi accurately describes the 
situation for the Ming Dynasty, and underlines that after 1436 the northern 
threat was gradually becoming greater. In the 210 years, from 1435 till the 
end of the dynasty in 164439, the construction of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall
UK BBC TV program: The Great Wall of China.
M Ming shi, 91, (sM, 67), Frontier Defense üJßfj , p2235.
39 In 1556, Mongol pressure was continuing, particularly under Altar Khan
(1550-1573). Later in 1556, the Empire fell once more into serious 
crisis. Mongol cavalrymen advanced on Beijing, only to be repelled. From 
1600 - 1644, the Ming lost all its strongholds beyond the Great Wall 
except for the Northeast. The Great Wall became the front line of 
defense, as the Ming Empire faced the calamitous prospect of invasion - 
from a coalition of Manchus and eastern Mongols.
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for northern defence was a top priority. The Ming Imperial government 
abandoned for ever its once brilliant maritime activities.
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<3> Conclusion: Replacement of the Great F lee t  by the Great 
Wall was in e v i ta b le
The Great Wall replaced the Imperial Fleet  both for f inancial  p r io r i ty  
and defence s t ra teg ic  role
In 1434, the Ming Empire was in c r i s i s  again a f te r  the Tartar Mongol and the 
Oirot Mongol were reunited, forming a new Mongol power. The Mongol and Ming 
China were at  war for a long time. The Mongol (and other steppe peoples) 
had cavalry superiori ty  and continued to be a t e r r ib l e  threat  to China’ s 
f rontier ,  from Qin China to Ming China.
In 1435, The Ming Dynasty changed i t s  emperor: the new Emperor Yingzong was 
aged only 10, and of course a 10-year-old child must depend on his advisers 
to make decisions. During th is  time, many suggestions for defence of the 
northern f ron t ie r  were sent to the Imperial Court. Enhancing the northern 
fo r t i f i c a t io n s  became the primary policy for Ming China. Some sections of 
the Ming Dynasty Great Wall were gradually being buil t .
In 1449, the Ming Empire experienced a crucial  event. The Tumubao Incident 
resulted  in the rout of the Ming Empire’ s 500,000 troops. More than 300,000 
troops and o f f i c i a l s  were kil led, and the emperor was captured by the 
Mongol. The Ming Empire’ s troops in the south were transferred north for 
defence, and a f t e r  several f ie rce  ba t t le s  in the v ic in i ty  of Beijing 
and along the f ron t ie r s  the Mongol force was repelled, and the captured 
emperor was at la s t  released and returned to China. Many t r ad i t iona l  
his to rians  have focused on the capture of the emperor, but the death in 
b a t t le  of more than 300,000 soldiers and o f f i c i a l s  was a much more 
devastating blow to the Empire’ s security.
The consequence of th is  incident was one of the world’ s most spectacular 
constructions -  the Ming Dynasty Great Wall which, inevitably, replaced the 
imperial f l e e t  of Zheng He. Qiu Jun and many scholars of the Ming Dynasty 
believed that  building the Great Wall for the Empire’ s defence was the only 
option. Ming China changed i t s  strategy from advance to defence, and work on
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the Ming Dynasty Great Wall was begun on an intensive scale, and continued 
to the end of the empire.
Empire’s security more important than maritime development
The conclusion of this chapter is probably more spectacular than those 
earlier. What obstacle was there to the continuation of Zheng He’s voyages? 
The interesting but also remarkable answer is given by this thesis: the Ming 
Dynasty Great Wall was the great obstacle to the continued voyage of the 
Ming Dynasty’s Imperial Fleets. What is more, there was no longer any 
purpose for long-range diplomacy of the kind Zheng He had been engaged in 
(the Timur Empire had disappeared in Central Asia).
In addition, whilst Zheng He’s fleet was of course costly, the 5000 km 
Ming Dynasty Great Wall was far more so. The northern frontier crisis 
compelled Ming China to change her policy from attacking, and seeking to 
destroy, the Mongol powers, but when the "two prongs strategy” - alliance 
with the Timur Empire in order to assist Ming China’s desert expeditions to 
destroy the Northern Yuan - became unrealistic, construction of the Ming 
Dynasty Great Wall seemed the only option and abandonment of the Zheng He 
Imperial fleet became inevitable.
Given the choice between the Wall in the north, and the Fleet in the south, 
the Ming Imperial government opted for the former. That was a sensible 
decision. However, it was later to have enormous consequences. Europe had 
its Industrial Revolution far earlier than China, not least because of its 
continuous maritime development, which China had abandoned.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
(l). Strategic Search)
Much research has been undertaken into Zheng He’s voyages, but analysis 
shows that it has been insufficient to determine the original motive for, 
and the reason for abandonment of, Zheng H e ’ s voyages. Many essential 
questions need to be answered. For example- What was the situation in the 
countries that Zheng He visited? Did Zheng He visit only city states? Asian 
countries (other than China) also had great civilizations at the time of 
Zheng He’s voyage, but they are often ignored by Chinese scholars. There are 
three points of importance to be considered in developing a methodology for 
research into early Ming China’s strategies.
First: The concept of Sinocentrism in the archives must be understood before 
objective scientific research can be carried out. Sinocentrism, Prejudice 
and Imperial Ritual, Territorialism (for example: Tibet was the Mongol 
power’ s ally, not a territory of the Ming Empire, in fact), and confusion 
between trade and tribute has always obscured the historical truth of the 
early Ming Period in the minds of present-day scholars. It is important to 
be cautious in the use of the Ming Dynasty’s archives.
Second: The political map of Asia, and Asian countries’ histories during 
1405 to 1433, are important clues for research into the original motive for 
Zheng He’s voyages. For example, according to Ming shilu, and Zheng He’s 
steles, Zheng He and his fleet visited Calicut j^J| and Cochin in the 
South Indian Peninsula. India has of course many sources and data, and 
Calicut and Cochin were two cities, not states, belonging to the Vijayanagar 
Empire. Many scholars had not heard of this empire, as they used only 
Chinese sources to research Zheng He. These, of course, are quite inadequate.
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Third: Reviewing the Dynastic H istories  for reports  of the Ming Empire’ s 
s t ra teg ic  design is a valuable method of study for Ming China’ s s t ra teg ic  
options. The Ming sh ilu  and the Ming shi are the main sources for 
researching Ming history.  The Dynastic H istories  were writ ten for the 
Empire’ s guidance, not for scholars; they provide experience to help the 
ruling of the Empire. Therefore, in the search for the chief original  motive 
for Zheng He’ s Voyages, the foreign records of the Dynastic H istories  are of 
great assistance.
(2) Strategic Origin
The origins of early Ming China’ s st ra tegy were complex. The Mongols were 
expelled by the new-rising Ming Dynasty, but they remained a t e r r ib l e  threat  
to the Ming Empire, due to the i r  superior cavalry. The Mongol powers in the 
Ming period were not only the present-day Republic of Mongolia, but also 
included present-day Inner Mongolia, which belongs to Chinese te r r i to ry ,  
the northern part  of China’ s Xinjiang province, and the southern part  of 
Russia’ s Siberia. For geographical reasons the Mongol powers had be t te r  
horses, and in greater numbers, than the Ming Empire. To completely destroy 
the Mongol forces was an overriding policy for Emperor Hongwu and Emperor 
Yongle.
Many pieces of evidence demonstrate that  the Ming Government understood the 
strong mili tary capacity of the Timur Empire. At that  time, Timur seemed 
like another Ghengis Khan. Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle t r i ed  to make 
an a ll iance  with the Timur Empire, and so many missions were sent to v i s i t  
Samarkand and Herat; the aim was e i the r  to destroy the Mongol forces, or at 
least  to sever any cooperation between the Mongol powers and the Timur 
Empire. Both were descendants of Ghengis Khan, so i t  would be perfect ly 
possible for them to form a s t ra teg ic  mil i t ary  all iance.
The Timur Empire and the other Mongol powers combined would offer  an 
enormous th reat  to the Ming Empire. According to Ming shilu, Ming China had 
good in te ll igence;  the Ming government knew the descendant of the Yuan 
Dynasty had fled to Samarkand, the capita l  of the Timur Empire, meaning that 
a mili tary cooperation between the Timur Empire and the Northern Yuan 
was quite possible. Some large missions, including that  of ambassador Fu An 
with 1500 people, were sent by land from the Ming government to improve
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relations between the Timur Empire and the Ming Empire, but all were 
unsuccessful.
Ming China’s missions were detained, but the Ming government did not 
retaliate, as is recorded in Ming shilu and the Ming shi. These events 
proved that in Ming China’s strategic design, the Timur Empire was thought 
of as a possible strategic partner rather than an enemy. In 1405.2, Ming 
China received definite intelligence that the Timur Empire and the Mongol 
power had organized an enormous military force to conquer Ming China. In 
1405. 6 Zheng He’s great fleet and 27, 800 soldiers were sent to the ” Western 
Ocean” ; a fleet of this scale was intended to demonstrate Ming China’ s 
power, and the many Muslims in fleet were to express the Ming’ s sincerity; 
the amount of gold they took with them meant that Ming China wanted to 
offer it as a gift to improve the relationship between the two superpowers.
(3) Strategic Voyages
Zheng He’s voyage should be reviewed from a macro perspective of Asian 
history. The Mongol Empire was the greatest empire in history, and Ming 
China knew that the Yuan Dynasty was only a part of the Mongol Empire. 
During the early Ming period, the Mongol Empire became divided into some 
smaller empires, but they were still dominant in Asia, and had expanded into 
India by the 16th century. Joined together, they constituted a serious 
threat. The former Ming Emperor Jianwen was no longer a danger to Emperor 
Yongle’s throne, but the Mongol powers were still menacing. The struggle 
between the Ming and the Mongol Empires (not just one) continued during the 
early Ming.
The original motive for Zheng He’s voyages is one of the greatest academic 
puzzles in Chinese history. Owing to the shortage of histories of other 
Asian countries, and poor academic knowledge of the Timur empire, this 
significant puzzle has been left unsolved until now. The Asian political map 
for the period 1405 to 1433 is a key to the puzzle. Zheng He’s voyages were 
to the west, but Admiral Zheng He would have been well aware of the critical 
wars to the north. In 1409.7, Emperor Yongle launched the first of six 
desert expeditions led by General Qiufu.
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Research from various perspectives* 1 shows that Hormuz in the Timur Empire 
was the chief destination for Zheng He’s voyages, and that its chief goal 
was the Timur Empire, the most powerful empire, excluding Ming China, during 
that time. Zheng He’s voyages may have played a strategic role in Emperor 
Yongle’s great wars in the north. In 1405-1433, Hormuz, Kerman, Herat, 
Samarkand and Delhi (for a time) in India all belonged to the Timur Empire. 
This is the key concept in the search for the original motive for Zheng He’s 
voyages. Each of Admiral Zheng He’s fleet’s visits to Hormuz meant a 
visit to the Timur Empire in Persia.
The "two prongs strategy" could be considered to be the core of the Ming’ s 
military approach2. Ming China wanted to destroy (or subjugate) the Mongol
The original research was to try answering six questions: A. Did Zheng 
He’s voyage have a chief destination? If it did, where was it? B. What 
was Hormuz in 1405-1433? (on the real Asian political map) C. With which 
country did the Ming most need to improve its relations? What was the 
most significant diplomatic change for the Ming during 1405-1433? E. 
What was the goal of Zheng He’s voyages? F. What was it that Zheng He 
wanted to achieve with the Timur Empire?
The most likely strategic reason for Zheng He’s voyage
1) From 1392, the Ming knew that there was a considerable threat from 
the Timur
The Yuan shi was compiled in the early Ming by the Ming government, and 
it shows that Ming China knew the Mongol Empire had an enormous 
territory and had even conquered Baghdad far to the west. The Ming 
government also knew of the strong military force of the Timur Empire 
and the relationship between Timur and Ghengis Khan. From 1392, the Ming 
was aware of the potential crisis should Timur join with Mongol.
In 1395, Emperor Hongwu sent a large mission, consisting of Fu An and 
1500 soldiers, to the Timur Empire, but they were detained there. It 
meant that Timur wanted to go to war with China. During this time the 
wars between Ming China and Mongol (the Northern Yuan) were continuing. 
Mongol wanted to restore the Yuan Dynasty. For climatic reasons, Mongol 
always had more horses than Ming China, this is the reason why the Ming 
Empire was unable to completely defeat Mongol.
2) Emperor Yongle tried to separate the Timur and Mongol
In 1402, Emperor Yongle sent another mission with many gifts to the 
Timur Empire, but the relationship still did not improve. According to 
the Ming shilu, Ming China had good intelligence, and they knew that the 
descendant of the Yuan Dynasty had fled to the Timur Empire to ask for 
assistance in restoring the Yuan Dynasty. All of the Mongol powers, 
including the Timur Empire, the Northern Yuan Mongol, and Moghulistan 
(Eastern Chagatai) could join together to destroy the newly-rising Ming 
Empire.
In [1405.2], The Timur Empire, Moghulistan and the Northern Yuan 
organised a very large-scale military operation to conquer Ming China. 
According to the Ming shilu, Emperor Yongle was well aware of this 
crisis.
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forces completely, but the Mongol power was a mobile military power, which 
could withdraw to the west. The Ming sought to make a strategic alliance 
with the Timur Empire, in order to dismantle the Mongol powers’ backup 
forces and sever cooperation between the Mongol powers and the Timur Empire. 
There were many Muslims in Zheng He’s fleet, indicating that Ming China 
thought it important to have contact with one or more Muslim countries. 
However, the main stream of the spread of Islam in Southeast Asian countries 
was after Zheng He’s voyages3. Thus the Southeast Asian countries were not 
Zheng He’s chief destination. Zheng He’s steles also prove this. The Timur 
Empire was the strongest, and the only large, Muslim country to be visited 
by Zheng He.
(4) The "two prongs strategy"
Improving the relations between the Timur and the Ming Empire was very 
important for the Ming’ s large-scale northern expeditions. In 1407.6, early 
in the month according to the Ming shilu, Ming China still thought of the 
Timur Empire as an enemy. Later in the month, Ming China’s ambassador Fu An 
was released from the Timur Empire, and the Ming shilu changed its tune, 
no longer considering the Timur an enemy. Such an important matter was 
of course recorded in the Ming shilu. In 1407. 9, just 3 months later, Zheng 
He returned to China. Emperor Yongle ordered more ocean going ships to be 
built for Zheng He’s next voyage.
3) The original motive for Zheng He’s voyage was to visit the Timur
In [1405.6], Zheng He and his great fleet were sent to the Indian Ocean. 
This voyage had a strategic role. Ming China used to call people from 
the Timur Empire Huihui (Muslim). There were a great many Muslims in 
Zheng He’s voyages, and the fleet carried many soldiers to demonstrate 
Ming China’s power and more gold for peaceful diplomacy was taken by 
Zheng He’ s fleet. .
In the 3rd month of 1405 Timur died during an expedition. Ming China was 
unaware of this (perhaps it was a military plot!) and continued to make 
preparations to deal with this crisis. Zheng He departed from China in 
[1405.6], but did not know Timur was dead. The Timur Empire’s symbol was 
three balls, meaning that the world had four parts and the Timur Empire 
occupied three of them. Many records in the 23 Dynastic Histories 
indicate that China could go to Persia by land and sea, and this also 
mean Ming China could contact with the Timur from land and sea.
Professor Anthony Reid’s work: the Islamization of Southeast Asia,
(spread of Islam in southeast Asia) has a clear interpretation.
Reid, Anthony .Charting the shape of early modern Southeast Asia 
.Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000. p28.
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In 1407. 10, according to the Ming shilu, Ming China received accurate and 
significant intelligence, that the descendant of the Yuan Dynasty from the 
Timur Empire (Samarkand) had returned to Mongol. The severing of the 
cooperation between the Timur Empire and the Mongol powers had been
successful. In 1409. 2, the Sri Lanka stele of Zheng He was set up, its
inscription involving three languages, Chinese, Tamil and the Timur Empire’s 
language, Persian. In 1409.3, Hormuz in the Timur Empire was designated by 
Emperor Yongle as the chief destination for Zheng He’s voyages, and this is 
the most significant evidence for searching the original motive of Zheng
He’s voyages.
In 1409.6 (9 August 1409), Ming China’s ambassador Fu An returned
to China, accompanied by a mission from the Timur Empire, which even brought 
horses for trade (in Chinese records: “tribute” ). Four days later, In 
1409.7 (13 August 1409), 100,000 crack cavalry from Ming China were sent 
to attack the Mongol power, and this was just the beginning of the large- 
scale desert military expeditions of the Ming Empire. Ming China wanted 
to destroy the Mongol forces completely, and this was the empire’s strategic 
focus.
In 1410.2 (14 March 1410), the ruler of the Timur Empire, Shah Rukh, sent 
gifts to the Ming Court, and next day, the 15 March 1410, Emperor Yongle 
himself commanded an enormous contingent of troops - 500,000 soldiers - 
which advanced north to attack the Mongol power. About this time, Zheng He 
arrived at Hormuz, which was part of the territory of the Timur Empire. This 
was the "two prongs strategy" to surround, then destroy or subjugate the 
Mongol power. There is a popular phrase in Chinese foreign relations history 
- making friends with a distant country for attacking a close country 
#  •
(5) Strategic Change
Emperor Yongle died in 1424, but Admiral Zheng He still went on his last 
expedition, which lasted until 1433, after which the tremendous
Imperial Fleet was abandoned. In Portugal, between 1424 and 1434, Prince 
Henry employed Portuguese sailors to explore the coast of Africa, and
built a school of navigation at Sagres in Portugal, to train sailors for 
further expeditions. After he had dispatched 15 ships, one finally
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rounded Cape Bojador in 1434. After this event, the pace of exploration 
increased. Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1487, and Columbus 
discovered America in 1492. Afterwards, Europe dominated the ocean for 
500 years, and China lost its opportunity forever.
In 1444, invading Thai armies forced the Khmer Empire to abandon the great 
Palaces of Angkor Wat. From then on Cambodia was controlled by the Thai 
kingdom of Siam, and Angkor Wat gradually became a ruin. In 1453, the final 
fall of Constantinople ended the 1000 years of the Byzantine Empire (the 
East Roman Empire). These two once brilliant civilizations disappeared 
forever. The fate of each shows that national security is always more 
important than other development.
In 1449, the Ming Empire almost faced the same fate. However, extra 
resources had by then been transferred from maritime and mercantile 
activities to the northern frontier. Furthermore, large numbers of men were 
also deployed from these activities to the frontier area. The splendid fleet 
was abandoned and the incomparable Ming Dynasty Great Wall was constructed 
for northern defence. Thus, the Ming Empire still flourished for a 
considerable period. On the other hand, the other superpower, the Timur 
Empire, suddenly collapsed in 1449 (the same year), then vanished from 
central Asia and Persia forever.
In the long term, the Ming Empire’ s abandonment of maritime expedition 
would prove to be an error, although it seemed to be a reasonable decision 
at that time. Zheng He’s objectives were not like those of European oceanic 
explorers who sought trade and (later) land. However Zheng He’s fleet had 
the capability to do the same things. The security of the country was always 
more significant than trade profits, cultural exchange and potential 
colonisation^. Northern defence had a serious impact on China’s politics, 
economy, and culture. The Ming Empire’ s abandonment of the Great Fleets to 
construct the Great Wall was a sensible strategic option which was 
influenced by the critical northern defence crisis. The Tumubao Incident 
further forced the change of strategy from advance to defence. The
4 Geoff Wade. “The Zheng He voyages: a reassessment” . Journal of the Mayaysian 
Branch
of the Royal Asiatic Society. 2005.
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outstanding scholar of the Ming Dynasty, Qiu Jun, clearly indicated the 
foundation for the change of Ming China’s strategy.5
(6) Fleet and Wall
A slip of the moon hangs over the capital, 
ten thousand washing-mallets are pounding.
The Autumn wind is blowing for ever and ever, 
brought the feeling of the Jade Pass ...
Oh, when will the steppe troops be pacified?
and my lover (husband) come back from the distant expedition
’ npm&w
Many famous Chinese poems reflect the emotions prompted by China’s frontier 
defence, for example, Li Bai’s 5 ^ 0  "A song of an autumn midnight"
It shows that even during the powerful Tang Empire, China’s frontier 
defence was still under heavy pressure, large numbers of men were recruited 
as soldiers to be put on the frontier to defend their empire, and wives 
missed their husbands; there is a long history to China’s frontier crisis. 
This poem is emotional evidence; the Great Wall was a symbol and a concrete 
object for China’s defence.
On the other hand, Zheng He’s fleet provided evidence of China’s maritime 
capability. However, it did not develop any further. If Zheng H e ’ s Imperial 
Fleet had not been replaced by the Ming Dynasty Great Wall, what might have 
happened in world history? According to the Sui shu, in the Sui period 
(AD589-618), the Chinese had some knowledge of a huge land, to the south of
Lee, Cheuk-Yin Ch’iu Chun (1421-1495) and his views on 
government and history. Canberra: Thesis (Ph. D)— Australian National 
University, 1984. p331.
Although Ch’ iu believed that China could breed fine horses, he 
acknowledged the fact that in general Chinese horses were not 
comparable to barbarian horses. He also acknowledged that 
horse-riding was not the strong point of Chinese troops ... In 
line with this argument, Ch’ iu suggests that the best strategy 
for frontier defense is building high walls and deep moats and 
being prepared for tenacious defense.
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Annam, whose people were fam iliar with throwing something, which perhaps 
could be boomerangs6. Might th is  have been Australia? More evidence would be 
needed to prove th is . However th is  record s t i l l  i l lu s t r a te s  one thing, a 
large island had been explored, located to the south of Vietnam.
After Zheng He’ s voyages, some Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia. Singapore 
-  as an overseas Chinese s ta te  -  could be the grea test heritage l e f t  by 
Zheng He’ s voyages for the Chinese. However, i f  the expedition of Zheng He, 
a f te r  reaching present-day Singapore, had changed d irection  to Australia or 
had the voyages continued, the overseas Chinese s ta te  might not be 
ju s t  Singapore, but the much larger Australia.
(7) Summary
I summarize my conclusions as follows.
1. Many Chinese pre-modern archives involve Sinocentrism and other 
ideas which often obscure the h is to r ic a l  truth. Greater 
research into Asian h is tory  must be the basis for an accurate 
h is tory  of China’ s foreign re la tions .
2. The language used in Ming sh ilu  and the Ming shu suggests that 
the Ming Empire was very safe and splendid; whereas, in fact, 
m ilitary  pressure from the Mongol Powers were of grave concern 
to the early Ming Empire.
3. One of the main motives for Admiral Zheng He’ s voyages was 
s tra teg ic . This is  why Zheng He made five v i s i t s  to Hormuz, which
The Sui shu, (82 juan), Poli. Hflj
This connection is suggested by Menzies, Gavin. 1421 - The year 
China discovered the world. London: Bantam. 2003. p202.
The country of Aborigines: From Vietnam south past Java and
Timor by sea, one arrives at this country. Its territory needs 
four months to walk from east to west, and forty-five days from 
south to north. The countrymen are familiarly with throwing 
boomerangs, the size of a mirror, with a hole in the center and 
an edge like a saw. From whatever distance they throw they never 
miss.
»«■  - ■ ffläsfct - a n  ■ b s k b  - • s
4tra+sH fT - ......B A f f t s z i  • • ffisE  • Kmm  - a u
f3A - ÄV45 •
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belonged to the Timur Empire, during 1405-1433.
4. The continuing serious threat from the Mongol Empires’ Khans 
meant that, for reasons of military strategy, the resources of 
the Ming Empire were moved north, and the strategy was changed 
from advance to defence; this brought an end to the expeditions 
of Admiral Zheng He. Construction of the Ming Dynasty Great Wall 
was a costly military strategy which in effect replaced the 
expeditions of the Ming Dynasty Imperial Fleet, both financially 
and strategically.
5. The critical requirements of military strategy for the defence 
of the northern frontier had an inhibiting and comprehensive 
impact on southern maritime development for the rest of the Ming 
and the Chinese Empire thereafter.
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Appendix 1: Ming shilu, the Imperial Edicts and Ming shi
[1373.8]:
sbas+h * ’ i**t - lAisffl^ ac • i®H+s*5Sffl»äa • xa 
^is ’ HSffiAR; mmmsm > [ i s ^ m a ; ■ m.
SSS^It > %imm • «BBÜB • : £ « ^ 4 «
Notes
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 84, 8 month, 6 year of Hongwu. p!503.
[1392.2] :
..... •
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 216, 2 month, 25 year of Hongwu. p3181.
[1392.12]:
H H + A A  °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 223, 12 month, 25 year of Hongwu. p3266.
[1392] :
* h a m  * um * h a m  •
Notes:
1. Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609
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[1395]:
Notes•
1. Ming shi, 332, (Zhuan 220), Herat, p8609
[1397. 6] :
S lü g ilS S R -tf*  • SBA=Pt£S • ■BJRiS«»+
m • ^ z p ^ S S K r i i - S  • W M +M 2M  ’ ü * « ) » r « T » «  ■ «
i ^ m,w p  - ss
a± s  - iwt+js • ° i ä I t- • °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 253, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3656.
[1397. 6] :
©b ä —i  - m m m  • A m m t - m m ±  ° mmm . • ammm ■ a 
misssb»  - mA»m ■ - smm±WM
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 253, 6 month, 30 year of Hongwu. p3658.
[1398. 4] :
....
[1398. 4]:
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Notes‘
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 257, 4 month, 31 year of Hongwu. p3715.
[1398. 4] :
= rB I S * j  ’‘HT'&ftZiMl
-mikzm ’ gBjrro • mztirftsri? - - #weh - &»
mm ■ »fseft ’ e^-üiiidS!I - wsüwke • tsm&m
■ mime • sjsms. ■ jm±?iZb • mmttnzM -
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizu, 257, 4 month, 31 year of Hongwu. p3717.
[1402. 12] :
• m&m°iMHisfisoA
A M i i l i f t & A #  * ° » A A A h Ü  Ü2 •
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 15, 12 month, 35 year of Hongwu, p270.
[1403. 9] :
m * ms?.• m* mmm»
&  ’ ’ « m i r s  • ara&a* • m t m m m »
’ BtBfflff] • { « l i i l  : IMSiill • # ^ J t  ’ ° m
r«.• gy**j§ ’ aumjs ° aitm£ß& ’ -
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 23, 9 month, 1 year of Yongle, p422.
[1404. 1] :
m&TM ■ » amais *mwimm»mmm»it
• JICW»nW^Ji¥Mö ’ ffiöra * TOAA •
[1404. 1]:
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Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 27, 1 month, 2 year of Yongle. p498.
[1404. 10]:
asgras, fts: r mmzrn * mmmmm • liimmm
, • fg»»A - ttÄfsaBft ■ mm is
K rais - s ia v ta #  ■ ssrjfmrfö • mmmm. • s a m  ° j m
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 35, 10 month, 2 year of Yongle. p616.
[1404. 12] :
• & M S .  » i S  • i * r s # $ i  - 
fifÄ‘43 ■ ttS*®»...
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 37, 12 month, 2 year of Yongle. p634.
[1405.2]:
a  = (-ü m m m iE w m B d B  ■ @@eij7Ca • M ja¥@ @ sisij£A s• m&mmimik > ras - 
- nt asm  - aas±js - tita t • itar« •
a s s e  °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 39, 2rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p659.
[1405. 3] :
ft : (i*a*|s]?XtteaS)B : fct*g*4>S#S ’ •
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nmmps * i t t w A J M * » -
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 40, 3rd month, 3th year of Yongle. p664.
[1405. 4] :
tiaxmxxm&m • fämw* -
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 41, 4 month, 3th year of Yongle. p669.
[1405. 5] :
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 42, 5 month, 3th year of Yongle. p675.
[1405.6] :
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 43, 6 month, 3 year, Yongle, p685
mm ’ m a  ’ w m ^ x ^ m  • • iwais •
• n#±A-n-txx^rnx « •  mxm • lira+ra
A ' jff+ A A ^A A - • > t l S ^ S ^ P Ä f L »IfilA
« ’ ’ wAAis • s » i i  ’ ■
ur e #  » ’ M i l  ’ • MÄi s i t  * iüi^itp# ’ mmm
mm ■ mxfm& * m s « «m? *iMtra •
a a a ^itoäjuj • m^ sm^ m^ mm^ mx > ■ «
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’ m u »
ä j s  • mmmmz.  • * » £ * $ £  • A a a / M f m f i  • « a i ^  • f f
§ »  • j w  ’ ^ P i tB H «  » # « ± r a  ’ m m m m  * a # b #  •
a a a - m i ^ p ^ «  * a n n m u  • a M f i a a i P t »  ’ > &
f t i© a & E  * » i i ^ ^ i ^ f j . mmm^-  • a a a a - t Ä
• # * §  ’ H I i t ^ ± Ä M  •
a r a a a  ’ » a n ' ^ a ^ + A ^ M i t i w  * mm  • t t ^ p ^ m  • i m  •
a ^ a t ^ i i  • + A a # t i t £  ’ Em A R W  • - a - a i M  • « ^ » w j i i i  
m t «  • O T m e p f f iü ^  • ttm» • a ^ f n a a
• i t ^ ia a f i» g w ^ a  • « i s a a ^ • w jm t m x » m h  
» i s^ h a i » * *  s & ^ m ^ § n s ^ + ± ; f f i m g  •
m « a n . ’ m js a M ' * ä h  ' m m * m m * a a * » a n *
» s ' rnnrnq* h #  ' w & ' ± m m * a b m  ' m m t a ' n a * £ n n iö ' p®  
fe a ' m a a ' ta e a ' n w a ' mmm' * t « * %mm f ' itünj' m
' » j ' a # ^ a ' je#  ' m m * ä s & a * ^ a « ^  * a a '
' iPsna ’ a a a ^ a  • m r a a s » »a a B i t  • M ^ ü i ^ t  • ^ M i a  
m ’ ’ ^ a ^ i m  • i w i e^ • sa t t » » na
f f i f S f P J ^ ^ #  ’ f ö f ^ H f c f c i r r a #  » Ü W ; M i t e  •
Notes:
1. Ming shi, 304, (Zhuan 192), Zheng He, p7767.
[1406. 1] :
» £ * ■ »  ■ 35» B f f l l S i t «  ° ftÄSfS - S iR I I A iS tS • S jS S K
; rn.mm.mz - st« ttjw a i*itj«  > maat*«®....±mxnm • *
#git - immm&^ m-nm^ -m. • xiäb^lub : m^ mmz
U4 • ÄWJtift ’ ± * 1 S K B  : ...
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 50, 1 month, 4th year of Yongle. p751.
[1407. 4] :
s ' j £ A s i ö > i * ä i  ’ « t t R ^ r f f i i j M i s s i Ä A ^  - a w f t Ä iä ¥ $ Ä
%mm ’ my&mz - ±fir.«»»»garB = a*®?»* -
m m u h m m m  • -
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Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 66, 4rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p929.
[1407.6]: (10. July. 1407)
f t ; s = ngüttsiifff!®*» - asääm®
• ’ A*#»aAs»&*rtJS; »Aii^iiA
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 68, (j^-p) 6rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p956.
[1407.6]: (25. July. 1407)
- S t Ä ^ a t e M K L t f i P f ö  * 
o ......gcW : 7LteP5äP(«BP • näMiÜ^  ’
• * r a i f t s M  * » # © £ sb
j s w m °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 68, (H5P) 6rd month, 5th year of Yongle. p963.
[1407.9] The Grand Supervisor Zheng He returned to China after
as embassy to the Western Ocean countries.......  Ordering
Commander Wang Hao, modifying 249 sea transport ships to prepare 
for embassy mission to the western ocean countries.
.. m • m
m °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 71, 9 month, 5 year of Yongle. p987,988.
[1407. 10] :
9 ■ 7c#5EI • ..AH = • ASS«
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» a s# ’ • jläsmfrbha
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 72, 10 month, 5 year of Yongle. pl003.
[1408. 1] :
» A S # j m i 5 ä ¥  ’ &#BÜAAS » AÄMAifflAA - t m m m M
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 75, 1 month, 6 year of Yongle. pl030.
[1408. 3] :
fi : » A S S  : toMBWMHßPMM' ’ ©BOAAS..g j tw m z » g
imzMk a a »  ’ mMZM» .. m it& m m
w i e  * ..m  •
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, 77, 3 month, 6 year of Yongle, pl043.
[1408. 4] :
mm^ms • tm®.&Tmn • mm • .....m m
m m x m s m m°
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, 78, 4 month, 6 year of Yongle, pl053.
[1408.12] :
Earlier, pirates came to (Chinese) coast several times, robbed 
and stolen property of farm people. Earlier your father, King of 
Devotion (Yoshimitsu), hearing the order from me, your emperor, 
right away mobilize troops to ruin pirots, let sea route and 
border was peace .....  In the 26th of the 12th month, sixth
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year of Yongle.
« : h  mmrm • • wm
■ - h r $  - ep m&BM- « « » * ■ »  ° 
* * * * *  ’ mWiäW ■ * 8 F R B  • I ^ t l B S W X Ä g  ’ EPlSÄlx?£}flW 
■ io i z . * * # # * * * * *  ’ Ä Ä J ^ e g f t f t  - * * * * ? + = £ • { * *  a
Notes:
1. Sato, Shin’ ichi , 1916- and others . Iwanami Japanese History 7
S?jSli® • B ^ M j k 7  .Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten g?jgft)£ ,1971. p53.
m m m rn  •
[1409.3]:
»: mpsTfmmmmmmmRmmimm ■
• w § m &  • o&ii
« «ftEfö»> °
Notes:
1. Li, Shihou ^drW-. Zheng He jia pu kao shi Kunming: Zheng
zhong shu ju lEd-'ilrlü , 1937.
Xu, Yuhu .Ming zheng he zhi yan jiu .Kaoxiong: 'i§M7
tt»±, 1980. p 131.
[1409.6]: (9 August 1409)
m * m % m » * i i s ¥ i • •  mmmtK
mm  ’ • ä s h s +e  * °mmmmmmm
iia * ä m ü »  °
1. Ming shilu, 93, 2 E  6 month, 7 year of Yongle, pl241.
[1409.7]: (13 August 1409)
■ -m-mm * imtzirnffim • sp^ ie
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Notes:
1. Ming shilu, 94, ^§jff 7 month, 7 year of Yongle, pl243.
[1410.2] (14 March 1410)
cm1) fen * • 5tsis * ’ m&m.
• ...
(15 March 1410) (T*) ’ MM ( )  fiES8£
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, 101, 2 month, 8 year of Yongle, pi316.
[1410. 2] :
’ -jj^ iRiii ’ mmmm • • m ^ f i §
ii • i s m s ’^ rai « s£®n£ • ’ m.
m u m  • -mzm ’ js»gj? ’ • mmmmm  •
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, 101, 2 month, 8 year of Yongle, p 1316.
Ming shi, 332, (zhuan 220), Herat, p3829. (little different)
[1412. 11]:
■ a «  - mm •
1. Ming shilu, 134, 11 month, 10 year of Yongle, pl639.
[1416.11] :
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im its i  • m iM m tM  • ittte* - Bn#*tT > **uj« • m o t e > 
A t a r a  ■ uw 11 mm • a i w e r a ^ s K T  ■ s ^ i n t a ^ n m  -
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, 182, 11 month, 14 year of Yongle, pl965.
[1418.5]:
1. Ming shilu, 200, 5 month, 16 year of Yongle, p2085.
[1418.9] :
vsm ■ mtu:
> » « t * Ttt-fö# -
1. Ming shilu, 204, 9 month, 16 year of Yongle, p2103.
[1419.12] :
: - t s s s t  > Ä S ß i t s  ■ t ä ® ®  - a t *  
is • f*M»ts > eimi® • a » a ; wmm. • ssia-B • « s u e  ■
1. Ming shilu, 219, 12 month, 17 year of Yongle, p2172.
[1420. 5]:
7T*+/WSH*B ’ nMT&Änß • 
S H A #  • « 3 H — Sfc °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 225, 18th year of Yongle. p2211.
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[1420. 6] :
a 3 ’ m ^ i i' $ii5E¥' ' m m* a m ü a^ratn >
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 226, 18th year of Yongle. p2216.
[1420. 12] :
• mm&mmm  • « t u a  -
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 232, 12 month, 18 year of Yongle. p2243.
[1420. 12] :
m m it* ’ ALüsm±' wm' mm* * nmmm •
• g  * £ + £ * £ * £  -
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Taizong, 232, 12 month, 18 year of Yongle. p2244.
[1420. 12] :
m ■ ±mmm..m ■ oooo ammo
* fö^#pre«Eei^Äm > mmmmm • am ° 7*^+
/ W + - ^ I U + 0  °
Notes•
1. Gong, Zhen IjtfA fl. 1430-1434, edited by Xiang Da [pjjH .Xi yang fan guo 
zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000.
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[1421. 1]:
&mwm' M R ' mmsi' m m ' '  a m  * m $.' Ann 
m' hua' muj ' mmm* unmy > h# * *$u*p* ^ ea* +aa
' A t ?  ’ °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu. Taizong, 233. 1 month, 19 year of Yongle, p2255.
[1421. 1]:
»üüm ° •
Notes:
1. Ming shilu. Taizong, 233. 1 month, 19 year of Yongle, p2256. 
Zheng, Hesheng H|it§§f 1903- . Zheng He yi shi hui bian
.Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shu ju ,1970. pl09.
[1427. 3] :
.... ........................................ ^ m m m - w n e m :°
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Xuanzong, 26, 3rd month, 2nd year of Xuande. p673.
[1430.5] :
m ■ ' m m ' mm • *.m$m ■
* a / M i a + - m  »
mm •
’ma ’ mmm
ifcfiSc^n^fPQ ’ a jb a ' mm * am  * m m ' • ismua
s a »Aimü ’ «&& • »ssasraras °
Notes:
1. Li, Shihou Z^ibjlP .Zheng He jia pu kao shi Kunming:
Zheng zhong shu ju I E A H tH  > 1937.
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mxmmmmmmmmm • iss = xtA • M A M a x  *
ifilf • AM.WSUfflüffi»* ’ *WM*nH¥#£A
ggiBfp' zMummmom > ^ # w i x i t  »M A a  • a ^ A X A f g  
° j /imffi&MtÄFf' üffliij' x a ' mmm * m m  * h * « * x i t ^ A  ' ni*ij' mnm'i* ■«* * h# ' xea * h x' xxa' x#
' un^«ö#-+SÄii^a:itwi> °
[ 1430. 6] :
Notes:
1. Ming shilu, Xuanzong, 67. 6 month, 5 year of Xuande, pl576.
[1430. 7] :
m ■ ±%kmm ■ mummim • * niitw«»' ■
»xmmn »i m , « » »
M ° «xitirit > « h a > a§iMgft£fi • mmnz i ttsm# •
m • itt
n # f ^ x  ’ m x ^ ! * ^ t a # a  • m u  - ® M m a
A E £ t t * W ^ T C R  ’ mmmMJM ’ X J M X X ^ X  • ^ X ^ M M X  
* X X X ß i  ’ J ^ S M M Ä Ö  0 Wfo ° W | i x a x ^ x + A 0 -
Notes:
1. Zheng, Hesheng ftpifSp, 1903- Zheng Yijun ftp— -f%. Zheng He xia xi yang 
zi liao hui bian H ß f P T f f i # ^ 4 Ä ü (Xfifl-) .Jinan: Qi Lu shu she H H  
H X  , 1989. pl56.
[1436.3]:
c mt 'Mm) : urn® ’ gxxx.töiima ’ mmmWi > sit
SI#IÄg^£ • ’ § I ± § X i ^ X A ...X M Ü A X  ’ » i t
^ * ?«?« • t » » ..i *  °
Notes:
1. Ming shilu. Yingzong, 15. 3 month, 1 year of Zhengtong, p297.
293
[1436.12] :
* mmm  • • j  K l i f f e  •
Notes:
1. Ming shilu. Yingzong, 25. 12 month, 1 year of Zhengtong, p508.
[1439. 1] :
-B tffiE  - mm • : r sfij0?i> - ä s « ^ -  • - # H t - £
• j
Notes:
1. Xia Xie H ü  1799-1875. Ming Tong Jian  H£Jjgi§g .B eijing : Reform Publish. 
1994. p744.
[1441. 1]:
* mi?
• ü £s» s  ’ im n Ä  > f i n «  * f&^ü
Notes:
1. Ming shilu. Yingzong, 75. 1 month, 6 year of Zhengtong, pl468. 
Ming shi, 162, (f!| 50), Liu Qiu §jp;p , p4402.
[1449.7]:
mzft-imwmm * mummst • T is^ fiE -san j^ M -^ ±  
TfY ’ m b »  ’ * f # i i ^
s iB s a  - sgwtii5Ti*ri5i.....tu
Notes:
1. Ming shi, 10, (10), 14th year of Zhengtong, pl38.
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TiXitm ’ mmmw. • äcitisayw • =mi&m ■ mum ■ ® s h # • 
mmzvt • mmt. ■ mmmm ■ mmmm ■ sissm • »tmm °
Notes:
1. Ming shi, 91, 67), Frontier Defense , p2235.
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Appendix 2- The steles of Admiral Zheng He
S te le  of Yang Shu
mwmpmmmmm
mmxm/ w  c 1 3 o 4 ] C4t ^ ) • + - ¥  ( 1 3  0 7 )  wm
turn °
N otes’
1. Huang J in  Tpr/ff. Hui Yun Qian Hu Yang Shi Mu Zhi Ming 5541A  PWoWiM 
, J ing  Hua Huang Xian Sheng Wen J i  [Juan 35] A A Jfl ’ 35.
The 1405 Yunnan S te le , ( fa th e r  of Zheng He)
1405, mm  h id
a ^ h  ’ •mnm • • 5ä h  »
a ° ’ Mimmm*j& • ^n&nmx • « hi* $t® am
m • &fcSf#*aÄ®Ä«»«s#»©(ms« • ; mscis
i w a ^ a i « ^  ’ m  ’ mmm° a ^ h a  »n £ &  • • a h a
• fngiAPAAA ’ ^ A A A  » m m  * :H A ^ A I £  - A t ; «  > If A ll
& ’ A ii^ iö  ’ 0 1 «  ! IKAMAATOIAAB ’ |5|«A
APIDJ1AI - ’ A ^ E A iA b T O H B  « $
M A + A ü  - H A >C i£ » •
&B : JM A ilßi ’ M flsssa^^ ’ AATOA > Z M  •
*i«Ä • ffi*r7fciro^#0fti2!
Bf 7tüH^aig|ii B »Jte# te**±¥SP9 'JjS  °
(Back of s te le )
h a h - a a i ^ a i » ^ - + - b
’ U f f i i l ! °  •
N otes:
1. Yuan Shuwu J§;f|fYT • Kun yang ma ha zhi bei ba M l^M rSaHS^Jt , Zheng He 
yan j i u  z i  l ia o  xuan bian .B e ijin g : Ren min jia o  tong
chu ban she A S A M u t Ä i  , 1985. p30.
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The 1406 Japan S te le  fo r Guarding S ta te  Mount
m  hog»
Mitm a m a # » b^ aa^  • m x *
.......B ^ A A W IJ I i i iS  ’
iä  • E l f ü H ) * ^ ^  ’ ’ H A f t S A i l J  ’
* i f ö i i e  ’ m ^ n = f - M M  * * g s  :
* m m m ^ m ä  • 
m •
W lS t& tg & Ö J  ’ •
MSWiHgTOa® ’ M «^ M f f! °
£pw$p®fftnrf ’ mm^mix'j<&°
JS ’ °
^mmiumm * fii&##mjtt# • 
’ ÄiäifäÄife^ Sa: °
N otes:
1. Ming sh ilu , Taizong, 50. p753.
Shen De Fu 'i±M M  • Wan Li Ye Huo Bian MMWf^Lfää • 1 Jüan, -, I J ^ f l l f #  
.B e ijin g : Zhonghua shu ju  ,1959.
The 1408 Nanjing grave s te le  fo r  King of Brunei 
( i f  : y f M S M I i »  1408»
v m r ^ w x n z ,^  ’üi^®ittiPic!ipiP7!f^ • m n m * ^ m * a* 
' « ' • a h s+^amp^ t  ’ ' mAti ° ± » ams »
- iSTOAH ’ Emm • I I Ä I  ’ El : rl l E I  • ®£®fc ’ J3Bt 
rta ’ jkd^  ’ m&mm• j a s  = r AAsa »« « a  • aa a^ 
E • * Ikmnm • AWM ’ tiffins ’ iAjmA »
’ mAfftl« » #AAiMA^-fe ? AATtifggAE# ’ fBB2
A*fe °.....’ MEfMM ’ - M »  ' ^ ' HI ' W ' §M * PS
£ ’ ifE »IP  ’ A m ü  : .....S tA lf ’ ±miim  * AAJIlt: • Hit
-HA °
N otes:
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1. J i  nian wei da hang hai j i a  Zheng He xia xi yang 580 zhou nian chou bei 
wei yuan hui. Zheng He x ia  x i  yang Luan Wen J i  Di Er J i  fiß^nA ®  Aim A  
.Nanjing: Nanjing University  Press ,1985. p54.
Fang Zhongfu Li Erhe ^ H ^ P  . Yu Zheng He x iang  yu hai shang
.B e i j ing :  Tong xin chu ban she 2005. pl41.
The 1409 Malacca s te l e  fo r  Guarding S ta te  Mount (Malaysia) 
« i m i l M S J i T W i t a L W  1409»
• M i l f l C T A r i  
M m m±mi *
tbA mvtwsM ’
’ MllIHtijzkHfef
• m&Timmm
Notes:
1. Ming sh ilu , Taizong, 38.
Zheng, Hesheng Üßfliif 1903- , Zheng Yijun Hß—■ ßhj .Zheng He x ia  x i  yang z i  
l ia o  hui bian ( JlTffl} ) . J in a n :  Qi Lu shu she
jf± , 1989. p94
Ming shi, 325, (Zhuan 213), Melaka. p8416.
mmm ’ a a m  • jiiiiiABMtiiffl • a m t - b ipm ..... mmmm......h a a
• mztz ’ m * j M 3 E .....mmn • • m
i i  ’ • j • mw^ c • « joj±  > » J i s
The 1409 Sri Lanka S te le  
( i P T O / f S M A ^  1409»
■ \mwM*mmmx •
mms® » mmmm • m m m ■m m it»m iw j « • t i n
wiaab2« !  ’ ww» j * ° h b ^ ii^ ig iiü #  • mmzm * ^
’ A i f ^ J  • ° 7jcif A t i  ’
mm ' '  t urn' i t  I , « « ' ’ Afof*# • t i e #
h a  • * m m m  *
fösE' * m m m m m m m  * m m m » i t i * nmm  *
m  *
^nrnrnrnm * ' smimm * munwf
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ffiffiftjj - » « S f ä S ' « S s f & t t  » I 
JS"
Notes:
1. This stele now is in the Sri Lanka National Museum in Colombo.
Gong, Zhen fl. 1430-1434, edited by Xiang Da [p]jl| • Xi yang fan guo
zhi .Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju ,2000. p50.
Zheng, Hesheng flßttif 1903- . Zheng He yi shi hui bian
.Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shu ju 4 ^ 1 1 1 ^  ,1970. p90. 
J t B A ^ M B ^ I l U N a i t o  Torajiro) °
The 1414 Buddhist name stele of Zheng He
h h »
»
m m s ’ mmä • jwj^aim * a e^mhim « aim •
% • a ^  * mm % ’
M l » @  { $ B » f ’K ^ O O O O
^ras^m^oooooooo
The 1416 Nanjing stele
Hie»
> finAin»üAmn • • ^ aik
m • w «  ’ nran > o h^3s*vti* ’ misaa ’ raMjg; 
•» fw ’ > m &se® ’ tm & m  °
#s » m&mm * » im»  » summ • es®
in# ’ wiKff»rnrnnm * «bb«« * ui»»»
’ » B U S  ’ SPFitflf • ......f f  BUM • B£»7J« > W JPiÄ BÄ SIIES
»'®0a®?At«is^ K ■ ’ tia:^ ± • äe»spä ■> • • • * m
+ H ^ A ^ W U B
Notes:
1. Zheng, Hesheng f^WlW 1903- . Zheng He yi shi hui bian
.Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shu ju ,1970. plOO.
The 1416 Cochin Stele for Guarding State Mount
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(mmmmmmiuw n i e »
’ nmmzft * p« * » #  *üiifteöü • mrm * ^
S ^ C i '  ’ M t^ A f iö t i  ’ £&!6ji£lRl& ’ ’
r^n^M ’ t ism±»l i t Hi j  • « 5  rmimg ’ m
’ i i i f i » i£t m s j  • • M%mm * - üi«ic * » a ®
ith • ’ mmmitm
’ •
’ zm zm » » #
£l f £Ü > ) » »  » liOTAiTOTE] : r fp J ^ ^ H M A -ZM ' te&JSffe ! j TbWtffiX
a ’ mftwm ’ ’ ^ m j j »
• • OräßffiSK • «gig& . m m ®  ’ *«HA » ’
immn • m aä  • * *lm i  • uw «  • »f«r
tg$nji • ? i h m j^ s ü h a  > i m e « * •  _£f
ÄSAALiisiisAA ’ mmn± ’ • wk&äm ■
rm®m\u • * n±oms • ^TSÄü • ätoiik • BtÄHHi. *£&&&
• m m m  • jf®ny#»7* ^ 1*»f«^ü • » wm • m% i iiiAir^  * mz
im  ’ m m m  • *&&&& • j
Notes:
1. Ming shilu. Taizong, 183. 12 month, 14 year of Yongle, pl970.
Ming shi, 326, (Zhuan 214), Cochin, p8442.
7K^7c¥a4,'B5&# « i s i i a * i i  - i§k §&m m h  - m&zm - m^ ,R.mm. ■ 
g^»ffifÄÄH • A ¥ - I^WfiitffiAJI • + ¥  ’ «ßfnffttSH ’ m=-MAm •
m&mmtm • ^ sh^^oj • • haw* • ^«jelua •
Mma ■
The 1417 Quanzhou stele, in Fujian Province
(mmmmm9tmmm 1417»
[1417.5] The Imperial mandated Regional Military Commander Grand 
Supervisor Zheng He proceeding to Hormuz and other countries in 
the Western Ocean for o ff ic ia l affairs , offers incense and prays 
for God’ s blessing on the 16th day, f i f th  month, fif teenth  year 
of Yongle. Governor Pu Heri recorded this and set up the 
stele.
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A S M f T f l l  
B id  ±l
Notes:
1. Pu Heri ^ff^PB is  nephew of Pu Shougeng ftgäpjfl, Pu Shougeng is  an 
Arab-Persian.
The 1431 Nanjing Jinghai Temple S te le
«wftffi mm 1431»
* £ = ¥ » * mwuwm
• • •
Notes:
1. Xu, Yuhu |£3£ j^  .Zheng He p ing  zhuan ftpfPfFfll- Taipei: Zhonghua wen hua 
chu ban shi ye wei yuan hui 1958. p23.
The 1431 Liujiagang S te le
* mmmzifc'gmmmmmm  1431 mm)
r a t i A a  » »§im a ^ a m * m i t * &
'  h ä  ’ ■
• g w te tf tse s  • ^  -
* p ^ g * is r a ^ * u #  ’ aim-b a  ’ m m m & W M X » « ö H t£ ü  • g A ^ ts #
* Ö M ' iina ' /iwa' w&b * Aaa * (mm
h + )  ^ a  ’ •
•
#LM  ’ i ^ I i  > ? M B P I • —WWW * MS$P
#  ’ H PW M *fm *i 0 Sbfe-B ’ UBI&fili * - jtbffisfö
a m  • ä e s ^ p ’
ro$ t #  ’ # A f i A A A ü  * °
• ^n -m p M im ± »7Tcft/OT ’ i^ fP ü id A  *
«HÄ ’ ’ lOüWa • ^ ^ l / r  • PP
Ü s f!  - ’ f i ^ T  ’ C T A » i ü i «  ’ w E f ^  ° n
ZM&mmm > § /j& ira • *m a s -
f r 0 « g W A ^ B #  0 ! « T O M *
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* m u #
© * ° s s a n i i i  -
7i<^5a»i^afi3t£a^' # s ' m% ' s n n a  • s a i # A A t j ^  
i l l  ° M -fc a iU ü  °
7m^mmmmm^m  • i is fW A a  * >
’ w ^ m i k p « : ’ ° « m w » \ m m
m°
• Ä S i^ jih M ^ P iii^  ’ sw w  a m  ° » ä iiü  • ’ m+
n a i f M  ° ^mmm^mmmj-mm -
7 X ^ + a a ^ I * g r p t i ® ^  - ^ ^ n t H S i r a i i »  ' ' H J i  -
im «  • m%m.mm» määj^p&k ; ; h
f iM a ^ im ^ isM i'g ii• m i ' * a a « a ^ i i :  - *m s
mmnm  ° a s^ a ^  > i ^ ü i i i i i  -
^cSH-A¥«E^es ’ »# j§m • a
&m±mmijty] • r a t io n  °
« I S ¥  ’ !M£lt#PflfS * ^-BiPre^T - • 5^*»Ä
°
N otes:
1. Zheng, Hesheng UPlItSf1 1903- . Zheng He y i  sh i hui bian
.T a ip e i: Taiwan Zhonghua shu ju  A ^ fS A l ,1970. p 114.
The 1431 Changle S te le  (Fujian Province)
■ x^zn m m M m  1431 ^ »  :
M.mu-m^  • * wm& • ° a w c t  »mitzm •
’ f f n f i i t a i f  » » A H  #  ’ i m ü ü i  ’ ’ E P A Ü  ° M ± H A
&m ’ ’ »*&&«£ ’
iiAm ° »m j» a : ö ä ii  * /i®a *
a ' » n a ' wzm^fmium* # a a ' mi a * *  pto 
a ' A #tP A a ’ A /jN A H +^a»^ m ^ + iif& a  •
m x m m m m x »e &spoi • • * stM iiii£#A pBp -
• m&MM ’ 'M gffii • ’ xmM tt.wm.m2M
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m • ’ » M i t  ° ’ immrn •
m ’ ®a - ^  • mmmmm * • äbs^ p *
’ °E&^'Mirff^ ’ # A « M  ’ WW23&Z•
° frW ü fT Ü  ’ I5HAS ’ ’ 7X f« Ä  ’
^ P i ü f a ^ ^ w a  • • j&nzmm&Fft • ^ M ssm u ^ frs  •
ABiwüM fr»fHjim# ° ’ g » a s i  - aw
mium^ f * m ü a m  ’ m ^ m t s »s i t f « »t* £ i i g  * »imwm •
4M #A /A lf# • * /IfiifAA$S ’ A » A  ° Ü D X S -»  ’ JBHtH»
» i ’ jm m /t  ’ i g ^ - i f  ’ Mt£ cm&) A fi * BT'im • ^ü$n
Jt ’ 0 m » i r  ’ ü ^ «  ’ f&JÜ^S ’ MBßfö * *
fiii®  ’ wmm °
* m /r * « a a  • n%\m ’ » * t M  ° i a
’ IWffiFFÄ • ’ lÜ il^AJl ° fn#±*ffillS rft£ l£  ’
T%mmmmzm * mabi Am • «imA# • map#  * ßtm ii > t^sus^
S U  • « ^ T O B 2 ! Srm Z % &  ’ t A M A H Ä  ’ f l M A A i m g M d M M l ^ A
« * a  ’ Aidi##tA® a ü ü  * ms&xn °
®  ’ ä t e f c $ E a & 8 f i  ’ ’ - M # M A  0 ^ S M i M  °
-  ' 7X^S¥ • ^ I IA #  ’ A/IW ' AM ' föjfä ' S I i# S  • # M # A ^
»  ' t ^ s t i i  0 M-tWMil0
- .  7x^ a m  ’ mmm»/ » a s *MÄ^MOj a »
@AS ’ IW A #  ’ » « M P «  ’ i i ö » M  ’ MAAlfM - « J M  
’ f^liA S 0
- '  7X^m- m • mmsm&mmmm• ä k p ^ otmw«3e» » $ ü 
t^ I A S  ’ Ä i^ S m P R T itT S ^ M ^  ’ l « A A « f  0 *W »lö ’ 
AM iM  ’ MAHMMM - J i ¥ * 0 M M » ^ M I M  »
- '  7X^+s m  * mmmmm ° ' a ®
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23 Dynastic H istories «2 3 ^ »
Abbas id Arab Empire
Abu al-Abbas Mwmm
Aden tm
Alutai H U a
An Lu-shan j&r/li [il
Annam $;]^g (north of Vietnam)
Arab Empire
Arigboh
Aru MU
Baarawe Kf'M
Baghdad A^m
Bata Khan Ötü^fp
Benyashili (Wanzhetu) » km
Beiaeryitai Ö P « r l E f / f n
Beijing (Peking, Cambalu)
Bengal mrnrn
Bras Island f mm
Brunei ifrM
Bu Yu Er Hai
Canton UK
Cail
Calicut (Qaliqut) Am.
Caliphate (Abbasid) usmm
Censor
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
Chagatai
Chahar
Champa
Changan
Chen Cheng WM
Chen Dewen \WMS:
Cheng-Hua Period
Cochin
Commandant of Nanjing
Count, Earl im
Crack cavalry it it
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Dadu (Cambalu, Khanbalig) 
Dao Cheng 
Daroushi (Yuezhi)
Datong
Dawan (Ferghana)
Duihuang 
Eastern Chagatai 
Emperor Hongwu 
Emperor Hongxi 
Emperor Jianwen 
Emperor Xuande 
Emperor Yongle 
Esen 
Ezhe
Fang Xiaoru 
Fa Xian 
Fei Shen 
Ferghana (Dawan)
Fu An 
Fukuoka
M U  (Great cap ita l) ,  Beijing 
i (? -  143D
(city)
(Moghul i stan) AM , M & tn m
mm^  ’  mxm
mMM 7K
MM
mrn^
« i l l
Mm
mm
G H I
Gao Xianzhi
Ghengis Khan, Chinggis
Grand Eunuch
Great Canal
Great King of Abaha
Gu Cheng
Guangzhou
Gumalalang
Guo Chongli
Guo J i
Guo Jing
Gu Yingtai
Haidu (Caidou)
Han Lin-er 
Han Shu 
Herat
Hong Chi Period
Hongwu
Hormuz
Houxian
Hu Yuan
Hudaida
Hulagu (Hulegu)
Hurildai (Great Hurildai) 
Iki
Yuan Taizu, Genghis
AilM
I 1M
M ffÄ l
mmm
mu
W faSl
mm
mm
%MWm,
M il
nm
jitXM
mmx
S K  (Japan’ s island)
J K L M N
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Jiangnan
Jiao Zhi (Vietnamese:Giao Chi)5£ßif: 
Jiayuguan H fö U
Jobo
Julan
Kangxi
Khalil Sultan (Hali)
Khanbalig
Kharkhorum
King of Pacification 
Koyampadi
Kublai Khan (Yuan Shizu)
Lambri
Lhasa
Li Da
Li Long
Liaodong
Lintao
Linzhou
Liu Sheng
Liu Wei
Lu An
Le Loi (Vietnamese)
Ma Huan
Ma Yun
Mabaer
Majapahit
Malacca
Maldives
Malindi
Marco Polo
Marwan II
Mecca
Medes
Meng Tian
Ming Empire
Ming Shi, Ming Shih
Ming Shilu, Ming Shih Lu
Mogadishu
Moghul Empire
Mohammed
Monh Khan
Mountain Helan
Muslim
Mu Ying
Nanjing
Northern Yuan
No war countries
{JIM
J Ä
ßpJH (Grandson of Timur)
FFAM (city of the Khan), Beijing 
A W  (Helin)
t t e m
(Khubilai Kubilai)
] # W J
&M,
mm
mit
m u
Hffc
H A Ü .
mm
f ä l U
j m ,  m u ,  m u
tF E
H fg
0 M I
0M .
(Ming Veritable Records)
WK3mm
mmmm,
ü ^ ö j F F
M M l U
m s ,  m m  
i m  
M m  
i t f t
a ö e  zm
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Ogedei (Ogodei, Wokuotai) 
Oirot (Oirat)
Olugh Beg Mirza 
Palembang 
Parsia Empire 
Parthia 
Persia
Princess Gong 
Pu Heri 
Qing Jiangpu 
Qiong Shan 
Qiufu
Qiu Jun (Chiu Chun)
Qin Shihuang 
Quanzhou (Zaitun)
Queen Himiko 
River Wonan (Onon River) 
Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo 
Samarkand (Samarqand)
Shah Rukh (Bahadur) 
Shamichagan 
Shangdu 
Shi j i
Shi Si-ming
Shogun
Sima Qian
Song Biao
Song Cheng
Song Lian
South Sea
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Suhar
Sui Dynasty 
Sulu 
Sumatra 
Sun Tzu
Sun Tze’ s Art of war
-------T U V W---------
Taicang 
Tang Dynasty 
Tartar
Thailand (Siam)
Timur (Temur, Tamerlane) 
Timur Empire 
Togoontomor (1320-1370) 
Tsushima (Japan’ s island) 
Tumubao Incident 
Tuohuan (Togoon-taishi) 
Tuolei
k m
xmimRflü
mm
m if
3*Ul
mu
(1421-1495)
&W  G ü Ö flf)
mm
sfejtd (The Record of Historian)
w m m
ö ]ü :
WiM
irasHf, mm, mmiu, fimwiu 
m m
mnmq
W F
± l k
m m
mm
7CJIÜ^, Emperor Shundi
m m
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T u o tu o b u h u a
U i g h u r  ( V ig h u r ,  H u ig e )
U la a n  B a a t a r
V i j a y a n a g a r JSAft
Wang D ayuan W z ff l
Wang J i n g h o n g
W e s t e r n  R e g io n m m
Wonu m y
W u l ia n g h a
W u l i a n g h a t a i
--------- X Y Z -----------
X ia o  Yi m m
X i n j i a n g  P r o v i n c e m i m
X io n g n u m z
Xuda
Xu Yuhu ts ä
X u a n z a n g  ( T r i p i t a k a  ) z m
X uande
Yan Cong J i a n
Yang Q in g m m
Yang S h i q i
Yang Su
Yao Chen
Y e l lo w  R i v e r M
Y e lu  D ash e
Yi Ru —$□ ( 1 3 5 2 -1 4 2 5 )
Yi To, G r e a t  K in g  S e - j o n g
Y o n g le
Y o n g le  E n c y c l o p e d i a
Y o n g zh e n g ÜIE
Y o s h i m i t s u Äifü*« « a * )
Y o s h im o c h i £ « » §  m m m
You Tong X M
Yuan D y n a s t y
Yuan S h u n d i T C l H ^
Yumenguan
Yumuchuan WMW
Yu Q ia n T it
Z h an g  Q ia n mm
Z h en h  He m u
Z h e n g t o n g lEfit
Zhu Chun
Zhu Di
Zhu G aoxun
Zhu Heng
Zhu Yong
Zhu Y u a n z h a n g XXM - (Chu Yuan C hang)
a l - A h s a MM
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M P
m p a
a s p
±m
xim
p s b
r a i m  r a i
Hucker: Palace Eunuch)
# A
H P
w p m
^fjf
ä s b
im
mn
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Battalion Commander 
Supreme M ilitary Commission 
Imperial Court Eunuch 
Five Chief M ilitary Commissions 
Grand Astrologer 
Grand Astrologer 
Grand Preceptor
Chamberlain for the Imperial Stud 
Court of the Imperial Stud 
Grand Supervisor (Only Eunuch could as 
Ministry of Revenue 
Translators In s t i tu te  
Vice Minister 
Eunuch
Company Commander 
M ilitary Company 
Grand Commandant 
Ministry of War 
Baron
Deputy Minister 
Expositor-in-waiting 
Envoy
Han: Envoy: Commissioner 
Minister 
Commander 
Commander
Surveillance Commissioner 
Reminder
Pasturage Office 
Vice Battalion Commander 
Assistant Regional M ilitary Commander 
(Ming) Regional M ilitary Commissioner 
(Ming) Regional M ilitary Commission 
Commandant, Commander-in-chief 
Assistant Commissioner-in-chief 
Executive Assistant 
Supervising Secretary 
Military Commissioner 
province (Hucker: precture)
Vice Director 
Imperial son in law 
Selection Margrave 
Proofreader
Regional M ilitary Commander (Hucker: Regional Commander) 
Judge in a M ilitary Guard 
Imperial Guard 
lÜHnß Ministry of Rites
tij p
IS M #
Iff1/ 3
mmmm
mm
i f
mM
ifM
3^ :
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Qing ming shang he tu (part '/§9 ^ ± M i)
Taipei: National Palace Museum; this picture shows 3 ships on the river in the Song period.
Liang Zhi gong tu 502-557 H i ,  this picture shows Persian ambassador visited China ) 
Beijing: Chinese History Museum.
(left) The official ships on Qing ming shang he tu.
(right) Quanzhou: Museum of Quanzhou Overseas-relations History
A steles display of Arabic and Persian denizens who lived in Quanzhou in the Song and Yuan 
China.This proves from Persia to China by sea route was not very difficult.
1 9
Mausoleum of Emperor Hongwu, Nanjing, Ming Xiaoling (1398) 
(Left) A chubby horse, (Right) A chubby camel.
The Forbidden City was built by Emperor Yongle in 1419.
Mausoleum of Emperor Yongle, Beijing, Changling, 1424
Statue on Mausoleum of Emperor Yongle in Beijing, wearing army uniform
The Ming Dynasty Great Wall (Beijing)
Yoshimitsu 1358-1408) Ashikaga Shogun: He was friendly with Ming China.
(Right) Kinkaku-ji Temple was built by him in 1394.
Manuel II Palaeologus and his father John V Palaeologus, Saint Sophia, the Church was 
built in 530
2 2
The Ottoman Empire (1299-1908)
(Left) Beyazid I, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, he was defeated by Timur in 1402.
(Right) This fresco from the Moldovita monastery in Romania, depicts the Ottoman siege of 
Constantinople in 1453.
Korean Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910)
Great King, Sejong ( t^ ^ E E ,  1397-1450, r. 1418-1445), a famous king in Korean history,
the Hangul alphabet was invented by him in 1443. He was friendly with Emperor Yongle.
(Right) Gyeongbok Palace was built began in 1394.
The 1417 Quanzhou s t e l e
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iSU-fÜÄff: Hormuz: Timur Empire (1370-1506 , Is lam )
[HI1 ' fnJfcli: C a l i c u t ,  C ochin : V ijay an a g a r Empire ( 1336-1565, H induism ) 
H \® : Jav a : M ajapah it Empire (1293-1500 , H induism ) 
z i ü :  Siam: Kingdom o f  A yutthaya (1350-1767 , Buddhism)
fäHBll lPÜ: S r i  Lanka: Gampola Era ( 1 3 4 1 - 1 4 1 5 ,  B u d d h i s m - m a i n ,  H in d u i s m -  
s u h )
S SÄ J II :  M elaka:  Kingdom o f  Melaka  ( 1 4 0 2 - 1 5 1 1 ,  1 4 1 4 ,  from H in d u i s m  
c o n v e r t e d  t o  I s l a m )
Tran Hung Dao (ßjlflxlt 12287-1300, left)
He commanded troops resisted the Mongol Empire Kublai Khan’s invasion successfully, and 
became a national hero. His name was recorded in the Yuan shi.
Later Le Dynasty (1428-1788)
Le Loi, (H^IJ 1384-1443, r.1428-1443 right) King of Vietnam, he leaded an outstanding guerilla 
war against the Ming Emperor Yongle’s troops and founded a new dynasty in Vietnam, 
(imaging picture from Vietnam) .
Champa (192-1697)
The Thap Poshaknu Cham Towers near Mui Ne and over-looking the city of Phan Thiet, 
South-Central Viet Nam. It was a Hinduism country.
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Tha Khmer Empire (802-1462) Angkor Wat
2 6
Kingdom of Ayutthaya (1350-1767) Ruins of Ayutthaya, Thailand.
2 7
Kingdom of Melaka Parameswara (1400-1511) , Founder of Melaka.
He was originally a Hinduism ruler, In 1411, Parameswara traveled to China with an entourage 
of 540 by Zheng He’s fleet and met the Ming Emperor Yongle.
The Majapahit Empire (1293-1500).
(Right) This is Prambanan Hinduism temple in Central Java.
2 8
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Sri Lanka Gampoia Era ( Ceyion, 1341-1415)
Among Gampoia Era 1341 -1415, the most famous temple was Lankathilaka.
Vijayanagar Empire (1336-1565 AD)
Temple at Hampi, Hampi was the capital of the Vijayanagar Empire, Zheng He visited Calicut 
and Cochin that was to visit the Vijayanagar Empire, a great Hinduism Empire in south India.
2 9
Vijayanagar Empire’s elephant stable.
The Timur Empire (1370-1506)
Hormuz was the chief destination for Zheng He’s voyage, Zheng He visited Hormuz was to 
visit the Timur Empire.
(Right) The Timur Empire succeeded the west part of the Mongol Empire. (Dark area is the 
territory of the Timur Empire)
3 0
Mausoleum of Timur in Samarkand, completed in 1404 (before Timur died), he was buried in a 
beautiful jade-covered vault. This is one of the finest examples of Islamic art from this period.
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The Mosque of Gauhar Shad, Mashhad, it was built by Timur’s son, Shah Rukh, in 1419.
Ulugh Beg (1394-1449), Shah Rukh’s son, Timur’s grandson, the fourth ruler of the Timur 
Empire, and was a scientist. His embassy visited Beijing in 1420 and was welcomed by 
Emperor Yongle.
Moghul Empire (1526-1857)
The name Moghul is a variation of the word Mongol, it was the last Mongol empire, 
(left) Babur, first Moghul Emperor of India.
(Left) Genghis Khan, Babur’s ancestor, this picture was painted in Indian Moghul Empire 
(Right) Taj Mahal is the most beautiful building of Moghul Empire.
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The Map of Fra Mauro 1459
•f> tfim fx} t i w m t r t h . <x w m  w> . k s .a * * .  .*<* r s* . .
The Grand Ming Universal Map 1389 (3.86m * 4.75m)
The Kangnido Map 1402
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Fleet and Wall
Ming China’s Strategic Options 1392-1449
Admiral Zheng He wearing formal official dress of Ming China (1371-1435, imaging picture),
3
